1. Excessive concentration of power: too much personal power and excessive concentration of decision-making power in the government and enterprises will violate the implementation of the democratic system. Excessive concentration of power will lead to the imbalance of power balance between citizens and government officials. There is no power to restrain civil servants from accepting bribes and abusing their powers, which will aggravate the rent-seeking behavior of power.
2. Defects of supervision system: the serious lack of basic management system provides a good soil for the intensification of power rent-seeking behavior. Internal supervision is not in place or out of touch, and a good interlocking restriction pattern cannot be formed.
3. The influence of feudal customs left by China: China people have special customs and their own ways of doing things. And this kind of culture is easy to encourage the growth of rent-seeking behavior. China emphasized the doctrine of the mean and self-discipline, and lacked the consciousness of establishing a normative system.
4. Lack of good faith culture: agents should have legal awareness and fulfill their obligations. However, in the market environment before China, the lack of honesty culture seriously hindered the normal competition in the market and provided opportunities for rent-seeking behavior. The lack of sense of justice and responsibility of agents and themselves shows the tendency of opportunism and chasing short-term profits, which aggravates the problem of power rent-seeking behavior.
Second, the preventive measures of power rent-seeking behavior
1. Strengthen the supervision mechanism and curb the rent-seeking behavior of power.
The supervision mechanism has always been the weak link in the market. The lack of supervision mechanism can only show that the market transparency is not high. A good supervision mechanism not only ensures the implementation and enforcement of systems and regulations, the correct use of various standards, but also ensures the transparency and fairness of market operation.
2. Transform the functions of local governments and curb the rent-seeking behavior of power.
Scientifically, rationally and accurately divide the scope and boundaries of government economic functions, and set basic means and methods for local governments to perform their functions. As far as possible, standardize the procedures of official behavior and restraint behavior, and pay attention to standardizing the exercise forms and procedures of local government officials. At the same time, assist public officials as strictly as possible. Therefore, rent-seekers can't get considerable benefits from rent-seeking behavior, and rent-seekers will choose to give up rent-seeking. Under the perfect market economy system, some procedures can be automatically regulated by the market, and the effective way to decentralize officials' power and weaken rent-seeking is to optimize the government's economic management mode, narrow its control scope and reduce the opportunities for government officials and party and government cadres to rent-seeking.
3. Increase the rent-seeking punishment mechanism and curb the rent-seeking behavior of power.
There are serious defects in the punishment mechanism, which will lead many local governments and rent-seekers to continue rent-seeking unscrupulously. Therefore, only by increasing the punishment for rent-seekers, will it bring enough deterrence to those with rent-seeking tendencies and effectively curb the rent-seeking behavior of local government agencies. When establishing the supervision mechanism, we should pay attention to the two-way mode of prior supervision and post supervision. The main measures of prior supervision are: improving the transparency of public power operation, clearly implementing the hearing system and promoting democratic decision-making. Give play to the relevant supervisory roles of legislation, justice, administration and media. Post supervision's main measures are: severely punish corruption and bribery according to law, and reduce the punishment for bribers.
4. Improve the verification efficiency of power rent-seeking behavior and curb power rent-seeking behavior.
Relevant government departments should strengthen verification when dealing with illegal cases of rent-seeking behavior, and should not tolerate rent-seeking behavior. Finally, let the rent-seekers get the punishment they deserve.
5. Strengthen the ideological education of honesty for government workers and enterprises, and fundamentally curb the occurrence of rent-seeking behavior of power.
Thought determines behavior. At ordinary times, we should pay attention to the ideological changes of government workers, educate them in good faith, cultivate their moral cultivation and ethical knowledge, and fundamentally curb the occurrence of power rent-seeking behavior. Anti-corruption activities can be carried out in peacetime, and positive and negative cases can be publicized to set an example for officials and inspire them to learn. In terms of enterprises, we should also have a sense of honesty and pay attention to fair competition, and we should not use bribery to achieve personal goals and undermine social systems and strict laws. Only in this way can we play the role of moral restraint.
6. Deal with the problem of property right distribution according to Coase theory, and curb the rent-seeking behavior of power.
Looking at rent-seeking behavior from the cost level, rent-seeking is a kind of surplus value created by the owner of production factors when his income exceeds the opportunity cost of production factors. Looking at rent-seeking behavior from the perspective of property rights, power rent-seeking behavior is a way to redistribute existing property rights, which can be handled through the normal market or distributed by the government. If the government plays the role of a just social manager through institutional or legal channels, then there is no rent-seeking behavior. On the contrary, it is rent-seeking behavior, which will increase transaction costs. Therefore, in order to curb the rent-seeking behavior of power, we should apply Coase theorem and focus on the clear protection of property rights. When the transaction cost is not zero, the allocation of resources should not only pay attention to the primary distribution of legal rights, but also pay attention to the secondary distribution of power centered on property rights.
The frequent rent-seeking behavior in China can not be ignored, which is not conducive to the normal and healthy development of the economy. Preventing rent-seeking behavior is conducive to the orderly development of social and economic activities. The main reasons for the rent-seeking behavior of corporate governance mechanism are imperfect implementation and institutional defects. Therefore, only by establishing a perfect preventive mechanism can we overcome the rent-seeking behavior and fundamentally solve the rent-seeking problem in its governance. China is in an important period of development, and the occurrence of power rent-seeking behavior is obviously harmful to social development and economic development. In order to curb the occurrence of power rent-seeking, it is necessary to strengthen the supervision mechanism, change the functions of local governments, increase the punishment mechanism for rent-seeking, improve the verification efficiency of power rent-seeking behavior, and deal with the issue of property rights distribution according to Coase theory. At the same time, it is necessary to strengthen the ideological education of government officials, cultivate their awareness of moral self-discipline, and fundamentally curb the occurrence of power rent-seeking behavior.