The situation in Greece is different. It is not in danger of extinction like the Turks. The purpose of the war is only to seize part of the territory of Asia Minor. Therefore, it is impossible to get the people's conscious and long-term support for this war. The Greek government can only rely on a regular army. As a small country, Greece has very limited human and material resources, so it is appropriate to adopt the strategic policy of quick decision when using troops overseas. At the same time, its military action must also get political, military and especially economic support from western powers. As the war continued, these necessary conditions were lost, and the Greeks gradually changed from initiative to passivity. 1922, the government had to issue treasury bonds to maintain the wartime economy, which led to soaring prices and complaints from the people. When Turkey launched a strategic counterattack, the army, the last capital of the Greek government, also began to rebel. At present, soldiers no longer obey orders, and many positions are easily abandoned in chaos. In addition, defenders in many places rushed to the seaside without seeing the shadow of the Turkish army, which led to the failure to meet the troops retreating from the front line, and the whole division was captured by the Turkish army. This situation is in sharp contrast with the indomitable spirit of the Turks in the Battle of Sakarya in 192 1 year. Turkey established the unified leadership of the national bourgeoisie headed by Kemal to the war of independence.
During the Ottoman Empire, Turkey constantly improved itself to adapt to the changing international situation in modern history. These improvements made Turkey's social foundation more advanced than other semi-colonial countries, thus creating a group of commercial bourgeoisie, many of whom received modern western military culture education in German-style military academies. As the backbone of the bourgeoisie, Turkey, an officer class with strong national democratic thoughts, has a deep understanding of the Sudanese system and the aggressive nature of imperialism. Many guerrilla organizations in the early days of the war of independence were initiated by them, and the troops and teachers who directly controlled the remnants of the Turkish army were the main supporters of the Ankara regime. Some senior generals of the Turkish army, such as Esmat, Kassem Kalabai Kiel, Fevzi Cakmak, Refaat Bailai and others, took the lead in the national disaster and were good at commanding. Kemal himself is a leader who combines political and military talents. He has a keen eye and bold action, and has shown strong perseverance and strong creativity in the cause of national rejuvenation in Turkey. Because of his popularity, Kemal monopolized the power, but he was calm, always tried his best to avoid dictatorship to lead the national movement, and showed due respect for the social rule of law and political norms, so the government he led won wide support from all walks of life. In the early days of the Greek-Turkish War, the actions of the Greeks were apparently fully supported by the intervention group of the Allies, but in essence Greece only had close ties with Britain. Britain has benefited the most from the plot to carve up land, but it is still not satisfied. It pulled Greece into the interference group with great wily, and prepared to take Greece as an agent to compete with France and Italy for Turkey. So Greece set foot on the land of the great powers openly with the help of Britain's strong background, while Britain gave Greece full support politically, economically and militarily. Therefore, some people describe the Greek-Turkish war as a British-Turkish war in essence. However, Greece's involvement in Turkish affairs caused Italy's unhappiness from the beginning. In the original secret agreement, Izmir and its surrounding areas were originally divided with the Italians, and the territorial claim put forward by Greece at the Paris Peace Conference of 19 19 even included the Dodecani Islands occupied by Italy as early as 19 12. However, Winnie Cerro tried her best to win over the Italians at the meeting. He first allowed Italy to compete for territory in other regions, then gave up its claim to the Dodd-kanis Islands, and proposed that the League of Nations entrust the Armenian State to Italy. Finally, Greece and Italy reached an understanding, and the Greek interests in Anatolia were reluctantly recognized by Italy. At the end of 1920, a bloodless coup took place in Greece, which seriously affected Greece's international status. Constantine, the Greek king who won the general election, was a famous pro-German faction during the war and also the leader of various Greek monarchies. Such an identity is naturally unpopular with the Allies. Some countries say Constantine has no right to inherit the Greek throne. However, Constantine ignored these, did not cherish the international environment established by Prime Minister Yiqi Yao Theros after he ascended the throne, and relied on the support of the British to abandon France and Italy and flagrantly expand the scale of the war. This not only cast a shadow over the relationship between Greece and Italy, but also aroused the anger of the French. France is the country with the largest investment in Turkey among all imperialist countries, accounting for 63% of Ottoman debt, exceeding 2 billion gold francs. After the war, France was very concerned about the repayment of this huge national debt. Many French politicians pointed out that the partition plan drawn up by the British and the military measures taken against Kemal Party will make the French lose a lot of debt income. A reporter pointed out bluntly: "To return Izmir to the Greeks is to steal from France." It was only because the occupation of Izmir was the condition for Greece to participate in the world war, and the Greeks acted cautiously at the beginning of the Greek-Turkish war, which did little harm to France's interests, that France forbeared. However, after Constantine came to power, the war intensified. Before Sakarya War, Greece had already sent 200,000 more troops to Turkey, and it was likely to annex Asia in one fell swoop. This means that France's interests in Ottoman debt will be shattered. In addition, France's military operations in southern Turkey are not progressing smoothly, and Britain and France are at loggerheads over the Rhine River in Europe, so France intends to make peace with Ankara. However, the loss of two "allies" on the battlefield was helpless to Greece, and after the Sakarya War, Britain, as the backstage boss, suspended its aid to Greece, which was undoubtedly the most fatal blow to Greek diplomacy.
While Greece is increasingly isolated from the international community, Ankara government has gained more and more international support with its active and flexible foreign policy. It was the United States that first gave the Turks moral support. After the war, although the United States put forward Wilson's "14-point proposal" for its own benefit, the proposal on respecting the right of Turkish self-determination was supported by Turks. The United States gave up its support for the Armenians and refused to sign the Treaty of Sevres, which won favorable comments in Turkey, so Turkey has always maintained friendly relations with the United States. Tsarist Russia was once an old enemy of Turkey. However, after the October Revolution, the Soviet regime established by Russia was besieged by the allied forces, which made the Turkish and Russian governments, which were also hit, have a common language. The Soviet government attaches great importance to the national liberation movement in Anatolia, because the armed struggle in Turkey can alleviate the military pressure of the allied forces on southern Russia. 1917165438+10. In October, Soviet Russia announced the abolition of the secret treaty between Russia and its allies on the partition of Turkey during the czar and the interim government. During the period of 1920, the Soviet Union and Turkey exchanged envoys, and on March 192 1 year 16. The signing of Moscow Treaty made Ankara regime recognized by big powers for the first time, which played an important role in improving the international status of Ankara regime. More importantly, the Soviet Union and Russia promised to give Turkey money and weapons assistance. At the same time, the government of the Grand National Assembly has also established friendly relations with neighboring Afghanistan, which has won Ankara wider support from the Muslim world. In the eyes of many Muslims, the armies of Britain, Greece, France and Italy are all pagan troops, and Turkey's war to defend its sovereignty is also a war to defend Islam. Muslim donations from India, Egypt and North Africa continue to be remitted to Anatolia. Arab leaders who repeatedly caused riots behind Turkey during World War II also set aside their differences and vowed to sympathize with the cause of the new Turkey. After the Battle of Sakarya, Ankara signed the Kars Treaty with the Caucasian government composed of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia through the introduction of Soviet Russia. As early as May 1920, the government of the Grand National Assembly began to disintegrate the interference alliance. Because the French are skeptical about the strength of the Turkish national armed forces, the negotiations are intermittent, and the two sides are in an intermittent fighting state on the battlefield. It was not until the Turks won a decisive victory in Sakarya that the two sides quickly signed the influential Ankara Treaty. Because of Izmir, Italy adopted a neutral attitude in the Greek-Turkish war. After the second Battle of Enonu, the Italians realized the strong will of the Turks to strive for independence and freedom, so they began to withdraw their troops before France. Before the 1922 counterattack, the Ankara government had completely mastered the diplomatic initiative, the negotiation skills had matured, and the diplomatic struggle was closely integrated with the military struggle. These practices provided the necessary conditions for Turkey to win at the negotiating table of Lausanne Conference. There are many reasons for the surprising results of the Greek-Turkish war in just three years.
In the past three years, Turkey has always regarded armed resistance to foreign invasion and striving for national freedom, territorial integrity and national independence as its ultimate strategic goal. At the beginning of the war, Turks made some dangerous mistakes in operational command. For example, in several encounters with the Greeks, the Turkish army has always ignored the defense of the south front road, and Afyon City is a transportation hub that turns from south road to north road. Without this important town, the troops on the North Road would be in danger of being outflanked by the Greek army. Especially before the Battle of Enonu in 1, the government of the Grand National Assembly did not hesitate to deploy a large number of frontline troops to Kutahaya in order to incorporate garde nationale in Izem, but Houssack actually left only the troops of 1 battalion and hostile bases, which was really a risky move. Before the Battle of Elki Hill-Kutahaya, although the defense of South Road was strengthened, due to misjudgment, the main force of the Turkish army was still concentrated on the front line of North Road. It is puzzling that the Turks deployed a large number of troops in remote areas such as Kayiwi and Mendres under the condition of very tight troops, which made the defenders on the Afeiyong front even more isolated. Therefore, shortly after the start of the campaign, the Greeks quickly opened a breakthrough here, completed a detour to the north in ten days, and seized all strategic locations along the railway. The Turkish army on the western front was almost completely annihilated. With the enrichment of war practice, the Turkish army has gradually matured in combat command. In defensive warfare, they always make the best use of favorable terrain to contain the enemy's military superiority, and at the same time give full play to the powerful advantages of their cavalry to carry out quick and effective assault on the enemy, so they can often turn the crisis around in a passive situation. The Turkish army rarely rigidly implements the original operational plan, and its military operations are often adjusted according to the specific situation on the battlefield. For example, at the beginning of the Battle of Sakarya, the Turkish army saw through the Greeks' operational intentions, quickly contracted the left wing and deployed troops to strengthen the defense on the south side. At the end of the campaign, Turkey's right-wing counterattack was originally a tentative assault, but the Turks were able to seize the fighter plane in time and develop this partial counterattack into a victory of the whole campaign. In the great counter-offensive, the Turkish army took this active, brave, mobile and flexible way of fighting to a higher level. First of all, they annihilated the Greek army with the strength of one division through long-distance circuitous and large-scale circuitous, and then, in the constant pursuit, they beat the retreating enemy to pieces with bold interpenetration and division, making it impossible for them to organize effective resistance. This has played a decisive role in the rapid realization of the strategic objectives of the Turkish army. The Greek army also made serious mistakes in campaign command. The first is Enonu 1 offensive warfare. The commander-in-chief of the Greek army rushed out just because the Turkish side had the opportunity, so that the March was extremely blind. The south, where the Turkish army had the weakest defense, was not attacked at all, while the Greek army in Beilu, in the case of absolute superiority, turned around and retreated after being frustrated in World War I, and lost the excellent opportunity to destroy its opponents in vain. In the second battle of Enunu, although the Greek army succeeded in the containment attack launched by the South Road, the rear of the Turkish army was not threatened because of its unfavorable cooperation. On the other hand, the Greek army on the North Road made the same mistake and was lured into the Enu Valley again, where it was hit head-on. It should be said that the last two campaign plans of the Greek army are correct, and the main problem lies in the operational command. The battle of Cecil-Kutahaya in Erski has established the strategic policy of north-south joint attack, with clear objectives, outstanding key points and close and reasonable tactical cooperation. Sakarya's campaign plan is also aimed at the weakness of the Turkish army's insufficient strength, adopting the plan of lengthening the front and implementing key breakthroughs. However, the Greek army is conservative and rigid, and lacks initiative and flexibility in combat, which makes the better operational plan not be fully exerted. After the victory of the Battle of Mount Erski-Kutahaya, the Greeks did not seize the fighter plane to pursue and destroy the enemy, so as to expand the results. Instead, it stopped to prepare the next plan, which led to the safe retreat of the troops on the western front to Hedong, Sakarya, and did not suffer heavy losses, leaving serious future trouble for the Greeks' next attack. In the Battle of Sakarya, the advantage of the Greek army on the battlefield was gradually lost because of the Turkish tactical adjustment on defense, but Constantine and others insisted on the original battle plan. As a result, the Greek army could not make a decisive breakthrough at any point of the Turkish army's defense, while the Turks gradually grasped the initiative in the battlefield between stalemate. However, after the Battle of Sakarya, the Greek army decided to defend the Hill-Kutahaya defense line in erskine, which was much more serious than any previous strategic mistake. Because the Greek army still has a certain fighting capacity, but Sakarya's rout made the Greek army lose its last chance of victory. The only way out for the Greeks is to retreat as soon as possible. If not all, they should retreat to Izmir or bursa. However, due to the personal interests of those in power, Greece's withdrawal was delayed again and again, which led to the fiasco of 1922 in August and September.