With the reform, state-owned enterprises have achieved great success, but at the same time, the defects of encouraging and restraining the top managers of state-owned enterprises have also emerged. Below, I have prepared questions and countermeasures for you about the incentive and restraint of the top management of state-owned enterprises. Welcome to reading.
1. The present situation of the incentive and restraint mechanism for senior managers of state-owned enterprises has emerged with the shareholding system reform of state-owned enterprises, and our government has also begun to devote itself to the establishment and improvement of the manager market in the process of economic transformation in order to better serve the reform of state-owned enterprises. However, due to the special national conditions in China, the manager market in China, especially in state-owned enterprises, is still regulated to some extent. According to their corporate governance structure, state-owned enterprises can be divided into two categories, one is standardized corporate governance structure enterprises (hereinafter referred to as standardized state-owned enterprises) and the other is non-standardized corporate governance structure enterprises (hereinafter referred to as non-standardized state-owned enterprises).
1. 1 standardize the incentive and restraint status of senior managers of state-owned enterprises.
Standardized state-owned enterprises are mainly guided by market efficiency and mainly exist in the form of corporate system with diversified equity. They are truly modern enterprises. Although many of these enterprises may remain state-owned for a long time, in essence, these enterprises will no longer be? Pure? State-owned enterprises are legal person enterprises in the form of mixed ownership enterprises.
Its incentive and restraint mechanism is divided into material incentive and spiritual incentive. Material incentives include salary, annual salary, bonus, stock options, management buyout (MBO), etc., and material incentives are the main ones. Spiritual encouragement is to grant management control in management. Through the board of directors and the board of supervisors to supervise and restrain the exercise of their control rights, full market competition ensures that the professional reputation of top managers has an incentive and restraint effect on their behavior, while the degree of competition among manager market, product market and capital market determines their incentive and restraint effect on managers.
1.2 irregular incentive and restraint of senior managers in state-owned enterprises
Non-standard state-owned enterprises are special enterprise forms that mainly undertake national policy objectives and mainly exist in the form of state-owned sole proprietorship. The number of such enterprises is very small, including only a few large and super-large state-owned backbone enterprises and state-owned enterprises undertaking special policy objectives. Their senior managers should be quasi-civil servants, and the incentive and restraint mechanism should refer to the standards of civil servants. The government's direct appointment and dismissal mechanism and position promotion mechanism are the key to the incentive and restraint of senior managers, and the effectiveness of enterprises' policy tasks is the performance basis of their position promotion. The government's financial or financial budget constraints and administrative discipline constraints play an important role in supervising and constraining the behavior of senior managers in such enterprises.
2. Problems in the incentive and restraint mechanism for senior managers of state-owned enterprises Under the conditions of socialist market economy, the operating conditions of an enterprise (especially state-owned enterprises) depend to a great extent on the comprehensive quality and ability of operators. Effective incentive mechanism is one of the fundamental driving forces to urge operators to work hard and pursue enterprise development continuously. In fact, the overlapping of formulation, assessment and incentive objects, and the simplification of performance assessment indicators all show that there are still many problems and deficiencies in the incentive assessment mechanism of state-owned enterprise executives in China, and there is still much room for improvement.
2. 1 The evaluation of operators cannot be implemented.
There are some disadvantages in the existing performance appraisal system, which seriously restricts the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism: too many qualitative appraisal standards such as morality, ability, diligence and performance are adopted, while the quantitative standards are ignored, which cannot avoid the interference of the subjective judgment of the appraisal organizers; Paying too much attention to the assessment indicators that reflect the short-term business performance and ignoring the indicators that reflect the long-term business effect cannot avoid the operators' pursuit of short-term business; Pay too much attention to the standardization and integration of assessment, and fail to conduct hierarchical assessment according to different economic categories, industry characteristics and enterprise scale; Too much help from the internal forces of enterprises for assessment, in the case of imperfect system and poor supervision, powerful operators may manipulate the assessment.
2.2 incentive mechanism dislocation, lack of incentives and excessive incentives coexist.
Who are the managers and chairmen bred by the traditional system? Another form of administrative official? Their assessment and incentives are mainly based on the same standards of party and government cadres, advocating official-based incentives, ignoring the material incentives for senior managers, and not widening the distance between managers and ordinary employees, as well as the local average income level of enterprises. In fact, they have formed a one-size-fits-all approach and did not really reflect the principle of linking the contribution, responsibility, risk and reward of operators. This not only inhibits their creativity and enthusiasm for innovation and adventure, but also leads some business operators to obtain it through illegal means? Deserved reward? And the so-called? 59? Phenomenon. Enterprises adopt flexible means, such as issuing shopping vouchers, providing various subsidies, reimbursing related personal expenses and on-the-job consumption. To get the so-called? Gray income? .
2.3 Lack of supervision motivation and constraints.
Generally speaking, the ownership structure of a company shows the degree of power control of shareholders over the company's operators. In developed market economy countries, because property rights are always implemented to one or more? Natural person? Boss, this can better solve the problem of investors in place. From China's point of view, the major shareholder is often the government. Due to the absence of the subject of state-owned property rights and the unclear principal-agent responsibility, the motivation of state-owned stock representatives as representatives of major shareholders is weakened and they lack sufficient enthusiasm for supervision. And sometimes it will become a way for the government to intervene in enterprises. At the same time, under the premise that China's capital market is not yet mature and perfect, the highly centralized ownership structure affects the motivation and way of small and medium shareholders to supervise the company.
2.4 Lack of social security and institutionalized pay
At present, the incentive for managers of state-owned enterprises is basically only when they are on the job, and there is no reward after they leave according to their performance. Due to the lack of social security and institutionalized remuneration for business operators after leaving their jobs, individual operators have made despicable acts of converting state-owned assets into personal property in order to seek life security after leaving their jobs.
3. Establish and improve the coping strategies of the incentive and restraint mechanism of state-owned enterprises 3. 1 Establish a scientific and reasonable assessment system and improve the restraint mechanism.
While solving the lack of mechanism, we should pay attention to solving the problem of insufficient constraints. The first is to establish a set of scientific and reasonable assessment indicators. This set of indicators should not only truly reflect the short-term business performance, but also reflect the long-term development of enterprises. In short, it should be able to scientifically measure the operating performance of operators.
Secondly, it is necessary to clarify the evaluation subject. The first problem to be solved in strict assessment is who will conduct the assessment, that is, the subject of the assessment must be clear. At present, to a large extent, it is the enterprise managers who evaluate themselves, which makes it difficult to ensure the authenticity of their performance and meet the requirements of maintaining and increasing the value of state-owned assets. The state-owned assets management department should undertake the evaluation of state-owned assets authorized enterprises, that is, the interface layer; Enterprises below the interface level are evaluated by authorized business units of state-owned assets. In the assessment, we can also use the power of social intermediary agencies, audit departments and expatriate supervisory committees.
3.2 Cancel the administrative appointment of senior managers and strengthen their ideological construction.
It is one of the contents of modern enterprise system to cancel the administrative appointment of senior managers. At present, many business operators are not appointed by the board of directors in accordance with the provisions of the company law, but directly appointed by the competent government departments. The appointment of managers by the government is not mainly based on their management ability, which is often influenced by many non-human resource management factors, especially some managers can still serve as officials in different places after failure. This management mode is obviously not conducive to the establishment of an effective incentive and restraint mechanism for operators.
Whether it is an incentive or a constraint for managers of state-owned enterprises, it is an external influence on managers. To fundamentally solve the problem, we must work hard on ideological and moral construction. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the ideological construction of top managers. Conduct regular ideological and moral education for operators, improve their ideological and moral consciousness, make them consciously safeguard national interests, and organically combine the pursuit of personal interests with the maximization of national interests. Only in this way can the problem be fundamentally solved.
3.3 Have a good external environment and a perfect supporting system.
Establishing and perfecting the incentive and restraint mechanism is not a simple independent work, but a complex systematic project including politics, economy, morality and humanities. Therefore, it is very important to create a good external environment and build a perfect support system.
At present, the overall quality of the top management team of state-owned enterprises in China is not high, and it is far from enough to make a fuss about the incentive and restraint mechanism. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the education and training of existing operators in various forms and comprehensively improve the management quality of existing operators. Similarly, efforts should be made to create conditions for operators and create a healthy social environment, especially to form a good atmosphere in which the whole society understands and respects operators.
If the incentive and restraint mechanism of state-owned enterprises is to be practical, it is necessary to improve the supporting system construction of the incentive and restraint mechanism, formulate the combat readiness management plan, improve the financial management technology and system, establish the talent selection system, strengthen the cultural construction, and establish the evaluation system of the incentive and restraint mechanism of enterprises, so that enterprise managers can observe the effect and direction of the implementation of the incentive mechanism outside the enterprise and form corresponding improvement measures and methods.
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