On the way to the Long March, the Red Army was constantly besieged and intercepted by the enemy, but it was not ambushed once. We can accurately find the gap in the encirclement set by the Kuomintang army, mainly relying on radio reconnaissance to grasp accurate information in time. At that time, the Red Army Radio had a basic requirement: "Everyone has a password, and everyone has a password." In case of crisis, call the radio first and destroy the code.

Security personnel will destroy all secrets until they die. In the vanguard of the Red Army's Long March, a group of scouts made great contributions by scratching their tongues and dressing up to explore the road. However, this kind of reconnaissance generally has only tactical value, and it is difficult to know the plan and overall deployment of the enemy's top management.

The most prominent feature of the Red Army's reconnaissance work is the uninterrupted reconnaissance of the passwords of the Kuomintang during the Long March. From 65438 to 0929, Zhou Enlai secretly set up a training course for radio personnel in Shanghai, and entrusted the Soviet Union to help train a group of radio personnel. They broke into the Kuomintang high-level and secret service organs and obtained some cipher books from the enemy's core departments, which not only translated a lot of important information, but also mastered its coding rules.

In 1930s, telecom personnel trained by the central authorities in the Soviet Union and China were assigned to the main Red Army. They combined the technology they learned with the enemy's situation and studied hard in practice, and finally mastered the unique method of deciphering the enemy's secret code. From 193 1 the second counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression", the Red Army began to intercept and decipher the code of the Kuomintang army, which made Mao Zedong, Zhu De and other leaders take the lead.

Since the Long March, the armies of the enemy and ourselves have been moving. Because there was no wired telephone network in China at that time, Chiang Kai-shek's orders to Kuomintang troops and divisions were mainly sent by wireless telegraph. At this moment, the Red Army's password decoding activity has reached a climax, most of the enemy's messages can be intercepted, and the decoding success rate is almost 100%.

In addition, our team can maintain the relay cooperation thousands of miles away, which is also our outstanding point. Half a year after the Central Red Army (the first army) started the Long March, large troops marched during the day, so radio personnel had to put away their machines and follow suit, and could not work on the road. At this time, the radio station of the Red Fourth Army is still in a fixed position in the Sichuan-Shaanxi Soviet Area, so it is responsible for intercepting and deciphering the signals of the enemy stations during the day. After dark, the first army radio station arrived at the camp, and the fourth army radio station immediately sent the intercepted content to the first army.

Then, on the one hand, the army radio station works at night and intercepts the telegraph communication of the Kuomintang army at night. The first and fourth armies still maintained relay cooperation thousands of miles apart, ensuring that all enemy telegrams were intercepted almost uninterrupted and without omission during the Long March.

Later, the Red Fourth Front Army marched north from western Sichuan, and the radio station stopped marching during the day. It was the radio station of the first army that intercepted and deciphered the enemy's password, and then notified the radio station of the fourth army. During the Long March of the Central Red Army, the Red Sixth Army had a radio station, which was kept in touch with and shared information with the radio stations of the First and Fourth Army.

The Red 25 Army, which is active in the north of the Yangtze River, has no radio station. Before the central authorities arrived in northern Shaanxi, they had to rely on the traffic police to contact the central authorities. It takes several months to go at a time, so information communication is very difficult. After Mao Zedong arrived in northern Shaanxi, he saw Xu Haidong, the head of the Red Fifteen Army, who was co-edited by the Red Army in northern Shaanxi, and immediately assigned him a radio station, which enabled the main team of the Red Army to have a radio station, thus ensuring telecommunication contact and reconnaissance of the enemy.

During the Long March of the Red Army and even the whole revolutionary war in China, the * * * production party was able to grasp the inside story of the Kuomintang in detail, but the Kuomintang was basically helpless about the actions of the * * * production party. Mao Zedong praised Ceng Xisheng, who served as the director of the Second Bureau of the Central Military Commission during the Long March, and said that Comrade Ceng Xisheng was a "glass". When we fought against Chiang Kai-shek, it was like betting on glass. We were accurate and won. On the issue of telecom secrecy, it fully reflects the inefficiency of the Kuomintang authorities.

193 1 April, Gu, who was in charge of security work in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, was arrested and defected. Xu Enceng, the head of the Kuomintang spy, knew that his secretary Qian Zhuangfei was a producer of the Chinese Communist Party, and he cracked the code on him.

Xu Enceng was afraid that Chiang Kai-shek would hold him accountable for the oversight of employing people, and colluded with his colleagues for many years. The secret cables concealed by * * * have been deciphered. Chiang Kai-shek didn't know the truth of his failure in the mainland until 1975.