First, the existing reflection on the research paradigm of rural family and social relations in China
Since the reform and opening up, with the decline of omnipotent politics, the relationship between the state and society has gradually become an analytical term widely used in domestic academic circles (note: this category was first introduced into academic circles through the discussion of civil society. In the early 1990s, a series of special articles in China Social Sciences Quarterly (Hongkong) started this academic discourse in mainland academic circles. Theoretically speaking, civil society is a specific type of relationship between state and society, and whether it is suitable for analyzing China society is controversial. Moreover, some scholars have raised the corresponding question whether the dichotomy between state and society is suitable for China. Scholars have given different answers to this. However, with the introduction and influence of liberal works in China, the analytical category of the relationship between the state and society is more and more widely accepted. Yang Nianqun: Research on Modern Civil Society in China-Methods and Limitations, 2 1 Century, (Hongkong) 1995No. 12. Huang Zongzhi's "The Third Field between State and Society" is included in the book Socialism: Reflection in the Post-Cold War Era edited by Gan Yang and Habermas. Oxford university press 1995 edition; Liang Zhiping: Customary Law in Qing Dynasty: Society and State (Introduction), China University of Political Science and Law Press,1996; Huang Zongzhi, editor-in-chief: A Probe into the Research Paradigm of China, Social Science Literature Publishing House, 2003. )。 In the study of rural politics (especially villagers' autonomy), both theoretical articles and empirical research have almost become a dominant research paradigm.
When analyzing rural politics with the paradigm of the relationship between state and society, the so-called "state" refers more to the township government as a state agent. In the eyes of ordinary farmers, the state is associated with "officials", and the "officials" they come into contact with in daily life are township cadres. And "society" refers to villages and villagers, which is conceptually different from the state. Therefore, the relationship between villages and towns is regarded as the relationship between the state and society, and the dictionary type of "village governance by township government" represents this analytical thinking. The so-called "township government" means that the township is a first-level government agency and belongs to the category of the state; "Village governance" refers to the implementation of villagers' autonomy in villages, which is an autonomous organization of the masses and belongs to the category of society. It can be seen that "township government and village governance" observes rural relations from the perspective of organizational nature and legal relationship. The actual relationship between villages is far richer and more complicated than this term. )。 Here, the distinction between the state and society is determined according to the boundaries of government (administrative) organizations. This practice naturally has some truth, especially for a highly politicized society, the establishment of the pattern of "township government and village governance" is of great significance. On the other hand, this distinction only reflects one aspect of complex events, and it is obviously too simplistic to ignore other aspects. The author thinks that there are at least two points worthy of attention: First, the township government has its own specific interests besides playing the role of the agent of the higher government. When this particular interest is not well satisfied or effectively restrained, various hitchhiking and deviant behaviors may occur. Although various forms of land policies are introduced in the name of the government, they may actually completely violate the laws and policies of the central government. In this case, if we want to use the category of the relationship between the state and society to analyze the contradictions between villages and towns, we must be very cautious. Because at this time, the central government, which represents the national interests, often stands with farmers, we can often encounter similar cases in reducing the burden on farmers. This shows that the government does not always act in a holistic manner. On the contrary, it is likely to split into many actors, so be careful when using the "state" hat [1]. Secondly, although the village does not belong to the government series in organizational nature, it has certain administrative functions because of its particularity. The Organic Law of Villagers' Committees of the People's Republic of China also clearly stipulates this. Village cadres also play the role of state agents when performing administrative functions, even if they are not state cadres. In this way, the contradiction between village cadres and villagers can sometimes be analyzed by the category of the relationship between the state and society. This means that from the perspective of methodology, the organizational boundary of villages and towns is not the natural boundary between the state and society [2](p2 13). As Xu Yong said, "Because villages and towns belong to the grass-roots political power of the country in rural areas, the affairs they manage reflect the will of governments at all levels, which are usually called government affairs, that is, the tasks assigned by the government. Villager autonomy is implemented at the village level, and the scope of autonomy mainly involves the interests of villagers in the village, which is usually called village affairs, that is, the affairs of the community itself. Because the village belongs to the township, the government affairs managed by the township must extend to the village. In this way, there are both government affairs and village affairs in the village "[3](p2 12). Therefore, the analytical paradigm of the relationship between state and society should not only stay at the level of organizational structure, but should grasp the meaning of this category from the perspective of interest representation and functional performance.
If our understanding only stays here, it is obviously not enough. When we use the paradigm of the relationship between state and society to analyze the rural relationship in contemporary rural areas of China, another problem that must be solved is how to treat the township government as a "state agent". It is unrealistic to discuss the relationship between the state and society and ignore the role and function of the party organization under the system of party and government. The problem is how to analyze the complex relationship between the party, the state and society from the theoretical level. More specifically, should township party committees be included in the generalized township government (at the macro level, this question is expressed as: can the ruling party become an organic part of the country)? (Note: There are different types of relations between political parties and the state. In this regard, some scholars distinguish: "Generally speaking, there are three ways for the ruling party to lead the political life of the country in history: first, the ruling party is above the government, and the ruling party makes decisions, and the government becomes a tool to directly implement the party's decision-making; Second, the ruling party directly exercises the functions of managing the state and all social affairs without going through the organs of state power, that is, the so-called "party-state" politics; Third, the ruling party exercises leadership over the country's political life through state power, that is, through legislative activities such as constitution-making and constitutional amendment by state representative organs, and through the implementation of laws and regulations by state power organs. " Zhang Zhiming: From the Road of New Democracy to Governing the Country by Law, Jiangxi University Press, 2000. )
On this issue, we need a dialectical research perspective. On the one hand, we should realize the special position of China's * * * production party in China's political system and the corresponding party-government relationship structure. As Hu Weiwei said, "China's * * * production party ... is the center of contemporary China government procedures. In fact, the China Organization has unified the power of state organs with itself. It holds military power and determines the whole process of interest expression, synthesis, decision-making and implementation. No matter in structure or function, it is different from the meaning of general political parties in world political phenomena, and in fact constitutes a kind of social public power, which is equivalent to and beyond the national organization. However, * * * does not completely replace the national organization, but makes the existence of the national organization more conducive to the play of its own functions. This has both the general characteristics of socialist countries and China's own characteristics. " [4](p98)
On the other hand, although there is a close relationship between China's organizations and state machines, they are not the same thing. In a recently published paper, Lin Shangli equated the state with the broad concept of government (including legislative, administrative and judicial parts) from the perspective of function, and thought that "in China, it is inappropriate to bring political parties into the category of the state as a special political force. Political parties are the protagonists of modern politics, but they have not become a part of the political system. Only as the actual operator of the political system-the ruling party, can a political party have actual political power, and this political power can only be realized with the help of the political system, that is, the state. In this case, political parties (ruling parties) can naturally be classified as countries. China * * * Production Party is the leading core of the socialist cause, which is not only the ruling power, but also the leading power. As the ruling power, it is the actual operator of the political system. As a leading force, it can have actual political power without relying on the political system, that is, the state system. Therefore, in China, although there is some overlap between party power and state power, they are still relatively independent. " [5](p 153- 154)
From this, we get two pictures of a coin: on the one hand, China, as the ruling party, occupies the core position of state institutions, and the high-level organizations of political parties actually operate as part of the generalized state machine (therefore, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council often jointly issue articles). "Because ... the party and government are integrated in personnel organization, and the leaders within the system and those outside the system are interrelated in many ways. Under this leadership mode, the relationship between the party and the government has a strong internal unity, with the party as the core of decision-making and the government as the main body of policy implementation. The relationship between the party and the country formed by the party's leadership over the country determines that the country's overall leadership over society is realized on the basis of the party's overall leadership over the country. At the same time, the party's overall leadership over the country provides rich organizational and institutional resources for the country to lead the society, because under the condition of the party's overall leadership over the country, many relations within the government, such as the relationship between the central and local governments and the relationship between the government and social organizations, all have the nature of intra-party organizational relations, which emphasize the relationship between leadership and obedience. " [5](p 167) On the other hand, party organizations in China have their own relative independence. Outside the government system, there are party member and grass-roots party organizations that permeate the whole society. This characteristic of China organization largely determines the limitations of the national and social paradigm. In this regard, Lin Shangli pointed out that "... in the relationship between the state and society, the China * * * production party, as the core of social leadership in China, plays a decisive role. We can classify the party as a political force into the category of the state and analyze the relationship between the state and society, but the problem is that the relationship between the party and society as an organizational force is close. This means that the power relations in China society are very different from those in other countries (including western countries). This difference determines that we can't directly study the China issue with the dichotomy of state and society as in other countries. We must fully consider the important role of the party as a special political force in national life, social life and the relationship between the state and society. " [3](p 152- 153)
This view is of great methodological significance to the study of China's politics. It reminds us that we can't analyze the current political reality in China in isolation from the category of the relationship between the state and society, but we must consider the factors of political parties (Note: The author wrote this sentence as a summary of his own research and reflection. In the article "Villagers' Autonomy from the Perspective of the Relationship between State and Society", I used the term "single structure and dual functions" to describe the relationship between the organizational nature and the functions of village committees. The so-called "single structure" means that the nature of the village Committee is a mass autonomous organization, and the so-called "dual function" means that as an autonomous organization, it must undertake both autonomous functions and administrative functions. This narrative obviously ignores the existence of the most important organization-the village party branch, so it is doomed to be one-sided and unrealistic. Today, it seems that the methodological reason for this cognitive deviation lies in, among other factors, the failure to handle the relationship between the party and the state and the failure to pay attention to the complexity of this issue. Jing Yuejin: Villagers' Autonomy from the Perspective of the Relationship between State and Society —— Reading Professor Xu Yong's Villagers' Autonomy in China, (Hongkong) China Book Review1May 1998 12. )。 Therefore, the triangular relationship among political parties, state and society enriches the dichotomy between state and society.
Second, the interweaving of the relationship between the party and government and the state and society: the practice of the relationship between the two committees
However, in this article, the author tries to explain the relationship between the party, the state and society in another sense-even when investigating the activities of political parties within the state system, we need to treat the role of party organizations in a special way. Let's take the "one-shouldered task" of the two committees in villagers' autonomy as an example to illustrate this point.
Logically speaking, the relationship between the two committees embodies a special type of party-government relationship (Note: Yang Guangbin pointed out that "the leading position of China's * * * production party to the country is reflected in its political leadership, organizational leadership and ideological leadership to all aspects of the country. Party organizations exist in a wide range of political life in the form of leadership, whether it is the central political organ that constitutes the center of political power, or the rural grassroots management institutions, street offices, enterprises and institutions, and mass organizations. In this context, the most fundamental "Party-government relationship" in contemporary China's political relations has been formed, which is the "state" in the "party and state leadership system" that we are used to talking about. Therefore, in China, many political relations and important political phenomena contain the content of "Party-government relations" to some extent. Even those political activities that are not directly related to' party' or' politics' will eventually reflect the content of' party-government relations' to a greater or lesser extent. " Yang Guangbin: Introduction to China Government and Politics, Renmin University of China Press, 2003. ), rural relations reflect the relationship between the state and society and belong to different analytical categories. However, in real life, there is an internal relationship between these two categories and the empirical phenomena they describe. Under the party-state system, party organizations are highly bureaucratic. At every level of government, there are political party institutions that occupy the core position of power. In this way, a structural consequence is that the relationship between the party and the government and the relationship between the party and the society are connected in a special way, that is, the relationship between the state and the society permeates the relationship between the party and the state (government) and the relationship between the party and the society (Note: Strictly speaking, the relationship between the party and the state and the relationship between the party and the government are not the same concept, but in the context of this discussion, ignoring this distinction will not lead to major problems. The author will have a special article to discuss this. )。 In grass-roots politics, this connection is manifested as follows: the role of the Party organization exists not only in the vertical rural relationship-the relationship between township party committees and village party branches, but also in the horizontal relationship between the two committees and the relationship between township party committees and the government. As an intermediary, the party organization links the relationship between the two committees of the village with the state-society relationship in the village.
In the era of omnipotent politics, the distinction between party and government and the distinction between state and society are two sides of the same coin. The implementation of villagers' autonomy is obviously a deconstruction of the commune system, and the boundary between the state and society has changed from vague to clear, but this process is mainly realized through the growth of social factors, and the system of party and government integration has not undergone major fundamental changes. Therefore, the relationship between the party and the government, the relationship between the state and society is still institutional, and there is considerable overlap/interweaving. On the political level of the village, "the village branch is not only the political leader in the village life, that is, to achieve political leadership, but more importantly, to play the role of the state administrative agency and exercise the state administrative power. Because the tasks assigned by superiors, that is,' government affairs', such as family planning, conscription, grain purchase and storage, tax collection, etc., are almost all organized and implemented by village branches. Every year, the first responsible person who signs the target responsibility letter between the township and the village is often the village party secretary. The arrangement or inspection of township cadres going to the countryside is also directly dealing with the secretary of the village party branch. " "In a sense, the essence of the relationship between the two committees is the relationship between state administrative power and villagers' autonomy, the relationship between government affairs and village affairs, and the relationship between the state and farmers. The essence of the conflict between the two committees is the conflict between administrative power and autonomy, the conflict between government affairs and village affairs, and the tense relationship between the state and farmers. " [6]
In fact, when faced with the impact of villagers' autonomy, township governments use this linkage mechanism to make up for the possibility of losing control due to the implementation of villagers' autonomy by (or even strengthening) the leadership relationship with village party branches. "One shoulder to shoulder" just becomes the intermediary of such an institutional arrangement. It has become the connection point and intersection area of different institutional arrangements, so it is destined to become a field of contradictions and conflicts.
We can understand this by describing the behavior of township cadres. In a sense, township cadres look at villagers' autonomy from the perspective of their own interests, and their interests are concentrated in the following three aspects: First, the challenges from personnel arrangements. The traditional way of producing village cadres mainly reflects the wishes of township cadres, so any new change in personnel system means a challenge to the established arrangements. In villages where the relationship between cadres and masses is tense, villagers' autonomy probably means that village cadres who like villages and towns will step down, while villagers' favorite "thorns" will come to power. Second, closely related to personnel issues is the implementation of administrative tasks. Under the pressure system, the most urgent need of villages and towns is obedient and responsible village cadres. Due to the limitation of township scale and management scope, township cadres can't personally carry out daily management of villages and personally complete the administrative tasks of the country. Village cadres are their own legs for township cadres. Moreover, after the implementation of the household contract system, the administrative costs of villages and towns are increasing day by day, and the problems and difficulties encountered are also increasing. In this case, township cadres need the support and cooperation of village cadres. But what will the village cadres elected by the villagers think of the administrative tasks assigned by the villages and towns? Are you obedient? It is largely unknown, which brings a kind of uncertainty to the township administrative work. Third, the interest relationship formed by the Ministry of Rural Affairs between government businessmen and private businessmen, although this interest can not be brought to the table, is a real political variable (Note: at the beginning of the direct election of the village committee, the newly elected village director used public opinion to audit the accounts, which often led to fierce conflicts. In most cases, township cadres are involved in this conflict in different ways and degrees, thus highlighting this interest among rural cadres. With the replacement of township cadres and the change of village team, this interest knot is gradually weakening. As a result, the bargaining or game between rural cadres is becoming more and more utilitarian. )。
Therefore, no matter from which angle, township cadres generally do not really support villagers' autonomy. On the contrary, in more cases, villagers' autonomy is regarded as an external dangerous variable, which subverts and challenges the "rural power structure complex" (note: all township cadres do not like villagers' autonomy. This is of course a very arbitrary statement. In the first few years, I hardly met village cadres who supported villagers' autonomy, but during my two visits at the turn of autumn and winter in 2003, I met several enlightened people. The investigation by He Baogang and Lang Youxing in Zhejiang also found that the attitude of township cadres towards the election of village committees has changed imperceptibly. Nevertheless, as an institutional analysis, as long as the basic structure and macro environment do not change greatly, the basic behavior pattern of township cadres will not change fundamentally. He Baogang and Lang Youxing: Seeking the Balance between Democracy and Authority, Huazhong Normal University Press, 2002. )。 It may lead to the double disintegration of the existing power structure and interest pattern. The former means that villages and towns are out of control over the personnel rights of village cadres, and administrative management is lame because of this out of control; The latter means that the informal relationship network and the interest pattern developed on this network may be impacted.
Based on the above reasons, in the conflict between the two committees, villages and towns are not independent arbitrators, but players who tend to form an alliance with the village party secretary in this game. From this, we can understand why township cadres generally stand on the side of the secretary of the village party branch in the reports of contradictions between the two committees in various places. In this regard, He Zengke analyzed: "After the implementation of direct election of village committees, the role awareness of village Committee cadres, especially village Committee directors, as village heads and villagers' interests protectors has been significantly enhanced, while the role awareness of state agents and profit-making brokers has been significantly weakened. The Party branch committee, especially the Party branch secretary, plays the role of "agent" and "profit broker" of the higher-level government, and the contradiction and conflict of the dual role of village cadres externalizes into the contradiction and conflict of the two village committees, especially the secretary and director. In addition, in the process of dealing with township party committees and governments, when there is a conflict between village committees and villagers' interests, they often stand on the side of safeguarding villagers' interests, implement the tasks assigned by their superiors if they are satisfied, and push them off if they are not satisfied, which makes township leaders feel headache. Under this circumstance, township leaders rely more on the village party branch to complete various tasks, and at the same time stand on the side of the party branch intentionally or unintentionally when there is a dispute between the two committees. " [7](p76)
Analyzing the contradiction between the two committees from the perspective of the interweaving relationship between the party and government and the state and society contains double meanings: on the one hand, under the background of the contradiction between the two committees, how can the village party branch maintain its authority with the support of township cadres; On the other hand, under the background of villagers' autonomy, how do township cadres rely on the village party branch in order to complete administrative tasks and satisfy the impulse of political achievements? Under the action of this dual dynamic mechanism, the practice of shouldering heavy burdens is widely welcomed by township governments-it is conducive to reducing the administrative costs of townships. One-on-one shoulders not only solved the organizational basis of the conflict between the two committees in structure, but also effectively eliminated the challenges and potential threats from villagers' autonomy through the leadership relationship between township party committees and village party branches.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the changes of rural power structure complex before and after the implementation of "one-shoulder-lifting".
Figure 1 rural organizational structure before "one shoulder to shoulder"
Figure 2 Rural organizational structure after "one-shouldered"
The comparison between Figure 1 and Figure 2 shows that the relationship between villages and towns has been simplified, and the guiding relationship between village committees and township party committees and the leadership relationship between village branches stipulated in legal texts can be distinguished in theory, but it is difficult to identify them in practice (Note: Xiang Jiequan found in his rural investigation that the actual situation of rural relations far exceeds the scope of leadership and guidance relations. He pointed out that "the influence of' township government' on' village governance' has both institutionalized organizational channels and non-institutionalized human relations; There are both political and policy support and administrative participation and assistance. Obviously, this cannot be simply classified as' mentoring relationship' or' leadership relationship'. " Xiang Jiequan: Rural Governance under the Background of Collective Economy, Huazhong Normal University Press, 2002. )。 The vague definition of the functions of the two committees in national laws and central documents provides the best barrier for the replacement of this relationship.
In this "rural power structure complex", the village party branch has become a very important adhesive, and its role directly affects the effective operation of this rural complex. In fact, in order to facilitate control, township government meetings are often held in the name of village party branch secretaries' meetings in places where "one-shoulder-lifting" is implemented, so as to dilute the influence of villagers' autonomy from the perspective of technical operation, strengthen the leadership consciousness and leadership relationship of subordinates (within party organizations), and thus implement the will of township governments (note: in villages where one-shoulder-lifting is not realized, township governments also have their own control methods. For example, village affairs are decided by Bao village cadres, the village director implements the overhead method (the township meeting does not inform him), and the village assistant is appointed to grasp the actual power, and the village finance is managed by the township. Similar indigenous laws can be described as varied. )。
To achieve this goal, we must ensure that the secretary of the village party branch is successfully elected as the village director. In many places, the "one-shoulder-lifting" has once again stimulated the motivation of villages and towns to "manage elections". For example, the qualifications of candidates are becoming more and more strict, and the proportion of "one shoulder to shoulder" is issued as an administrative task (note: in many places, "one shoulder to shoulder" is implemented as a hard indicator in village Committee elections. Some places require 70%, and some places even require as much as 90%! A province in the south requires towns and villages to control the nomination right of candidates in the form of government documents. ), emphasizing the strengthening of organization and leadership in the election process, so as to block the vitality and vitality of democratic politics produced by sea elections or direct elections in a bottle again, which is considerable and unreal.
Three. abstract
From the perspective of system design, "one shoulder to shoulder" combines a dual relationship: it not only includes the "administrative" relationship between towns and villages, but also embodies the party organization relationship between township party committees and village branches. The secret that township governments generally welcome the "one-shouldered" institutional arrangement is that under the party and government system, township governments use the leadership relationship of township party organizations to dilute or even replace the guidance and guidance relationship between township governments and village committees. This fact shows that under the background of the existing political system, we must comprehensively consider the relationship between the party, the state and society, and the relationship between the party and the government, the state and society is the specific way to examine this issue.