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A paper on resource tax
Environmental tax has gradually become a hot topic for tax law researchers and environmental law researchers. However, from the existing environmental tax research literature, the research status of environmental tax in China is not optimistic, and the research on environmental tax is superficial, which fails to dig deep into the essence of environmental tax system, that is, effectiveness and legitimacy. The specific questions are as follows.

First, the nature of Pigou tax

Judging from the existing documents that the author has mastered, almost all the environmental tax research documents will refer to Pigou tax without exception when discussing the theoretical basis of environmental tax, but unfortunately, almost all the research documents only cover it, and almost all of them omit the core elements of Pigou tax effectiveness without exception. According to the background of Pigovian tax theory and its core problem, Pigovian tax aims to solve the social injustice caused by the gap between private cost and social cost, and then realize the optimal distribution of social resources and wealth. In short, "Pigou tax" is to make private costs and social costs as equal as possible through taxation, and internalize the negative externalities caused by social behavior. It is not difficult to see that an effective Pigou tax contains two important categories and an important premise. Two important categories are private cost and social cost; An important premise is that Pigou tax can produce the best institutional effect, that is, the best state, only when the private cost is equal to the social cost.

According to the logic implied in the premise of Pigovian tax, the optimal Pigovian tax pricing should be equal to the difference between private cost and social cost. Only in this case can Pigou tax completely internalize the negative externality cost of behavior. If the price of Pigovian tax is less than the difference between private cost and social cost, the internalization function and incentive effect of Pigovian tax will be weakened, for example, the effect of environmental tax on protecting the environment will be greatly reduced; On the contrary, if Pigou tax pricing is greater than the difference between private cost and social cost, it will often lead to illegal behavior, such as excessive environmental tax may lead to illegal disposal of environmental pollutants.

Therefore, as far as the specific design of environmental tax system is concerned, it is necessary to put two important categories and one premise of Pigou tax into reality.

Organic combination, for example, for the construction of China's environmental tax system, we should not blindly advocate raising the tax rate of environmental tax. It is reasonable that the environmental tax pricing should be equal to the difference between private cost and social cost, and the corresponding environmental tax rate should be formulated as a guiding principle. Otherwise, the environmental tax can not play the expected role in regulating social behavior and protecting the environment, or it will lead to secret and illegal activities that destroy the environment. But unfortunately, the existing environmental tax research in China has not paid enough attention to this, which is obviously the defect of environmental tax research in China.

Second, the definition of environmental tax

It is precisely because of people's understanding of Pigou tax that the concept system of environmental tax in China is chaotic, such as interlocking.

The definitions of environmental tax, resource tax and various tax concepts with certain environmental protection effects are often vague, giving people a feeling of being at a loss. According to the previous understanding of Pigou tax principle, it is not difficult to find that it is far-fetched to classify resource tax into the category of environmental tax, because according to the principle of traditional tax law, resource tax is often classified into the category of property tax, and its main function is to adjust the uneven distribution of social resources and property. Although it is a fact that resource development is often closely related to environmental protection, this obviously cannot be used as a reason to claim that resource tax belongs to environmental tax. Can it be argued that personal income tax also belongs to the category of environmental tax because of the relationship between personal property income and the environment? Obviously not. The vague definition of environmental tax is undoubtedly a defect in the research of environmental tax in China, which will affect the establishment of an effective environmental tax system. In my opinion, the concept of environmental tax revealed by the existing environmental tax research literature can be divided into two levels. One is the concept of environmental tax at the conceptual level. At the conceptual level, the concept of environmental tax mainly refers to the greening of the tax system, that is, the tax system should be reformed in a direction conducive to environmental protection and sustainable development; Secondly, as the concept of environmental tax at the institutional level, at the institutional level, the concept of environmental tax is mainly aimed at specific tax targets oriented to environmental protection, such as gasoline tax, sulfur dioxide tax and so on. Obviously, the above two levels of environmental taxes have different effects, but they are often confused. For example, it is far-fetched to incorporate resource tax into environmental tax at the institutional level.

Third, the instrumental attribute of environmental tax.

According to the theoretical principle of Pigou tax and the specific practice of environmental tax in western countries, environmental tax is nothing more than a policy tool and means of environmental protection. No matter in theory or from the practical role of environmental tax in environmental protection, environmental tax, as a policy means, is also dependent on environmental protection, that is, effective environmental tax must depend on the constraints of several institutional conditions. In other words, environmental tax has the limitations of environmental protection. Compared with the traditional command and control means, environmental tax is not necessarily the most ideal policy tool in environmental protection, but only an optional policy tool. Judging from the existing environmental tax research literature in China, there are obviously the following defects in the study of environmental tax in China. First of all, in the research literature of environmental tax in China, the consideration of environmental tax in the whole environmental protection policy system is ignored, and the lack of overall consideration often leads to one-sided and exaggerated environmental tax. Secondly, in the research literature of environmental tax in China, due to the lack of comparison with traditional environmental policy tools such as control orders, the reconstruction assumption of environmental tax system is often too arbitrary. Judging from the successful experience and failure lessons of environmental taxes in western countries, the choice of environmental taxes based on market mechanism and traditional control order environmental policy tools often depends on specific social conditions, and the effectiveness of environmental taxes depends on specific social systems. For example, imposing environmental taxes on state-owned enterprises that lack hard budget constraints may not produce the expected results. Environmental tax is essentially an environmental policy tool based on market mechanism, so environmental tax must be accompanied by the general characteristics of market mechanism, such as market mechanism is sometimes in a state of failure. Obviously, the existing environmental tax research literature in China lacks the proper reflection position on the boundary of environmental tax, and lacks the creation of an optimal system combination from the perspective of environmental protection.

Fourth, the choice of environmental taxes and fees.

According to the existing literature that the author has mastered, there is a common proposition that environmental fees should be taxed in the research literature of environmental tax in China, but

However, if we think calmly, we can easily find that this is not necessarily the right approach. Both the environmental tax system and the environmental fee system have the institutional effect of internalizing the external costs caused by environmental behavior. For the purpose of protecting the environment, if the system is designed properly, the effects of the two systems are exactly the same, and there is no absolute difference. Whether the environmental tax system can play an effective regulatory role or the environmental fee system can play an effective regulatory role depends on special institutional conditions. Environmental charging system also has its relative advantages. For example, the environmental fee system is flexible. Compared with the rigid environmental tax system, the environmental charging system is more suitable for China's environmental protection in a transitional society in some cases. Once the environmental tax system is established, it must conform to the relevant provisions of the tax law, which will inevitably lead to the environmental tax system not meeting the requirements of social life changes. Comparatively speaking, the environmental charging system obviously has comparative advantages. Although a few scholars believe that, based on the reality of China, the continued existence of the environmental tax and fee system in China is justified and should continue to be an important environmental protection policy tool in China, it is indeed a great pity that the specific application conditions of the environmental tax and fee system are not discussed. From the practice of environmental tax and fee system in western countries, environmental tax and fee belongs to the governance means based on market mechanism to protect the environment. European countries are more inclined to apply the environmental tax system, while the United States is more inclined to adopt the environmental fee system, so it cannot be arbitrarily said that the environmental fee system must be backward. Therefore, the reform of environmental tax and fee system needs further exploration. On the macro level, we should establish the idea of parallel environmental taxes and fees, and on the micro level, we should find the specific conditions for maximizing the respective utility of environmental taxes and fees, and define them reasonably.

Applicable conditions and their scope.

Verb (abbreviation of verb) Social impact of environmental tax

Just as the establishment of any system will produce social effects, environmental tax, as the main tool of environmental protection policy, aims to change the behavior of social subjects and produce the expected social effects. Therefore, the construction of environmental tax system is bound to produce important social effects. For example, because environmental tax belongs to indirect tax in nature, the object of environmental tax collection is mainly social consumer goods, which can be divided into general necessities and luxury consumer goods. Taxation on general necessities, on the one hand, violates the principle of taxation, on the other hand, may lead to the "regressive effect" of taxation, which is inconsistent with the expected assumption of environmental tax. For example, burning coal does have the effect of damaging the environment, and it is the object that environmental protection needs to focus on regulation. However, if the coal tax is levied simply out of the actual social background, it may lead to unsatisfactory social effects. For example, in the northwest rural areas, the main raw material for farmers' heating in winter is coal, which is a necessity for farmers. Collecting coal tax will definitely increase the purchase price of coal and have a great impact on the lives of low-income farmers. On the contrary, it has little impact on high-income farmers, which is a typical embodiment of the "regressive effect" of taxation. Judging from the existing literature that the author has mastered, the research on environmental tax in China has obviously not paid due attention to this, which is an undue deficiency.