China is a big agricultural country, with rural population accounting for more than 2/3 of the total population, and rural elderly population accounting for about 75% of the total elderly population. Solving the problem of providing for the aged for farmers is equivalent to solving the basic living problems of most elderly people in China. The following is what I collected for you. Welcome to read the reference!

Supply Analysis of Rural Endowment Insurance System in China

With the acceleration of urbanization and industrialization in China and the gradual aging of rural population, this paper takes rural old-age insurance system as the research object, introduces the concept of transaction cost in institutional economics, and tries to analyze the supply of * * * systems at all levels by analyzing the supply subject model of public * * * products, and determine the optimal scale of supply of * * * systems at all levels.

Keywords: rural endowment insurance system; * * * products; Institutional supply; transaction cost

A perfect social security system is an important symbol of a country's civilization and development. Rural endowment insurance is an important part of China's social security system. Farmers and * * * are the subjects of the rural old-age insurance system, farmers are the demanders of the system, and * * * is the leader and main supplier of the system. Compared with the needs of farmers, the will of * * * plays a more important role in the development track of rural endowment insurance system in China.

First, the rural endowment insurance system of public goods attributes

Article 45 of the Constitution of China stipulates: "China people and citizens have the right to get material help from the state and society in case of old age, illness or incapacity to work." As the majority of people and citizens in China, farmers naturally have the right to enjoy social pension rights. On this basis, it can be judged that the ideal rural social endowment insurance system conforms to the first attribute of public goods-the inseparability of utility. As a system that should be provided to all rural people, it has the characteristics of * * * benefit or common consumption. Moreover, the enjoyment of rural social endowment insurance by individuals will not affect the enjoyment of other individuals at the same time, which obviously conforms to the second attribute of public goods-non-competitiveness. Finally, the implementation and enforcement of this system does not have the problem of "who pays, who enjoys", but all rural people enjoy it, and the scope of benefit covers all rural people. To sum up, the ideal rural social endowment insurance has the attribute of public goods.

At present, there are three types of rural old-age insurance projects in China: 1 rural social old-age insurance, the combination of individual pooling, collective subsidies and subsidies, the combination of social pooling and individual accounts, and other social security policies and measures, such as family pension, land security and social assistance, to ensure the basic livelihood of rural residents in old age; 2. Supplementary endowment insurance for village, community and other collective organizations to raise funds, operate funds and issue pensions; 3. Commercial endowment insurance with full voluntary participation, self-payment of premiums and commercial operation of insurance companies. As far as these three ways are concerned, rural social endowment insurance can be analyzed separately according to its account composition. The social pooling account should be a pure public product, and the financing of this account is completely subsidized by * * * *, so it is non-exclusive and non-competitive; Personal accounts are quasi-public goods, and the funds in these accounts are raised by * * * and individuals * * *, and individuals cannot participate without paying fees. Collective community supplementary endowment insurance is a quasi-public product with obvious club product nature, which can be enjoyed by collective members but not by people outside the collective. Commercial endowment insurance is a private product, which is exclusive and competitive. Individuals fully pay premiums and enjoy pensions.

As far as China's actual national conditions are concerned, there is no material basis for establishing a multi-level rural endowment insurance system that combines the above three endowment insurance methods nationwide. What China needs to do now is to improve the new rural social endowment insurance system in accordance with the spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the Seventeenth Central Committee. Therefore, this paper mainly discusses the supply of rural social endowment insurance system.

Second, the optimal model analysis of rural social endowment insurance system supply

A model hypothesis

1. The rural social endowment insurance system studied is an ideal system and a public product, and its supplier is * * *, and there is no market supply.

2. Only one farmer participates in the rural endowment insurance system, and its utility function is known.

3. It is known that the production cost and transaction cost in the process of public goods supply are functions of output Q, that is, Pc=Pcq and Tc=Tcq, while the income function of farmers in the rural old-age insurance system is Tr=Trq, so the income function of farmers is π=Trq-Pcq-Tcq.

The rural endowment insurance system is provided by the central and local governments at the same price. The reason for this assumption is that China's * * * is divided into five levels: central, provincial, municipal, county, city and township, and from the division of financial power, it is roughly divided into central * * * and local * * *. Since every level of * * * exists, and it is necessary to provide public * * * products to the region through taxation and other channels. In practice, the trial of the new rural social endowment insurance system also emphasizes the concept of "two levels". "The central government gives full subsidies to the central and western regions and 50% subsidies to the eastern regions in accordance with the basic pension standards set by the central government. The local * * * subsidizes the payment of the insured, and the subsidy standard is not less than 30 yuan per person per year; To choose a higher level of standard payment, can be given appropriate incentives. The specific standards and measures are decided by the people of all provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government. " Based on the above reasons, this paper also discusses the optimal supply model under the premise of * * * classification.

Second, the transaction costs under the premise of the rural old-age insurance system supply model

Considering the transaction cost, the cost of institutional suppliers has changed. In addition to the original production cost, it also increases the transaction cost. We still assume that the production cost is a function of institutional supply and is proportional to supply. However, as mentioned above, the transaction cost depends on the opportunistic behavior of organizations or people, market uncertainty, small-scale negotiation and asset specificity. Transaction cost is the enhancement of asset specificity, and it shows an exponential growth trend. With the improvement of asset specificity, the deviation from the optimal supply scale of the organization is increasing, which leads to the increase of the transaction cost of the organizational unit, showing a "U"-shaped change of "first falling and then rising". Therefore, the transaction cost plays a decisive role in the supply boundary of the organization to the system.

Suppose: 1 Only one consumer in the whole society participates in the rural old-age insurance system; The supply subject of the system is two levels: central government and local government; 3 The demander's demand for the system is Q, and the cost he is willing to pay is T; 4. The demanders of the system can express their actual rural endowment insurance system through negotiation, and the order of transaction negotiation is * * * from the central government first, and then from the local government * * *; 5 The transaction cost that institutional demanders are willing to bear is TA; The total cost of institutional supply includes production cost and transaction cost, and production cost PC is a proportional function of institutional supply; The transaction cost first falls and then rises.

As shown in figure 1, the horizontal axis represents the supply quantity q of the rural endowment insurance system, and the vertical axis represents the total cost. The production cost curves of central * * * and local * * * are PC 1 and PC2 respectively, and the transaction cost curves of two levels * * * are represented by TC 1 and TC2 respectively; C 1, C2 represents the total cost of the central and local governments. Namely:

C 1=PC 1+TC 1

C2=PC2+TC2

When there are transaction costs:

1 According to the previous series of assumptions, the system scale that * * * can supply is:

GC=α+βT-TC 1-PC 1

This is obviously less than the supply when the transaction cost is zero. At this time, if the demanders are willing to bear the maximum transaction cost Tα≥TC 1, indicating that the demanders of this system can accept this transaction cost, then the central government * * * provides all the system supplies and controls all the resources used for endowment insurance, and the supply of endowment insurance in the whole society is g = GC = α+β t-TC1-PC/kloc-. If Tα≥TC 1, the system demanders are unwilling to accept this transaction fee and negotiate with the local government instead.

In order to save transaction costs, demanders will negotiate with local governments, and the transaction cost between them is T2. As mentioned above, if the marginal transaction cost mtc2 supplied by the local * * * system is ≥ MTC1,it will still be supplied to the central * * system at this time, and the supply amount is g = GC = α+β t-TC1-PC1; If the marginal transaction cost of local * * * is less than or equal to MTC 1, two situations may occur. One is that the central * * * no longer undertakes the supply of the system, and all of them are supplied by local * * *, and the total supply is g = GL = θ+ρ T-TC2-PC2; The second is that the central government * * * competes with local governments * * *, and the final result is that the central government * * * reduces the transaction costs by * * * degrees, making the marginal transaction costs of the two levels equal. At this time, the system supply of the whole society is the central government and local governments * * * *, and the supply of the central government * * * is GC = α+. The supply of local * * * is GL=θ+ρT-TC2-PC2T 1, and T2 is the resources provided by central * * * and local * * * respectively. If Tα≤TC2 demanders are willing to bear the transaction cost, the system demanders cannot accept this transaction cost. Then, if there is a next level in society, the system will be supplied by the next level, and the analysis process is the same as above. If there is no other system supplier in society, demanders will not consume such a system as the best choice.

Furthermore, if the cost of all levels of * * * supply system is continuous, there are countless * * * cost lines, from which an envelope can be found. Under the condition that every point on the envelope represents the transaction cost that the system demanders can bear, the optimal system supply at all levels is shown in Figure 2. The figure also shows that the optimal institutional supply mode is determined by the transaction cost.

The above model shows that it is because of the existence of transaction costs that rural old-age insurance at all levels is provided. In addition, marginal transaction cost plays a decisive role in determining the supply boundary at all levels, which also determines the supply mode of rural endowment insurance system.

Three. conclusion

Introducing the concept of transaction cost, this paper analyzes the supply boundary of rural endowment insurance system from the central and local levels. Based on the assumption that the transaction cost is zero, the theoretical analysis is carried out by using Edgeworth's boxed diagram, and it is concluded that the supply scale of two-level * * * is determined by the slope of the supply curve under the condition that the transaction cost is zero and there is no policy to allocate resources.

Then, excluding the assumption that the transaction cost is zero, in the case of transaction cost, in addition to transaction cost, the transaction cost Ta acceptable to the system demanders also has an important impact on the system supply. Under the condition that the system demanders can accept the transaction cost, the marginal transaction cost of the institutional supply of the * * * system is the factor that determines the supply of * * * at all levels. In addition, it should be noted that these analyses assume that there will be competition for institutional supply among enterprises of * * *, excluding collusion or interest game.

The contents discussed in this paper can also explain the unique rural endowment insurance system in developed areas of China. For example, the "Southern Jiangsu Model". The basic feature of Sunan model is that in addition to the rural social endowment insurance system stipulated by the state, there is also a good community guarantee, that is, in addition to the two-level supply system, the collective community becomes the main body of the system supply. We might as well regard the collective community as the third level. Then, due to the difference of transaction cost when the system demanders choose the main body of system supply, the southern Jiangsu model can be developed. The county economy in southern Jiangsu is extremely developed, and the transaction cost of institutional transactions between the rural population and the central government or even the provincial government is relatively high. On the contrary, the transaction cost of the system provided by collective communities is less, and farmers get more benefits. Therefore, the main supplier of the system is the collective community.

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