Author: (America) Martin J. Osborne Translator: Shi Xiquan, Lu Qiujun, Zhong Ming.

Game introduction * * * is divided into 17 parts, introducing complete information game, mixed strategy equilibrium and complete information expansion game: theory; Alliance game and its core, complete information expansion game: extension and discussion, incomplete information expansion game, evolutionary equilibrium and so on. Introduction to Game Theory is a rigorous and popular introduction to game theory, and it is an introductory textbook for senior undergraduates and graduate students.

Directory translator's command

order

Chapter 1 Introduction

1. 1 What is game theory?

1.2 rational choice theory

1.3 next attraction: interactive decision makers

I finished the information game.

Chapter 2 Nash Equilibrium: Theory

2. 1 strategy game

2.2 Case: Prisoner's Dilemma

2.3 Example: Enjoy Bach or Stravinsky music?

2.4 Example: Flip a coin to bet.

2.5 Case: Deer hunting

2.6 Nash equilibrium

2.7 Nash equilibrium example

2.8 Optimal response function

2.9 Bad behavior

2. 1 0 single population equilibrium: symmetric game and symmetric equilibrium

Chapter 3 Nash Equilibrium: Examples

3. 1 Cournot oligopoly model

3.2 Bertrand oligopoly model

3.3 sports

3.4 War of attrition

3.5 auction

3.6 Civil Law

Chapter IV Mixed Strategy Equilibrium

4. 1 Introduction

4.2 Strategic Game of Players' Random Behavior

4.3 mixed strategy Nash equilibrium

4.4 Bad behavior

4.5 Pure strategy equilibrium under randomization

4.6 Example: Expert Diagnosis

4.7 Balance in a Single Group

4.8 Example: Reporting Cases

4.9 the formation of people's beliefs in the game

4. 1 0 Extension: Finding Nash Equilibrium of Mixed Strategies

4. 1 1 Extension: A game in which people's actions have a continuous unified potential.

4. 1 2 Appendix: Give priority to the expected profit.

The fifth chapter is the game of complete information expansion: theory

5. 1 complete information expansion game

5.2 Strategies and results

5.3 Nash equilibrium

5.4 sub-game perfect equilibrium

5.5 Find the sub-game perfect equilibrium of finite category game: backward induction

To annotate ...

Chapter 6: Complete Information Game: Examples

6. 1 ultimatum game, rip-off game and agenda control

6.2 Stackelberg model of duopoly

6.3 bribery

6.4 competition

To annotate ...

Complete information game: expansion and discussion.

7. 1 Consider simultaneous actions.

7.2 Example: Entering Monopoly Industry

7.3 Example: Strategic Voter Movement

7.4 Example: Decision Committee

7.5 Example: Exit the declining industry

7.6 Consider external uncertainties

7.7 discussion: sub-game perfect equilibrium and backward induction

To annotate ...

Chapter VIII Alliance Games and Core

8. 1 Alliance Games

8.2 Nuclear energy

8.3 Example: Owners and Wealth Distribution

8.4 Example: Exchange horses of the same kind

8.5 Example: Exchange different kinds of houses

8.6 Example: Voting

8.7 Example: Matching

8.8 Discussion: Other Solutions

To annotate ...

Ⅱ incomplete information game

Chapter 9 Bayesian Game

9. 1 enlightening example

9.2 General definitions

9.3 Two examples of relevant information

9.4 Example: Cournot duopoly game with incomplete information

9.5 Example: Providing public goods.

9.6 Example: Auction

9.7 Example: Jury

9.8 Appendix: Auction under Arbitrary Valuation Distribution

To annotate ...

Chapter 10 Unfinished Information Game Development

The unfolding game under 10. 1 incomplete information

10.2 policy

10.3 Nash equilibrium

10.4 belief and sequence equilibrium

10.5 signal game

10.6 example: eye-catching cost as a signal of quality.

10.7 For example, education is a signal of ability.

10.8 Example: Strategic Information Transmission

10.9 Example: Agenda Control with Incomplete Information

Note /335

Ⅲ variants and extensions

Chapter 11 Strict Competition Game and Minimization

1 1. 1 maximize and minimize

1 1.2 minimax and Nash equilibrium

1 1.3 Strictly competitive games

1 1.4 Maximization and Nash Equilibrium in Strictly Competitive Games

To annotate ...

Chapter XII Rationalization

12. 1 can be rationalized.

12.2 continuous elimination of strict and inferior actions

12.3 continuous elimination of weak and inferior actions

12.4 main solvability

To annotate ...

……

Chapter XII Rationalization

Chapter 13 Evolutionary balance

Chapter 14 Repeated Game: Prisoner's Dilemma

Chapter 15 Repeated Games: General Results

Chapter 16 Bargaining

Chapter 17 Appendix: Mathematics