The so-called accounting information distortion refers to a phenomenon that accounting information fails to truly reflect objective economic activities and adversely affects the relevant decisions of decision makers. The information quality distortion of listed companies is mainly manifested in: first, the information disclosure is untrue; Second, insufficient information disclosure; Third, information disclosure is not timely.
Second, the overall situation of accounting information quality of listed companies in China at present
From 65438 to 0720, the world's first accounting fraud case of listed companies-the "Nanhai Company" incident in Britain, the authenticity of accounting information has become one of the core issues that investors and creditors pay attention to. Although in the past two hundred years, modern auditing technology has made great progress, and at the same time, financial accounting standards have been generally established and improved all over the world, which greatly guarantees the authenticity of accounting information. However, the problem of accounting information distortion has not been fundamentally curbed as investors and creditors hoped. On the contrary, cases of serious distortion of accounting information of listed companies still occur from time to time. In China, this phenomenon also exists: according to relevant data, when the Ministry of Finance randomly checks the accounting statements of 100 state-owned enterprises in 199, 8 1 company had fictitious assets of 376,654.38 billion yuan, and 89 companies had fictitious profits of 2.747 billion yuan; In the spot check of accounting information quality in 2000, among the 159 enterprises, 147 enterprises had false assets. This 147 households * * * inflated assets10.848 billion yuan, and depreciated assets of 2.475 billion yuan; The inflated profit was 65.438+47.2 million yuan, and the inflated profit was 65.438+94.3 million yuan. Listed companies: in 200 1 year, more than 0/000 listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai were audited, and the inflated profits should be reduced by 654.38+0.89 billion yuan, and the squeezed profits should be 654.38+0.5%. Among them, the audit reduced the profit by 365.438+07 billion yuan, the audit increased the profit by 654.38+028 billion yuan, and the total profit increased or decreased by 44.5 billion yuan; The audit reduced assets by 90.3 billion yuan, increased assets by 84.2 billion yuan, decreased assets by 6 1 billion yuan, and increased and decreased total assets by174.5 billion yuan. In particular, the assets of six listed companies have shrunk by more than 50%. At the same time, Hong Guang, Qiongminyuan, Yinguangsha, Maikete, ST Liming, Monkey King, Dongfang Electronics, Lantian and other listed companies also appeared a series of accounting fraud cases. The frequent occurrence of these fraud cases not only seriously challenges the integrity foundation of accounting, but also seriously damages the investment confidence of investors.
Third, the reasons for accounting information distortion of listed companies
There are many reasons for the distortion of accounting information, including interest-driven factors, institutional defects and moral problems. China is in the process of market economy transition, and there are some problems in the perfection of capital market, corporate governance structure and external supervision mechanism, which makes the accounting information distortion of listed companies in China have certain particularity and complexity. A comprehensive survey of the phenomenon of accounting information distortion of listed companies in China shows that the main reasons for accounting information distortion are as follows:
(A) China capital market problems and accounting information distortion of listed companies
China's capital market was established and developed under the background of imperfect market economic system and defects in corporate governance structure, and there are some problems such as lack of market mechanism, single market structure and administrative market. Due to the low marketization of the capital market and the lack of financing channels for enterprises, the listing qualification with the attribute of "shell resources" has high economic value. According to the existing system, the company's listing, allotment and delisting are all based on accounting profitability. In order to meet the conditions of listing or allotment or avoid delisting, a considerable number of listed companies engage in legal but unreasonable earnings management or accounting fraud. At the same time, the listed companies dominated by state-owned enterprises artificially divide the ownership structure and block the circulation, "the same shares have different prices and different rights"; In addition, the state-owned shares are dominant, minority shareholders hold less shares, pay little attention to the actual operation of the enterprise, and the speculative atmosphere is serious, which may easily lead to the behavior of large shareholders occupying the assets of listed companies and harming the interests of minority shareholders through related transactions. For example, "Zheng" fabricated financial surplus to obtain listing qualification in order to raise listing funds in the case of serious losses; In order to maintain and regain the rights issue qualification, Yinguangxia fabricated transactions, exaggerated profits and bid up the company's share price. "Blue Sky Co., Ltd." inflated profits by counting inventory value, fixed assets, inflated sales revenue and inflated sales cost, and obtained bank loans. Moreover, the friendship between Jinzhou Port and the anniversary has set off the climax of securities civil compensation after the State promulgated the "Several Provisions on the Trial of Civil Compensation Cases Caused by False Statements in the Securities Market" on June 5438+1October 9, 2003. These events reflect that the distortion of accounting information of listed companies in China has strong policy-driven characteristics.
(B) The conflict of interests of all actors in enterprise property rights leads to the distortion of enterprise accounting information.
Economics assumes that people are rational, and rational individuals pursue their own interests or utility maximization. Each individual maximizes his utility within the limited scope allowed by the system on which he depends. Because of the different interests of individuals, there will be different stakeholders in the organization.
Generally speaking, there are several subjects in enterprise property rights, such as government, creditors, owners, operators and other individuals related to the enterprise. The government is most concerned about the collection of taxes; Creditors are most concerned about whether their creditor's rights can recover the principal and interest on time; The owner is concerned about whether the assets he has invested can preserve and increase in value; Operators are concerned about whether the improvement of performance will bring them additional economic benefits; Investors in the securities market care about the value of stocks and the performance of companies. Because they have different behavioral goals and economic characteristics, they have different interests, which inevitably leads to conflicts of interest. Compared with other stakeholders, the operator's position is unique, that is, the operator directly manages the enterprise, and he is directly responsible for the operation and action of the enterprise, so he has a unique information advantage. But based on their own interests, operators will only provide information to maximize their own interests. At the same time, the "stealing" opportunity caused by information asymmetry brings the problem of "moral hazard", that is, the operators have the motivation to manipulate the generation of accounting information, and even provide false information, which leads to the distortion of accounting information. From the perspective of information users, accounting information is distorted because of their different interests and goals. From the perspective of information users, because of their different interests and goals, they have different requirements for information. Some information users really need accounting information that truly and objectively reflects economic activities, while others don't. Sometimes, driven by the interests of individuals, departments and regions, they may not need real accounting information for a special purpose, such as whitewashing their political achievements or concealing facts, if these real accounting information is unfavorable to their purposes. From the creditor's point of view, they are concerned about whether the creditor's rights can be recovered on time, and they should also ask for real accounting information so as to make correct judgments and take countermeasures as soon as possible. At present, the biggest creditor of an enterprise is a bank. Do all banks really need real accounting information? I'm afraid not. The interests of banks are also involved here. At present, most banks in China are state-owned banks, and most enterprises that accept loans are state-owned enterprises. If the bank still requires the authenticity of enterprise accounting information before the loan is issued (in fact, it is even doubtful), then the importance of the authenticity of accounting information after the loan is issued will be greatly reduced. The reasons mainly include: first, the needs of bank and credit personnel's own performance appraisal, and real accounting information is not necessarily beneficial to them; Second, even if they know the real situation of the borrowing enterprise (of course, the financial situation is not good), there is nothing they can do. The rest of the shareholders, it should be said that investors in the securities market need real accounting information most, because they have the clearest property right relationship with the enterprise and the greatest interest correlation. But as far as China's securities market is concerned, investment and speculation coexist, and the latter accounts for a large proportion. There are many "shareholders" who want to earn short-term price difference, but few long-term investors really want to appear as "shareholders". Whether accounting information is true or not is not important to most shareholders. What they care about is whether accounting information will make the stock price rise, because that is their interest. Sometimes, different property owners may collude with each other to provide false accounting information in order to realize their own but consistent interests, although this may not only harm the interests of other property owners, but also harm the long-term interests of enterprises.
(c) Lack or inefficiency of internal control system
The purpose of establishing enterprise internal control system is to find, prevent and correct mistakes and fraud. A perfect internal control system should at least achieve the following objectives: to ensure that business activities are carried out in accordance with appropriate authorization; Ensure that all transactions and events are recorded in the appropriate accounts with the correct amount in the appropriate accounting period, so that the preparation of accounting statements meets the relevant requirements of accounting standards; Ensure that access to and disposal of assets and records are properly authorized; Regularly ensure that the book assets are consistent with the actual assets. So theoretically, all mistakes and frauds can be found and corrected in time through a sound internal control system. However, if a company's internal control system is imperfect or lacking, accounting fraud will easily occur. At the same time, the quality of the control environment that has a great influence on the establishment and implementation of the internal control system of enterprises also directly affects whether the internal control system plays a role. A very important reason why all false information can finally form financial reports through the accounting system is that the internal control environment of these enterprises is extremely abnormal, which makes accounting fraud have an opportunity.
(D) ineffective external supervision led to the proliferation of accounting information distortion.
In China, the competent department of accounting work is the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for formulating the accounting system and supervising its implementation. According to the provisions of the Accounting Law, the departments of finance, auditing, taxation, people's bank, securities supervision and insurance supervision shall supervise and inspect the accounting data of relevant units in accordance with their duties as stipulated in relevant laws and administrative regulations. It stands to reason that our supervision should be effective, which can prevent the flooding of accounting information distortion. But in fact, the phenomenon of poor supervision and lack of supervision means still exists. Securities supervision, finance, auditing, taxation and other departments have the right to supervise the authenticity and reliability of accounting information. However, the regulatory authorities lack cooperation and are fragmented, failing to form an effective and complementary regulatory mechanism. Take the listed companies with more supervision, it is obvious that the quality of accounting information of listed companies in China is not high. After listing, if the enterprise is not well managed, it will take various means to inflate the income and profits of listed companies, obtain the qualification of capital increase and share allotment, and further squeeze funds from investors. Some listed companies also cooperate with bookmakers to speculate their own stocks in violation of regulations. When the losses are unsustainable, we will restructure our debts and assets and sell our shell resources. This has become a landscape of listed companies in China. Zheng Co., Ltd. is a typical case. At the end of 1997, Zheng Company prepared false financial statements by means of fictitious rebates and inter-period recording expenses under the actual loss of1500,000 yuan. Publicly disclose the profit of 85.6 million yuan to the public in the annual report, and raise funds through rights issue 1998. After Zheng's huge losses and fraud were revealed in 2000, the China Securities Regulatory Commission intervened in the investigation. Due to the limited supervision power and means of the CSRC, it is difficult to detect the fraudulent behavior of listed companies in time, and other departments have not played a corresponding role.
Fourthly, the harm of accounting information distortion of listed companies.
The distortion of accounting information of listed companies is a serious deviation from the rules of market economy. The survival and development of enterprises can not be separated from capital and market. The accounting report information provided by listed companies to the open market is a very important reference index for the outside world to understand the operating conditions of enterprises. After a listed company publishes its accounting reports, the external users of the company's accounting reports, including shareholders, creditors, potential investors and other public, will make their own decisions according to the information (assets and liabilities, operating conditions, etc.) reflected in these reports. If the financial and accounting information provided by enterprises to the open market is untrue, investors will feel cheated. If investors in the capital market feel that listed companies are using these false accounting information to deceive them, they will not invest in listed companies; Similarly, if the bank knows that the statements provided by the enterprise are false, it will not lend to the enterprise again. If everyone doesn't invest in listed companies, enterprises are like fish without water, and sooner or later they will fall into an unsustainable predicament. Therefore, the distortion of accounting information of listed companies is a serious deviation from the rules of market economy. It will not only seriously weaken the decision-making usefulness of accounting information, endanger the interests of investors and creditors, and make the public doubt the foundation of accounting integrity, but also fundamentally shake the credit foundation of market economy, weaken and distort the fund-raising and resource allocation functions of securities capital market, and endanger the normal operation of macro-economy. The distortion of accounting information will also promote corruption and seriously hinder the smooth progress of economic development and enterprise reform.
Verb (abbreviation of verb) measures and suggestions to control the distortion of accounting information of listed companies
It is a complex social system engineering to control the accounting information distortion of the boss company, which needs long-term unremitting efforts and comprehensive management. Based on the above analysis, I think in order to improve the quality of accounting information of boss company, we should do the following work well:
(A) improve the ownership structure and clarify the market mechanism.
The premise of controlling accounting information distortion is to find problems in time. The accounting supervision system based on government administrative supervision is too slow to respond, and when problems are found, the consequences are usually irreparable. The market-oriented accounting supervision mechanism mainly relies on the stakeholders of enterprises to discover and reveal problems, and the speed of discovery is often much faster. The establishment of this mechanism needs to mobilize the enthusiasm of investors to explore the accounting problems of listed companies, and needs to be based on the shareholding structure of shareholder diversification, micro-decentralization and macro-centralization. Therefore, reducing the proportion of state-owned shares, building a diversified equity structure and increasing the liquidity of equity according to the market mechanism are the primary tasks to solve the problem of accounting information distortion.
(B) improve the corporate governance structure
1. Clarify property rights and give full play to the role of property rights in standardizing and defining the process of accounting information generation.
Property right is the basic condition for enterprises to obtain the qualification of legal person in the market, and only enterprises with clear property rights can truly become market subjects. An enterprise is essentially a contract, which broadly stipulates which members of the enterprise should complete which tasks. Here, the basic rights (income claim, use right and transfer right) are actually divided into different interest groups. In enterprises with unclear property rights, the lack of power transfer makes the enterprise's behavior deviate from the market to a certain extent, and the enterprise's behavior is not implemented according to the laws of the market, thus causing the accounting information not to be provided according to the needs of the market.
Only a clear definition of property rights can enable market participants to conduct accounting management transactions in accordance with accounting behavior norms. This is because the clarity of property rights creates two important conditions for the realization of accounting information objectives: first, the owner pursues the maximization of asset returns, and second, there is an economic contractual relationship between the owner and the operator. Under these two conditions, the allocation of resources is relatively efficient: operators maximize their own utility without reducing (or even increasing) the owner's utility, and implement economic behavior according to the market rather than the owner's will. At the same time, accounting subjects can choose the combination of accounting norms according to the level of transaction costs, and give full play to the functions of incentive, restraint, resource allocation and income distribution of accounting norms.
2. Implement the system of independent directors.
China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the draft of "Guiding Opinions on Establishing Independent Director System in Listed Companies", and determined that more than one third of the board members of listed companies are independent directors, including at least 1 accounting professionals. Where the board of directors of a listed company has remuneration, audit and nomination committees, more than half of them shall be independent directors. The main duties of independent directors are to fulfill their obligations of honesty and diligence to listed companies and all shareholders, safeguard the overall interests of the company, and pay special attention to the legitimate rights and interests of minority shareholders. Independent directors will embody the value of "independence" in professional committees such as the Audit Committee under the board of directors. Independent directors have special powers, such as proposing to the board of directors to hire or dismiss accounting firms, independently hiring external audit institutions or consulting institutions, and expressing opinions on the fairness of major related party transactions of listed companies. Carrying out the independent director system and giving full play to the checks and balances of independent directors have become the focus of attention from all walks of life.
(C) improve the internal control system
Establishing, perfecting and strictly implementing the internal control system of enterprises plays an important role in standardizing accounting behavior, improving the quality of accounting information and preventing fraud.
1. Formulate and publish the internal control standard system.
With the deepening of China's economic reform and the establishment of modern enterprise system, it is urgent to strengthen internal accounting supervision and establish and improve internal accounting control system. In order to promote the construction of internal control system in units as soon as possible, the Ministry of Finance should formulate and issue unified internal control standards for all units to implement or refer to. Generally speaking, an organization's internal control standards should meet the following requirements: First, the standards should include all aspects of the internal control system to form a complete system; The second is to formulate detailed and specific standards for the content of * * *, and formulate principled standards for complex and special content; Thirdly, normative standards should be formulated for the contents of internal accounting control involving the quality of accounting information and the contents of the unit's compliance with laws and regulations, and exemplary standards can be formulated for the contents only involving the internal management control of the unit.
2. Organize the implementation of internal accounting control system.
First of all, we should vigorously publicize the internal accounting control system. Secondly, earnestly perform the legal duties of the financial department, and urge all units to establish and improve an effective internal accounting control system through regular supervision and inspection. The third is to guide and help all units to do a good job in the construction of internal accounting control system through experience exchange, and at the same time provide manpower and technical support for the implementation of internal accounting control system by using intermediary forces such as accounting firms.
(4) Strengthening the construction of external supervision mechanism of enterprises.
1. Improve the construction of relevant laws and regulations and strengthen the supervision and punishment of listed companies.
We should give full play to the deterrent role of accounting law in promoting healthy trends and opposing unhealthy trends. Further improve the accounting system and continue to improve the enterprise accounting system. In view of the special business of various industries, we will promptly study and formulate professional accounting methods for different industries. Strengthen the transparency of the operation and management of listed companies, reduce the information differences between the two parties to the transaction, and improve the comprehensive information disclosure supervision system including judicial investigation, securities supervision, violation warning, industry self-discipline and media supervision. In legislation, it is necessary to increase the punishment for false disclosure and raise the cost of illegal information disclosure from the system.
2. Improve the independent review system.
Certified public accountant is the product of the development of market economy to a certain stage, and its premise is the separation of property ownership and management rights. China's CPA industry started late, and the relevant policies are not matched. There are some problems to be solved in the process of progress, such as the small number of full-time CPAs, the shortage of working-age personnel, and the lack of necessary risk funds. Some firms simply pursue income, ignore the quality of practice and even issue false reports; As a result of departmental organization, administrative audit business, introduction business is divided in proportion, and income is paid in proportion, which has become an important economic source for the competent department to engage in welfare and bonuses, thus seriously damaging the image of social intermediary organizations and their relationship with all walks of life, affecting the independent, objective and fair status of certified public accountants, and so on. The 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China established the development goal of cultivating and perfecting the socialist market economic system at the end of 20th century and the beginning of 20th century, and raised the cultivation and development of market intermediary organizations to the height of political system reform and democracy and legal system construction. Therefore, with a high sense of responsibility, mission and urgency, we should promote the reform of the firm system through decoupling and restructuring, build a high-quality and high-level team of certified public accountants and a number of accounting firms as soon as possible, strengthen the practice supervision of certified public accountants, and make the social accounting supervision institutions truly become the "economic police" of the socialist market economy. It is necessary to further clarify the legal responsibility of social accounting supervision mechanism to the conclusion of accounting review, give full play to its role, and safeguard the authenticity, legitimacy and seriousness of information.
Graduation thesis opening report
Paper Name: Analysis of the present situation and problems of the fund management mode of enterprise groups.
College: Accounting College
Major: Accounting (International Accounting)
Student number:
Student name:
Instructor:
June 5438, 2008+10 month
First, the motivation of topic selection (background or significance).
Fund management is the core of enterprise financial management. As an economic union composed of several enterprises, the most important link of enterprise group is capital. In the case that the enterprise group takes the maximization of enterprise value as the financial management goal, it has sufficient theoretical and practical basis to take fund management as the center. Because the quality and effect of all aspects of enterprise production and operation activities can be comprehensively reflected in the capital movement, it is important to organize capital activities effectively and reasonably to improve enterprise management and economic benefits. Only by strengthening capital management, reasonably organizing capital supply, reducing capital cost, speeding up capital turnover and optimizing capital control and supervision mechanism can enterprises promote a virtuous circle of cash flow and achieve financial management objectives. Therefore, it has become a crucial practical problem for modern enterprise groups to choose the appropriate fund management mode in fund management.
Second, the main problems that need to be clarified in the paper
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the problems and modes of fund management in enterprise groups, so as to improve the efficiency of fund management in enterprise groups and realize the financial goal of maximizing enterprise value. The conception of this paper is based on the understanding of modern enterprise theory and financial management theory. The basic idea of this paper is to discuss the content and function of enterprise group fund management, point out the particularity and importance of enterprise group fund management, and then emphatically analyze the outstanding problems faced by enterprise group fund management and the reasons for these problems, put forward a variety of enterprise group fund management models, and analyze and compare their applicability, advantages and disadvantages in reality, so as to try to put forward the author's own suggestions on enterprise group fund management.
This paper mainly adopts the logical method of normative research, combined with case analysis, data analysis and chart analysis to demonstrate. The basic point of this paper is that choosing an appropriate fund management model is conducive to improving the efficiency of fund allocation of enterprise groups and solving some problems encountered by enterprise groups in fund management.
Third, the outline of the paper.
I. Overview of fund management of enterprise groups
1. The concept and characteristics of enterprise groups;
2. The content of enterprise group fund management;
3. Fund management objectives of enterprise groups;
4. Principles of fund management of enterprise groups.
Second, the enterprise group fund management model analysis-based on the chart
1. Common modes of fund management of enterprise groups
2. Analysis of advantages and disadvantages of enterprise group fund management mode
Thirdly, the analysis of common problems faced by enterprise group fund management-based on case and data analysis.
1. The funds are scattered and the use efficiency is low;
2. Poor supervision, lax supervision before and during the event;
3. The information is distorted, which makes it difficult to provide a basis for scientific decision-making;
Four, to solve the problem of enterprise group fund management countermeasures
1. Realizing centralized fund management and improving the efficiency of fund use —— Introduction of advanced cash pool management technology
2. Explore various supervision methods to ensure the safety and integrity of funds;
3. Using advanced computer technology as a means to improve financial rules and regulations and reduce human factors.
Elements to achieve efficient information management.
Fourth, the paper work arrangement
The time node of the content of each stage of the serial number paper
1 topic selection
2 2008. 10.5 Determine the topic of the paper
3 2008. 10. 10 began to write the opening report.
4 2008.11.1Start writing the first draft of the thesis.
5. The first draft of the paper was completed on February 28th, 2009.
On March 30th, 2009, the paper was finalized.
thesis defence
Verb (abbreviation of verb) main references and related materials
[1] China Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Financial cost management. [M], Economic Science Press, 2008.
[2] Wu Bolin. On China Enterprise Group. [M], Fudan University Press, 1996.
[3] Lin Yuan. On enterprise collectivization and centralization of financial management. [J] Friends of Accountants, No.9, 2000.
[4] Ma. Establish three concepts of fund management. [M], Economist, No.65438, 2006 +0.
[5] Zhao Dongfang. Construction of settlement system of group settlement center. [J], Accounting Monthly,No. 19, 2005.
[6] Ren Yong. Financial settlement center: an effective way for group companies to centrally manage internal funds. [J] Accounting Newsletter (Comprehensive Edition),No. 13, 2004.
[7] Yu Zengbiao, Liang,. The starting point of modern company budget. [J] Accounting Research, No.8, 2002.
[8] Zhang Fang. On the financial management mode of future enterprise groups. [J], Shanghai Accounting, 200 1, No.4. 。
[9] Lu. On enterprise collectivization and centralization of financial management. [J] Accounting Newsletter, No.9, 2000.
[10]Charles T.Horngren, Gary L.Sundem, William O.Stratton, Introduction to Management Accounting, Prentice Hall, 12 edition.
Scoot Besley, Eugene F.Brigham, Essentials of Management Finance, Thomson Learning, 12 edition.
Sixth, the guidance of teachers' opinions.
Do you agree with students entering the thesis writing stage?
Instructor (signature):
20 years