Japan's new constitution fully embodies the basic idea of constitutional democracy. "Starting from the three principles of national sovereignty, pacifism and respect for basic human rights, it embodies the bourgeois ideological and theoretical system and is a relatively complete bourgeois constitution, thus establishing a bourgeois democratic political system for the first time in Japan." [26] Compared with the Meiji Constitution before the war, the new constitution established the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Under the Meiji constitutional system, all the powers of the Japanese state, including Commander-in-Chief Lu Haijun, belonged to the Emperor. Although there are three independent institutions: parliament, cabinet and judiciary, they are all auxiliary institutions of the emperor. The three powers are not really separated, and there is no balance between them. Therefore, Japan's Meiji constitutional system finally moved towards fascist dictatorship. After the war, the new constitution denied the feudal centralized emperor system, and established three state organs with independent legal status, namely Congress, Cabinet and Supreme Court, to exercise state power.
The new constitution is not only the legal basis for judging the nature of its state power, but also the rigid institutional bottom line that restricts its legislative, administrative and judicial power. Throughout the political life of Japan since the new constitution, from the process of voter voting, cabinet formation, government budget, public policy formation process, local autonomy and so on. It is inevitable that its bureaucracy will not surpass the new constitution and become a special force outside the constitutional system, and its power boundary and operation process will inevitably be restricted by democratic politics. Otherwise, it is difficult for us to explain that the post-war bureaucracy, as a part of the whole constitutional democratic system, still retains the nature of being subordinate to the Meiji Constitution after the qualitative change of the national political system; If we deny the restrictive effect of the Constitution of Japan on the post-war Japanese regime, including its bureaucratic system, we will logically deny the role of the Meiji Constitution on the pre-war Japanese politics and its bureaucratic system, and it is easy to ignore the institutional basis for the existence and operation of the bureaucratic system and its relationship with the external environment. In this way, bureaucracy, the research object in complex political relations, has become an isolated constant.
According to the provisions of the Japanese Constitution, all decisions involving major political, social and economic issues stipulated in the Constitution must be submitted to the National Assembly through government proposals or House of Representatives proposals, which will be put on file for deliberation and approval by the National Assembly, and then become law and implemented by the government, thus forming the "parliamentary center" feature of Japanese constitutional democracy. Mainly reflected in the legislative, administrative and judicial departments that exercise state power. Congress occupies the highest position and is the highest authority of the country. All members of parliament are elected by universal suffrage. Article 4 1 of the Japanese Constitution stipulates that "the National Assembly is the sole legislature of the country" and that "all national legislation can only be established by resolutions of the National Assembly"; In addition to monopolizing legislative power, the Japanese parliament "also has a strong voice in national politics and the function of fully controlling state power." In addition, according to the cabinet system of the House of Representatives, Congress can influence the existence and dissolution of the cabinet. Moreover, the two houses of Congress also have extensive powers to investigate state affairs (Article 62 of the Japanese Constitution). "[27] However, some scholars have suggested that only about 30% of the bills passed by the Japanese National Assembly are actually put forward by members, and most of them are prepared by relevant government ministries and agencies and submitted to the National Assembly through cabinet meetings. Take1October 1999 to 19 to August 13 as an example. Of the bills submitted for deliberation, 6 1.2% were proposed by the cabinet, only 38.8% were submitted for deliberation by members of parliament, and 88.9% were enacted by the cabinet. [28] From this perspective, Japanese administrative bureaucrats have indeed played an important role in the formation and implementation of public policies. However, "the institutional restrictions on public administration must be evaluated on the basis of constitutional principles. "[29] The basic principles of national sovereignty, democracy and freedom in Japan's Constitution determine the scope of responsibilities and powers of its public administration and bureaucracy. The Cabinet is responsible to a democratically elected legislature and an independent judicial system. The Constitution also provides for freedom of political speech and freedom of the press. Furthermore, we must also pay attention to the difference between the administrative power in the separation of powers and the dichotomy of political administration of Wilson and Goodnow: the theory of separation of powers has laid a kind of institutional arrangement and operable institutional operation mechanism; The dichotomy of politics and administration is a logical division of the functions of politics and administration under the premise of decentralization. Its purpose is to help give full play to the administrative functions and solve the contradiction between democracy and efficiency. If the dichotomy between politics and administration is rigid in political practice and research, it will not only help, but also mislead the relationship between politics and administration. Because representative system is an indirect democracy, it is the "discussion" of democratic politics and the "action" of the implementation result of "discussion", that is, politics and administration are the unity of value rationality and instrumental rationality; In the process of public policy formulation, administrative bureaucrats will inevitably participate in the drafting, formulation and implementation of policies, and the boundary between politics and administration cannot be clearly defined in real political life. The value of the dichotomy between politics and administration lies in that "it is precisely because of these distinctions that democratic norms can play a role and help to define administrative management as a form different from democracy." " [30]
Therefore, to analyze the power scope of each political subject in the formation of public policy, we can't only look at the proportion of bills passed in Congress, nor can we think that the policy process is "bureaucratic-led", thus affecting the evaluation of Japanese public administration democratization. One of the main reasons why Kun Qingming, a famous Japanese scholar, holds the theory of bureaucratic rule is that he believes that the privileges of Japanese bureaucrats before the war were not eliminated in the post-war political reform, but were preserved and strengthened because of the "indirect rule" policy during the American occupation period, which hindered the process of Japanese political democratization. [3 1] In fact, this is just an instrumental rationality problem. Weber's classic description of the instrumental rationality of bureaucracy: "Once this organization (bureaucracy) is established, its objective indispensability and its unique' impersonality' make it easy to serve anyone as long as this person knows how to control it." [32] can fully explain the instrumental characteristics of Japanese bureaucracy under Meiji Constitution and Japanese Constitution. In addition, Japan's "bureaucratic domination theory" is also vague, and the source, nature, effect and boundary of power that bureaucrats can control are not clear. If the boundary of domination is not beyond the scope of bureaucratic functions, then this kind of domination may not involve democratic politics at all, but belongs to the functional category of normal administration; If the power of bureaucratic leadership comes from the entrustment or recognition of politicians, and its scope and content are mainly in technical aspects, such as law, education, science and technology, then this kind of leadership has its own political legitimacy, so there is no doubt. Moreover, "revolution is not a dinner party". In the political field, "the maximization of human impulse is power." [33] No ruling party will give up its power easily, and Japanese political parties are no exception. Relevant research has pointed out that the reason why Japanese bureaucracy has extensive power in public policy is that LDP politicians are willing to hand over such' technical' details in the process of policy formation to bureaucrats. According to Japan's political party system, the LDP is willing to grant bureaucrats various powers and then try to exert influence when they exercise these powers. "[34] This also reflects the core position of the Japanese ruling party in public policy and some characteristics of its decision-making mechanism.
In fact, "Japan's administrative decision-making has never been a process of independent decision-making by the government, but a comprehensive decision-making combined with party politics." [35] As far as the operation of Japanese bureaucracy after the war is concerned, from the way and procedure of the proposal, all provincial offices in Japan have democratic procedures for drafting bills. The draft bill will also go through external democratic procedures such as the Legislative Affairs Bureau of the Cabinet, the ruling party and the cabinet meeting, and finally be passed by the National Assembly. That is to say, the administration and bureaucrats did not encroach on the right to propose bills or crowd out members' proposals by illegal or improper means, but because the technical advantages of the government and bureaucrats increased the feasibility and professionalism of the proposals; Due to the limitation of professional knowledge, bills put forward by ordinary members only by individuals or several people are often rejected because they do not conform to legislative procedures or conflict with relevant legislation, and some cannot even be discussed in Congress. On the other hand, from the actual performance of Japan's public policy, although it is undeniable that Japanese bureaucratic organizations may expand themselves at any time, senior bureaucrats with real power naturally have the attribute of maximizing the personal interests of "economic man" in public choice theory, when discussing the great success of Japan's economy after the war, "Japan's civil service system has been widely praised as playing a key role in Japan's modernization and subsequent economic development." [36] There are many factors why the Japanese civil service system [37] can play such a "key role", but as far as the relationship between economic growth and political development is concerned, "the economy has made amazing achievements, and its political system of checks and balances of various powers should be more reasonable, at least having a positive effect on economic development." [38] The institutional arrangement of constitutional democracy is the basis for promoting economic development and maintaining social stability.
It can be said that the positive role of Japanese bureaucracy in public policy is not only conducive to a series of clear and specific laws and regulations such as Japan's new constitution and the national civil service law, but also the need and result of Japan's development model as a post-modern country. In the process of catching up with advanced countries in Europe and America, the Japanese government's economic and social affairs functions are constantly strengthened, and its administrative functions are bound to expand. Kazuo Muramatsu, a representative Japanese scholar who holds the theory of "party domination", has a reasonable explanation for this. He believes that with the development of Japan's democratic politics after the war, the autonomy of Japanese bureaucracy is increasingly restricted. Faced with the pressure of social criticism or the requirement of administrative management, the bureaucracy has to increase its functions. When there is a securities scandal, set up a securities management committee; When the demand to limit the soaring land price became high, the national land agency was established, and so on. [39] Of course, even under the constraint of Japanese constitutional democracy, it is impossible to completely avoid "bureaucratic leadership" or administrative centralization, but if we deny the supreme position enjoyed by the Japanese parliament in the Constitution and its decisive role in real political life, it will inevitably become a simplification. The position and function of Japanese bureaucracy in the process of politics and policy should be analyzed in detail from the nature of its power source and service object. Without the general trend of Japanese political democratization after the war and the internal relationship between democratic politics and bureaucracy, its value orientation of bureaucratic democratization cannot be denied.
2. The Tokyo trial did not hold Emperor Hirohito responsible for the war, which is the main reason why Japanese society lacked understanding of history after the war. Emperor Hirohito is by no means a "powerless and innocent constitutional monarch" described by people with ulterior motives, but the highest decision-maker and active participant in the war of aggression launched by Japanese militarism, and the commander-in-chief and spiritual leader of the Japanese army. After World War II, it was the deliberate excuse of the United States and the denial of Hirohito and the Japanese authorities. Hirohito escaped justice. As a result, Japan denied the history of the war of aggression, repeatedly overturned the case, and the right-wing forces became increasingly rampant, leading to the turmoil in East Asia.
The 3,55-year system refers to a system that has appeared in Japanese politics since 1955, that is, the party structure has long maintained the two-party political structure of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the opposition Japanese Socialist Party. It is generally believed that the system ends at 1993. The term "55-year system" first appeared in the paper "1955 の Political System" published by political scholar Jun Zhishu 1964 (Thought,No. 1964).
In the early 1990' s, due to the corruption of the LDP regime and the collapse of factional balance, the LDP fell into division. In addition, the collapse of the bubble economy led to a long-term economic downturn, and the Socialist Party once rose. Soon after, however, both parties fell into recession. In the house of representatives election of 1993, the liberal democratic party failed to win half of the seats in the country and became the opposition party. The "55-year system" collapsed
4,
Political participation refers to the activities that citizens of a country directly or indirectly express their collective or individual political will to the formulation and implementation of government policies through certain methods and procedures according to law, that is, civil political activities. [1] The deepening of political participation means that individuals have more and more rights and opportunities to assume political roles and conduct political activities, and the process of participation is getting deeper and deeper, which is the core of modern democratization.
Political participation is an open system, and many factors affect political participation from different levels and angles. For example, Anthony Orom, a famous American political scientist, believes that "in terms of social and economic status, people who are in a higher position in the social hierarchy also have a higher proportion of political participation ... This conclusion is the same regardless of professional level, education level, family income and the total or comprehensive scale of these three items." [2] Japanese political scientist Yukio Urashima believes that citizens of associations are more enthusiastic about participating in politics, and group consciousness also drives people to participate in politics. [3] In short, political scientists generally believe that the higher people's socio-economic status, the higher their enthusiasm for participation, while education, community nature, communication, social and psychological factors, that is, political trust and concern, have an impact on political participation. Through study and thinking, I personally think that the influencing factors of political participation can be analyzed from two aspects: participation cost and participation income, because the final result of any factor is reflected in participation cost and participation income.
Participation cost, as its name implies, is the price that the participant will pay and may pay for his participation behavior, as well as his subjective feelings about this price. Participation income refers to the actual or possible income brought to him or his group by the participation behavior of the participating subject. Economic, cultural and psychological factors play a role at the potential level, all affecting costs and benefits, and all affecting participation behavior because of their absolute or relative value. From the perspective of participation cost, the smaller the cost, the greater the possibility of actual participation. On the contrary, the greater the cost, the less likely it is to actually participate.
When analyzing the cost of participation, the main analysis factors are as follows: one of the most direct factors is whether the participants have to pay the price of time, energy and money, and sometimes the estimation of these costs will make people shrink back. One element is continuity, that is, the prediction and analysis of the adverse consequences of participation, such as whether reporting someone will bring revenge, whether organizing a dialogue on a certain policy will be listed in another book in the future, and whether children and their families will be implicated. This kind of cost analysis is often more critical. Especially in countries with underdeveloped democracy and imperfect legal system, people's worries are not superfluous. The third element is implicit, for example, participation needs corresponding knowledge, and learning this knowledge needs to be paid; Participation requires good interpersonal communication, and developing and maintaining interpersonal communication requires hard work and so on.
When analyzing the benefits of participation, there are three main analysis elements, which are mainly different from those in the world in degree. First, whether citizens' political participation can affect the political process. Practically speaking, due to various complicated reasons, China citizens' political participation often cannot have much influence on the political process, and the political process is still in a closed and semi-closed state. The willingness of ordinary citizens to participate in it is often in a state of diminishing, and finally it becomes a spent force. If the participation is fruitless, there is no participation income. The second factor introduced is the strength of influence. After participation, the less the energy drops, the greater the influence intensity and the higher the enthusiasm. The third thing to analyze is the actual benefits of the participation results to individuals. It is possible that the participation of a group is significant, but the actual income of the specific individual living in it is not obvious, so his enthusiasm is not harmonious with the group. Especially worth mentioning is the phenomenon of "hitchhiking". The so-called hitchhiking phenomenon means that citizens can enjoy the fruits of other people's participation without paying the price. For example, a voter may not vote because the leader elected by others is exactly what he wants to elect. If everyone thinks so, the enthusiasm for participating in politics will be reduced; For another example, if one person does not take the risk to report an official, others may do the same thing, and everyone will benefit in the end, but if everyone does it, anti-corruption will not be carried out smoothly. The phenomenon of hitchhiking exists objectively and is a complex combination of income and cost. Eliminating it involves many aspects.
We should pay attention to two problems when we attribute the influencing factors to costs and benefits: First, we must pay attention to the fact that costs and benefits do not exist in isolation, but exist in a specific participation behavior. In one case, the cost-benefit ratio is large; in another case, the cost-benefit ratio is small; in another case, the cost-benefit ratio is small. Participants often make choices through comprehensive comparison. For example, in voting, the cost paid by the subject is very small, but because the election may not be able to express his true wishes and the final income forecast is even smaller, citizens still lack enthusiasm. Another example is that the villagers in a village negotiate with the township administrative organs, which is very costly, both direct and follow-up. But once the will of the subject is reflected, such as removing unreasonable burdens, the benefits will be huge, so the enthusiasm of the villagers will be higher.