Let's start with the first question. The existence of anything needs to be expressed by language to construct its social significance, and the law is no exception. The expression of values such as fairness, justice, order and efficiency also needs to be expressed in words. Linguistically, language itself is an abstract symbol system, and Saussure understands language as a combination of signified and signified. The relationship between them is not a one-to-one linear necessity, but an unspecified arbitrary arrangement. The signifier refers to the physical object pointed by language, while the signifier refers to the formal phonetic symbol. The combination of the two is arbitrary and irregular, with the exception of onomatopoeia. Of course, language is also social, restricted by cultural habits and ways of thinking, and becomes the same definition of universal social consciousness, but this is not enough to subvert the essential arbitrariness of language as an abstract symbol. Law is expressed by language symbols, so naturally we can't fully construct the orientation of language "signified" that we want to achieve. That is to say, the inherent uncertainty and openness of language doomed that the expected legal connotation could not be expressed in advance, so that the application of law often failed to get a clear response in practice, which is also an inevitable defect of law caused by language representation, or a congenital disease that cannot be cured by written law. Customary law has a unique advantage in this respect, which is not expressed by language, but carried by words and actions. Language and speech are two different linguistic concepts. "Speech is the behavior of individuals when they use their own functions, and it uses social conventions" (Saussure language), that is, speech is a concrete change, which can effectively carry the interpretation of customary law in people's knowledge, so that the law can basically be applied without ambiguity. It can be seen that it is not easy for the law to be truly clear. Maybe it's because we can't do it, but the two are a paradox. All we have to do is be as clear as possible.
Let's look at the second question again. For example, we make a recruitment notice, which clearly stipulates that the height must be above 170cm, and we must have more than 2 years of work experience, so as to refine the conditions as much as possible and make the most favorable screening. However, there are some defects in this provision. Wouldn't it be a pity if someone who is excellent happens to be the person we need, but is excluded from the hard conditions because of the slight difference in height 169cm or one year 10 months of work experience? I think it also violates our original intention of recruiting talents. In this case, why not stipulate vague conditions such as being above average height or having certain work experience, so as to increase the scope of recruiting talents, because the initiative is still in our hands, and we can still exclude people who don't need it, leaving only the most favorite objects (of course, this may arouse Posner's suspicion, because this treatment involves the increase of legislative costs in the economic sense, and this is not considered). I think the answer to the second question may be a little clear. The clarity of the law does not necessarily conform to our willingness to design legislation. For this reason, the law also gives judges greater discretion when making provisions, and in the case of possible exceptions, "other ……" is often used as the bottom clause. Isn't this the default of the law?
"On the one hand, the rule of law shows the need for legal certainty and stability so that people can plan and organize their arrangements accordingly; On the other hand, the rule of law emphasizes that the law needs to be flexible and can adapt to changes in public concepts. " As Volcker said in this sentence, the law itself is a logical contradiction, which not only emphasizes clarity but also does not exclude fuzziness. The internal tension between them is an inherent paradox of the law itself. Of course, this kind of internal conflict may also provide opportunities for the development of law.