On June 65438+February and February 2, 20221day, local time, gerasimov, Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, attended the enlarged meeting of the Russian Defense Ministry Committee at the Moscow Defense Control Center.
On June 5438+1October 1 1 day, 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defence stated that Russia had once again replaced the commander-in-chief of its regional joint forces to carry out special military operations against Ukraine, and gerasimov, chief of staff of the Russian armed forces, was appointed.
It has been nearly a year since the Russian army launched the "Special Military Action". In the first eight months of the operation, there was no clear unified commander. Until June 2022, 10, the commander-in-chief of the space force Sulovikin became the first commander-in-chief.
Now, for the first time, the commander of the "Special Military Operation" has been officially replaced, and the standard configuration of the command team is higher, which makes the Western analysis institutions such as the War Research Institute regard this as a major change in Moscow and think that this may indicate that a larger attack will be delivered in the winter and spring of 2023.
Another analysis noted that even after the "special military action" began, the Russian General Staff led by gerasimov always kept the communication channels with the US military open. Compared with former Commander-in-Chief Sulovikin, gerasimov is not famous for his frontline command ability, but is better at strategic decision-making, national defense construction and national defense diplomacy.
War escalation or strategic callback?
Why should "military special operations" change coaches? 65438+ 10/2, Russian Presidential Spokesman peskov said that gerasimov's appointment was "related to the broader goal of' special military action'". The day before, the Russian Defense Ministry explained that the new Commander-in-Chief needed to handle the close coordination between various arms and services and military departments in order to improve the efficiency of these coordination work.
In September 2020, gerasimov accompanied Putin and shoigu to watch the "Caucasus -2020" military exercise.
How to strengthen the coordination across arms and services and departments and realize the basic goal of "special military action"-controlling the whole Donbass area-is a difficult problem facing the Russian army. On the military level, since the second half of 2022, military publications sponsored by the Russian Ministry of Defense have published many papers, recalling the lack of coordination between front-line services and arms, and the backwardness of using drones and electronic reconnaissance in firepower coverage.
Western analysis is more concerned that the "synthetic group army" formed after the Russian military reform is difficult to follow up because of its heavy firepower allocation, and it may face supply interruption if it goes 50 kilometers ahead. With the continuous improvement of Ukrainian combat experience and firepower allocation, it is difficult for Russian troops to make a breakthrough on the battlefield by repeating the original offensive methods.
Sulovikin took office as Commander-in-Chief from June 5438 to October 2022, originally to break the deadlock. He is famous for his cooperation with many arms on the Syrian battlefield. According to western media, the Russian electronic warfare unit has gradually become a big branch of the synthetic group army, alongside armored forces and artillery, which is related to Sulovikin's suggestion. After returning from Syria, Sulovikin became the commander-in-chief of the Russian space force, responsible for the formation of a new force composed of air force, air defense force, rocket army and space force, which also met the needs of "total war."
Sulovikin did bring his "Syrian experience" to the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield by resuming large-scale air strikes against Kiev and other cities behind Ukraine and strengthening drone strikes, but he could not solve the coordination problems at the strategic level, such as the adjustment of weapons supply and use.
Since September 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin has made many new decisions on this issue, reorganized the military industrial complex, and legislated to ensure the production and upstream and downstream supply of military enterprises. But by June 5438+February, Putin still admitted to reporters that the armament problem was "far from being completely solved" and he discussed the supply of troops almost every day.
This requires the experience of gerasimov. Although gerasimov participated in the Second Chechen War, coordinated the Russian military's actions in Syria, and was accused by the Ukrainian military as the behind-the-scenes commander of the 20 14 Dunbath Civil War, his most widely known achievement was that he presided over the Russian military's modernization reform. In 20 12, Russian defense minister serdyukov, who was originally in charge of the reform plan, stepped down, and shoigu and gerasimov took up new posts as defense minister and chief of general staff respectively, thus opening the "shoigu period" of Russian military reform that continues to this day.
However, some analysts believe that gerasimov's appointment actually means a strategic "callback" of Russian troops. Both the British Ministry of Defence and the "War Research Institute" speculate that "changing coaches" is an admission that the current war situation has failed to achieve Russia's previous goals.
When gerasimov took office, it coincided with a heated discussion between Russia and Ukraine on the "Leidal War". Soreda is located about 10 km north of Bakhmut, an important town in the northeast of Donetsk controlled by Ukrainian army. As of June+10/October 13, 65438, Russian sources said that the Russian army had basically controlled the town. Ukrainian Donetsk Governor kirilenko denied it, but admitted that street fighting was taking place and 80% of the buildings in the town had been destroyed.
Since the winter of 2022, although the long-range confrontation has won or lost, Russia and Ukraine have made little achievements in the frontal confrontation on the ground battlefield. Nowadays, no matter whether Suo Reidar changes hands or not, it is only part of a series of village disputes between Russia and Ukraine around Bakhmut. 10 from September to June, the Russian army announced the occupation of several villages and towns around Bakhmut, similar to Suo Reidar, but it did not change the deadlock in Bakhmut.
From exaggerating "Battle of Donbass" to focusing on battlefields such as Bakhmut and Hikoum on the northern line of Donbass, and then emphasizing "Battle of Bakhmut", it is now simplified as "Battle of Leidal", but the changes in propaganda by both sides are not consistent with the "escalation of the war".
Some analysts therefore believe that if the appointment of Sulovikin is the last effort to "make a quick decision", it is to cater to the voices of hardliners in Russia; Then the appointment of gerasimov, who is unknown as a frontline commander and questioned by hardliners, to succeed Sulovikin seems to mean that Russian troops admit that they will spend a long time with Ukrainian troops in Donbass.
Regarding the outside speculation, Koltunov, Director General of Russian International Affairs Committee, told China Newsweek that the strategy of Russian military is being adjusted recently. "At first, Russia thought that the' special military action' would end soon, and did not realize the amazing resilience of the Ukrainian army and Ukrainian society, nor did it realize that the western world would be so deeply involved." Koltunov said, "Now, people are beginning to think about how to adjust their decisions and effectively deal with this long-term war."
A chance to "fight"?
At the same time of fierce fighting between Russia and Ukraine over the Leidal issue, on June 65438+1October1day, 2023, Russian Commissioner for Human Rights moskal Kova and Ukrainian Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights Lubinetz met in Ankara, Turkey, and reached an agreement on exchanging a new batch of prisoners of war. When meeting with the representatives of the two countries, the "host" Turkish President Erdogan further proposed that the negotiations on the humanitarian corridor could be restarted. However, according to the Tass news agency, the two sides did not talk about this topic during the meeting.
With the development of "long-term war", contact and dialogue outside the battlefield has become an unavoidable issue for both sides. Ukrainian Commissioner Lubinetz1October 65438+ 12 revealed that during this trip to Turkey, more and more voices mentioned the need to institutionalize and legalize the negotiation and dialogue between these enemies, which is also conducive to the more efficient exchange of prisoners between the two sides.
Some western media believe that since the "Special Military Action" began in February 2022, gerasimov, the military leader, has been responsible for making decisions on such matters in Russia. In the past, he went to Syria many times to coordinate the defense diplomacy of Russian troops participating in Syrian military operations. In May 2022, at the request of the US, gerasimov discussed the situation between Russia and Ukraine with Mili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Army. Public reports show that the communication channels between the Russian General Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States will remain open until the end of 2022.
"More communication is conducted in private. What is certain is that there will be contacts between the Pentagon and the Russian General Staff from time to time, and there will also be exchanges between the Russian Foreign Ministry and the State Council. " Koltunov said, "These communications are not too many, but at least we have the first and second communication channels."
Koltunov stressed that this does not mean that the Russian-Ukrainian war situation is expected to "talk while fighting" in the short term, but it is possible for the two sides to restart regular dialogue on some humanitarian issues, which will improve the poor humanitarian environment. After Sulovikin became Commander-in-Chief in June 5438 +2022 10, he bombed Ukrainian cities and energy facilities on a large scale many times, which led to frequent water and power cuts for Ukrainian civilian facilities in this cold winter. Whether the two sides can reach a new agreement on "not attacking key civilian targets" under the mediation of "third parties" such as Turkey in the future is worthy of attention.
Koltunov also pointed out that the commander-in-chief of "special military operations" is a "professional military leader" in charge of the whole operation, but the specific candidate "depends on the specific power balance and power relations within the leadership". Today, gerasimov has three deputies. It is expected that Sulovikin may continue to be responsible for long-range strikes and drone operations. Commander-in-Chief Saliukov is responsible for commanding the ground forces, and Deputy Chief of Staff Alexei King may assist gerasimov in handling logistics, transportation, equipment and humanitarian liaison.
It is too early to say what changes gerasimov's new job will bring to the war situation. Therefore, the outside world is still paying attention to the next adjustment of the Russian command structure and force deployment. On June 65438+ 10/day, it was reported that the former commander of the Russian Central Military Region, General Lapin, who was in charge of ground operations in the early stage of the "special military operation" and was suspected of being dismissed after June 10, had "returned". Earlier, Lapin, like gerasimov, was criticized by Russian hardliners.
Regarding whether Tieping will "come back", Russian Presidential Spokesman peskov said that the relevant laws and regulations in Russia are "open and secret", while Tieping's post adjustment is "invisible in fair laws and regulations".
Reporter: Cao Ran.