The propaganda of the battalion commander stopped. Jin Kailai, who turned back from the position of sharp knife row, complained: "Shit! Let them enforce battlefield discipline! Shoot! Kill us all! They only know how to measure the map with a ruler, but are we walking in a straight line? Show them. Has anyone climbed this mountain? Ask them, this road, from where someone took the road! ..... "—— Li Cunbao's" The Garland under the Mountain "
The two paragraphs quoted above are believed to be familiar to readers who have a certain understanding of the war history of * * *. Both Xu's anger and Jin Kailai's spit reflect a common drawback of commanders or staff offices in wartime organization and command: ignoring the actual natural geographical conditions such as terrain ups and downs and road twists and turns, simply and rudely calculating the distance on the map with the command ruler, and then setting the time for troops to arrive at the designated position on this basis. The result is often that despite their best efforts, all the troops can't be in place on time, which will have a negative impact on the operation.
Take 1979 as an example: on the eastern front, Xu served as the commander, and asked the 4 1 army 12 1 division to attack from that slope and carry out the battle mission of the northern line, and 12 hours advanced 80 kilometers. Results The fastest time was 363 regiments for 32 hours, and the whole division reached the designated position in nearly 3 days.
The 42nd Army124th Division, which attacked from Longzhou and carried out the task of inserting into the south, was required to insert into Gaoping before 18 that day, and cooperate with 4 1 Army to destroy the enemy in Gaoping area within three to five days. But the reality is that the 70-kilometer journey took almost four days, and it was not until the 20th that the soldiers arrived in Gaoping City.
The troops inserted in the northern and southern lines of the two campaigns failed to insert into the designated positions at the specified time. Before the launch of the campaign, * * * refers to the campaign determination to insert it in place before sunset, close Gaopingmen and reach the encirclement of the Vietnamese army. It must be pointed out that it is not Xu's style to carry out deep-seated sports. He just carries out orders. Xu's own style of play is: spread out the whole line, advance synchronously, from shallow to deep, divide and encircle, slowly and steadily, and annihilate the other side. But this policy was rejected by the superior! )
West Line: The Kunming Military Region, with Yang Dezhi as the commander, asked the 38th Division 1 14 Regiment to cross the Red River in the south of Manchuria, along the Langnang, Jinlong and Dengshang, advance 38km seven and a half hours, and insert it in Dai Nai to take over the defense task of a battalion of the 39th Division in the unknown highland in the southeast of Dai Nai, and then insert it in Ben Xi Ai and Song Weilong. When the enemy regiment 36544 1 14 entered the11highland, it was impossible to advance because of the narrow road. /kloc-on the afternoon of 0/8, according to the order of the army, the regiment changed from carrying out interspersed tasks to attacking the enemy face to face. In the post-war review, it was considered that the alternate route was not selected, the road was too narrow and the traffic capacity was too low, so that it was not in place on time and was forced to change the nature of the task. This was a heavy lesson.
The experience and lessons of actual combat prove that it is an extremely important issue to carry out interspersed tasks and calculate time scientifically. Commanders should accurately calculate, reasonably allocate and use time when accepting interspersed tasks and formulating interspersed operational plans. Usually, the whole process of penetration should be divided into several sections according to factors such as penetration distance, enemy situation, road conditions, weather conditions, time limit for completing tasks, weight of troops' equipment, etc., and the possible situations in each section should be fully estimated, and the time of each section should be well planned, leaving room to avoid inadequate preparation.
Another point worth noting is the difference between the distance on the map and the distance on the spot. Especially in the tropical mountain jungle, due to the undulating terrain, the route is tortuous. Generally speaking, the distance on the map should be increased by more than 50% to be roughly consistent with the actual distance. If it is measured as 4 kilometers on the map, it is more appropriate to set it as 6 kilometers on site. As a commander, don't ignore the influence of terrain factors and directly measure the distance with a ruler.
What should the troops do if they can't occupy the starting position of the attack on time and launch the attack at the time specified by their superiors because of natural and geographical factors such as topography, roads and weather? For this unfavorable situation, the commander 1 1 Army 3 1 Division * * who was ordered to lead the recapture of Yinshan made a very correct disposal. Mr. Liao, considering that some teams were not in place due to terrain, roads and other factors, the team that arrived at the designated position was quite tired and needed a short rest for a certain period of time, and resolutely proposed to the superior twice to postpone the preparation time for artillery fire. His composure won the troops an extremely precious 50 minutes needed to complete the attack preparation. 3 1 division finally fought a clean annihilation war at a small cost and successfully recovered Yinshan Mountain, which reflected Mr. Liao's excellent command ability.
Our soldiers are not afraid of hardship, fatigue or death, but they cannot sacrifice in vain and pay unnecessary prices. As commanders and staff officers, you can't just take a ruler to measure a map. Soldiers have two legs!
The author is a master of history and a university lecturer, focusing on the history of the Sino-Vietnamese war.