165438+1October 30th, the official website of Beijing Banking Regulatory Bureau announced the punishment decision on the case of "fake wealth management" in Tianqiao Sub-branch of Minsheng Bank, claiming that the persons involved in Tianqiao Sub-branch of China Minsheng Bank sold fictitious wealth management products, and the internal control management of Beijing Branch seriously violated the prudent operating rules. In addition to ordering China Minsheng Bank Beijing Branch to make corrections, it also imposed a total fine of 27.5 million yuan, and imposed administrative penalties on Zhang Ying, Xiao Ye, He Rui, Wang Tao, Wang Xiaohong, Li Yahui, He Shuqiong, Wang Fei, Wang Qiuyu, Chen Yayong, Zhang Jian, Zhou Jin, Wang Yuewei and other 13 responsible persons.
Among them, Zhang Ying, former president of Tianqiao Sub-branch of Minsheng Bank, was given the administrative penalty of lifelong disqualification of directors and senior managers and lifelong ban on banking. Xiao Ye and He Rui were given administrative punishment for prohibiting lifelong banking. Administrative penalties were imposed on Wang Tao, Wang Xiaohong, Li Yahui, He Shuqiong, Wang Fei, Wang Qiuyu and Kun Yatong, who were prohibited from engaging in banking business for 65,438+0 years respectively. Zhang Jian and Zhou Jin were warned and given an administrative penalty of 500,000 yuan. Wang Yuewei was given an administrative penalty of five years' disqualification of directors and senior managers.
Case Reduction: "Air Ticket" under the Coat of Share Transfer
In April this year, many investors who were cheated by financial management "flying orders" gathered in the lobby of Tianqiao Sub-branch of Beijing Branch of Minsheng Bank to discuss their views. The amount involved is about 65.438+0.65 billion yuan, involving about 654.38+0.50 customers. As a result, a "flying order" case in the cloak of share transfer surfaced.
On the same day, Minsheng Bank announced that Zhang Ying, the president of the branch involved, had been arrested. According to the first financial reporter, a vice president and three employees of the branch were also taken away by the public security organs.
According to the investors involved, when they bought wealth management products from the wealth management manager of Tianqiao Sub-branch of Minsheng Bank, the other party told them that the original investors were eager to pay back the money, so they were willing to give up interest. The original product with an annualized rate of 4.2% will expire after half a year, which is equivalent to an annualized income of 8.4%.
A bank wealth management account manager pointed out to the first financial reporter that this business model is called "share transfer" in private banks and wealth management industries, and it is a relatively common business model. Some customers will also see in the product manual of purchasing wealth management products that the contract is allowed to be transferred to others before the expiration.
But in fact, these customers are not buying Minsheng Bank wealth management products at all. Since then, Minsheng Bank officially posted a poster in the circle of friends, saying, "All the financial knowledge you want to know is here": "Up to now, our' extraordinary asset management series' personal financial products have paid the principal and income on time according to the contract."
It can be inferred from this that the wealth management products included in the aforementioned "share transfer" products should not be similar wealth management products that are self-operated by Minsheng Bank or approved by the Head Office for compliance consignment.
Minsheng Bank publicly stated afterwards that, according to the clues initially grasped by Minsheng Bank, Minsheng Bank's "fake wealth management" case was that Zhang Ying fabricated false investment wealth management products and wealth management transfer products by controlling other people's accounts as fund collection accounts, and he himself or instructed individual employees of branches to find target customers, illegally raised customer funds for personal control, and some of them were used to invest in real estate, cultural relics, jewelry and other fields, and the raised funds did not enter the accounting system of Minsheng Bank.
There are loopholes in the internal control mechanism
After the incident, Shi Jie, vice president of Minsheng Bank, said that according to the information reflected by customers, Beijing Branch found that Zhang Ying, president of Aerospace Bridge Sub-branch, used forged wealth management contracts and bank seals to defraud customers of wealth management funds, which was an operational risk event caused by personal moral hazard and was suspected of breaking the law.
An insider close to Minsheng Bank's "fake financial management" case told the First Financial Reporter that the outbreak of the Aerospace Bridge Sub-branch case was not "explosive", but was discovered by internal self-examination of Minsheng Bank. He said that this reflects that Minsheng Bank has serious security risks in internal control, and the head office cannot open the "black box" of branches.
In the view of the financial manager of a joint-stock bank, once millions of financial products and funds enter the bank account, in addition to monitoring the transfer of large amounts of funds, it is impossible for the middle and back offices of the bank not to be monitored. It can be seen that the funds in the "fake financial management" case probably did not pass through the bank account at all; And if you use other bank cards, it is incredible to brush POS machines at Minsheng Bank outlets to buy wealth management.
Minsheng Bank publicly stated afterwards that the main reasons for this case are: First, there are loopholes in the internal control mechanism and internal control management of individual grass-roots units, and the awareness of compliance needs to be further improved, and the construction of compliance system and the cultivation of compliance culture need to be continuously strengthened. Second, personal violation of the system and illegal operation are the main reasons for this case. This also reflects that the intensity and frequency of daily business inspections of branches are not enough, the timeliness of inspections is not strong, and there is a lack of necessary sensitivity to potential risks. Third, the branch did not manage the employee's behavior in place, and the daily management failed to play its due role in preventing and restricting, especially the moral hazard management of key positions and personnel.
Shi Jie said that a special meeting of the whole bank had been held within Minsheng Bank, requiring all employees to learn lessons, attach great importance to the problems behind the case, conscientiously implement the special governance requirements of the CBRC such as "three violations", "three arbitrage", "four irregularities" and "chaos in the banking market", strictly implement the system, completely plug loopholes, thoroughly investigate hidden dangers, and prevent similar incidents from happening again.
It is understood that at present, Minsheng Bank has ushered in a complex system reform, including embedding a private bank account management system in wealth management products to monitor the situation of branches and sub-branch customers throughout the process; After the customer's investment quota reaches a certain level, it will be registered and monitored by the private banking center of the Head Office to prevent "flying orders".
Liars should be punished.