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Do you know that South Korea also has a nuclear weapons program?
If you ask the DPRK and the ROK who had the earliest nuclear weapons development program, many people will definitely think of North Korea, but in fact, South Korea's nuclear weapons program is much earlier than North Korea's, and it was even cheated by Japanese gangs.

In 1950s, South Korea was cheated by Japanese "gangs" for developing nuclear weapon insurance.

195 1 year, South Li Chengwan's government tried to make its own nuclear weapons. At that time, South Korea knew almost nothing about the nuclear field, not only lacked equipment and technology, but also lacked decent scientific research leaders. At this time, a Japanese expert named Okada came to South Korea, and Li Chengwan regarded him as a distinguished guest. For this reason, a laboratory was established in Qianhai Sumo Island, Zhenhai, South Korea. Okada, the "father of nuclear weapons", is just an ordinary engineer of an electrical company in Japan. Under the leadership of this "Japanese gangster", the Korean nuclear team began a long journey. But what puzzles Korean engineers is that they only see Okada turn around the center and leave in a hurry every day, and everyone has never heard of Okada's speech on nuclear technology.

The older scientists in this team couldn't bear to wait, so they went directly to Okada and begged him to take out the drawings first and let them study them. With the efforts of these people, Okada handed over a drawing, but to the surprise of Koreans, this drawing marked the principle that charged particles run at high speed in a high-frequency magnetic field to produce a particle accelerator. This is obviously a drawing of electrical engineering. What does it have to do with nuclear physics? In desperation, Okada threw out his own unique nuclear weapons manufacturing scheme: he wanted to obtain a large amount of hydrogen by electrolyzing water, and then detonated the hydrogen by adding high voltage electricity to make a hydrogen bomb. It sounds like a fable theory, and people like Quan Xiao can't laugh or cry. Koreans who doubted Okada's identity began a secret investigation of Okada, and the result finally came out. 1June, 953, Okada was deported.

The early development of civil nuclear energy in Korea was promoted and influenced by the policy of peaceful use of nuclear energy in the United States in the 1950s. 1956 On February 3, South Korea and the United States signed a cooperation agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and in March, the Ministry of Atomic Energy was established. At the same time, China sent a large number of nuclear experts to the United States for education and training in nuclear energy development. Up to 1958, nuclear experts have been sent abroad for training 89 times. In addition, 1958, 1962, on February 3rd, Korea signed an agreement with American General Dynamics Company and General Atomics Company to purchase 100 kW TRIGAMarkII research reactor (used by General Atomics Company for training, research and isotope production), which was completed on March 30th, 1962. South Korea has used these research reactors to carry out a lot of research and development work in the nuclear field. At the same time, South Korea vigorously carried out the civil nuclear energy development plan, established the Atomic Energy Research Institute on June 1958+00+ 1, and began to build nuclear waste treatment plants and research and build nuclear power plants, so as to establish the infrastructure and technical capabilities to support its nuclear weapons program.

In the 1970s, South Korea's nuclear program was strongly blocked by the United States.

Japanese military expert Jiang Tian Jian introduced four conditions for developing nuclear weapons: capital, technology, nuclear materials and will. Park chung-hee has a strong desire to develop nuclear weapons, and another key condition is to acquire nuclear materials. In the early 1970s, park chung-hee began to actively prepare for the development of nuclear weapons.

1. Establish specialized agencies. 1971.1kloc-0/.00 A nuclear weapons development committee was established in Cheongwadae, and the second economic secretarial office was newly established to manage related affairs. In the winter of 1973, a top secret report on the development of nuclear weapons was formed, with a budget of about1.5-200 million dollars and a development time of 6-65438+.

2. Recruit nuclear experts. The core figure in the development of nuclear weapons is Dr. Zhu Zaiyang, who is an international authority in the field of nuclear fuel. Referred back to China by South Korea's Director of Science and Technology Choe Jiong-sup, he became the first deputy director of the Institute of Atomic Energy in March 1973. Zhu visited the United States, Canada and other countries successively, and introduced more than 10 nuclear experts. At this point, the core camp of Cui Jiong-xie (Chief Commander of Nuclear Development) → Zhu Zaiyang (Practice Manager) → Jin Zhe (Responsible for Post-processing) has been formed.

3. Purchase post-treatment facilities. The core of nuclear weapons development is to acquire reprocessing facilities, because reprocessing facilities are essential to acquire plutonium, the raw material of nuclear weapons. 1972 south Korea began to purchase reprocessing facilities. Officials from the Ministry of Science and Technology of Korea 1972 visited France and Britain to investigate the possibility of technical cooperation in reprocessing facilities. In the same year, South Korea began negotiations with French nuclear engineering company SGN, hoping that France would develop an experimental reprocessing facility for South Korea. 1974 In March, Korean scientists visited Canada and hoped to import NRX experimental reactor. Park chung-hee government finally chose to acquire reprocessing facilities and technology from France. Director Cui Jiong-sub of South Korea visited France in May 1972 and reached an agreement with the then Minister of Industrial Technology Development of France to provide post-processing technology to South Korea. From June of 1972 to June of 10, Korea Institute of Atomic Energy made many practical contacts with French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), and finally determined the cooperation intention. A preliminary contract was signed at 1974. According to a report by a South Korean journalist at that time, the reprocessing plant in the 1974 contract can provide 20 kilograms of plutonium to South Korea every year, which is enough to make 2-3 nuclear weapons.

1974 12. The U.S. Embassy in Korea sent an assessment report on the nuclear status of South Korea to Washington. The report concluded that "South Korea is in the initial stage of the development of its weapons program". 1March, 975 12, Schneider, then US ambassador to Korea, called the State Council, USA: "We judged that the time for South Korea to develop nuclear weapons was less than 10. Judging from all kinds of information we have, high-level officials of the Korean government are very concerned about the development of nuclear weapons, and relevant achievements will appear in the early 1980s. With the perseverance of Koreans, the high-level technology mastered, the policy of attracting foreign experts, and the enthusiastic encouragement of countries including the president, it is by no means alarmist for South Korea to build nuclear weapons in a short time. " Under the strong opposition of the United States, park chung-hee had to abandon the introduction of reprocessing facilities from France and temporarily suspended the development of nuclear weapons.

The park chung-hee administration has not given up its pursuit of nuclear weapons-related technologies. After the deal with the French reprocessing facility was cancelled, park chung-hee tried to develop nuclear weapons technology in a roundabout way. From 1976 to 12, Korea established the Korea Nuclear Fuel Development Institute (KNFDI). The purpose of this research is to develop the fuel production technology of civil reactors, but its more important significance is to obtain the reprocessing capacity in an indirect way. The institute maintains close contact with SGN company in France. The institute also sent 20 senior researchers to study post-processing technology in European countries such as France and Belgium. In addition, South Korea also obtained the post-radioactive inspection facility (PIEF) from France at that time. The public function of PIEF is to test and evaluate the performance and integrity of nuclear waste, but this facility is to move the spent fuel from the storage pool to the hot room, and then dissolve the spent fuel by remote control device and measure it. This process is very similar to the core stage of post-processing. Moreover, South Korea restarted secret negotiations with France on 1978, hoping to resume importing reprocessing facilities from France.

When the United States basically confirmed in 1975 that South Korea was advancing its nuclear weapons program, the State Council suggested taking "special bilateral action" against South Korea, supplemented by the control of international mechanisms. The role of international mechanisms is first challenged. Although South Korea signed the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) in April 1975 under the persuasion of the State Council and the National Assembly, the speeches of government officials such as park chung-hee in June 1975 showed that South Korea would still regard nuclear weapons as an option at this time. After that, the United States decided to use economic and security means to pressure South Korea to completely stop its nuclear program. First of all, the United States threatened to detain the US$ 292 million loan provided by the Export-Import Bank of the United States to Guri-2 in South Korea, as well as some low-absorption loans and technical assistance provided by the United States to other reactors under planning. The United States also tried to persuade South Korea not to import reprocessing facilities, suggesting that South Korea and the United States will support the construction of a multilateral regional reprocessing plant in East Asia. These messages were sent to park chung-hee through South Korean Ambassador Schneider, but it didn't work, and then Kissinger threatened to withdraw from the US security commitment. Kissinger sent Philip Habib, Deputy Secretary of State, to deliver these messages at the end of 1975. In a face-to-face conversation with park chung-hee, Habib said that the United States will reassess the entire security alliance, including withdrawing the nuclear umbrella (during the period of 1958- 199 1, the nuclear protection provided by the United States to South Korea was completed by directly deploying nuclear weapons in South Korea. 199 1 After the withdrawal of the US nuclear deployment in South Korea, the extended deterrence of the United States in South Korea was mainly provided by the sea-based nuclear forces deployed in the Pacific Ocean and the nuclear forces of the US Air Force, and was confirmed in the form of the annual US-South Korea Security Consultative Conference (SCM) communique. )。 He also hinted that if South Korea stops its nuclear weapons program, the United States will increase its technical and economic assistance to South Korea in developing civilian nuclear energy. In the later period of park chung-hee's nuclear development, the United States still directly intervened in Korean nuclear development activities for many times. For example, the PIEF factory in Dade Science City became the focus of unplanned inspection in the United States after its completion. After the United States discovered that South Korea resumed negotiations with France on 1978, US President Carter blocked the deal through direct communication with French Prime Minister guiscard D 'Estaing. Moreover, after park chung-hee's assassination, the TFTF reactor that the Park government worked hard to build in the later period was stopped under the pressure of the United States.

Why does park chung-hee want to develop nuclear weapons? 197 1 10, park chung-hee once said to a senior official in charge of defense-related heavy chemical industry: "Our national security is very fragile because of the uncertainty of the US military presence on the Korean peninsula. In order to become safe and independent, we need to get rid of our dependence on US military protection ... Can we develop nuclear weapons? " Park chung-hee hopes to use "special weapons" to give full play to South Korea's defense capability.

South Korea's nuclear weapons development level. To what extent did South Korea's nuclear weapons program go in the late park chung-hee administration? Park chung-hee's press secretary Shen recalled that in 1979 and 1 year, park chung-hee told him privately, "We will complete the first nuclear weapon in 198 1 year, and then Kim Il Sung will not dare to invade South Korea." Park chung-hee also plans to build South Korea in 198 1. Dr. Kim Dong-hoon, the main person in charge of South Korea's nuclear program, once said, "The design was completed in the month of President Park's death 1979+00, and the related development went smoothly, although it was a little later than planned." The nuclear fuel processing facility was completed in 1978, and park chung-hee attended the completion ceremony. 1979, South Korean scholar He Yingshan commented on South Korea's nuclear capability: "South Korea is striving to acquire fissile materials, and in this respect, South Korea is at least six years ahead of North Korea."

After Quan Doo-hwan came to power, South Korea's nuclear weapons program was cut and suspended. During the Lu Taiyu administration, out of concern about North Korea's nuclear program, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a report on fully launching its nuclear weapons program. Lu Taiyu did not immediately veto the proposal, but Lu Taiyu only vetoed it after the United States learned about it and put pressure on the ROK. 1991165438+18 October, South Korean President Lu Taiyu officially announced South Korea's denuclearization policy: "South Korea will not manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons", and there are no nuclear fuel reprocessing or refining facilities. In the middle and late 1990s, South Korea repeatedly hoped to develop its own reprocessing facilities or conduct reprocessing overseas, but these activities were stopped under the obstruction of the United States.