Author Zhang Yating
Editor Jin Yang
Recently, an internal employee letter "exposed" a major personnel change in Meizu-Huang, the former CEO and brother of Meizu's founder, became CEO and remained as chairman of Meizu Technology, and will focus on strategic direction and product-related work.
It is understood that Huang joined Meizu in 2004, one year after Meizu Technology was formally established. Huang has successively held important positions such as Meizu finance, supply chain and overseas business leaders.
In this regard, some netizens commented, "This personnel change just confirms that Meizu is a family business." Meizu's public relations said, "Our management is very modern, and there are many types of existence at the capital level."
In fact, it is not uncommon for the founder's cronies to hold important positions in the company's management. For example, Ren's daughter is currently the vice chairman and chief financial officer of Huawei.
The main reason why Meizu has been criticized in recent years may be that all the "Three Musketeers" who fought in the country were out, while Meizu led by the "Huang family" was "losing ground" in the mobile phone battle field.
"Huang Family" in Meizu Management
Sohu Technology found that among the main personnel of Zhuhai Meizu Technology Co., Ltd., in addition to (Huang), there are two members surnamed Huang, namely Huang He. In addition, Huang is the historical shareholder and Huang is the historical legal representative.
There are two key points in Meizu's changes in directors and supervisors in the past two years. According to the industrial and commercial data, after April 30th, 20 19, the position of general manager changed from Huang to Huang, and the position of supervisor changed from to. After June 65438+1October 65438+April 2020, the supervisor was changed from Huang Xiaoqin to Huang Jinsong.
Judging from the public information, there are at least eight "Huang family members" behind Meizu's organizational structure. Among them, Huang Zhang's cousin Huang Baiqing is the vice president of logistics in Meizu; Huang, my cousin, is the general manager and purchasing director in the company; Huang Zhang's sister Huang Xiaoqin is the vice president of business.
The criticism of Meizu family business has a long history. According to the report of Pinwan, some insiders said that the quality of Meizu products has dropped significantly. For example, frequent fires in chargers are related to the Huang family in charge of the supply chain. "In 20 16, Meizu actually had the ability to sell 30 to 40 million units, but at that time, the Huang family had just taken over the supply chain from Guo Wanxi and something went wrong."
In stark contrast to the ubiquitous Huang family, it is the lonely withdrawal of the entrepreneurial "Three Musketeers". The "Three Musketeers" are mainly composed of co-founder Bai Yongxiang, Li Nan in charge of marketing and Flyme system manager Yang Yan, who have made outstanding contributions to the development of Meizu. In 20 18, Bai Yongxiang resigned due to PRO 7 Waterloo, Yang Yan resigned as the president of Flyme Division, and in 20 19, Li Nan resigned due to opposition to Meizu 16.
For their departure, Huang Zhang's attitude is slightly indifferent. When a netizen asked about Bai Yongxiang's resignation, Huang Zhang said, "I just want him to buy his PRO 7”； at the original price"; Regarding Li Nan's departure, Huang Zhang responded that "it is talent who can make money for the company, and it is a waste of money that has been losing money."
After his younger brother Huang became CEO, Sohu Technology saw in Meizu official community that a post entitled "General Manager Huang's Reply to Family Business Rumors" became a hot topic with a high degree of discussion.
The post was published on February 8th, and the content was Huang Zhang's response to the remarks made on 20 19 about "Meizu family business". The poster said that "rumors stop at the wise"; The most popular comment is, "Boss Huang is right, these low-level blacks are really boring."
Earlier, Huang Zhang said, "My younger brother who has worked in Meizu for many years is one of the overseas marketing executives. The organizational structure of Meizu Company is open, so don't pretend not to see it. As for shares, I personally gave employees about 2 billion shares as equity incentives twice, and the follow-up company will continue to implement equity incentives through the form of increasing shares (it should be "additional issuance", Sohu Technology Note). Due to policy reasons, most employees hold shares through the establishment of limited companies, so industrial and commercial registration is invisible. "
The market share is only 0.5%. Can "coaching change" solve Meizu's dilemma?
In fact, it doesn't matter whether Meizu admits that it is a family business, because most people don't simply reject the family business, but reject the one-sided "cronyism" that affects the company's operation.
For example, as a family business, Samsung has three generations of heads from the Lee family, and its management style is considered to be militarized, male chauvinistic and zero tolerance for mistakes. However, its family management mode has brought high cohesion and decision-making efficiency. Samsung has also grown from a local company to a global brand, and now its overall turnover is equivalent to one-fifth of South Korea's GDP.
In the history of Meizu's development dominated by the Huang family, the wrong strategic direction and frequent personnel turmoil made Meizu miss the best opportunity to become the first camp of mobile phone manufacturers, so that it became the "Citi Xiaomei" on an equal footing with Huawei, Qiku and Xiaomi. Others.
During the rapid rise of domestic manufacturers and the rapid increase of Huawei's OV market share, Meizu blindly increased the number in 20 16 and released 14 new products in one breath; In 20 17, it entered the high-end market, but the PRO 7 series did not impress consumers, and it was still digesting the inventory until 20 18. Executives have become the buyers of decision-making mistakes, and the adjustment of organizational structure has ushered in great changes.
According to public data, Meizu's mobile phone shipments were 20 million units in 20 15, 22 million units in 20 16 and 20 million units in 20 17. From 20 18, Meizu will no longer announce the specific shipments. Sino data shows that Meizu shipped 9.48 million units in 20 18, down 46% year-on-year.
Regarding how Meizu caused this problem today, Li Nan once said in an interview with the media, "The whole company culture is arrogant from top to bottom. Think about it, Meizu has also made its own Weibo and wants to compete with Sina. "
Last year, Meizu only released two 17 series mobile phones. According to CINNO data, in the first half of 2020, Meizu accounted for 0.5% of the domestic mobile phone market, and Q3 accounted for 0.3%. However, thanks to the contraction of the front line, Meizu announced that it will complete its performance and achieve profitability in 2020.
As the new CEO, Huang said in this year's internal letter that Meizu will continue to adhere to the high-end route and differentiation strategy in the future. In 20021year, Meizu will implement the strategy of "one body and two wings", with high-end flagship mobile phones as the main body, and at the same time fully develop AIoT smart wear business and Lipro high-end smart home.
However, the mobile phone market has entered an oligopoly era, and the head effect has intensified, and the living space of "small but beautiful" manufacturers has intensified and shrunk. According to IDC's domestic mobile phone market data, in 2020, other mobile phone manufacturers accounted for 3.5%, down 5 1.8% year-on-year, and 6.5% in 20 19, down 5 1.7% year-on-year.
With the end of the nut phone and the announcement of "small but beautiful", how far can Meizu, led by the new CEO Huang, go on the "small but beautiful" route?