First, innovative consciousness, seeking development in renovation.
Propaganda of ideological and political work must be based on concept innovation, and we should think, plan and deploy the work from the perspective of overall situation, advance and actual combat, and give full play to the enthusiasm, initiative and creativity of political cadres and backbones. First, we must establish a "sense of advance."
Second, innovate ideas and seek development through enrichment and perfection.
In order to meet the requirements of ideological and political work in the new situation, we must constantly adjust the new ideas of ideological and political work. A series of educational rectification and methods and measures carried out by the army are not only the need to strengthen the construction of border defense forces, but also the concern for the vast number of officers and men. Only by strictly administering the police can the border guards be more pure and the team never change color.
Third, innovate the mechanism and seek development through inheritance and improvement.
Adhere to mechanism innovation, and guide officers and men to struggle hard and strive for self-improvement in their values, social psychology, morality, ability and mental state.
The first is to establish an incentive mechanism. While inculcating and enlightening people in a positive way, guiding and inspiring people with positive examples and models, we should also pay attention to police education with negative examples, and warn and admonish people with negative teaching materials to urge people to reflect on bad phenomena and take them as a warning. The second is to establish an information feedback mechanism. We should always go deep into the grassroots, investigate and study the masses, and establish and improve the information feedback mechanism.
The third is to establish a mechanism to solve problems. We must resolutely prevent and overcome the wrong practice of focusing only on solving practical problems, ignoring solving ideological problems, and even replacing ideological and political education with solving practical problems, so as to avoid the tendency of simplification and practicality of ideological and political work. The fourth is to establish a scientific evaluation mechanism.
Main problems in ideological and political education of grass-roots fire forces at present
1, the ideological understanding is not enough, and the task of political education is discounted.
Although the superior has repeatedly stressed the need to attach great importance to and strengthen leadership when deploying educational tasks, the grass-roots fire brigade can not correctly handle the contradiction between work and study in actual operation, and has not really implemented it, and its enthusiasm is not enough.
Many cadres and soldiers, especially a few brigade leaders, always feel that fire fighting and rescue, duty training, special fire safety management and so on. Time is tight and tasks are heavy, and political education is a "soft indicator", which is not as urgent as other work. If you don't pay attention to it, you won't see the effect at once. Even if you don't do well, you can cope with the past. Therefore, the time of education is often squeezed, the content is compressed and the personnel are mobilized, which affects the implementation and effect of education.
2. Formalism is widespread in political education.
Some grass-roots political cadres do not carefully prepare lessons for the education assigned by their superiors in combination with the actual situation of their own units, and read textbooks word by word in class, even if they finish reading, they just want to do it, but don't want to do it well; Some units cut corners when carrying out political education, stipulating two days of content, and only arranging one day or half a day; Even some units carry out political education only to cope with the inspection by superiors, and create educational momentum through the internet, briefings and other means. To some extent, fraud exists in political education in different forms.
The method of political education is out of date.
In recent years, grass-roots fire fighting units have been basically equipped with computers, televisions, DVD players and other equipment, and the educational conditions have been greatly developed. However, the educational methods are advanced, but the educational methods have not changed much.
Most grass-roots political cadres always take political lessons like this. They are also content to read in class and copy on the blackboard. They are content with the status quo, refuse to use their brains and do not know how to use advanced equipment. When most brigades carry out special education, they only know the old routine of meeting mobilization, attending classes, discussing, writing experiences and summing up. They carry out education according to the plan, talk about experience according to the script, find no problems and experiences, and the educational effect is not obvious.
4. The difference of political education level is not obvious.
In recent years, various focused political education activities have been carried out for different educational objects, and good results have been achieved. However, judging from a large number of conventional education, there are still different levels of confusion between officers and men, and the problem of "one pot cooking" has not been fundamentally solved.
In order to save trouble, several political cadres have a class of cadres and soldiers, and everyone listens to a lesson plan. They are not separated from each other at different levels. What they should say is unclear, and what the soldiers should not know is invisibly leaked in class. The educational effect is not ideal, and even has a negative impact. In some units, the form of political education is "consistent between officers and men", and the effect of education is measured by soldiers' standards. The quality of cadre education is not high, which makes soldiers unable to understand, and the whole education is in a mess.
5. Political cadres lack theoretical knowledge and the knowledge content of teaching is not high.
Most grass-roots political cadres are relatively young, some have just been adjusted from fire prevention and combat training posts, some have just graduated, and their knowledge of political theory is generally not high, resulting in low knowledge of political education, which can not fundamentally solve the problems encountered by officers and men in life, work and study and enhance their enthusiasm for learning.
When teaching, "according to the book", formalism goes through the motions, and the language is dry and empty. Especially for the lack of market economy and high-tech knowledge, officers and men are selling "old tunes", which sounds boring and tasteless.
References:
Some thoughts on promoting the development of ideological and political work in military-civilian network