After the failure of the First Great Revolution, China waged an indomitable struggle to save the revolution and explore the correct revolutionary road. In the exploration of the revolutionary road, Mao Zedong, Zhu De and other proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation combined Marxism–Leninism's universal truth with the reality of China's revolution, and gradually realized the political strategic transformation from urban to rural areas and the military strategic transformation from regular warfare to guerrilla warfare, opening up a revolutionary road with China characteristics, which established rural base areas, surrounded cities with rural areas and finally seized cities. In the process of exploring China's revolutionary road, Zhu De was one of the pioneers, who made unique achievements and outstanding contributions from theory to practice.
First, after the failure of "Nanchang Uprising", the idea of changing political strategy and choosing rural foothold was put forward in time.
The road of China revolution is a key issue related to the success or failure of the revolution. How should we take the revolutionary road in China, a semi-colonial and semi-feudal backward country with extremely unbalanced political and economic development? In the works of Marx and Lenin, there is no ready-made answer. Before the August 7th meeting, China had been copying the experience of Russian October Revolution, focusing on cities, in an attempt to achieve the strategic goal of seizing national political power through widespread riots in central cities. The Nanchang Uprising was also aimed at taking the big city of Guangzhou south and then holding the Northern Expedition. So the rebel army left Nanchang for the south, and as a result, the main force was defeated in Tangkeng and Chaoshan in Guangdong. Zhu De said: "The main lesson of failure is that the insurgents did not integrate with the peasant movement in Jiangxi, but went to Guangdong. If we take advantage of the contradictions between warlords at that time, it is completely tenable to carry out peasant movements throughout Jiangxi, solve land problems, establish revolutionary base areas, and transform the rebels themselves. " (1) Where to go after failure? This problem is facing Zhu De severely. He resolutely led the rest of the people who failed in the uprising and started a long-distance battle to find a revolutionary road under extremely difficult conditions. At that time, the unit was completely out of touch with its superiors, in danger and with unstable morale. 1927 10 10 On 7 October, Zhu De held a meeting of cadres in Maozhi, Raoping, and decided to get in touch with his superiors as soon as possible to save this unit. "Insert this unit from the northeast, advance along the border between Fujian, Guangdong and Jiangxi, and find a foothold." (2) This decision is the result of Zhu De's reflection from the experience and lessons of the failure of Nanchang Uprising. After marching in Wuping, Fujian, at the junction of Fujian and Jiangxi, the troops quickly entered the mountainous area of southern Jiangxi. At the end of June+10 in 5438, when the troops arrived at Tian Xin Wei in Yuan Xian County, Zhu De clearly stated at the military meeting: "This area is the foundation of the peasant movement during the Great Revolution, and it must be combined with the peasant movement to find a foothold." (3) Subsequently, Zhu De and Chen Yi came to Shangbao, Wenying and Gu Ting in the southwest of Chongyi County at the junction of Hunan, Guangdong and Jiangxi. Recalling the history of this struggle, Zhu De said: "In the past, the revolution was only about insurrection in cities. At this time, we knew that we could go up the mountain to fight guerrilla warfare. " "We didn't know that we had to go up the mountain for a month and felt that there was a way out." ④ The conclusion that there is a way up the mountain is Zhu De's valuable exploration of China's revolutionary road, which shows the outstanding talent, strategic vision and courage of proletarian politicians and military strategists.
Second, the "Three Combinations in Southern Jiangxi" put forward the idea of transforming military strategy from regular war to guerrilla warfare by creating a new type of people's army.
China's revolution must take the road of encircling the cities from the countryside, and a new people's army led by the proletariat must be established to solve the problem of military strategic transformation. The rest of the Nanchang Uprising Army led by Zhu De is based on the old army, and the party's leadership over the army is very weak, the composition of the army is very complicated, and the warlordism habit is quite serious. How to transform this army? Zhu De started with political and ideological education. When the troops arrived at Tianxinxu in Anyuan County, Zhu De and Chen Yi reorganized their troops for the first time. In view of their confusion, some people were pessimistic about the revolution and left the team to escape. He told the troops about the situation and the future, and strengthened his confidence in continuing the revolution. He said to the officers and men, "Those who want revolution can come with me, and those who don't want revolution can go home reluctantly." He also used the tortuous road of the Russian revolution to educate everyone: "The Russian revolution in 1905 failed, and the' slag' left behind was the backbone of the October Revolution. This time we are equal to 1905 in Russia. As long as a few people are retained, they will play a very important role in the future revolution. The previous method didn't work, and now we are going to do it by' stretching'. " ⑤ After this reorganization, the team facing disintegration was revived and its quality was obviously improved.
At the end of 1927 10, the troops arrived in Dayu (Yu). On the basis of ideological reorganization of the troops, Zhu De decided to organize the reorganization of the troops. The empty shelf of the nominal army and division system was abolished, and the troops were organized into a column with three detachments. In view of the fact that there is no grass-roots Party organization in the army and the number of people in party member is small, the Party's work cannot go deep into the grass-roots units and soldiers. "First, rectify the organization of the Party and the Communist Youth League, and establish Party branches." ⑥ The Party branch distributes some party member to various companies to strengthen the Party's grass-roots work. Later, Zhu De said: At that time, we didn't know that the branch would be located in the company, but we distributed a part of party member to various companies, thus strengthening the party's work at the grassroots level, which was a measure of great significance to the construction of this unit. These organizational measures of Dayu's reorganization have strengthened the party's leadership over the army and are the beginning of building a new type of people's army.
In the same year, in the first ten days of 1 1, the troops moved to Shangbao area in Chongyi County, where the peasant movement was high. Zhu De took advantage of this advantage to carry out military training and consolidation for its troops. First of all, rectify the discipline and stipulate that all fund-raising and seized items should be turned over. Then, we have military training classes, with large classes every other day and small classes every day. One of the important contents of the lecture is to change the old concept that there is only regular warfare and implement the transformation to guerrilla warfare. Without realizing this transformation of military strategy as soon as possible, it will be difficult to survive and develop. Zhu De personally gave a lecture to the troops: "At that time, the tactical problem was mainly how to change from fighting a big battle to fighting a small battle, that is, fighting guerrilla warfare." ⑦ While giving military training courses to the troops, we should disperse the company's activities, help farmers to produce labor, publicize the revolutionary truth to the masses, and mobilize the masses to fight local tyrants and divide the fields. In this way, the army quickly adapted to the changes in military strategy and changed some old systems and concepts in the past. Zhu De recalled: "We retreated from Fujian to Jiangxi and began to be forced to go up the mountain to fight guerrilla warfare. This has advantages. From then on, we began to turn to the right direction-the direction of guerrilla warfare. We did not adopt the method of occupying big cities in the past, but sought truth from facts, combined with the masses, launched mass uprisings and created revolutionary base areas. Tactics have also changed. If you are sure to fight, don't fight if you are not sure. Swim if you don't fight. With the correct direction, revolutionary forces can exist and develop. " After nearly 20 days of training and consolidation, "the troops have moved towards unity, strengthened discipline and improved their combat effectiveness." ⑨
From the perspective of military reform, the "three rectifications in southern Jiangxi" provided valuable experience for the establishment of a new type of people's army. From the perspective of military strategic transformation, the "three combinations of southern Jiangxi" has made a useful exploration for the development of rural guerrilla warfare.
Third, the "Southern Hunan Uprising" attempted to liberate the peasants and establish the regime of workers and peasants.
After the "Three Rectifications in Southern Jiangxi", Zhu De and Chen Yi led their troops to the southern Hunan area with the foundation of the peasant movement in 1928+0. With the support and cooperation of the CPC Southern Hunan Special Committee, Yizhang County was outsmarted first, and then the famous "Nianguan Riot" was launched in five counties in southern Hunan. Zhu De renamed the army he led as the First Division of the Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants, openly launched an armed uprising to establish a revolutionary regime, and carried out the banner of an armed regime of workers and peasants.
During the uprising in southern Hunan, Soviet regimes were established in Yizhang, Chenzhou, Zixing, Yongxing and Leiyang counties, and Soviet governments at district and township levels were established in other counties:1In mid-March, 1928, Yongxing held a county Soviet congress and established the Soviet government in southern Hunan. Under the leadership of the Soviet government, farmers rose to fight local tyrants and divide the land. The riots in southern Hunan mobilized millions of peasants who supported the revolution and created a good situation of armed separatism. The Third Division, the Fourth Division, the Seventh Division and two independent regiments of the Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants were established in southern Hunan. "Since then, our army has combined with the Hunan peasant movement." "Don't take over big cities as in the past, but seek truth from facts, unite with the masses, launch mass uprisings and create base areas." Participating in the uprising in southern Hunan is a successful attempt to establish the revolutionary regime of workers and peasants by combining the army with the peasant movement.
Later, due to the "Left" putschism and the policy of killing and arson, the Southern Hunan Special Committee aroused the dissatisfaction of the masses and greatly frustrated the victory that had been achieved. In addition, the warlords of Guangxi, Hunan and Guangdong joined seven divisions to "suppress" the revolutionary army of workers and peasants in southern Hunan in three ways: south, north and west. In order to save military strength, in addition to leaving some local armed forces to continue their struggle in southern Hunan, Zhu De and Chen Yi led more than 10,000 people from the Nanchang Uprising Army and the rest of the Southern Hunan Uprising Army to withdraw from southern Hunan and move to Jinggangshan.
"Trooping Jinggangshan" and Mao Zedong opened up the correct road of China revolution.
1in April, 928, the rest of Nanchang Uprising Army led by Zhu De and Chen Yi joined forces with Xiangnan Peasant Army and Autumn Harvest Uprising Army led by Mao Zedong in Longshi, Ninggang County. According to the decision of the CPC Southern Hunan Special Committee, the two departments were co-edited as the Fourth Army of the Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants (later changed to the Fourth Army of the Red Army of Workers and Peasants), with Zhu De as the commander and Mao Zedong as the party representative. Smedley, an American progressive woman writer, described this great meeting as follows: "The two main streams of the agrarian revolution have converged, and this meeting is one of the most important events in the history of China" (1 1). On May 4th, Zhu De delivered a speech to celebrate the meeting of the two armies: "The meeting of the two revolutionary armies led by our Party means a new starting point for the China revolution. After this victory, our strength has been expanded. With Jinggangshan as the base, we can constantly fight against the enemy and continuously develop the revolution. " (12) Mao Zedong and Zhu De successfully combined the armed struggle, the agrarian revolution and the construction of the red regime in the process of leading the revolutionary struggle in Jinggangshan, founded the important theory of "armed separation of workers and peasants", opened up a road with China characteristics to seize political power by armed forces, and summarized the army building, party building, political power building, economic construction, T-shaped agrarian revolution, strategy and tactics.
In a word, Zhu De was one of the pioneers who explored the revolutionary road in China and made immortal achievements. His contribution to solving the problem of China's revolutionary road in practice and theory is enormous. After the failure of Nanchang Uprising, it was He who put forward the idea of political strategic transformation in time, combined the armed struggle with the peasant movement and chose to base himself on the countryside. In the process of the three major rectifications in southern Jiangxi, how to reorganize the troops and put forward the idea of changing the military strategy from regular warfare to guerrilla warfare. The peasant uprising in southern Hunan led by him was a successful attempt to launch a peasant uprising and establish a worker-peasant regime. Later, he led his troops to Jinggangshan, and together with Mao Zedong, he opened up the correct road of "encircling cities from the countryside and seizing political power by armed forces". Since then, the China Revolution has taken a new direction and a crucial step towards victory. Today, when we study Zhu De's contribution to the exploration of China's revolutionary road, we should not only objectively evaluate his historical achievements, but more importantly, learn from his revolutionary firmness, revolutionary courage and verve, learn from his spirit of seeking truth from facts and being brave in exploration, and inspire us to work hard for the great cause of building Socialism with Chinese characteristics.
Precautions:
(1) (6) (9) See Zhu De's Collected Works, pp. 393-394, 125, p. 395.
②( 12) Zhu De Chronology, page 52, page 64.
③ Attending Yang Zhicheng: "Bitter War", see Nanchang Uprising Materials, p. 375.
④ ⑤ Li Yu: See Nanchang Uprising, pp. 489 and 483.
(1 1) Ai Smedley's Great Road, page 26.