Chapter 2 Bargaining Problem
Chapter III Non-cooperative Game
Chapter 4: Iterative algorithm for solving the game.
Chapter V Equivalence of Extended Game
Chapter VI Extended Game and Information Problem
Chapter 7 The Value of Multiplayer Games
Chapter VIII Random Games
Chapter 9 Recursive Games
Chapter 10 Von Neumann-Morgenstein solution of cooperative game without extra reward
Chapter 1 1 Limit Theorem on Economic Kernel
Chapter 12 Cooperative Game of Negotiating Group
13 there is a competitive equilibrium in the continuous trader market.
Chapter 14 the core of n-player game
Chapter 15 incomplete information game played by Bayesian participants?
The first part is the basic model
The second part is Bayesian equilibrium point
The third part is the basic probability distribution of the game
Chapter 16 Major Competition
Chapter 17 Market Game
Chapter 18 re-examine the concept of perfect equilibrium point in extended game?
Author list
Index 1988, several colleagues in the department of economics suggested that I choose some papers on game theory to be published as supplementary reading materials for the newly developed textbooks of this course in the departments of mathematics and economics. The initial suggestion is that the article should be selected from the special topic of game theory in the Yearbook of Mathematical Research (Contributions to Game Theory, Volumes 1-4, Frontiers of Game Theory). However, the more I devote myself to this work, the more I feel that this restriction is too strict. Articles should be selected from various sources. So around the tentative list of articles, I asked the opinions of many friends and colleagues, and I trust their judgment. Although there are some different views, most people agree that the collected articles should be "game theory classics". Although they are not responsible for the final list, I still want to thank them for their opinions and suggestions. They are Ken Arrow, Paul Caravanni, V·p· Crawford, gerard debreu, Avinash Dixit, Sergio Hart, Ehud Kale, Roger Mayerson, Hervé Mullin, Guillermo Owen, john roberts, Herbert Scarf, David SchMadler, Martin Shubik and William Thompson.
The title "Classic Game Theory" means different things to different people, but the core of this book is to provide a cornerstone for building a modern game theory building. Because a procrastinator (myself) is in charge of this work, the final article list was decided at 1990, and even the most urgent urging of Jack Repcek (the economics editor of Princeton University Press) failed to make me waver and move forward. I had planned to prepare an introductory article, including some "prehistoric" experts (for example, Monte, zermelo and von Neumann). The article also gave me an opportunity to give this book some historical views and explain some selection criteria of this book by the way. However, it did not come true after all.