After a short period of prosperity, Japanese mobile phones quickly fell into the quagmire of performance decline.
In 2002-2004, the mobile phone market in China was the hottest, but the market response of Japanese mobile phones was not enthusiastic, which failed to grasp the psychology of consumers.
On a working day at the beginning of 2003, Xi Huan-hao, the former president of NEC, did not deal with the daily affairs of the company as usual, but refused the clients interviewed and quietly reflected on what he had done in the past four years as president of NEC. The 2002 financial report with a loss of 24.5 billion yen on his desk made him feel frustrated. In his resignation letter, Hiroshi Nishihuan wrote with regret that "... the structural reform of NEC company that he devoted himself to after taking office as president has come to an end. In addition, I have worked hard as a president for four years, and now I feel that my energy is poor and my body is declining. "
But this seems to be just his word. After taking over, Jinshan Mingxin, director of NEC and president of NEC Solutions Company, found that NEC was facing the accumulation of 2G and 2.5G services.
In order to change this situation, NEC hired Lu Lei as the president of NEC China in September 2003. After he took office, he found that NEC, an old communication company, had a sense of superiority in the market and formed a strong culture of "engineers who can't sell things". In the process of communication between NEC employees, Lu Lei found that NEC's persistent pursuit of technology made NEC appear too conservative, and was snubbed by the market.
The paranoia of this technology has been amplified to the development of the whole Japanese mobile phone brand, which has brought profound pain to Japanese mobile phone enterprises. By the end of 2005, NEC lowered the target of mobile phone sales from the previous 6.5438+0.5 million to 6.5438+0 million. Industry insiders estimate that its sales deficit will reach 25 billion yen, and its market share is only 2. 1%. Panasonic is losing ground. According to the mobile phone market ranking published by Sino Consulting in the first half of 2005, Panasonic's mobile phone market share in GSM plummeted by 40%, becoming the fastest declining foreign brand. Among them, Mitsubishi, Kyocera and Sanyo have less shares, all below 1%.
In the face of painful performance, Taro Kurataro, general manager of mobile communication company of Panasonic (China) Co., Ltd., once publicly stated, "It is precisely because in the China market, Panasonic mobile phones are unfamiliar with its domestic mobile phone channels and misjudge the market, resulting in a large inventory backlog, which has caused damage to channels and terminals and directly affected the confidence of mobile phone agents in Panasonic's mobile phone operation model."
Finally, an amazing scene finally happened: Japanese mobile phone companies embarked on the road of collective rout. In March, 2005, Toshiba announced that it would withdraw its capital from Putian Toshiba and formally withdraw from the CDMA mobile phone market in China, thus tearing open the hole of the collective collapse of Japanese mobile phones.
In June of the same year, Mitsubishi bid farewell to the mobile phone market in China; In 65438+February, Panasonic announced its withdrawal from the GSM mobile phone market ... Like the defeated camp, there was a domino phenomenon in the delisting of Japanese mobile phone brands.
Chapter 2: Pride and prejudice make them encounter waterloo in China.
Why did Japanese mobile phones fail in China market? There are many reasons, but in the process of being interviewed by IT Times Weekly, I found that the biggest failure of Japanese mobile phones is that they don't respect the China market.
Lin Huasheng, a professor and deputy director of the Asia-Pacific Research Center of Waseda University in Japan, said in an interview with IT Times Weekly that the failure of Japanese enterprises in China was due to Japanese management mistakes and Japanese-style management model (on seniority-based salary system and promotion system). ) After entering China, he failed to adapt to China in time and failed to cope with China's rapidly changing foreign investment policies and laws.
The first reason: distrust of local managers in China.
After World War II, Japan's economy rose rapidly in less than 30 years and became the second largest economy in the world in the late 1980s. Japan's economic take-off has become an important topic for economists and historians to study. With the deepening of interpretation, Japanese corporate culture with team spirit and innovative spirit has gradually entered the public eye. This corporate culture, which is deeply influenced by Japanese history, religion and national psychology, has become an important force for Japan's rise.
However, the corporate culture full of Bushido spirit and traditional Japanese national psychology has also become a shackle that restricts the further development of Japanese enterprises in the new economic environment.
While European and American giants such as Nokia and Motorola have increased their investment in China and started to write a new chapter in China's localization strategy, many Japanese mobile phone companies are still on hold. Pursue centralized decision-making based on Japanese mainland, and any decision made by Japanese mobile phone companies in China must be reported layer by layer, and can only be implemented after being instructed by the headquarters. A person in charge of a Japanese company in China recalled, "We asked a client of a Fortune 500 company for a document, and it took us two months to get it."
Due to the strict hierarchical system, Japanese enterprises in China seriously lack autonomy.
NEC is one of the few Japanese mobile phone companies that set up R&D institutions in China. After investing in 3G R&D center in Beijing, more than 70% of NEC's global mobile phone R&D is conducted in China. However, when planning new products, Beijing R&D Center must submit the R&D achievements to the Japanese headquarters, and only after obtaining the listing permission from Japan can the R&D achievements be commercialized in China. NEC paid a heavy price for the complicated examination and approval system, and R&D institutions in China could not play their due role. Even with a keen market antenna, NEC missed the market opportunity because of filing at different levels, and the performance loss was hard to recover, so delisting was inevitable.
In last year's survey of 32/kloc-0 Japanese-funded enterprises in China, JETRO, a famous Japanese research company, listed "difficulty in coordinating with the headquarters" as the first issue in the reorganization of Japanese enterprises. Although the strict hierarchical system has seriously affected the performance of enterprises, there is no sign of reform in the management system of Japanese enterprises that have inherited Japanese cultural traditions.
Advocating "loyalty" Japanese corporate culture and paying attention to employees' loyalty to the enterprise. Investment in China still relies heavily on Japanese employees and lacks trust in China employees. From Panasonic, Mitsubishi to Toshiba, almost all Japanese mobile phone companies in China are Japanese.
Even Japanese enterprises that employ local management teams in China, the management system permeated with corporate culture failed to give China professional managers a reasonable space to display their talents.
In 2004, the reorganized NEC established NEC Communication (China) Company in China, and appointed Lu Lei as the president of China Company. This professional manager from Motorola has become one of the highest-ranking Japanese companies in China. However, this unconventional appointment did not bring long-awaited changes to NEC. Lu Lei, which intends to make great efforts in a new platform with abundant resources and powerful technology, soon found that there is such a huge gap between ideal optimism and reality cruelty.
During his more than one year as president, Lu Lei's responsibility in this communication company is still mobile phone marketing, which is no different from a series of marketing jobs he used to do in Motorola. What annoys Lu Lei is that he doesn't seem to have much control over the marketing strategy except in a limited scope. Since the second half of 2005, Lu Lei has frequently traveled between Beijing and Tokyo, reporting the market situation in China to the headquarters, and more importantly, listening to the latest strategic deployment of communication services other than mobile phones by the top management of NEC headquarters. Lu Lei has no choice but to adopt tactics that are completely close to the headquarters strategy, which is somewhat helpless.
Although we can give full play to the past marketing experience, under the strict examination and approval mechanism, China's decision-making mechanism exists in name only. In the face of fast-moving consumer goods markets such as mobile phones, slow decision-making will inevitably lead to a gradual decline in performance.
The limited localization of NEC did not let this Japanese mobile phone watcher continue to fight in China's 2G market. Lu Lei has been president for less than two years, and the news of his departure came out. Some people commented that this is the need of NEC's business transformation, but at the same time, it was reported that many resolutions submitted by Jong were rejected by the Japanese headquarters.
When Lu Lei was in office, he made it clear that "NEC, as an overall solution provider, must integrate various resources to achieve coordinated growth outside the mobile phone business." However, without the approval of the Japanese headquarters, business integration cannot be implemented. In addition, NEC took a fancy to Lu Lei because of his excellent marketing ability. An NEC executive commented on Lu: "He is a rare telecom marketing talent. Now that NEC's communication terminal is sluggish, Lu will definitely make a difference to NEC. "
Lu Lei's stay is just an example, which reflects the localization strategy of Japanese enterprises. Even though we are aware of the importance of localization, paranoid corporate culture has greatly reduced the implementation of this strategy.
The second reason: arrogance towards the China market.
When European and American giants keep repeating "China is different", they begin to observe and analyze the world's largest mobile phone market with cautious eyes. However, in the eyes of decision makers of many Japanese mobile phone companies, China still represents a pure sales market, and resolutely follows the marketing strategy of local operations in Japan. Some people think that the marketing strategy of Japanese mobile phone companies is inflexible. However, the arrogant attitude towards China market is an important reason for the Japanese management team's improper decision-making.
In Japan, with the unique PHS network in the 2G era (instead of the global GSM and CDMA networks), Japanese mobile phone manufacturers have successfully blocked foreign enterprises from the local market. In the Japanese market, Japanese manufacturers dominate the world. According to the statistics of Gartner Japan, NEC's market share is 19.8%, ranking 1 for two consecutive years. Panasonic ranked second, accounting for16.4%; Sharp followed closely, ranking third, accounting for13.4%; Toshiba ranked fourth with a market share of 7.8%; Mitsubishi electric ranks fifth, with a gap of 0. 1% at the bottom.
It is hard to imagine that this is the performance of Japanese enterprises in China. In 1980s, China people were proud to buy Japanese electrical appliances. Color TV, refrigerator, tape recorder and air conditioner are symbols of quality, identity and taste. Hitachi, Toshiba, Sanyo, Panasonic, Sony, etc. These brands are familiar to most people in China, but today, almost all product lines have suffered unprecedented losses in China.
Why is this?
Mr. Cao, a veteran in the IT industry, often contacts multinational companies and is deeply touched by the current situation of Japanese mobile phones. He told the IT Times that, first of all, Japanese companies are not as open and broad-minded as European and American companies. If media reporters have a topic and want to get help from Japanese companies and ask them to accept your interview or provide data support, there will basically be no satisfactory results (except, of course, how good their products are), they will politely refuse you, or they will say that they need to ask for instructions step by step. After several months, you finally lose interest in yourself. Unlike European and American companies, they will actively cooperate with you and answer many questions, as long as your questions are deep, especially like IBM, Hewlett-Packard, MOTO, Nokia, INTEL and so on. They will provide a lot of first-hand information with a very atmospheric attitude, and some will even take the initiative to help you improve your topic selection.
Therefore, there are few in-depth reports about Japanese companies, and some of them are mostly negative. In addition to product news, European and American companies are more active in in-depth reporting, which makes readers feel that buying such products has more cultural added value.
It is so difficult for reporters to interview, and it is even harder for the media to sell advertisements. Their marketers have never seen you well and will never come out to see you. The marketers in charge of advertising basically don't know Chinese media, but they are conceited and entrusted by their Japanese advertising companies. The Japanese only trust the Japanese. So that Japanese companies often spend a lot of money to buy advertisements, but they are just two advertising spaces for streaming media. There is a Japanese company specializing in information system software, and the advertising agency they found in Shanghai openly demanded kickbacks from the media. Vote for whoever gives more kickbacks, which makes this software company come to China for many years and spend a lot of money, but the market has not improved so far. But the marketers of European and American companies are completely different. For the new media, they will definitely take the time to meet with you. If you have enough reasons to convince him, they will consider cooperating with you in advertising. Of course, your media is not good, so it's hard to invite them again next time, but at least people can give you a chance to find a new bright spot in their own market.
As we all know, among Japanese enterprises, most employees in China have no status and will always be executors. No matter how long you work in this enterprise, you will never have the decision-making power. The headquarters will send someone from Japan who doesn't know China to manage you, 10 times the salary. Many executives of European and American companies use local employees in China.
A story that has been circulating in high-level circles for a long time is unforgettable. The chairman of a well-known Japanese company sent to China is very old. I often doze off while listening to the report. When China employees stopped reporting for fear of affecting his rest, he suddenly woke up strangely, opened one eye and asked, Why did it stop? Go ahead. Soon the snoring began again.
The arrogant attitude has made Japanese mobile phone companies taste the bitter fruit again.
Reason three: the crime of technical conservatism.
Sony's internal strategic planning shows that its path judgment for the industrial chain is very clear, and there is only one answer: increase investment, quickly "grab the position", and then dance again under the guidance of technological innovation.
The insiders believe that this strategic thinking has obvious Europeanization traces, but for Japanese companies that have always been conservative, it still faces many difficulties in taking this step. Jiang Fengxiang, vice chairman and secretary general of China Household Electrical Appliances Association, told this reporter, "Unfortunately, the technological innovation of Japanese companies' production plants in China is five years behind that of Korean companies. "The Japanese are too conservative and sensitive!
In 2003, the plasma project of Shanghai Panasonic Plasma Display Co., Ltd. was adjusted from "technical upgrade" to "capacity expansion" by the headquarters, and the investment was also reduced to 654.38 billion US dollars. In July 2005, Panasonic announced that it would invest 654.38+0.6 billion US dollars to build the world's largest plasma panel factory in Shimosaki Prefecture, Japan. So far, Panasonic has five plasma panel factories, but only one of them is located in China. In the investment strategy in 2006, Honda decided to go back to Japan for the first time in 30 years to build a new factory, and invested heavily in building a new factory in Suji-CHO, saitama, mainly to develop and produce the next-generation automobile engine with little impact on the environment. Honda said that it plans to cultivate the factory into a "testing ground for technological innovation" to guide the production of automobile engines and complete vehicles at home and abroad. Obviously, the core technology of the next generation automobile engine is the key factor, and returning to China to build a factory is a fundamental strategy to prevent the outflow of technological innovation.
In recent years, Honda, Toshiba, Panasonic and Sony have all moved back to their headquarters in Japan and set up new factories. Analysts believe that in addition to improving the competitiveness of enterprises in Japan, preventing the outflow of core technologies is the main reason.
According to Japanese media reports, transferring high-tech R&D and production base to China can effectively prevent high-tech from being copied by competitors. As early as a few years ago, Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry asked Japanese companies overseas to take strict measures to prevent technology leakage.
In an interview with the IT Times, Boston Consulting Group revealed that Japanese companies are in urgent need of funds. In the early years, they seemed to turn a deaf ear to the huge investments made by European and American companies in the China market. Due to the excessive technical blockade, the technological innovation of Japanese enterprises' production lines in China lags far behind that of European, American and Korean enterprises for several years. China's growing enterprises, together with Korean and European and American enterprises which are much more open to the present, have taken the lead, leaving little room for Japanese enterprises.
Even when there is not much space, the conservative and too fragile and sensitive Japanese are secretly transferring some so-called high-end product production lines that were moved back to Japan from China. The Japanese government also requires Japanese manufacturing industry to ensure that about 10% of core industries remain in Japan. Therefore, even in some emerging electronic markets, such as music playing equipment and new monitors, South Korean Samsung and Philips have made great achievements together with China brand.
However, "with the lessons of the past few years, Japanese companies such as Sony, Panasonic and Toshiba are weighing the possibility of bringing technology back to China." Ye Ping of Sino Market Research Center said. But the actual action is not obvious at present, and it may need a brewing process.
Reason four: victims of increased competition.
Slow three's reaction to the market doomed the failure of Japanese mobile phones in China market.
According to the survey of China Mobile Research Institute, as of May this year, China's mobile phone market has reached 1853 models, but only 20 models have good sales, accounting for 43% of the market. This means that 1% models account for nearly half of mobile phone sales. Without accurate product positioning, rapid market response and strong marketing strategy, mobile phone enterprises are doomed to be eliminated.
Japanese companies, which have been working in China market for 10 years and are good at intensive cultivation, have never made any achievements in the mobile phone market in China, where businesses compete, ignoring the grasp of consumers' psychology in China, resulting in repeated setbacks in product positioning and product design.
Compared with Nokia, MOTO and Samsung, Japanese mobile phone manufacturers who advocate technology supremacy always lag behind the pace of market progress in product design. They stubbornly believe that, like the Japanese market, China consumers only pay attention to the function rather than the product appearance. However, the actual situation is just the opposite.
In 2003 and 2004, there were only 17 new products of Panasonic mobile phones in China market. In the same period, Nokia has 48 products listed, and Samsung has more than 30 products listed. Although Panasonic introduced 65,438+00 new products in 2005, it lacked striking creative masterpieces. As the core R&D centers of most Japanese mobile phone manufacturers are not located in China, far away from the China market and out of touch with the demand of consumers in China, the sales performance of mobile phones has been seriously affected. Even if some R&D teams are located in China, all design schemes must be approved by the headquarters. When all the complicated procedures are completed, the new model has missed the market opportunity.
This lack of innovative management system is the sorrow of Japanese enterprises. In an interview, IT Times found that the business division system initiated by Kōnosuke Matsushita, the "God of Management" 40 years ago, is still widely adopted by Japanese enterprises: each business division conducts independent accounting, but does not bear the business risks of the parent company. This loose organizational structure and management system can stimulate the potential energy of subsidiaries to the greatest extent, but it also leads to management infarction and intestinal obstruction.
A little scan of Japanese electrical appliance companies investing in China gives people the impression that almost all of them are the embodiment of business departments. At present, there are 122 Hitachi enterprises in China, but these enterprises are all doing their own businesses. For Hitachi's Tokyo headquarters, these 122 companies can make their own different voices. Compared with Hitachi, Panasonic's joint venture in China is more dispersed. In China, Panasonic just set up a general investment institution, and each subsidiary will conduct separate accounting. Not only that, Panasonic mostly uses its own network on the marketing network. Therefore, Panasonic's investment companies and wholly-owned companies in China are basically one company and one marketing network. Although Panasonic (China) took the integration step of reforming the business division system four years ago, the fragmented practice of its subsidiaries has not been fundamentally improved. Another semiconductor company, NEC, has brought the division system of Japanese enterprises to the extreme in China. At present, NEC has set up numerous branches in China, and a large number of independent "small NECs" can't find the independent office building of NEC's "headquarters" in China.
Chapter 3 Who is following the footsteps of Japanese mobile phones
The fiasco of Japanese mobile phones in China is not an isolated incident, but a concentrated reflection of many problems in the development of Japanese enterprises in China. If Japanese companies can't learn from it, who will quit the China market after the mobile phone companies?
At an industry forum held in China, the heads of electronic enterprises from Europe, America, South Korea and Japan sat side by side in China. IT Times Weekly saw at the scene that the heads of European and American enterprises in China are basically local managers. After entering the special discussion, they began to explain their views one by one in their mother tongue; It's the turn of Korean companies, and Korean bosses communicate with other managers in very pure Chinese. Finally, it was the Japanese company's turn. The Japanese general manager, who had been silent, motioned for his Japanese translator to come to the stage and translate his Japanese speech sentence by sentence. When Japanese managers spent twice as much time expressing their views, the lively and harmonious exchange scenes in the previous forum suddenly fell silent.
Such scenes are not uncommon in China today. But on the other hand, it also reflects the strangeness of Japanese enterprises to the China market.
Japanese digital products take the old road of mobile phones.
Japanese mobile phones failed in China, and now this fate of failure is also reflected in Japanese digital products.
Recently, Sony announced the Notice on Increasing the Free Replacement of Sony Digital Camera Imaging Components in official website. Thus, a new round of CCD (imaging module) update event is started. Because Japanese digital cameras including Nikon, Canon and Olympus all use the same CCD as Sony's new product problem camera, a new round of crisis is waiting for Japanese digital camera enterprises.
Previously, Japanese companies had trouble in China DC market. After a series of scandals, Sony CCD quality incident, product recall storm, Canon CCD quality incident, Nikon battery crisis and Japanese electronics company, the reputation of products dropped sharply. Under the increasingly serious crisis of confidence in the China market, Ke Mei also reluctantly announced his withdrawal from the camera business in early 2006.
On June 5438+ 10, 2005, Sony China announced that when Sony took photos of 9 digital cameras and 22 digital cameras (shooting), there was distortion or no image on the LCD screen or electronic viewfinder. After a lapse of February, Sony's six main digital cameras in China market were judged as "unqualified products" by China National Camera Quality Inspection Center because of their unqualified image uniformity and automatic exposure. In desperation, Sony had to promise to recall the camera and apologize to consumers.
Market reputation, which is more important than product quality, has also been questioned by Japanese electrical enterprises. 65438+At the end of February, 2005, the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics pointed out in the economic census data bulletin that Sony China Company concealed the sales of goods of/kloc-0.8 billion yuan, so Sony China had to get a fine of 30,000 yuan from the tax department of China. Not long ago, the secret that Japanese color TV companies such as Panasonic, Sharp, Sanyo, Hitachi and Toshiba made a long-term windfall in the flat-panel color TV market in China was also made public.
Any trouble in the market may affect the life of the enterprise. Japanese electrical appliance enterprises feel the difficulty of survival in the process of suicide. According to IDC statistics, in 2005, Toshiba ranked only about 10 in the notebook market in China, with a market share of only about 6%. In the air-conditioning market, the China air-conditioning sales report in 2005 showed that Japanese air-conditioners lost money across the board, and Japanese brands went out across the board.
LCD TV, once widely valued by Japanese home appliance manufacturers, is still in a downturn in the China market. Sony, Hitachi and Toshiba, which rarely participate in the price game, also launched a price "diving" war throughout 2005 and continued until this spring. The interpretation of the industry is that Japanese home appliance companies hope to quickly increase product sales by reducing prices to make up for or offset losses, and other marketing methods are lacking. Indeed, although Japanese home appliance manufacturers have recovered a little profit through price means at present, they have put themselves in an embarrassing situation that "no one wants to raise prices in the future, and they can't maintain operations without rising".
Japan's proud digital products are now on the old road of mobile phones.
You can't just rely on technology to occupy the market.
Technology has always been the capital that Japanese companies show off.
It has always been the goal of Japanese companies to manufacture electronic equipment by inventing technologies superior to competitors. In 1970s and 1980s, Japanese companies replaced American competitors, and in the following 10 years, Japanese companies have been lying on the solid accumulation of technical resources. However, when Japanese electrical appliance manufacturers stepped onto the position of global electronic products relying on one new technology after another, they also laid the groundwork for themselves to fall into the quagmire of technology "madman".
Occupy the market, you can't just rely on technology!
"Sony of technology" is a concentrated summary of Japanese electrical enterprises and a model for Japanese entrepreneurs to show off themselves. Reflected in the product image, Japanese electric appliances always seem to be the representative of high-end, high added value and high imagination. Sadly, almost all Japanese electrical appliance business operators believe in the high-end production line supported by technology, and as a result, they are in a passive position of "unattainable".
Take Hitachi as an example. As early as three years ago, Hitachi abandoned the low-end home appliance market and shifted its focus to the high-end home appliance field. Hitachi believes that it can completely conquer the consumption space of TV products in China by entering the field of rear projection and plasma TV in China with its own technological development capability, with a growth rate of about 65,438+00%. However, the China market did not fully develop to the high end according to Hitachi's wishes. The market of high-end household products represented by LCD just started in the second half of 2005, far from reaching 1% of domestic color TV sales. The more serious challenge facing Hitachi is that domestic and foreign home appliance giants have done enough articles in high-end fields such as flat-panel TVs. Moreover, foreign and domestic appliance manufacturers have also established brand advantages in the low-end market, and Hitachi has been aphasia in the low-end field since then.
In fact, the technological advantages that Japanese companies once had have begun to decompose. Since the rapid expansion of the electronics industry centered on Silicon Valley in 2005, technology is no longer an unattainable barrier, the main position of leading technology incubation is no longer controlled by research institutions of large companies, and the high-end operation of electronic products is no longer dominated by Japanese companies.
In addition, Japanese companies that dominate the world with their technical skills are particularly sensitive to the confidentiality of technology. On the one hand, in order to gain the price advantage, Japanese home appliance enterprises have to move to China to obtain cheap labor; On the other hand, they know that if a large number of manufacturing industries are transferred from China to foreign countries, it will inevitably cultivate competitors and intensify competition. As a result, many Japanese companies have embarked on the road of self-isolation in technology. It is worth pointing out that in order to prevent technology leakage, Japanese companies often implement a three-year rotation system for Japanese managers sent to China, which on the one hand greatly reduces the loyalty of employees, on the other hand, it is easy to induce short-term behavior of management-not paying attention to the rectification process of their own performance during their term of office, and even sacrificing the company's market image.
The IT Times discovered a secret in the interview. According to insiders, Japanese companies use one set of production standards and quality inspection standards for their products sold to European and American countries, and another set of production standards and quality inspection standards for their products sold to the mainland of China. The production cost under the two standards is very different, and the product quality is also very different.
It is understood that the Japanese product classification system clearly stipulates that first-class products are sold at home, second-rate products are sold to Europe and America, and third-rate products are sold to developing countries such as China. For products sold to China, the components are made of inferior materials. Some users complain that the Japanese products are guaranteed for three years. Why are most of them allowed to break down after a little more than three years, just like loading clocks and watches? According to insiders, Japanese products are guaranteed for three years. In the choice of chips and transistors, they choose scraps with a life slightly longer than three years.
The so-called technical cooperation is even more vanishing. Japanese enterprises and Chinese enterprises often blackmail China everywhere under the guise of technical cooperation. In the early days of reform and opening up, China began to introduce Japanese communication equipment, but what Japan sold to China was not the most advanced equipment, nor did it provide technology transfer. In the early 1980s, China introduced SPC PBX from Japan, but Japanese companies charged too much. Later, a fault caused the communication between Beijing and Shanghai to be interrupted for 24 hours, which caused extremely bad influence in the world.
If Japanese companies can't face up to these problems, the closure of mobile phone companies in China is likely to happen in digital products.
After all, it is not advisable to win the market by technology alone. Occupy the market, but also rely on a lot. It is time for Japanese enterprises to pay serious attention to their own essential problems.