foreign research status
At present, the research on financing of small and medium-sized enterprises abroad is mainly carried out from two aspects: First, it is carried out from the perspective of the structural characteristics of enterprises themselves and the capital structure of enterprises. Although the research object is mostly large enterprises, it also has strong theoretical significance for small and medium-sized enterprises; Second, from the perspective of the demand for funds by SMEs.
Capital structure theory
The so-called capital structure refers to the composition and proportion of various capitals of enterprises, which is the core issue of financing decision-making of enterprises. Enterprises are also committed to finding the best capital structure to maximize the market value of enterprises. Western capital structure theory is also centered on how to form the best capital structure, and its development process is roughly divided into successive stages, namely, early capital structure theory and modern capital structure theory.
Early capital structure theory
The goal of an enterprise is to maximize market value, which generally consists of equity capital value and debt capital value. The lowest total cost of capital means the maximization of market value when the enterprise's income before interest and tax is certain. Therefore, American economist David Durant (D? Durand? , 1952), he divided the capital system theory into net income theory, net operating income theory and traditional theory (also known as compromise theory). The theory of net income is based on the assumption that equity capital can always get a fixed rate of return, and enterprises can always raise all debt funds at a fixed interest rate. This theory holds that debt funds are always beneficial. When the debt ratio of an enterprise reaches 100%, the weighted average cost of debt capital and equity capital is the smallest, and the market value of the enterprise is the largest. The theory of net operating income is based on the assumption that the total capital cost and debt cost are fixed. The theory holds that no matter how the financial leverage changes, the weighted average cost of capital is fixed, the total value of the enterprise remains unchanged, the value of the enterprise has nothing to do with the capital structure, and there is no optimal capital structure problem in the enterprise. The traditional theory, that is, the eclectic theory, is a kind of capital structure theory between the net income theory and the net operating income theory. According to this theory, the capital cost of an enterprise is not independent of the capital structure, and the enterprise does have an optimal capital structure, that is, at the inflection point where the weighted average cost changes from falling to rising, this capital structure can be realized through the use of financial leverage. As can be seen from the above, these three theories are not mature enough. The net income theory pays attention to the financial leverage effect and ignores the financial risk, the net operating income theory exaggerates the financial risk excessively, and the eclectic theory ignores the relationship between the debt ratio and the cost of equity capital.
Modern capital structure theory
The early theory of capital structure was based on empirical deduction, without the support of scientific mathematical deduction and data statistics, and it was not mature enough, and there would be deviations in practice. The appearance of modern capital structure theory, represented by MM theorem, makes the research of capital structure theory take a big step forward.
(1)MM theorem. Modigliani & amp？ Miller published a paper "Capital Cost, Corporate Finance and Investment Theory" at the annual meeting of econometrics in 1956, which was later published in American Economic Review. The theory mentioned in this paper is called MM theorem. The proposition of MM theorem is regarded as the watershed between early capital structure theory and modern capital structure theory, and also the cornerstone of modern capital structure theory. Under a series of strict assumptions, such as perfect capital market, no corporate tax and personal income tax, MM theorem is proved by a series of strict mathematical derivation. Under certain conditions, the enterprise value has nothing to do with the financing methods they adopt, that is, whether they issue stocks or bonds, it has no influence on the enterprise value. The premise of this theorem is harsh, which is obviously not in line with reality.
Modigliani & amp？ Miller developed their theory in 1963 and relaxed the assumption that there is no enterprise income tax. The modified MM theorem holds that due to the tax-free nature of debt financing, enterprises with higher debt ratio will use more debt, that is, the "tax shield effect" of debt. The optimal capital structure of enterprises is 100% debt, and enterprises can change their capital structure by changing market value through policies.
Miller (1997) established a model including enterprise income tax and personal income tax, analyzed the influence of debt on enterprise value, and concluded that personal income tax offset the tax reduction effect of interest to some extent, but not completely. This conclusion has something to do with Modigliani? & amp？ The modified MM theorem proposed by Miller is consistent. However, both of them have the same defects, both of which take bond financing as the highest priority, ignoring the risk of debt and the increase of extra expenses, which is not in line with the real economy.
Ang (199 1, 1992) has studied the tax shield effect of SMEs. He believes that SMEs generally lack such motivation, because on the one hand, SMEs mostly adopt the form of sole proprietorship and partnership, and corporate tax and personal income tax are closely combined; On the other hand, the weakening of limited liability also makes the bankruptcy cost at least partially dependent on individuals. Because the profitability is not as good as that of large enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises rarely use the tax shield effect of debt financing (Prttit? & singer.1985), but from the perspective of the cost of debt, it is generally believed that small and medium-sized enterprises face greater bankruptcy possibility, so they use debt financing less than large enterprises.
(2) Static trade-off theory. MM Theorem only considers the tax shield effect of debt financing, but does not consider the risks and extra costs it brings. Benjamin Graham (1934) pointed out in his book Securities Analysis that when a financial crisis is unlikely to happen, an enterprise that maximizes its value will not have a tax shield effect. However, empirical analysis shows that increasing the debt ratio will increase the income of these enterprises by 7.5%.
In 1984, on the basis of MM theorem, Myers further pointed out that the increase of enterprise's high debt makes the enterprise's fixed expenses increase and the income decrease, so that the greater the financial risk faced by the enterprise, the increase of financial risk will produce two kinds of costs: bankruptcy cost and agency cost. What kind of capital structure an enterprise chooses depends on the goal it wants to achieve, including the choice between the income and cost of debt, which is the so-called static trade-off theory. The optimal capital structure is a balanced capital financing structure between the tax-free income of liabilities and the cost brought by financial risks.
In 1990, Mackie-mason estimated the probability model of the issuing company's priority in leasing shares. She pointed out that enterprises with low marginal tax rates (such as companies with deferred tax losses) are more inclined to issue shares than those with higher profits and fixed tax rates. Mackey Mei Sen? This result is consistent with the trade-off theory, because it shows that tax enterprises prefer debt.
(3) pecking order theory. 1984, miles? & amp？ Mujirouf wrote in his famous article "Enterprise? Financing? And then what? Investment? Decide? What time? Firm? Really? Information? That? Investors? Do what? Isn't it? Yes, according to the principle of signal transmission, they deduced the pecking order financing hypothesis. Assume that the financial market is complete, except for information asymmetry. In its view, the company prefers internal financing. If external financing is needed, the company will issue the safest securities first, that is, debt first and then shares. If the company's internal cash flow exceeds its investment needs, the excess cash will be used to repay debts instead of repurchasing shares. With the increase of external financing demand, the company's choice of financing tools will be: from safe financing to risky debt, such as from secured senior debt to convertible bonds or preferred shares, and equity financing is the last choice.
In 1989, baskin explained pecking order theory from the perspectives of transaction costs, personal income tax and control rights, and pointed out that the internal funds provided by retained earnings are superior to external funds, because they do not have to bear the issuance costs and evade personal income tax. Compared with equity funds, debt financing has the advantages of tax saving effect, low issuance cost and no dilution of corporate control rights, and is superior to external financing methods of equity financing.
(4) Signal theory. Michael was the first person to introduce signals into economics? Spencer, he thinks that although there is information asymmetry in the market, the potential trading income can still be realized.
Ross( 1977) firstly introduces asymmetric information into MM theoretical model from the perspective of information transmission, and assumes that the future earnings of the company obey continuous and discrete distribution respectively. Suppose managers know the distribution function of investment income, but investors don't. Signal model with established financing structure. Enterprise managers' choice of financing methods sends a signal to investors. Generally speaking, the bankruptcy probability is negatively related to the quality of the company and positively related to the debt level. Bankruptcy will bring losses to managers. Therefore, managers will not blindly increase debt, in the case that low-quality companies cannot imitate high-quality companies through more debt financing. External investors regard higher debt level as a signal of high quality. Therefore, investors understand the financing of issuing stocks as the deterioration of the quality of enterprise assets, while debt financing is a signal that enterprise assets are running well. The rising debt ratio shows that the operators have high expectations for the future earnings of the enterprise and convey confidence in the enterprise, thus making investors full of confidence in the enterprise and further increasing the market value of the enterprise.
(5) Agency theory. Agency theory means that the potential conflict between internal and external investors determines the optimal capital structure, that is, enterprises should choose between agency costs and other financing costs.
1976 Zhan Sen? & amp？ Meckling initiated the agency cost theory, that is, agency theory, enterprise theory and property right theory to systematically analyze and explain the financing structure of enterprises under information asymmetry, and Zhan Sen? & amp？ Meckling interprets the agency relationship as a service relationship in which the principal grants the agent some decision-making power and requires the agent to provide benefits for him. For example, the relationship between fund owners and managers caused by the separation of ownership and control in a company belongs to agency relationship. Because the operator is not the complete owner of the enterprise (there is external equity), the hard work of the operator makes him bear all the costs but only get some benefits. When he spends money on his work, he gets all the benefits, but only bears part of the cost. If both the principal and the agent pursue the maximization of interests, then the agent will not always act in accordance with the interests of the principal. That is to say, managers are not hard working, but keen on on on-the-job consumption, which will lead to the value of the enterprise being less than that when the manager is the full owner of the enterprise. This difference is the agency cost of external equity, referred to as equity agency cost. When the total investment and personal property are fixed, increasing the debt financing ratio will increase the equity ratio of operators, and then reduce the agency cost of external equity. But debt financing will cause another kind of agency cost. Because as a residual requester, operators will be more inclined to engage in high-risk projects. If it is successful, the operator can get the benefits of success from it; Once he fails, he will use the limited liability system to push the loss of failure to the creditors. Is the loss caused by this behavior of the operator to the enterprise the agency cost caused by debt financing? That is, the agency cost of creditor's rights. Analysis of equity agency cost and creditor's right agency cost? On the basis of Zhan Sen? & amp？ Meckling thinks? A balanced enterprise equity structure is determined by the balance of equity agency cost and creditor's rights agency cost. When the marginal agency cost of the two financing methods is equal, the general agent cost is the smallest, and then the enterprise can achieve the best capital structure.
(6) Control theory. The theory of control mainly discusses the capital structure from the perspective of managers' preference for control itself, which mainly reflects the influence of enterprises on the efficiency of corporate governance structure through the choice of debt and equity structure in the capital structure. According to this theory, the financing structure of an enterprise not only determines the distribution of enterprise income, but also determines the distribution of enterprise control rights. In other words, the effectiveness of corporate governance structure depends largely on the financing structure of enterprises.
Harris? & amp？ Raviv, mainly Zhan Sen? & amp？ Meckling raised the issue of agency cost caused by the conflict of interests between owners and operators. They use static and dynamic models to illustrate that under normal circumstances, operators will not proceed from maximizing the interests of owners, so it is necessary to supervise operators. They believe that debt financing is conducive to strengthening the public interest. Supervision and restraint mechanism in corporate governance structure.
Aghion? & amp？ Bolton introduced the theory of incomplete contract into the analysis framework of financing structure in 1992, and studied the relationship between debt contract and capital structure. They believe that in the process of multiple games, when there is income information that is not easy to obtain, it is optimal to transfer control to creditors.
Davidson (1989)? After analyzing the samples of owners and managers of small and medium-sized enterprises in Sweden, it is concluded that the most important thing for the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises is "? Expected financial returns "and" growth of independence ". ? When there is a contradiction between the expansion and independent development of small and medium-sized enterprises, the owners will give priority to maintaining the independence of the enterprises. It can be seen that the control right is a very important factor in the financing of SMEs.
Small and medium-sized enterprises' demand for funds
Judging from the capital demand of foreign small and medium-sized enterprises, there are many researches on the financing problem of small and medium-sized enterprises, which mainly include the following two aspects: first, at the micro level, the demand for funds by the growth cycle of enterprises themselves and the financing dilemma faced by enterprises; Second, the macroeconomic level, monetary policy, bank merger and structural adjustment.
1. Micro level
(1) theory of corporate financial growth cycle. The theory of capital structure mainly refers to the financing structure of enterprises, which does not take into account the different financing characteristics of enterprises at different stages of development, nor does it dynamically study the influence of the choice of financing methods on the arrangement of capital structure. The theory of enterprise financial growth cycle makes up for this deficiency.
Weston? & Brigham (1970) put forward the theory of enterprise financial growth cycle according to the change of financing sources in different growth stages, and divided the growth cycle of enterprises into three stages: initial stage, mature stage and recession stage. Weston? & ampBrigham extended the theory and divided the financial growth cycle of an enterprise into six stages? That is, the founding period, growth period I, growth period II, growth period III, maturity period and decline period? According to the capital structure, sales volume and profit of the enterprise, the financing sources of the enterprise in different development stages are explained, and the changing law of the financing structure of the enterprise is well explained from a long-term and dynamic perspective (see the table below).
Berger? & amp？ Udell( 1998, right? we? s？ t？ o？ n？ & ampb？ r？ Me? g？ h？ Answer? M's theory of corporate financial growth cycle has been revised? That is, information constraint, enterprise scale and capital demand are introduced into the system as the basic factors affecting the financing structure of enterprises? In the enterprise financing model, the following conclusions are drawn through analysis: at different stages of enterprise growth? There are information restrictions? The financing structure of an enterprise will change with the change of the scale of the enterprise, capital demand and other constraints. Do different stages of enterprise life cycle need different financing arrangements? .
(2) Enterprise financing dilemma.
As early as the early 1930s, British parliamentarian Macmillan pointed out in an investigation report on the problems of small and medium-sized enterprises provided to the British Parliament that the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises was facing a "financial gap", that is, the famous "Macmillan gap". Macmillan found that SMEs are short of long-term capital supply. This deficiency is especially obvious when the funds of the initial investors are not enough. However, the scale is not enough for enterprises to raise funds in the open market. The main reason of "Macmillan gap" is market failure, that is, market forces cannot make funds flow to small and medium-sized enterprises. Under the condition of market economy, financial institutions should also pursue the maximization of their own interests. When SMEs can't get direct financing from the financial market, they can only get indirect financing from banks. Compared with large enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises have narrow financing channels, so bank loans have become the only way for small and medium-sized enterprises to obtain funds. This gives banks a relative loan advantage.
198 1 Stiglitz? & amp？ After Weiss published Credit Rationing in Incomplete Information Market, information asymmetry is considered as the main reason for the financing difficulties of SMEs. Stiglitz believes that credit rationing originates from information asymmetry in the credit market, which leads to moral hazard in credit contracts. This problem is based on three main factors: commercial banks do not have the ability to supervise borrowers, the interests of borrowers and borrowers are inconsistent, and the information of both parties is asymmetric beforehand.
Best (1982) introduced the loan mortgage screening mechanism, and put forward that low-risk enterprises promised a higher mortgage level and enjoyed a lower loan interest rate, while high-risk enterprises did the opposite, so as to alleviate the adverse effects brought by information asymmetry. Strahan and Weston( 1996) put forward the matching theory, that is, there is a strong negative correlation between the bank's loans to SMEs and the size of banks.
Berger & Udell( 1998)？ It is found that solving the problem of information asymmetry has become the key to the financing process of SMEs. Relationship lending is considered as a consensual contract between banks and enterprises under the guidance of relationship. If the borrower and the borrower maintain a long-term relationship, it will be beneficial for the lender to obtain the relevant information of the borrower. For example, the production and operation of the borrower during the loan period, the change of market share of its products, the borrower's willingness and ability to repay, whether collateral is needed and whether it is necessary to sign a contract with other additional conditions.
Uchi & Gillespie( 1999) thinks that loan officers directly related to SME loans may have more authoritative information about SMEs than others. These loan officers keep long-term relationships with small and medium-sized business owners and their employees, and understand the local business situation and market share of enterprises. Even loan officers live in local communities. Therefore, we have a good understanding of the financial situation of SMEs and their owners, and have a more accurate understanding of their current and future performance.
2. Macro instruction level
(1) The Impact of Banking Merger and Structural Adjustment on SME Financing
It is generally believed? The financial institutions formed after the merger of the banking industry will not only increase in scale, but also become more complicated in organizational structure. Behavior will also change, and these changes are usually not conducive to the development of relational loans.
Strahan (1998) believes that at the beginning of the merger of small banks, diversified operations make the merged banks more resistant to risks, thus providing more loans for SMEs. However, with the further expansion of the scale, banks can start to provide loans to large enterprises, and internal management is becoming more and more complicated, so the proportion of loans from banks to small and medium-sized enterprises will decline; On the contrary, small banks are merged by big banks, and newly established banks will reduce loans to small and medium-sized enterprises; Similarly, the merger of large banks will also reduce loans to small and medium-sized enterprises.
Peek & amp？ Luo Songren found that the merger of large banks into small banks or between large banks often reduces loans to small and medium-sized enterprises. Berger further pointed out that banking mergers and acquisitions have four potential effects on SME loans: static effect, Reorganization effect, direct effect and external effect.
Sharp believes that market forces enable banks to strengthen the implicit long-term contractual relationship with small enterprises, while small enterprises tend to maintain long-term relationships with banks in the long run. Because the settlement cost of enterprises switching to "basic" banks is relatively high, when banks maintain long-term relations with enterprises, banks may make enterprises pay interest rates higher than those in the period of perfect competition, thus making up for the short-term low-interest subsidies that attracted small enterprises in the past. Peterson and Rajan's research found that when the market power of banks increases, small enterprises with relatively low credit ratings may also receive loan support.
(2) The impact of macroeconomic policies on SMEs.
There are two main transmission channels of monetary policy: monetary channel and credit channel. Monetary channel means that monetary policy affects the actual expenditure of economic departments by changing interest rates. There are two kinds of credit channels, one is bank loan channel, and the other is balance sheet channel. Bank loan channel means that monetary tightening is accompanied by the reduction of bank reserves, which in turn leads to the reduction of loan supply. . Balance sheet channel means that monetary tightening damages the value of enterprise collateral by raising interest rates, lowers the credit rating of enterprises and further weakens the ability of enterprises to obtain loans. Therefore, the change of monetary policy has a greater impact on SMEs.
g？ e？ r？ t？ l？ e？ r？ And then what? g？ Me? l？ c？ h？ r？ Me? s？ t？ In the empirical study of small manufacturing enterprises, it is found that small manufacturing enterprises are not only directly sensitive to interest rates, but also indirectly affected by economic cycles. Therefore, the impact of monetary tightening on small enterprises is far greater than that of large enterprises.
Taylor pointed out that financial liberalization will not lead to an increase in the total supply of funds, because the increase in interest rates will only transfer the supply of funds from the informal sector to the formal sector, and there will be no net increase in the total amount of loans. Steel believes that due to high transaction costs and risks, lack of collateral and historical origins, small enterprises will still face many restrictions in obtaining loans from the formal sector. If financial control is liberalized, financial liberalization will worsen the financing environment of SMEs.
Domestic research status
At present, the domestic academic research on SME financing mainly focuses on three aspects: first, the choice of financing channels for SMEs in China and related empirical research; Second, study the reasons why domestic small and medium-sized enterprises are facing difficulties and the corresponding countermeasures; Thirdly, it introduces and compares the international experience of SME financing operation.
1, He Liping (1999) thinks? The main factor that hinders China's banking institutions from expanding credit support for SMEs is the lack of sufficient information about the risks of corporate customers, so it is impossible to conduct appropriate risk rating and provide corresponding credit services. It is pointed out that the information asymmetry between lenders and SMEs borrowers can be solved by developing non-state-owned financial institutions and changing the operation mode of state-owned financial institutions.
2. Zhou Ye An empirically analyzes the influence of China's financial repression policy on its lending capacity. The analysis shows that the interest rate control, price and quantity discrimination in the credit market lead to excessive debt, adverse selection and rent-seeking, which wastes credit resources. The administrative control of the capital market increases the direct financing cost of enterprises.
3. Researcher Fan Gang (1999) believes that the main reason why banks are unwilling to lend to SMEs is that the government has never adopted the policy of developing non-state-owned banks. Therefore, the author suggests actively developing non-state-owned banks. At the same time, in order to prevent people's' market choice' from being distorted, it is suggested to provide depositors of non-state-owned banks with the same social security as state-owned banks.
4. Jason believes that the financial dilemma of private economy stems from the financial support of state-owned financial system to state-owned enterprises and the rigid dependence of state-owned enterprises on this support, as well as the resulting credit capitalization. He believes that the fundamental way out for the private economy is to create an external environment for the growth of the endogenous financial system.
5. Professor Chen Xiaohong (2000) pointed out: Because most small and medium-sized enterprises have poor quality, limited financial and material resources and outdated equipment, they produce end products that belong to the seller's market, rather than intermediate products and services that match large enterprises. With the formation of the buyer's market and the intensification of competition, the operating efficiency becomes worse. Considering the risks and profits, the credit funds of state-owned commercial banks are seriously tilted towards large enterprise groups, which makes the credit funds of small and medium-sized enterprises seriously insufficient. In order to solve this disharmony, the author thinks that we should solve the financing problem of small and medium-sized enterprises from three aspects: first, reconstruct the relationship between commercial banks and small and medium-sized enterprises, and establish the system of hosting banks for small and medium-sized enterprises; Second, establish policy-oriented small and medium-sized banks; Third, vigorously develop small and medium-sized non-state-owned commercial banks.
6. Dr. Wei (2000) believes that the relationship between China's market-oriented banks and small and medium-sized enterprises should be a contractual host bank relationship. This relationship model is based on market economy, which uses the general rules of market economy to regulate the behavior of banks and small and medium-sized enterprises, and embodies the contractual credit relationship.
7. Lin Yifu (200 1), Starting from the factor endowment of abundant labor force and scarce capital in China, Li Yongjun thinks that the direct financing cost of small and medium-sized enterprises in China is high, and the limitation of enterprise scale determines that the preparation of listed public financial statements will bear huge information costs; In indirect financing, large financial institutions tend to lend to large enterprises because of the transparency of business activities, mortgage and loan scale effects. Unlike large financial institutions, small and medium-sized financial institutions are more willing to lend for small and medium-sized enterprises. From the technical types of enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises are mainly labor-intensive, and the only way to solve the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises is to vigorously develop small and medium-sized financial institutions.
8. Bai Qingxian and Xue Yuhua (200 1) pointed out that due to China's long-term implementation of the catch-up strategy, the view of emphasizing economies of scale occupied a dominant position at the policy level, ignoring the comparative advantages of small and medium-sized enterprises in economic development, and the gap in understanding led to long-term development.
The financing problem of small and medium-sized enterprises has not been well solved.
9. Professor Yang Siqun (2002), based on the research on the relationship between foreign SMEs and banks, thinks that there are some problems between SMEs and banks in China, such as "reluctant to lend", discriminatory credit, non-long-term relationship, payment system and small and medium-sized financial institutions. This paper puts forward some ideas to alleviate the problems between banks and enterprises in China: on the one hand, banks' reluctance to lend reflects the problems of small and medium-sized enterprises and low credit degree; on the other hand, banks have made positive changes in credit culture and attached importance to the safety of assets, so "reluctance to lend" can only be used as a temporary measure in a short-term special environment, while in the long run, in order to ensure the safe and stable operation of credit assets, banks must improve their information analysis ability and credit guarantee technology; For the non-long-term relationship between small and medium-sized enterprises and banks, establish the system of small and medium-sized enterprises hosting banks; In the payment system, small and medium-sized enterprises have the phenomenon of "opening more than one account", which is not conducive to banks to understand the operation and credit status of small and medium-sized enterprises. It is necessary to reduce this phenomenon and improve the efficiency of bank micropayment system; In small and medium-sized financial institutions, one-sided emphasis on nationalization and state-owned holding makes them have institutional disadvantages such as poor corporate governance structure and weak budget constraints. In order to overcome this disadvantage, it is necessary to establish and supervise small and medium-sized enterprises according to the market-oriented criteria, and at the same time encourage small and medium-sized financial institutions to carry out market-oriented mergers and acquisitions in the process of integration.
10, Professor Chea Chang (2003) explained the special significance of small and medium-sized bank financing for small and medium-sized enterprises through the bank organizational structure and the characteristics of relational lending. The basic premise of relational loans is that banks and enterprises must maintain a long-term, close and relatively closed trading relationship, that is, enterprises regularly trade with a very small number of banks (usually one or two). Because relational loans are not limited to whether enterprises can provide qualified financial information and collateral, they are most suitable for small and medium-sized enterprises with less assets collateral. In other words, small and medium-sized banks are at a disadvantage in collecting and processing public hard information (such as corporate financial data, credit codes, etc.). ), but due to its geographical characteristics, through long-term close contact with small and medium-sized enterprises, it has the advantage of issuing relational loans to small and medium-sized enterprises with opaque information. Due to the cost of soft information transmission, banks will have agency problems. Compared with big banks, small banks have simple hierarchical structure, short agency chain and relatively low agency cost.
Insufficient theoretical research and future research direction
Although the financing theory of enterprises has been mature after years of development, the financing demand theory of small and medium-sized enterprises has not reached a consensus on many issues, and various empirical tests often lead to completely different results. This fully shows that the diversity and complexity of small enterprises make their financing demand theory far from perfect, and there are still quite a few problems and disputes that need further explanation. Especially in China, the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises is still in its infancy, both in theoretical research and practical operation. The economic situation in China is very complicated. Since the beginning of this year, the phenomenon of usury collapse in Wenzhou and Ordos has fully reflected the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises, which deserves our deep consideration.
The development direction of SME financing should be interdisciplinary. For example, adding game theory and behavioral economics to the research of financing for small and medium-sized enterprises may make a breakthrough to some extent.