Scientism is a derogatory term, referring to a trend of thought or movement in scientific epistemology and philosophy of science. Philosophers who oppose natural science as the most valuable part of culture call their opposition "scientism" and condemn them. However, some people who disapprove of the supremacy of science do not use this derogatory term, but appropriately call this view epistemological foundationalism and ontological naturalism. After Rorty's Mirror of Philosophy and Nature (1979) was published, fundamentalism became the target of public criticism. People blame the dead end of contemporary western philosophy on the foundationalism initiated by Descartes. Descartes' argument is roughly as follows: (1) Science is the only knowledge and eternal truth. Ethical, aesthetic and theological concepts will be ruled out by scientific progress. The only reason to accept traditional norms is that it is prudent to live according to traditional rules and experience-based practices to the extent that we don't have enough scientific knowledge in all practical fields. This is the most important point, and the following points can be directly or indirectly derived from it. (2) The certainty of scientific knowledge lies in that it is based on clear concepts in disciplines; This is Archimedes' knowledge point. (3) Natural science is the correct representation of objective reality because of the application of scientific methods. It has become the standard and example of all knowledge. (4) When all knowledge becomes scientific knowledge, all life problems (including ethical issues) have answers. (5) So science is the most valuable part of culture.
Philosophers in the 20th century seldom fully accept these arguments. They first denied that science was an eternal truth, but thought it was speculative knowledge (Popper) or a confirmed hypothesis (Carnap). The reasonable content of science has only withstood repeated tests and been temporarily accepted by comparing with other competitive hypotheses (lakatos); Only the whole science has been proved, any individual part may be falsified, but through internal adjustment, the whole science will still be accepted (Quinn). Philosophers who deny Descartes' first argument often deny deterministic argument; However, many empiricists can still replace the certainty of rational intuition with the certainty of sensory experience. As for denying scientific knowledge, there are people who can answer all life questions. However, as long as contemporary philosophers continue to agree with Descartes' expressionism and believe in scientific methods, they are fundamentalists of epistemology. For example, Peirce, Russell, Pope, Carnap, lakatos and Quinn were all such fundamentalists, so their views were denounced as scientism by the opposition.
People use the word "scientism" to belittle not only epistemological foundationalism, but also ontological naturalism, because naturalists admit that causality can explain all natural, social and cultural phenomena and human behavior. In short, everything is within the scope of scientific explanation. In this way, the word "scientism" is actually a derogatory term for foundationalism and naturalism. So what is naturalism?
Naturalism movement is a metaphysical trend of thought, which adheres to a methodology rather than ontological monism: this methodology can be consistent with various ontologies (dualism, idealism, materialism, theism, atheism, etc.). ). This naturalism is characterized by denying that anything exists outside the scope of scientific explanation in principle, and advocating that nature is not only the floorboard of all natural objects (including people), but also the system of all natural processes. As far as the scientific explanation it provides is concerned, nature is a self-sufficient system, and all processes may be scientifically explained in principle. In other words, everything in nature is understandable in principle. Rationality is the consistent application of natural methods. Natural law can be simply summarized as follows: (1) Explain by identifying the natural causes of the studied object; (2) test the consequences of this statement; What will happen if the hypothesis is true? The truth is only a matter of result. Natural law is the operation of natural objects (that is, people) on other natural objects.
Understandable meaning of nature: nature has laws, and natural methods try to establish natural laws through research. As a natural thing, man is subject to the laws of nature just like other natural things. The natural process that constitutes people's mind and social life can be studied by natural methods, which belongs to the scope of natural laws discovered by this method. Knowledge about the world in a certain period is scientific knowledge in that period. Because people believe that scientific knowledge is obtained through the strict and continuous application of natural methods. However, any theory of science can still be tested endlessly, so there is no final certainty and eternal truth in any theory. "No knowledge outside science" does not mean that people only deal with nature through scientific research. There are many ways to experience the world, but the way to know the world is scientific. Scientific method is the only cognitive method. Naturalists don't think that only scientific objects are real; All natural objects are equally true, and scientific descriptive words cannot exhaust the truth of nature.
Generally speaking, there is no virtue in nature, but its objects include valuable and value-seeking human beings. As a part of nature, human beings cannot be reduced to any other part, but like other parts, they can be explained by natural methods. Only natural methods, not some kind of moral intuition, can provide the key to explain moral arguments. Like other scientific theories, moral theory can determine the strength or appropriateness of the theory by examining the consequences. In 1930s and 1940s, naturalism prevailed in America, with Dewey, Santayana and Cohen as the main representatives. The representative figures in recent times are E.Nagel and S.Hook. Later naturalism was replaced by analytical empiricism. However, the problem of "continuity of scientific methods" put forward by it is still the focus of contemporary debate.
In short, the foundationalism of epistemology, whether truth or probability, and the naturalism of ontology, whether materialism or idealism, do not call themselves scientism. Scientism is a disparaging term for opponents.
Second, what is humanism?
Humanism has at least two meanings. Historically, humanism is a philosophical and literary movement that originated in Italy in the second half of the14th century and spread to other European countries. It constitutes an element of modern western culture. Humanism also refers to any philosophy that recognizes the value and dignity of human beings, takes human beings as the yardstick, or takes human nature, human limitations and human interests as the theme. The former is a basic aspect of the Renaissance. Thinkers at that time reintegrated people into the natural and historical world from this aspect and explained people from this angle. In this sense, humanism is one of the basic conditions for the scientific revolution in the17th century, so it is also the condition for the birth of "scientism" to some extent. /kloc-fundamentalism since the 0/7th century and naturalism since the end of19th century are not opposed to Renaissance humanism. The humanistic movement in history is the antithesis of supernatural belief and medieval Aristotemism. Besides historical humanism, we are now discussing contemporary humanism. People usually think that contemporary humanism is "subject philosophy". Because philosophers have different understandings of "subject", in this sense, "humanism" is ambiguous. If the philosophy derived from Descartes' "I think" and Kant's transcendental self is regarded as humanism, then neo-Kantianism is a typical humanism. We don't talk about whether individual neo-Kantians belong to philosophers in humanistic thoughts. Generally speaking, neo-Kantians strive to inherit Kant's program of laying a scientific foundation, especially natural science (Marburg School) and cultural science (Freiburg School). Their self-priming is universal, unexperienced and impersonal, which is fundamentally different from the experiential self emphasized by humanists. Moreover, Neo-Kantianism pays special attention to the value of science, which is precisely the characteristic of "scientism", which is quite different from humanism that emphasizes personal value. Secondly, as a school of "subject philosophy" or "consciousness philosophy", Husserl's phenomenology can also be called humanism. Like Kant, he took himself as the starting point and tried to lay the foundation for scientific knowledge. The difference is that he turned to "essential intuition" and completed the work of forming objectivity in a descriptive way. Early anti-psychology made him regard logical structure as "truth itself". Husserl's "I think" is different from Kant's "I think" and is not impersonal, but the transcendental basis of objectivity does not need a subject or subjectivity, but a pluralistic, inter-subjective and atomistic basis. Is this basic theory humanistic? Yes, if we regard any "subjective philosophy" as humanism. However, humanism is characterized by the primacy of human beings, and Husserl's phenomenological "reduction" of "I" in daily language and daily life. He doesn't defend philosophy for people's demands, but he cares about making philosophy a strict science. In this way, the phenomenology of idealism does not belong to the category of humanism.
Thirdly, M. Scheler's anti-formalism value philosophy, which originated from phenomenological "philosophical anthropology", emphasizes that personality is the center of moral action, which seems to be consistent with humanism. But individualism does not regard man as a measure of good and evil. Some individualists understand individualism as a philosophy that people often protest against being reduced to the level of ideas or things and pay full attention to the contemporary cultural crisis. This change of individualism makes it closer to humanitarianism. However, individualists still pay little attention to individuals' ability to build themselves, but pay more attention to their ability to accommodate others and open to a value order. Therefore, individualism is not a complete humanism. However, individualism or idealism (centered on Boston University) popular in the United States is often called humanism. Fourthly, we found a truly complete humanitarianism in Sartre's existentialism philosophy. His book Being and Being is the concentrated expression of phenomenology, existentialism philosophy and humanism, and also the full development of humanism. Existentialists concluded: "There is no other world except human world and human subject world." As a typical humanism, existentialism and naturalism are incompatible. Fifthly, Dilthey and his successors' methodological hermeneutics emphasized that social humanities needed to understand the text or social and historical phenomena, which was obviously different from natural science's explanation of the studied phenomena with general laws. Understanding and explanation are two different scientific methods. However, naturalism insists on the continuity of scientific methods, and all natural objects and phenomena, including people, can be scientifically explained by applying general laws, thinking that only in this way can real scientific knowledge be obtained. In this way, methodological hermeneutics is opposite to naturalism. Hermeneutics is also incompatible with epistemological foundationalism in denying the certainty of truth. Therefore, in the whole field of philosophy, early hermeneutics can be said to belong to the category of humanism, as opposed to scientism.
Third, anti-humanitarianism
Continental philosophy, especially French philosophy, appeared in the late 1960s, replacing "subject philosophy" with various theories about laying the foundation of humanism. During the period of "methodological tension" of famous German sociologists, the questions raised by various schools of epistemology focused on the relationship between subject and object, and the work of "laying the foundation for objectivity" of consciousness was such a relationship. However, Heidegger pointed out that real basic research cannot be based on this relationship. What is basic research? It is a study to restore the forgotten meaning of "existence". So the question of "I think" was downgraded and replaced by the question of "what is existence". Of course, this problem is first perceived in our own composition, that is, people who have realized the existence before expressing the meaning of existence with concepts, but our existence did not realize our own experience subject at first; Not Descartes, Kant and Husserl's "I think". This is why Heidegger called it "this is"-this is, not "I". Its existence level is lower than that of the cognitive subject facing the ideological object. This problem was first put forward by Heidegger in the article Image Age. He said that "I think therefore I am" is not a statement that transcends time or has no preset. It came into being in a certain period, when science itself was emerging as an intelligible model, which enabled us to obtain "what is" from appearances. In this way, the first presupposition is the process of objectification and representation. We claim that acquiring enough knowledge through this process is a deterministic experience, and only by seeking existence in such objectivity can the possibility of scientific knowledge appear. It is in this experience that the objective appearance is reliable and we become the subject. In Descartes' view, man became the first real subject and foundation, and at the same time became the center of existence itself. But this is possible, because the world becomes portraits and images before our eyes. Heidegger pointed out that it is the same thing that the world becomes an image and man becomes the subject of existence, and the two processes are intertwined: "The more the world becomes an image, the more people insist that they are the subject; The more widely and thoroughly the world can be regarded as the conquered, the more objectively it can be presented as an object, the more subjective people become, that is, the more they insist on their own opinions, and the reflection on the world and the theory of the world will become the theory of mankind and anthropology. It is no wonder that the influence of humanism is growing only where the world has become an image. " [1] Heidegger also condemned any philosophy that is based on lack and stays in human existence without returning to existential philosophy itself in Letters on Humanism (1946). Let us understand Heidegger's anti-humanitarianism. Obviously, what he wants to exclude is not the respect for human beings as the most valuable beings, but the subject metaphysics that some thinkers want to attach to this respect ethics. Descartes deduced "I am" from "I think"; In fact, "I am" is hidden in "I think" which has been established as the highest subject. But "I am" is no longer a proposition, it is still a problem in itself. Because the meaning of "I" is hidden, the question of "who am I" was initially buried in the appearance of the indefinite pronoun "one", directly buried in the pretentious self-knowledge, and even buried in the illusion of self-reflection. So the analysis of "this is" keeps asking: "Who is there?" Heidegger asked: "If' I' is taken as a given starting point, what should be done if existential analysis falls into the trap set by itself, that is, in the form of its own false obvious and false direct explanation?" [2] This doubt shows that the answer to the question "Who is there" can't have evidential value, but only explanatory value. Value itself depends on how to explain the relationship between people there and the world and others. Heidegger's breaking humanism in this way is not to destroy the foundation on which ethics and politics depend, but to build their foundation on non-anthropological land more deeply and reliably. There is also an attack on the anthropological basis of humanism in France, which is not carried out from the standpoint of ontology, but involves the popular understanding mode in humanities. At the beginning of the 20th century, the German philosopher Dilthey thought that the understanding mode suitable for humanities was opposite to the interpretation mode of natural science. Because what we first understand is and in principle is the spiritual life of others expressed through symbols. In this way, the understanding contained in history, sociology and linguistics can only be the expansion of our initial understanding in daily language communication. So understanding is double subjective, from one subject to another. Nowadays, due to the brilliant development of linguistics, psychoanalysis and structural anthropology, another intelligibility model has occupied a dominant position in humanities. According to this model, understanding is no longer opposed to interpretation, and human beings' mastery of facts no longer depends on their own or others' consciousness. This is a semiotic model widely used by philosophical structuralism. Semiotic model is a challenge to the philosophy of subject, because it looks at meaning from a completely different angle from the intention and purpose of subject. There are four hypotheses in structural linguistics. The first postulate is the difference between language and speech; The second assumption is that diachronic is subordinate to temporality; The third hypothesis is to simplify the essential aspects of language (pronunciation and semantics) into formal aspects. When the content of a language is eliminated, it is just a symbol system defined purely by the differences between them. The significance of any hypothesis of structuralism clearly shows in the fourth postulate that language is essentially an autonomous entity with internal dependence, that is, structure. [3] This last postulate can be called the closed postulate of the marking system, which summarizes all other postulates. This is the hypothesis that poses the greatest challenge to phenomenology. According to phenomenology, language is not an object, but a medium through which we face reality. Talking about things, what you say is fleeting and flows to what you say; It transcends itself and establishes itself in an intentional movement that points to things. According to structural linguistics, language is self-sufficient; All its differences are inherent, and it is a system that precedes the speaker. In this way, we can understand how the semiotic model has led some philosophers to deliberately oppose subjectivism and humanism. Language is self-sufficient and has no objects. It is neither open to the world it refers to, nor to those who will inject vitality into it and use it to talk about the world. Self-orientation and world-orientation disappeared at the same time. It was at this time that psychoanalysis and linguistics went hand in hand. Its attack on subjective philosophy is more intense. It points to Descartes' confidence, which has found a solid foundation for certainty. Freud deeply explored the meaning scene that constitutes the whole field of consciousness, and exposed the role of fantasy and illusion that cover up our desires. In this way, it shows that opening is a temporary suspension of the attribute of consciousness. It is an anti-phenomenology that requires consciousness to be restored instead of consciousness. When he talked about "ego", "id" and "superego", the expulsion of the subject took another step forward. Not only the bottom (id) of the deepest self is unconscious, but even the top (superego) is unconscious. In other words, the characteristics of unconsciousness are not only possessed by repressed desires, but also possessed by the complicated process of making orders and rules from social authority (mainly parental authority) penetrate into our hearts. Let me talk about the cooperation between linguistics and structural anthropology. The philosophical significance of this methodological reorganization is very significant. If all kinds of cultural phenomena are regarded as symbol systems, personal practical experience is as irrelevant to cultural phenomena as the speaker is to language phenomena. "Anthropology regards social life as a system, in which all aspects are organically linked. ..... When anthropologists try to build models, the basic motivation is always to find the homomorphism of all forms of social life. " [4] The kinship system is an example of this. Like language systems, they are designed by the mind at the unconscious level, so the mind is not unique to the psychological subject or transcendental subject. The mind working in language, kinship system and all other symbolic systems that constitute society is integrated with its creation. It is the system itself and the culture. This is the price paid for the possibility of objective knowledge: thoughts already exist in things and social facts. We can go one step further: if the heart is a structure and the structure is in things, why not say that the heart is a thing? "Since the mind is also a thing, its function is to tell us the essence of other things." [5] In this way, you will understand why Strauss can say: "The ultimate goal of humanities is not to make people disappear." 〔6〕
Fourthly, the above criticism of subjective philosophy is based on temporality and is abstracted from history. However, the criticism of subjective philosophy can also be synchronic: that is, it eliminates the extravagant hope that the subject forms the world in different ways, which shows that it ignores the historical changes of the social and cultural system and its * * * time structure. This is the purpose of Foucault's knowledge archaeology. It points out that every knowledge field (called knowledge) has a coherent structure. In this way, the three real things-life, work and language-studied in The Story of Words (translated as "The Order of Things", 1970) constitute a system in each period of knowledge history, but they are discontinuous and different in different periods. "These changes are so sudden that any concept of continuity and progress of knowledge is excluded ... In this way, archaeology abandons history and denies what guarantees historical continuity: the eternity of human nature." [7] As for man himself, he is only a disappearing image and a limited thing in a short conceptual system. Only within the time limit when this system arouses him, provides him with a basis and gives him a special position, does he really exist. Man was initially promoted as an epistemological entity by Descartes' philosophy and humanities. Archaeological epistemology's criticism of humanism is very similar to Heidegger's criticism of the "world portrait era". The fundamental opposition of today's philosophical thoughts is that on the one hand, it is subject philosophy, and on the other hand, it is system theory. Fortunately, in recent times, some studies have tried to avoid the contradiction between the subject and the system in one way or another.
Fifth, firstly, it criticizes the semiotic model in linguistics and extends it to other humanities. Mainly influenced by Chomsky, the Prague School, Geneva School and Copenhagen School of Structuralism constructed a new model. According to this transformational grammar model, the difference between ability and performance is different from that between language and speech or between system and process. After the publication of 1965 Aspects of Syntactic Theory, Chomsky further divided competence into grammatical competence and semantic competence. Once the meaning of language is considered, Bissell's "speaking" has a much richer concept of discourse. Saussure's "speaking" becomes the accidental realization of the language system by all and any speaker. As the basis of speech, the unit is a sentence, which cannot be simplified as a symbol of a language unit. Speech exists in the act of making judgments and cannot be reduced to the differences and opposites between symbols of a system. It must mean something, a world, a speaker. He uses personal pronouns to indicate that he is speaking. Finally, the speech also mentioned an interlocutor: the audience. But not only the concept of the speaker is treated in this way, but also the signal system materialized by system philosophy tends to be diversified. The so-called oral ability of speakers means that they have the ability to distinguish signals and choose appropriate signals at a specific time and in a specific environment. In this way, the speaker knows the variations, differences and changes in the language model. Therefore, speech theory opens a new discussion on the subject of speech. On the one hand, the rigorous linguistic analysis of Jakobson and Chomsky, and on the other hand, the philosophical analysis of speech act theory tend to this method. These analyses of speech require that the concepts of system and speech subject be revised at the same time. Hermeneutics also points in the same direction. Only by explaining the signs of people hidden in literature and culture can people understand themselves. This idea requires a fundamental change in the concept of subject, just like the change of text. On the one hand, it denies a philosophical intuitionism based on "I think" and proves that its own meaning depends on the meaning understood outside itself. On the other hand, the understanding of the text is not satisfied with finding that its structure is composed of those symbols, but ends with revealing the image and existence of the world it points to. But this revelation is only a copy of the deposed subject, who wants to know himself circuitously through the signs of the world. In this way, the hermeneutics circle marks the concept of system and subject, and at the same time abandons them. All kinds of anti-humanism, especially structuralism, adhere to the "epistemological fracture" between science and ideology and relegate humanism to the ideological field. Structuralism is a typical example of contemporary scientism, which is incompatible with humanism. Heidegger's hermeneutics and Foucault's post-structuralism oppose both humanism and scientism. There are two ways to solve the dilemma between humanism and scientific theory. One is to return to Meloponti's position: to regain the concept of harmony between man and the world at a level lower than any theory or actual behavior. Mikel Dufrenne pointed out that human philosophy must admit that it is human's privilege to be related to the world. However, according to Meloponty's ultimate philosophy, man is no longer the subject of all objectivity. Before he became an object, he had been tortured by this world. Therefore, the universe is no longer self-sufficient. "The concept coat describing the world is clothes stained with poisonous blood, and the fibers of truth are attached to the world. Because the world has given people their own sizes, people can weave these clothes. " [8] In this way, the theoretical system is no longer self-sufficient, just as man is no longer the giver of meaning. Only by exposing the arrogance of both sides can we find the true nature of the relationship between subject and object. Some people put forward another way: to accept the overall separation of humanism and scientific theory, but not to classify humanism into the ideological field. In this way, we can admit that everything belongs to theory and system, just to keep the most important things: "others", his face and his words. But what is left out by the whole is not the constructive "I think" of subjective philosophy, it is not even "I", but "you". What I first appeared was not the nominative "I", but the accusative "I", which was responsible because I was very close to others. In this case, the only possible form of metaphysics is ethics. Ethics itself originated when I found myself in the most vulnerable position-being held hostage by others. In this way, inspired by the criticism of subject philosophy, contemporary philosophy tries to creatively bridge the gap between the system without subject and the subject without truth in various ways; Or give up at the expense of fundamentally changing the opposing relationship, reconcile the ideas of both sides in a higher synthesis, and limit yourself to reflecting on the insoluble characteristics of this conflict. In this dilemma, humanism has no choice but to admit that it has no foundation-just like a bet or a slogan.
Four, the two main lines of modern western philosophy
From the above, it seems that modern western philosophy is not just black and white "scientism" and humanism, but colorful, many-hued. Focusing on humanism, on the one hand, there are basic epistemology and naturalism philosophy opposed by contemporary humanism; On the other hand, there are various schools that attack humanism from the perspective of ontology or methodology, and there are also hermeneutics that oppose both humanism and scientism. Finally, there is a new direction, trying to coordinate the subject and the world, so as to avoid difficulties. Simply seeing the so-called opposition between scientism and humanism is far from accurate and comprehensive. As far as influential schools are concerned, the situation is quite complicated. But in terms of modern philosophy, are there two or three main lines? Perhaps the opposition between scientism and humanism that we are used to hearing refers to the parallel development or mutual opposition of the two main lines? I think it is feasible to analyze the opinions of various factions and boil them down to two or three trends of thought. However, it is inappropriate to call them scientism and humanism and think that they are fundamentally opposed and incompatible with each other. Now briefly talk about this problem.
The division of modern western philosophy depends on the rationality of two types or modes. One is critical, reflective and analytical rationality, and the other is speculative, innovative and comprehensive rationality. In this way, the two major ideological trends that run through western modern times are roughly equivalent to the two philosophies that Kant talked about. Kant repeatedly asked Descartes' question of "I think" four times: What can I know? What am I going to do? What can I expect? What is a person? The philosophy of the world comes from Kant's first question, and the philosophy of man comes from the other three questions. The former critically reflects on knowledge, while the latter speculates on human behavior. The philosophy about the world corresponds to the first rational model, which can be called "the philosophy of reason and truth"; The philosophy about human beings is consistent with the second rational model, which can be called "the philosophy of freedom and value". These two philosophies develop in parallel in modern western philosophy, which are two opposing and complementary ideological trends and two main lines running through the whole history of modern philosophy. In order to answer the debate about humanism, we will briefly review the origin and development of human philosophy. Since Descartes put forward the question of "who am I", the philosophy of critical reflection has become more and more important; The philosophy of speculative synthesis didn't show its great significance until the turn of19th century and 20th century. Descartes' "I" is a universal non-historical subject, and "I" is everyone in any region and at any time. The real modern subject is different from the individual. In the subject, will replaces thinking, judgment replaces concept, and action replaces knowledge as the primary and central ability and strength. This subject has become the yardstick of all things, so contemporary humanism was born. It comes from the ontological study of human nature. Anglo-American analytical philosophy focuses on knowledge, and the research methods of action and human nature are similar to epistemology, such as language behavior theory and philosophy of mind. The research methods of Chinese mainland's speculative philosophy originated from Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and continued to Husserl's phenomenology and Sartre's existentialism. The question it discusses is: What must human freedom be like?