The key difference between monopoly enterprises and competitive enterprises lies in the ability of monopolists to influence the prices of their products. No matter what the cause of monopoly is, the result of monopoly problem will eventually show as monopoly price, but it is difficult to show it in a short time in different degrees. At present, the problem of monopoly price in China is quite serious, which has aroused widespread concern and strong reflection from all walks of life. Although the exposed monopoly price problem can't fully reflect all the problems caused by monopoly, we can also see from these problems that the root of the current monopoly problem in China lies in the irregularity of administrative monopoly and natural monopoly and the extension of their power. The real business monopoly formed by competition is not obvious, even if it exists, it is inextricably linked with the lag of system reform. Therefore, deepening reform will remain the key to solve the current monopoly problem in China.

First, the current monopoly price problem is not only the direct manifestation of the imperfect monopoly price formation mechanism and supervision and restraint mechanism, but also the terminal reflection of the deep-seated institutional problems that cause monopoly.

At present, the monopoly price problems that undermine fair competition, hinder the effective allocation of resources by the market mechanism, and harm the interests of consumers or other operators mainly include: first, the operators of natural monopoly industries use their monopoly position to force the government to falsely set prices, adjust prices without authorization or charge their own fees, and increase prices in disguise by means of price increase or out-of-price charges; Or expand the business scope or attach various unreasonable trading conditions, buy and sell hard, earn illegitimate gains brought by monopoly, and harm the interests of consumers and other operators; Or implement the price policy according to the situation, follow closely when the price increases, but find various excuses to postpone the implementation when the price decreases, in order to earn the time spread of the price policy changes. Second, local governments and industry departments, proceeding from their own interests, engage in market segmentation and regional blockade through discriminatory pricing or charging policies with the nature of regional blockade and industry monopoly, or encourage and support vicious price competition of local enterprises in other ways, or engage in industry self-discipline pricing on the grounds of strengthening macro-control and standardizing market order, thus forming a diversified pattern of price monopoly subjects behind enterprises by the government and hindering normal price competition. Third, it is common for enterprises, institutions and intermediary service agencies attached to the government to monopolize prices or charges. In particular, some government departments transfer the affairs in official activities to intermediary service agencies without authorization, changing free services into paid services, forming a pattern in which intermediary service agencies rely on administrative power to monopolize fees and administrative agencies rely on intermediary service agencies to obtain benefits. Fourth, enterprises in competitive industries collude with each other to engage in price alliance and exclude reasonable price competition.

To sum up, the main reasons for the above price monopoly problems are:

First, the price formation mechanism and supervision and restraint mechanism of monopoly industries are not perfect, which leads to monopoly prices in monopoly industries. First of all, the unreasonable price formation mechanism of monopoly industries makes it difficult for price control to stimulate operators to improve efficiency. At present, China's monopoly industries mainly adopt cost-based pricing, and the basis of government price control is mainly the cost data reported by controlled enterprises, which is the individual cost of monopoly enterprises in a specific region rather than the reasonable social average cost or advanced cost. Moreover, due to the asymmetry of cost information, government price control depends on the bargaining power of the government and enterprises to a certain extent, and it is difficult to restrain monopoly false high pricing. Secondly, the financial and price compensation mechanisms are not perfect, which leads to the fuzzy cost boundary of enterprises and the difficulty of government price control. In particular, because monopoly products or services bear the responsibility of stabilizing prices, the low-price policy has been implemented for a long time, and the cost compensation of universal services still adopts the policy of business cross-subsidy, which makes the policy factors and operating factors of enterprise losses vague. Enterprises often regard these losses as policy losses, and then seek price adjustment or turn to out-of-price price price increase or out-of-price charges. However, it is difficult for government price control to distinguish between operating losses and policy losses, and the establishment or adjustment of regulated prices actually legalizes the inflated prices. Finally, the lack of supervision over the implementation of price policy has affected the effect of price control. The lack of supervision over the use of price adjustment income leads to the coexistence of losses of monopoly enterprises and wage increases of employees, or the transfer of price adjustment income to non-monopoly links and diversified business fields. Insufficient government price supervision leads monopoly enterprises to monopolize prices by virtue of monopoly position, which harms the interests of consumers and other operators. The price policy announcement system is not perfect, and consumers' awareness of rights protection is not strong, so it is difficult to form an effective social supervision and restraint mechanism.

Second, the unclear definition of natural monopoly industries leads to the unreasonable extension of natural monopoly power and monopoly price problems. At present, enterprises engaged in natural monopoly business in China often engage in competitive business at the same time, which creates conditions for monopoly enterprises to use non-monopoly enterprises to monopolize prices. When it is difficult for a monopoly enterprise to obtain monopoly profits in the business field regulated by the government, it can rely on its monopoly position in the main business to extend the natural monopoly power entrusted by the state without authorization and seek huge profits in the additional business field. From the perspective of scale effect and scope economy, it is undoubtedly correct for monopoly enterprises to extend their products or services, which can well divert their main business. However, the abuse of monopoly position to avoid government price control constitutes a price monopoly problem, which is more obvious in monopoly management fields such as public utilities. For example, the pipeline gas company stipulates that if gas appliances are not provided or designated by the company, they will not be ignited, and then they will be purchased in large quantities at a reduced price, and consumers will be bound at a high price, thus achieving a two-way monopoly between the demand side and the supply side, damaging the interests of consumers and gas appliance operators. The gas company successfully evaded price control and obtained excess profits. Especially when it is difficult to allocate the public costs in regulated and non-regulated areas reasonably, monopoly enterprises can often transfer the costs or expenses in non-regulated areas to regulated products and cross-subsidize monopoly and non-monopoly businesses, which not only covers up the rationality of natural monopoly, but also leads to inflated government pricing and excess profits in non-monopoly sectors, and at the same time causes the problem of cross-subsidizing non-natural monopoly sectors through the main business of natural monopoly and crowding out competition.

Third, the separation of government and enterprise makes administrative power evolve into an important monopoly economic resource, which leads to the monopoly price problem in the field of competition. At present, because the reform of state-owned enterprises in China has not yet been put in place, the government still holds huge economic resources and bears the dual responsibilities of maintaining and increasing the value of state-owned assets and maintaining fair competition. A considerable number of state-owned enterprises are still important sources of economic income for local or departmental governments. Market economy is a competitive economy, and competition is the weakness of state-owned economy. Local governments or industry departments can only use administrative power directly or in disguise to make up for their weaknesses, so in the fierce price competition, there have been problems such as discriminatory price or charging policies in which the government or industry manipulates market prices and self-discipline prices. In particular, trade associations formed as a result of institutional reform still bear many functions of the original government agencies to a certain extent, making many administrative functions "special resources" in the market economy, resulting in monopoly price problems. In addition, administrative companies, institutions and intermediary service agencies separated from government functional departments in the reform are still attached to the original administrative power to monopolize business and prices or fees. As far as asset appraisal business is concerned, according to international practice, it should be operated by intermediary institutions such as accounting firms in society. However, according to China's current system, almost all relevant departments have asset appraisal agencies with business counterparts, which are designated as the only certification qualifications, which makes intermediary service agencies become real monopolies, monopolizing operations and fees.

Fourth, the government has multiple functions for monopoly industries, and the highly decentralized supervision function leads to the lack of effectiveness and scientificity of monopoly supervision. At present, China's monopoly industries basically adopt a state monopoly system that does not distinguish between government and enterprises. The government is not only the maker and supervisor of regulatory policies, but also the monopoly operator of specific businesses. The combination of monopoly interests and administrative power leads to a strong administrative monopoly. From the perspective of regulation legislation, the main body of industry regulation legislation is still the competent department responsible for industry development. The main purpose of regulatory legislation is to protect the safety of national infrastructure, but the regulations on the behavior control of monopoly enterprises are relatively weak, so regulatory legislation often becomes a super-economic means for departments to maintain monopoly status. For example, the emphasis on safety is often used by government departments and monopoly interests as a reason to continue to safeguard monopoly interests, which is also the main reason for the phenomenon of so-called unique designated products in many fields in China. In fact, technology control has extended to price monopoly. Judging from the establishment of regulatory agencies, the trace of departmental division is still obvious under the planned economy system, and the regulatory functions are scattered in many government departments. For example, according to the current management system, the price management of monopoly industries is basically managed by industry authorities and price authorities, and some have been managed by industry authorities. Theoretically, it can realize the complementary advantages of departments and better supervise them. However, due to the responsibility of maintaining and increasing the value of state-owned assets, especially the system of separating government from enterprises, price control has become a game between government departments or a means to protect enterprises to a certain extent. For another example, investment cost is the main component of the cost of regulated monopoly industries, while investment supervision and price supervision in China have always been separated, and investment approval is still treated as an industrial development issue. The government's price or charge commitment has also become an important way to attract investment, which leads to the policy of "full return, all-inclusive cost and all-inclusive price" and the rising construction cost.

Fifth, reasonable price competition is difficult to achieve, and the survival of the fittest and the optimal allocation of resources have caused monopoly price problems such as price alliance. In recent years, with the change of social supply and demand and the formation of buyer's market in China, enterprises have launched fierce price competition for limited market share. According to the law of market economy, the result of fierce price competition should be to optimize the allocation of resources and balance supply and demand. However, because local governments or industry departments often protect backward enterprises through preferential policies for local interests, some enterprises that have lost their competitiveness and living conditions can still be maintained; The existence of regional blockade and industry division leads to the high cost of cross-regional or cross-departmental mergers and acquisitions of advantageous enterprises, which leads some enterprises to give up mergers and acquisitions and adopt direct investment to form economies of scale and scope, making it difficult to optimize the allocation of existing resources; The exit mechanism of state-owned assets has not yet been formed, and the market access restrictions in many industries lead to too narrow exit space for enterprises, which makes enterprises fall into a dilemma. In particular, the property rights characteristics of traditional public ownership and the restraint mechanism for maintaining and increasing the value of state-owned assets have not yet been formed, which has led some enterprises to dump products to the market regardless of costs and benefits. Price competition is not the real competitive strategy of enterprise strategic objectives. In the end, the fierce price competition not only failed to realize the optimal allocation of resources and the balance between supply and demand, but also made the prices of many products close to or even lower than their production costs because of repeated price cuts. In the case that price competition is difficult to achieve survival of the fittest, it is difficult to form non-price competitive advantages in a short period of time, and the expansion of new market areas is extremely limited, preventing price decline has become an inevitable and helpless choice for many industries. Therefore, the price alliance between enterprises is a protective response to the continuous decline in prices. This is a unique economic phenomenon in China at present: the phenomenon of operating monopoly with very low concentration of economic scale.

Second, the current monopoly price problem cannot be solved simply by relaxing price control and strengthening regulation and supervision. The fundamental measure is to solve the system problems that cause monopoly prices through deepening reform.

To sum up, the current monopoly price problem is not only a direct manifestation of price reform and inadequate regulation, but also a terminal reflection of the serious lag of various system reforms. Even the existing commercial monopolies such as price alliance are inextricably linked with the lag of system reform. Therefore, the key to solve the current monopoly price problem lies in deepening reform and gradually eliminating the institutional factors that cause monopoly price problems.

(1) It is difficult to fundamentally solve the current monopoly price problem simply by relaxing price control and strengthening regulation and supervision. The role of relaxing price control and strengthening regulation and supervision is closely related to the competitive characteristics of the industry, the reform of circulation system and the development of productive forces. At present, all industries with administrative or natural monopoly are subject to price control, especially the institutional problems such as administrative monopoly caused by the long-term planned economy system, which makes it impossible to continue to liberalize prices in these fields. If we can't fundamentally solve the root cause of the monopoly price problem, but only seek a solution from the perspective of price deregulation, the monopoly price problem will intensify, and even strengthening control and supervision can only alleviate the current monopoly price problem. First, mature market operators have not yet formed, especially state-owned enterprises do not have the real nature of enterprises. Even if the price marketization is accelerated, enterprises can't accept the competitive price constraint in the market. Second, the reform of relevant systems lags behind, which seriously restricts the operation of market price mechanism. Even if the price control is relaxed, it is difficult to form prices through market competition due to many factors. Third, in the case of state-owned enterprises as the main body of competition, soft budget constraints often lead to price competition between enterprises more likely to evolve into vicious competition. Therefore, relaxing price control and strengthening regulation and supervision are by no means the starting point and breakthrough to solve the current monopoly price problem. The key is to eliminate the root of monopoly price problem through reform.

(2) Deepen the reform of management system, reasonably define the scope of monopoly, and effectively reduce the monopoly price problem caused by the reasonable extension of monopoly power. As we all know, both market regulation and government regulation have failed. Monopoly competition theory also holds that effective competition must take into account the coordination of economies of scale and competitive vitality in order to maximize social and economic efficiency. Therefore, opposing monopoly must respect objective economic laws, rather than eliminating all monopolies. The criterion of judgment is to see whether all the things that should be put in are put in place and whether all the things that should be managed are well managed. At present, we should do the following work well: First, we should speed up the separation of government from enterprise, standardize government administrative activities according to law, and reduce the administrative monopoly caused by the disorderly extension of administrative power to the market field. The second is to narrow the field of natural monopoly, speed up the separation of natural monopoly and unnatural monopoly, and minimize the monopoly problems caused by natural monopoly forces and their extension. The third is to speed up the reform of state-owned enterprises, cultivate mature market competitors, and gradually change the current management of enterprises from all properties to classified management according to industrial properties. Fourth, deepen the reform of trade associations, guide and standardize their behavior, and gradually form modern trade associations that meet the requirements of the socialist market economic system.

(3) Cultivate an effective competition mechanism, improve the efficiency of government supervision, and effectively reduce the monopoly price problem caused by the monopoly position of monopoly enterprises. The theory of government regulation under the condition of asymmetric information holds that the regulation system can be regarded as an incentive mechanism, and the government should take incentive control measures to improve the operating efficiency of regulated industries or enterprises. Practice has proved that cultivating effective competition mechanism is the key to improve the incentive function of regulation. But now when it comes to introducing competition mechanism, direct competition is considered too much, while the role of other competitive forces is often ignored. According to Porter's competition theory, the competition faced by enterprises comes from five aspects: the invasion of new competitors, the threat of substitutes, the bargaining power of customers and suppliers, and the competition among existing competitors. Therefore, we should attach great importance to the indirect competition mechanism and avoid introducing competition by excessive means such as horizontal and vertical splitting. First of all, asymmetric control policies should be adopted to cultivate new direct competitors in industries that still have room for development. The second is to actively develop indirect alternative industries and build an effective alternative competition pattern. Third, cultivate and gradually form professional consumer organizations composed of lawyers, technical and economic experts, enhance the influence of consumer groups on government control policies and enterprise group behaviors, and better restrain the business behavior of monopoly enterprises. The fourth is to establish and improve the bidding system for franchise. Fifth, for saturated industries, national monopoly enterprises can consider scientific and reasonable spin-off of existing monopoly enterprises, regional enterprises can consider cultivating comparative competition mechanisms between regions, or regional enterprises can compete directly on the basis of networking.

(4) Deepen the reform of regulatory agencies and operational mechanisms, and realize the indirect control of monopoly industries by the government according to law. Historical development and foreign practice have proved that a regulatory agency has multiple functions and its regulatory functions are highly decentralized, so it is impossible to achieve effective supervision. First, it is necessary to implement a system of separating government control functions from specific business management, so that government control agencies can exercise control functions independently. Second, gradually concentrate other economic supervision functions closely related to price supervision, such as cost supervision and investment supervision, and set up a number of professional supervision institutions in different industries, or unify investment supervision and price supervision in comprehensive departments, and concentrate the control functions scattered in government departments on new control institutions as far as possible to achieve all-round management in market access, operation mode and scale, product and service quality standards, price-setting procedures and methods, and even bankruptcy and merger. Third, the government's control function should focus on controlling the operation of natural monopoly industries and natural monopoly businesses, and strengthen the coordination of interests between monopoly enterprises and other operators and consumers. The fourth is to implement indirect control according to law. For the industries designated by the state to monopolize, the legitimate monopoly caused by setting up industrial barriers needs to be defined by law and necessary control measures should be implemented. By formulating special rules of conduct and special industrial control rules, we will resolutely stop enterprises from extending monopoly power without authorization, strictly regulate government behavior, and prevent the government from exceeding its authority or determining the scope of monopoly business without authorization, so as to truly manage less and better.

(5) Accelerate technological progress and strive to provide corresponding technical support for breaking monopoly and realizing effective competition pattern. Practice has proved that the introduction of competition mechanism is closely related to technological progress. One of the important reasons why some traditional monopoly industries or natural monopoly businesses are becoming competitive industries or businesses is technological progress. At present, some industries have not formed an effective competition mechanism after the reform, which is directly related to the fact that the pace of technological progress does not meet the requirements of development. Therefore, to break monopoly and introduce competition, we need not only various management system reforms, but also technological progress to create conditions for reform. It is impossible to achieve effective competition only through simple division, and it may bring about uneconomical operation, which runs counter to the original intention of reform.

(6) Learn lessons, make early preparations, and speed up the formulation and improvement of the anti-monopoly legal system. At present, China still lacks a general basis for deriving monopoly from competition, but in recent years, there has been a phenomenon of self-concentration monopoly in China to varying degrees. In addition, although the emergence of monopoly price problems like price alliance is due to various institutional problems, the situation that there is no legal basis to deal with it has taught us a profound lesson. Especially after China's accession to the WTO, foreign products and multinational companies will enter the China market more and more, and multinational companies will easily gain a monopoly position in the China market with their abundant capital and technical strength. Therefore, we should learn a lesson, take precautions, effectively safeguard market competition by enacting anti-monopoly laws, curb transnational monopoly forces, use legal systems to prevent multinational enterprises from restricting competition by manipulating market prices, product output, abusing market dominance, and prevent international enterprises from gaining a dominant position in the China market through a large number of mergers and acquisitions, thus forming a monopoly. This can not only avoid the recurrence of the problem of monopoly, but also enable domestic enterprises to enhance their anti-monopoly awareness, strictly self-discipline and optimize the market competition environment.

Third, reform and form a scientific monopoly price formation mechanism, improve the government's price decision-making system, improve the cost restraint mechanism and control supervision mechanism, and enhance the transparency and scientificity of price control.

Because the disadvantages of monopoly are ultimately manifested as monopoly prices, the economic supervision of monopoly industries, including cost supervision and investment supervision, is ultimately aimed at establishing reasonable prices, and price supervision is the core of economic supervision of monopoly industries under market economy conditions. At present, the legal framework for the government to control prices according to law has been formed. At present, in terms of science and transparency, we should mainly do the following work:

(1) Reform and form a scientific monopoly price formation mechanism. At present, monopoly enterprises mainly rely on monopoly position to form monopoly price, and convert part of consumer surplus into producer surplus to obtain monopoly income. Therefore, the key to solve this problem is to gradually establish the price control mechanism of monopoly industries based on the principle of market economy. First, actively explore design, and gradually form a scientific and standardized pricing model suitable for China's national conditions. At present, the international pricing models mainly include the maximum price model represented by Britain and the return on investment model represented by the United States, but the two models have their own advantages and disadvantages. According to the needs of China's overall economic development and the characteristics of the industry, we should adopt corresponding models, supplemented by determining the cost control parameters of enterprises according to the average social growth rate of enterprise production and operation expenses, the rate of technological progress in the industry, the actual production efficiency and the gap between advanced productivity in the same industry at home and abroad, so as to achieve the dual goals of controlling prices, promoting social distribution efficiency and stimulating enterprise production efficiency. The second is to realize the transition from "cost to pricing" to "pricing to cost". At present, the monopoly price in China mainly adopts cost additive process, and the basis of government pricing mainly depends on the cost data of enterprises. An effective cost constraint mechanism has not yet been formed, and information asymmetry leads the government to set or adjust prices only by examining legality, and it is difficult to examine rationality. Enterprises can completely force the government to falsely set prices by falsely reporting costs. Government price control should be changed from "first construction, then pricing" to "first pricing, then construction", or from bidding to "market competition" pricing. The third is to introduce a comparative competition mechanism between regions. At present, China's urban public utilities are basically run by regional monopoly enterprises, and the differences in production efficiency between regions provide conditions for the use of regional comparative competition mechanism. Government regulators can use the interregional comparative competition mechanism to compare the real costs of enterprises in different regions, eliminate various external factors that affect the costs, reasonably determine the basis for setting the prices of the same products and services, break the information blockade of regional enterprises to the government, and promote indirect competition among monopoly industries.

(2) Reform and form a standardized monopoly price decision-making system. At present, the formulation or adjustment of government-regulated prices still belongs to "negotiation" between the government and enterprises, and the rationality of regulation often depends on the quality of regulators and their negotiating ability with enterprises. In particular, price control involves a lot of professional knowledge, and the accelerated development of science and technology makes it difficult to achieve effective supervision only by the management of regulators. Under the condition of socialist market economy, price supervision is based on the diversification of interest subjects and the decentralization of decision-making subjects. Price supervision not only directly determines the distribution of interests of interested parties, but also determines the allocation efficiency of resources. To implement price control, we must correctly handle the relationship between controlled enterprises and consumers, consumers and consumers, give consideration to efficiency and fairness, and realize the optimal allocation of resources. Government decisions that ignore or deny the existence of demand prices of monopoly goods and services will never produce the expected regulatory effect or market results. Therefore, government regulators must realize the transformation from price level seeker to arbitrator, from negotiation between government and enterprises to diversified decision-making by introducing social forces, from individual decision-making behavior of a few people to collective decision-making review system, and improve the scientificity and transparency of price control. First, actively implement and improve the price decision-making hearing system. The formulation and adjustment of the prices of public utilities, public services and natural monopoly commodities, which are closely related to the vital interests of the masses, need to hold price hearings in accordance with the regulations to solicit the opinions of consumers, operators and relevant parties and demonstrate their necessity and feasibility. The second is to improve the expert argumentation system of government pricing. For some highly technical prices of goods and services, you can hire experts from relevant parties to demonstrate and strengthen the audit of the rationality of costs and prices. Price decisions on drugs and telecommunications can be entrusted to professional accounting agencies to audit the financial status of enterprises. The third is to implement the collective deliberation system of price decision, so as to reduce the uncertainty of government regulation caused by the personality differences of controllers and avoid the adverse impact of the quality of controllers on the scientific nature of regulation. The fourth is to change the current operating mechanism of "enterprise declaration and government approval" and increase the proportion of government directly setting or adjusting prices. Government departments can directly set or adjust prices according to the economic operation, the reflection of all aspects of society and the results of regular price evaluation, and according to the prescribed authority. At the same time, it is necessary to analyze the rationality of the price through vertical comparison and cost operation results, fully consider the factors such as cost reduction and user increase brought about by technological progress, adjust the price in time, and promote enterprise efficiency.

(3) Reform and form an effective monopoly cost restraint mechanism. At present, the basic basis for setting price control is still cost, and information asymmetry is an important reason for the failure of price control. In fact, controlling the cost also controls the price. This requires the establishment of an effective cost restraint mechanism. First, establish and improve the regular price review system. Regularly and comprehensively review the overall operating conditions, production and operation costs and period expenses, wages and labor productivity of industries or enterprises listed in the government's management of goods and services, and strive to provide an important basis for the government to adjust prices, so as to prevent price distortion from infringing on consumers' interests or affecting the normal operation of enterprises. The second is to improve the price supervision information network system and realize the exchange of price supervision information and resource sharing. Establish a compulsory disclosure system of government-controlled product cost information and improve the government pricing cost database. The third is to rationalize the cost compensation mechanism. It is impossible to achieve the goal of rational adjustment only by relying on the administrative guidance of regulatory agencies and expecting the sense of social responsibility of monopoly enterprises. From the cost point of view, the government-regulated price can be determined by marginal cost or average cost, but the loss of pricing by marginal cost must be solved by necessary measures. In the short term, we can separate compensation measures from the business activities of public utilities, actively and steadily alleviate price contradictions, draw a clear line between policy losses and business losses, and prevent price distortion from causing widespread violations without taking the blame. In the long run, marginal cost pricing will gradually change to social average cost pricing, and financial subsidies will change from "hidden supply enterprises" to "explicit supply consumers" and from "universal subsidies" to "subsidies for low-income groups" in the past. The cost compensation mechanism of universal service should also be changed from cross-subsidy between merchants to subsidy from universal fund, which is not only a way to adapt to wto, but also can prevent various disadvantages brought by cross-subsidy, make government price control more targeted and promote enterprises.

(4) Reform and form an effective price supervision and restraint mechanism. If there is no supervision and inspection as a guarantee, it is useless for the price policy to be scientific and reasonable, and it is even more difficult to implement it effectively. Therefore, it is necessary to reform and form an effective price supervision and restraint mechanism. The first is to establish a supervision system for price adjustment, income distribution and use. How to distribute the increased income after price adjustment has always been a key issue for enterprises to embark on a benign development path. It is necessary to strictly control the use direction of price adjustment income, prevent monopoly enterprises from transferring price adjustment income and affecting the effect of price policy, or formulate high-priced cross-subsidy competitive business in monopoly business to exclude market competition. The second is to strengthen the supervision and inspection of administrative law enforcement. Strengthen the supervision and inspection of the implementation of the price policy to ensure the implementation of the price policy. Resolutely investigate and deal with monopolistic operators who abuse their dominant market position and infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of other operators and consumers and the public interest. Comprehensively clean up the price and charging policies with regional blockade and industry monopoly. The second is to improve the reporting mechanism, actively promote and improve the price policy publicity system, change the concept of "emphasizing government inspection and neglecting social supervision", and form a situation of joint supervision by the whole society. The fourth is to establish a bad record of price adjustment and follow-up supervision system. For those who falsely report the cost, practise fraud or fail to implement the price policy without authorization in the price adjustment, bad records should be formed, timely feedback should be given to the enterprise and rectification should be required, and if necessary, it can be announced to the public.