To solve the thorny problem of accounting information distortion, enterprises must start from the source and try to block the source channels of false information. We should establish and improve laws and regulations, strengthen internal and external supervision, and strengthen the behavioral constraints on operators. According to the requirements of modern enterprise system, improve the internal governance structure of enterprises, straighten out the interests of all parties, clarify the responsibilities, rights and interests of the board of directors, the board of supervisors and the operators, prevent the distortion of accounting information to the maximum extent, reduce the distortion of accounting information caused by conflicts of interest, and ensure the accuracy of accounting information. The distortion of accounting information caused by the behavior of enterprise managers is manifested in the following aspects: 1, tax evasion. Its characteristics are: more expenses and less income, achieving the purpose of paying less taxes and not paying taxes. It is more common in private enterprises or state-owned enterprises with good benefits. 2, whitewash performance, protect the "name" and make fraud. Its characteristics are: less expenditure, fictitious assets and more income, in order to achieve the purpose of whitewashing business performance. It is more common in listed companies and state-owned enterprises with poor benefits, as well as enterprises that once dominated in provinces and departments and now lose their competitive advantage and market. 3. Fraud for profit. Its characteristics are: adjusting accounts, inflating profits and falsifying listing. First of all, the listing of joint-stock companies can enhance the attractiveness of the company's shares, form a stable source of funds, and raise a large amount of funds in a wider range. Therefore, promoting the listing of stocks has become the goal pursued by the company. For companies with immature conditions, forging financial information has become their preferred shortcut. In the process of restructuring and listing, although other enterprises are under the banner of "serving the public", the essence is to seek personal gain for individuals (leaders in charge, managers, etc.). ), such as the case of "Daqing Friendship" fraud and fraudulent listing. Secondly, for those companies that have been listed but are operating at losses, in order to meet the conditions of issuing new shares or allotment, raise the allotment price and obtain more funds from the capital market, they often use the methods of inflating profits and underreporting losses to create false accounting information and deceive investors. 4. Corruption, theft and transfer of state-owned assets. Its characteristics are: issuing false vouchers, not recording income, going through false procedures to scrap assets, confusing accounts, fishing in troubled waters, or selling state-owned assets at low prices. More common in small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises with chaotic management. In view of the distortion of accounting information caused by the behavior of enterprise managers, the author thinks that the following measures should be taken to improve the quality of accounting information: first, clarify property rights and give play to the role of property rights in standardizing and defining accounting information generation. Property right is the basic condition for enterprises to obtain market legal person qualification. Only enterprises with clear property rights can become real market subjects, and enterprises can conduct accounting management transactions in accordance with accounting behavior norms. Because the clarity of enterprise property rights creates two important conditions for the realization of accounting behavior information objectives: first, the owner pursues the maximization of asset benefits; Second, there is an economic profit relationship between the owner and the operator. Under these two conditions, resource allocation is relatively efficient. Without reducing (or even increasing) the utility of the owner, the operator maximizes his own utility and implements economic behavior according to the will of the market rather than the owner. At the same time, accounting subjects can choose the combination mode of accounting norms according to the level of transaction costs, and give full play to the functions of incentive, restraint, resource allocation and income distribution of accounting norms. Second, improve the company's independent director system and establish an audit committee to effectively prevent the distortion of accounting information. An independent director of a listed company refers to a director who does not hold other positions except directors in the company and has no relationship with the listed company and its major shareholders that may hinder his independent and objective judgment. A perfect independent director system can strengthen the external supervision of listed companies and externalize the internal organization of the board of directors appropriately, thus forming a certain supervision and restraint force and strengthening the supervision of the company's business activities. At the same time, the establishment of audit committee under the independent director system is helpful to re-supervise the accounting information subject. In view of the fact that management is responsible for compiling and providing accounting information, and the appointment of management is obviously dominated or influenced by the will of major shareholders, in order to prevent insider control and balance the rights of management and major shareholders in accounting information, an audit committee is set up in corporate governance practice to re-supervise the accounting information dominated by management. The main function of the Audit Committee is to ensure the quality of accounting information disclosed by the company by guiding and coordinating the internal audit of the company and the audit of external certified public accountants. The establishment of audit committee system can effectively get rid of the control of managers, realize the re-supervision of the quality of certified public accountants, and thus provide high-quality accounting information for the capital market. Third, to improve the corporate governance structure and internal control of enterprises, we should improve the internal governance structure of enterprises in accordance with the requirements of modern enterprise system. First, clarify the responsibilities and rights of the board of directors, the board of supervisors and the operators, establish a strong constraint on the managers by shareholders, and establish a contractual principal-agent relationship between the board of directors and the managers; Second, straighten out the interest relationship between the principal and the agent, and solve the problem of the absence of the subject of state-owned property rights; Third, reduce the risk of accounting fraud in the internal control mechanism of enterprises through the mechanism of right distribution, right balance and information disclosure; Fourthly, to improve the performance evaluation mechanism, we should consider adding some non-financial accounting indicators related to the sustainable operation ability of enterprises, so as to link the interests of operators with the constraints of enterprise goals; The fifth is to change the incentive measures to prevent operators from short-term behavior, and to separate long-term performance pay from short-term pay. Fourth, establish a perfect talent market for professional managers and effectively restrain operators. We should establish a perfect professional manager talent market as soon as possible, introduce the competition mechanism into the appointment of enterprise managers, set up supervision institutions in the professional manager talent market to supervise professional managers, and implement the membership system of professional managers. The organization has a complete file of professional managers, and established professional ethics standards and punishment regulations for professional managers. Once professional managers are found to have violated professional ethics standards, they will be publicized and recorded in the files according to the punishment regulations, and the professional managers will be disqualified in serious cases, thus effectively restraining operators and reducing moral hazard and adverse selection risk. In addition, a risk reserve system can be set up to restrain the behavior of operators economically, because both certified public accountants and professional managers belong to high-income classes, certified public accountants should bear the responsibility of audit failure, and professional economic personnel should also bear certain responsibilities for their own business failure. Fifth, intensify punishment and establish a civil compensation system. Where the accounting information is distorted due to personal behavior factors of business operators, business operators should bear corresponding legal responsibilities. In addition to increasing criminal punishment, they should also make civil compensation for the losses caused by investors. The subject of civil compensation should be the person responsible for the distortion of accounting information, that is, the business operator, not the legal entity, not the subject of accounting behavior. The civil compensation system can increase the huge potential litigation risk of enterprises, increase the cost of accounting fraud, and thus curb the fraud of operators.