Husserl rebelled against idealism from 65438 to 0894 and embarked on a road of no return in an attempt to revive rationalism. It is impossible to understand Husserl without understanding his pursuit of rationalism.
Rationalism has many meanings. First of all, it can refer to the requirement to choose the means to achieve the goal intelligently and intelligently, and to firmly implement their rational choices, not being moved by emotional, moral and other values; Secondly, you can refer to the requirement that ideas and opinions should have sufficient reasons, and only after sufficient argumentation can they stand up, instead of talking nonsense; Third, it can refer to the requirement that thoughts and actions follow the inevitable law and universal essence of things and are not interfered or even controlled by perceptual contingency. In this sense, rationality is universal inevitability, also known as objective inevitability.
Husserl's rationalism is the rationalism in the third sense mentioned above, and it is also the rationalism pursued by western mainstream philosophy since ancient Greece, which marks the characteristics of western civilization. As we know, this rationalism, together with western civilization, is rejected by many eastern traditionalists and postmodernism as a whole. Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson, Kierkegaard, Freud and others initiated this precedent. However, without Heidegger's participation, the rejection of this rationalism is certainly not profound. Before Heidegger and maintaining Genstein, it can be said that only irrationalism and anti-rationalism needed life impulse and individual desire to break through the control and suppression of rational inevitability and gain liberation and publicity. These people expressed their strong resistance to the western rational civilization tradition, which was extremely destructive and constructive. On the other hand, Heidegger and Wittgenstein are not anti-rationalists in this sense, but sentimentalists. What they maintain is not so much the impulse of life as the simplicity of life.
Husserl wrongly provided a phenomenological method for post-modernism or post-rationalism, but the purpose of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is a typical western rational tradition, which is completely consistent with the goal pursued by the western rational tradition: to lay the foundation for people's lives, and then to lay the foundation for science and metaphysics beyond life. What is the basis? Husserl firmly believes that the truth and essence of universal inevitability is the foundation of our living world, scientific world and metaphysical world. We follow them in life, science and philosophy, but never ask them in turn. His job is to "return to the thing itself", that is, to the basis of our life and its scientific world. However, this is only an end, and the key of phenomenology is to create a method towards this end and the consciousness analysis work done by this method. The difficulty in understanding Husserl lies in understanding the relationship between his purpose and method, that is, the relationship between the pursuit of universal inevitability and phenomenology. Why did he turn to the creation of phenomenology and the analysis of consciousness activity and structure? What does this have to do with the science he pursues or the goal of laying the foundation for all sciences?
The key to understand Husserl's phenomenology is to understand his definition of immanence. He strictly limited his research scope to immannenz (internal) field, excluding all transcendental (Transzendenz) settings. This is because, in his view, only what is directly given in the immanence of consciousness is arguable, while what is indirectly given outside the immanence of consciousness is only hypothesis and inference, which is not arguable. The so-called phenomenological reduction is to return to the inner field and eliminate transcendence. The so-called infield is the field of consciousness, which is what we face directly, while the external things, although we have to deal with it every day, are separated from us by a layer and cannot give themselves to us at all. Therefore, Husserl believes that only the internal things have unquestionable absolute inevitability, and the existence of external transcendental things is suspicious, so we can completely put them on hold and stop judging.
Husserl believes that returning to the field of inner consciousness is the premise of grasping the essence of universal inevitability. Therefore, in his view, transcendental (conscious) reduction is the premise of essential reduction, although he first proposed essential reduction and then proposed transcendental reduction. The purpose of transcendental reduction is to prevent transcendence and return to the inner. Therefore, he first shelved the natural science facing the outside world, then shelved the human self or empirical self facing the life world, and finally shelved the existence setting of the whole world, so that we can obtain a pure transcendental consciousness field. On this basis, by reducing the essence, we can get the essence of universal necessity.
Why did Husserl rule out exceeding the setting? He believes that this is related to the survival of European rational tradition, and whether human beings will fall into relativism, skepticism and humanism, which will lead to a full-scale crisis. Husserl attributed the crisis of our time, that is, the crisis of rationalism or science (what he said is not natural science, but the exploration of universal inevitability or strict certainty), to the prevalence of objectivism or naturalism, which, on the other hand, is associated with subjectivism, psychology and humanism, and all of them are doubts about the absolute certainty truth. Husserl's phenomenological reduction is to remove accidental factors and relative factors. In the final analysis, it is to go to irrational factors. He put irrational factors, namely uncertainty, relativity and subjectivity, in brackets in order to seek something absolutely effective for all people and all times. No wonder Husserl always maintains the western tradition and belittles the eastern tradition, which is similar to Hegel's behavior and contrary to Heidegger's.
Husserl clearly realized the ideal of the goal he pursued, so he realized the inevitability of crisis when people's rationality was exhausted. The worship of absolute rationality proved intolerable in the 20th century. However, the most critical thing about absolute rationalism is that it is illusory, that is, the universal inevitable truth it holds high is still a special value, such as the value of the West. Imposing universal inevitability on others is actually imposing a set of special values on others. Such a deconstruction of rationalism is based on Heidegger, who is also a phenomenology. Why does Husserl's phenomenology call for the further decline of rationalism instead of the rebirth of rationalism?
Husserl's goal is always the same, laying the foundation for any science and seeking the basis for all practical norms. However, the phenomenology he created for this goal is constantly changing. In his early days, phenomenology was just a method, through which we realized the reversal of vision, the change of attitude and the return to the thing itself. In the later period, transcendental phenomenology is not only a method, but also an ontology or basic science. It is not only to return to the field of consciousness, but also to provide an absolute source field for other sciences. When Husserl turned to the later transcendental phenomenon, almost no one of his students followed. Both Scheler and Heidegger stayed in his early phenomenology and regarded phenomenology as a method to pursue their goals. Although Husserl maintains the absolute inevitability of truth, this absolute inevitability comes from inner intuition (seeing) and has a strong intuitive color. The imagist theory he inherited from brentano inspired future generations to point out the uniqueness of human or consciousness, which is closely related to non-reflection or pre-reflection, and it is potentially subversive to reason. His description of the time flow of inner consciousness was originally used to illustrate the existence of the unchanging essence in change, but it can be completely used to eliminate the existence of the absolute essence and only keep the pure rheology itself, because there is still a certain degree of difference in directness between the intuitive essence and the experience flow itself. All these make Husserl's philosophy itself possible to be subverted.
When Heidegger turned the internal "look" of phenomenology to the transcendental "question", the subversion contained in phenomenology was realized, and what it realized was the death of absolute reason. The essence of Heidegger's philosophy is that we don't face the phenomenon (the thing itself) first and then transcend it, but we are always in the phenomenon (the thing itself), and the phenomenon transcends itself, not the inner conscious subject before. We have always been, and always have been, and must be in the process of transcendence. There is no inner presence before transcendence, it is an isolated self, and it is a subject with no world at first. In this way, Heidegger fundamentally denied the inward direction of reduction, and his own reduction method was not to restore to the consciousness source before transcendence, but to restore to the survival structure beyond itself, that is, "this is". Things themselves (phenomena) are not the domain of consciousness, but the domain of life, specifically the domain of "being in the world". Husserl regards consciousness itself as the object of "reflection", and his eyes are not outward toward the object, but inward toward the self, although this self is always outward about an object. Reflection does not occur in life, but in philosophy or in the theoretical process after or above life. On the contrary, Heidegger's phenomenology is non-reflective and even anti-reflective. He opposes taking the existence of "this being" as the object of reflection. The existence of "this being" is not an object at all, and our analysis of it is not a theoretical reflection at all. So, how do we enter the existence of "this is"? Heidegger believes that our grasp of the existence of "being" is not reflection, but understanding, explanation or logos. Understanding, explanation or logos itself is also a life process, an activity that takes place at the level of existence rather than theory. It is different from reflection. Any theoretical reflection on existence (life) is to destroy its original nature and make it another thing rather than the thing itself. Heidegger denied the certainty of the existence of "this being", and what we should grasp is not its "what it is", but its transcendental structure and process. Phenomenon is not an object, existence itself does not exist, and the manifestation itself does not appear, because existence is never itself, but always transcends itself. The more we catch it, the more it gets away from us and goes into seclusion. Therefore, what is needed is not an intuitive description of reflection, but an explanation based on previous reflection and understanding.
The essence of the opposition between Husserl and Heidegger is that, in Husserl's view, through transcendental reduction, we can obtain a purified transcendental subject, which transcends all positions, angles or prejudices. This subject is not based on the body, nor on any specific history, society and culture, and is not subject to any interference or influence from them. It sets its own essence, constructs laws and issues rational orders. This is completely consistent with Kant's view that "intellectuality is the legislation of nature" and that reason issues behavior orders to people. It is natural that such an extremely ideal rationalism is not accepted by Heidegger, because in his view, it is impossible to get rid of his cosmopolitanism, and it is doomed to be entangled with its secular existence, which is the fate of being abandoned. "This is" exists in the world, sinks into it, but actually exists; It annoys others, but in the final analysis it annoys itself; It escapes from the world, but it is forced to return to itself and make life plans for itself. In Heidegger's view, "existence" and the world constitute an inseparable and tense state of confrontation. Compared with Husserl's transcendental subject, Heidegger's "being" lacks joy and real freedom. Being always has a hard time with others. Being busy with the world, but being forced to bear the responsibility of life alone, is really self-defeating. Such an almost contradictory description makes "this is" exhausted in the tension between self and the world. "Here" tries to get rid of the world and return to the true self, but is unable to get rid of the world and sink into the world. This is the portrayal of life here. The basic point of Heidegger's philosophy is that "being" is integrated with the world, and there is no distinction between subject and object, while the basic point of Husserl's philosophy is the opposition between immanence and transcendence, and the first is the distinction between subject and object. Husserl pursues a transcendental field, not a field that precedes the division of subject and object, nor a field that is neither subject nor object. In his view, this transcendental field is a field of pure consciousness, which is opposite to transcendental or world, and realizes their identity through the intentional construction of the latter. It is on the basis of the opposition between subject and object that he wants to discuss their identity, which is the identity of subject and object structure, rather than Heidegger's clinging and nervous confrontation.
Obviously, Heidegger's descriptions are more realistic, and they truly reflect people's daily life. But in Husserl's view, the life world is only some relative and accidental examples of the ideal world, and it is not a universal necessity. They should be shelved in transcendental reduction, and they will not work and lose their effectiveness. In this way, we can outline an absolute, timeless, universal and inevitable possibility field, and what happens in real life can only be reasonable if we take this field as our ideal and pursue it. Husserl's philosophy is completely different from the humanistic care and cultural care prevailing in the 20th century. He doesn't participate in propaganda for capitalized people. He always cares about the rise and fall of reason rather than the situation of human life. However, this does not mean that he does not care about people's fate. He just wants to provide a non-relativistic, non-subjective, effective and non-accidental basis for human life, so that people may live a rational life, that is, a life that can be reasonably defended. In this sense, we say Husserl is a rationalist.