2. The lessee's claim The first claim is about the loss of time caused by the slow speed of the ship caused by marine life. The first way for the charterer to claim compensation is that the shipowner has violated the guarantee of speed in the charter party, which is likely to be applicable at the time of delivery, although some cases show that the key time is at the time of signing the contract. In the Al Bida case, Judge Evans pointed out in an accompanying opinion that the effectiveness of the guarantee is not continuous. Therefore, if the ship can meet its guarantee requirements at the time of delivery or when the contract is concluded earlier, then if the ship speed decreases due to bottom pollution, it does not constitute a breach of contract by the owner. However, the charterer usually requires the shipowner to bear the responsibility of maintaining the efficiency of the ship. For example, Article 1 of NYPE Format stipulates that "the owner of a ship … shall … keep the hull, machinery and equipment in a completely effective state during operation". If the operation of cleaning up the dirty bottom is unreasonably delayed, then the shipowner has violated this obligation, regardless of whether the bottom breeding is caused by the charterer's breach of contract. The argument that cleaning the dirty bottom will also cause the lessor to stop renting may be the loss caused by the decrease of ship speed or the time spent cleaning the bottom. In Rijn case, the charterer requested to stop chartering according to article 15 of NYPE, because the ship speed decreased due to the growth of dirty bottom. Although this does not constitute "hull defect" in this article, "any other reason" at the end of this article includes this factor. (But in the later Ioanna case, Judge Staughton still ruled that this constituted a hull defect. If marine aquaculture is a normal phenomenon of using the ship according to the charter party and is a normal result of the ship acting according to the instructions of the charterer, then the ship cannot stop chartering. (In Pan Filos case, Judge Coleman ruled that the charterer could not ask for rent reduction because of the stall of the ship caused by sewage bottom, but could invoke the exemption clause of "normal wear and tear" when returning the ship to counter the shipowner's claim for the cleaning cost after returning the ship. The two are not contradictory. This will only happen if marine breeding is purely accidental. For example, in the case of apollonius, according to the time charter party, the ship stayed in Huangpu Bay before delivery, and the bottom of the ship was dirty. Judge Mokata found, "If we accept these opinions and definitions and look back at the arbitrator's determination of the facts, it is obvious that during the long-term stay in Huangpu, the thick shells of marine mollusks or barnacles attached to the bottom of the ship are unpredictable, because it belongs to fresh water, or it is only slightly salty, and marine life prefers seawater. Obviously, what happened at the bottom of Huangpu ship was not only an accident, but also an abnormal thing. Therefore, the dirty bottom constitutes a stop-hire event as "hull damage or other events that hinder or prevent the effective operation of the ship". In Kitsa case, the charterer demanded that the chartering be stopped within the time when the owner cleaned the dirty bottom. The arbitrators consider this to be a fact, and it is not clear whether their award was made according to Article 15 or Article 54 of the Charter (Article 54 stipulates: "When a ship returns due to mechanical failure, collision, grounding, fire or other accidents or ship damage during navigation, or the ship deviates from its course due to the owner's reasons, from the time when there is a problem in the port or at sea until the ship recovers its efficiency in the same place or area or the ship reaches the charter party again. )。 Judge Aikins subsequently ruled: "During the operation of the ship under the charter party, marine organisms are attached to the bottom of the ship, and the time spent cleaning up these organisms constitutes the time loss stipulated in Article 15 of the charter party." He ruled that since the arbitrator found that one of the reasons for terminating the lease was Article 54, there was no legal problem with the scope of Article 15. Cleaning up the dirty bottom is considered as a departure from "for the purpose of the shipowner" in Article 54, because the shipowner has the obligation to maintain the ship regardless of whether the charterer breaches the contract. In Rijn case, the shipowner thought that it was unfair to stop chartering under such circumstances, but this claim was unconvincing. (Referring to Judge Staughton's later judgment in Berge Sund case, this explanation is even more powerful: in this case, when considering whether the charterer can stop chartering when cleaning up the residual goods of the last voyage, Judge Staughton distinguishes between two situations: the cabin sweeping due to the charterer's instructions on the use of the ship and the owner having to make extra efforts to repair the machine. The latter does not constitute the service required by the lessor, so the ship is stopped. Finally, if the wording of the specific termination clause requires stopping the ship during the time loss caused by the dirty bottom, it is very important to determine whether the dirty bottom is caused by the lessee's breach of contract. In this case, the shipowner can claim compensation for the loss of rent or claim that the termination clause is not applicable from the beginning, because it will lead to circular litigation. The situation may be the same if the shipowner asks the charterer to compensate for the bottom pollution first. 3. Conclusion Kitsa case shows how difficult it is for shipowners to obtain seabed cleaning fees from lessees by way of compensation. The bottom of the sewage will be regarded as the result of the operation of the ship in the tropical harbor, not as the instruction of the lessee. In fact, the real reason for this loss is that the shipowner has already taken the risk of this loss when he agreed to ship in and out of tropical waters. Only in rare cases can the shipowner get compensation by way of compensation. One of the possible situations is that during the period from the signing of the lease to the charterer instructing the ship to go to the tropical water port, there is unexpected congestion in the port. With regard to the lessee's claim for time loss related to dirty bottom, according to the judgment of Rijn case, the court will think that this claim does not fall within the scope of the standard termination clause (for example, article 15 of NYPE). However, the actual time spent cleaning the dirty bottom may be subject to a stop-hire clause, which will stop counting the time when the ship deviates from normal operation for the purpose of the owner. It should be noted that the co-author of this article is Simon Baughen, a senior lecturer at Bristol University, and the other is Natalie Campbell, a litigation lawyer hired by the Compensation Association, who represents the sub-tenant in the Kitsa case. Of course, there is no doubt about its legal professionalism. However, scholars believe that this article tends to be one-sided, so you should pay attention when referring to this article. Let's briefly analyze it. First of all, when talking about the shipowner's claim for seabed pollution, the author emphasizes that the shipowner must prove that seabed pollution is directly caused by the charterer's default in instructing the ship to sail to a port outside the navigation area, and at the same time prove that this loss is not a long-distance loss. Scholars believe that this is debatable: the first requirement is no problem, but the control of the loss range and whether the two sides foresaw it at the time of signing the contract is a factual issue with great flexibility. Just because one case won by luck doesn't mean that the next case won again. Especially "remoteness" is a concept in English law. In its legal system, we should pay attention to the distinction between "the principle of imputation" and "the principle of compensation" and emphasize that "the responsibility of the responsible person must be controlled". What is "certainty" here and under what circumstances "control" is a very vague question. Judges of the British ordinary courts have always held different views on this issue (please refer to scholars' papers on pure economic loss in ship collision 20 years ago for discussion on the ambiguity of this issue), but in China's civil law system, it is emphasized that as long as the loss is directly caused by breach of contract, the compensation should be complete, which is the meaning of the so-called principle of restitution. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties on exemption or limitation of liability, there seems to be no "compensation principle" in domestic contract law. Secondly, the author claims that the charterer can still return the ship to the shipowner without repairing the ship, but when explaining whether the shipowner can claim the cleaning fee, he cites the Puerto Buitrago case, which is a case about Guangzu. As we all know, bareboat charter is essentially a property lease contract (sometimes a financing contract). During the lease period, the lessee improperly instructs the ship to operate outside the navigation area, and the losses caused can naturally be determined by comparing the ship prices; Time charter is a contract for the use of a ship, and the charterer does not own the ship. After the ship is returned, the shipowner will continue to operate the ship, so it may be meaningless to compare the price of dirty bottom. But the loss of the shipowner has actually happened: he will either greatly discount the description of the ship when he charters the ship next time, which will inevitably lead to the downward rent, or clean up the ship himself, which will lead to the loss of cost and time. Therefore, the scholar thinks that bareboat charter and time charter have no similarity and comparability at all, so the author cites the Puerto Buitrago case to illustrate the problem and asks the shipowner to prove that he really wants to repair the ship, which is also necessary in business, which is completely wrong. This can be said to be a major failure of this article. For operational needs, the shipowner may not clean up the pollution immediately until the next dry dock, so this paragraph. This paper is also pale and powerless when discussing that the speed of the ship decreases due to the dirty bottom during the lease period, and the lessor claims for lost time and time. If the charterer instructs the ship to operate the port in tropical waters, then according to the author's own requirements for "predictability", he must also know that the shipowner's so-called obligation of "keeping the hull, machinery and equipment in a completely effective state" can't be fulfilled at all, and the ship's speed is naturally in a state of continuous decline, because it is the result of the charterer's continuous voyage instruction that the ship has no reasonable time to scrape the bottom, and the visibility in tropical waters is often poor, and the diving operation is unqualified, so the charterer chose this port. I'm afraid I didn't take this paradox into account when I talked about the "predictability" standard. Of course, the article believes that if the operation of cleaning up the dirty bottom is unreasonably delayed, the charterer can claim the loss of time, which is correct, but this belongs to the problem of stopping chartering. It is not that the shipowner has violated the obligation of ship maintenance, but that he is fulfilling his obligation. In addition, the scholar thinks that there is a major defect in this paper, that is, according to the standard time charter party, the shipowner's guarantee of ship speed is a theoretical guarantee with two meanings. The ship speed and fuel consumption mentioned above are only applicable to the signing or delivery of the ship, and the ship speed and fuel consumption are only applicable to the given weather and sea conditions (lower than Beaufort wind level 4 and lower than Dobo level 3); However, after the lease was fulfilled for a period of time, scaling and stall occurred and were gradually discovered. At this time, how to restore the state of the ship and convert it into the performance under the agreed weather and sea conditions, how to determine the gap between the theoretical and actual operating conditions, and how much influence the fouling has on it, this article has not mentioned a word, which makes people think very much. The purpose of introducing this article to outstanding people is not to promote some "original views" or "advanced views" On the contrary, what scholars hope is that everyone should refer to it with a critical eye.