Text | Our reporter Shen Xiaobo
No.298 Fushan Road is a small white building with 13 floors, which is not noticeable even in Zoucheng, a county-level city in Shandong. This is the headquarters office building of Yankuang Group, which has been used for decades. Due to the age, the old people of Yankuang can't remember exactly which year it was built. The whole building was repainted the year before last, covering up the sense of ruin left by a period of time. On sunny days, blue curtains will be drawn on the windows outside, which looks as monotonous and quiet as this small town.
But in fact, this illusion of peace is rapidly disintegrating. Yankuang, which was established nearly half a century ago, is experiencing unprecedented pains of change.
Since May, 20 13, in order to save the rapidly deteriorating performance, Yankuang Group has offered many measures to break the wrist of a strong man-not only the salary of management, but also the bonus of ordinary employees, and paid off thousands of unregistered employees. It is difficult for outsiders to understand the pain caused by this move to Yankuang employees. Most unregistered workers are employees' families. The annual recruitment of employees' children has finally stopped.
In July, the management of Yankuang Group changed again. Zhang Xinwen and Li Xiyong were transferred from Jinan High-tech Zone and Shandong Energy Group as the chairman and general manager of Yankuang respectively, which changed the usual ecology of internal promotion of Yankuang's main managers (except Geng Jiahuai, who played a particularly prominent role in Yankuang's development, see below). Zhang Chaochao, vice governor of Yankuang, stressed at the meeting of leadership adjustment that "smooth handover and smooth transition" should be ensured. At the same time, he also bluntly said that Yankuang faces "three major pressures of development, stability and reform". When talking about "the pressure of reform", Vice Governor Zhang listed the details in particular to show the urgency.
Yankuang has indeed reached the bottom line of reform. In 20 13, Yankuang Group's operating income fell again in the coal industry ranking, ranking 16. Beyond the ranking, there is a sharp decline in profits. In the first half of 20 13, the net loss of Yankuang has reached more than one billion-in the past decade, Yankuang has plummeted from its long-term position as the leader of China coal industry, and even today, it is still difficult to see signs of revival.
In order to appease the investors of its listed companies, Yankuang mainly explained the huge losses caused by exchange rate changes. However, in the frustration of Yankuang's falling profits year after year, the market has been hard to hide its criticism. In Yankuang, the situation is even more turbulent. At the reform meeting within the group, some people have complained that Yankuang is "seriously ill": the missed golden opportunity period, the coal chemical business that continues to lose money, the inefficient management system and the unclear strategic positioning have all become the targets of public criticism.
Under the strong light of China's previous coal golden decade, Yankuang's decline against the market was particularly dazzling. As a local state-owned enterprise with a level of 100 billion living in a small town, Yankuang's glory and decline have their insurmountable intangible barriers.
Vision, resources, personnel, system, and intertwined local relations are valuable forces for Yankuang to gather strength for a time, and are also the reasons for Yankuang's stagnation or even decline in the past decade.
Two months after taking office, Zhang Xinwen, the new chairman of Yankuang, summed up four major problems of Yankuang at the meeting of leading cadres: the planned economy thinking mode still exists (very serious); The system and mechanism are relatively backward, and the institutional setup is bloated; Investment control and risk control are not strict; Non-coal industries and auxiliary industries are the correct way to supplement the main business (but now they have become a big burden).
Obviously, after extensive and meticulous investigation, the new management has made a judgment that conforms to its reform direction, and it is also a resistance to Yankuang's future reform. The reason why Yankuang fell against the market in the past coal golden decade period is the comprehensive effect of more factors. Its failure is due to the failure of fermentation and decision-making, which reflects the general ecology of large local energy enterprises.
A strategic period that is difficult to pursue
By the end of 20 12, under the influence of many factors, such as economic environment, supply-demand relationship and so on, the coal industry in China, which was in turmoil, bid farewell to the "golden decade" since the beginning of this century. This decade has not only created the overall prosperity of China's coal industry, but also emerged a number of "Global 500" coal enterprises with huge volume and long industrial chain. Another important symbol of "golden decade" is that Shaanxi, Mongolia, Xinjiang and other resource-rich provinces have set off an unprecedented enclosure and investment frenzy. And all the coal enterprises in China, which developed at a high speed in the first decade of this century, occupied a lot of resources in these areas.
However, during this period, Yankuang not only failed to advance from the position of the first coal enterprise in China to the "Top 500 in the world", but lost its position in Shaanxi, Mongolia, Xinjiang and other new coal resources provinces.
20131211,Zhao Zhongduo, former deputy director of Yanzhou Mining Bureau, received a visiting reporter from Energy magazine on the second floor where Yankuang Painting and Calligraphy Research Institute is located.
"At that time, the profits of Yankuang accounted for more than half of the profits of the whole industry." Zhao Zhongduo left the post of deputy director on 1997, then worked as a researcher in Yankuang for three years, and retired completely in 2000, which coincided with the difficult period of domestic coal industry at the end of last century, but it was the most glorious time of Yankuang. According to historical data, the profits of Yankuang 1998 account for 58% of the profits of the whole industry, and 1999 accounts for 90% of the total profits of profitable enterprises in the industry. Yankuang's fame reached its peak in this period. Zhao Jingche, then chairman of the board, wrote the strategic concept of Yankuang in 200 1 with the goal of "top ten coal producers in the world".
But 200 1 is only the beginning of a new strategic period. The domestic coal market is picking up. A few years later, there was a large area of power shortage in China, and the supply of coal was in short supply. From the end of 2002 to the beginning of 2003, after a large number of small coal mines were shut down in the early stage, the policy began to encourage the development of large coal enterprise groups and the construction of large coal bases. Northeast China, Beijing, Tianjin, East China and Central China are included in the eastern transit area, Shanxi, Shaanxi and Mongolia (west) are included in the central coal transit area, and southwest and northwest belong to the western coal reserve area.
The coal development in three western regions (Shanxi, Shaanxi and Meng Xi) began. In fact, because Shanxi's resource development tends to local enterprises, the competition for resources is more concentrated in Shaanxi and Meng Xi. Looking back at that period of history, a coal expert said, "whoever catches Shaanxi and Mongolia will determine its development in the next 30 years."
Relying on its own Shendong mining area, Shenhua Group has been making overseas acquisitions, innovating its model, obtaining exploration rights by leasing and seizing coal resources. From the establishment of 1995 to 2003, Shenhua's coal output increased by 40 times, and it broke through1000000 tons in that year, becoming the first 100-million-ton coal enterprise in China.
Yankuang took a different direction. From 1997, Zhao Jingcheng put forward "paying equal attention to both coal and non-coal", to 1999, after the acquisition of Lunan Fertilizer Plant, Yankuang focused its future strategy on coal chemical industry. In 2003, Yankuang proposed to invest 40 billion yuan in eight years to form a large-scale production capacity of coal-to-liquid oil, methanol and alkyd.
However, coal chemical industry did not bring huge profits to Yankuang as originally expected. At the end of last century, during the downturn of the coal market, the concept of developing non-coal industries to spend the cold winter began to rise. Since then, the policy of "local transformation" in Shaanxi, Mongolia and other coal-producing provinces has also prompted the formation of a situation of "every reform must be reformed", and a large amount of investment has poured into coal chemical industry. For example, methanol and acetic acid, after a short period of profiteering, fell into industrial losses.
Yankuang once had high hopes for coal-to-oil Yankuang, relying on its own experience in coal gasification [-0.93% fund research report], went to Sasol Company in South Africa to dig corners. Yankuang claimed to have mastered the independent property rights of low-temperature Fischer-Tropsch synthetic oil technology, and planned a prospective coal-to-oil project of 6.5438+million tons/year in Yulin. But what Yankuang didn't expect was that the project was in line with the national development and reform commission's policy of controlling coal-to-oil and has not been approved so far.
After 2005, due to the exhaustion of resources in this department, Juye coalfield in the province was also carved up. Yankuang had to go outside the province. But at this time, the best period has been missed. After 2007, Yankuang gradually gained something outside, but at this time, the division of resources is coming to an end. The most important harvest of Yankuang is in 20 1 1 year. In that year, Yankuang won the bid for Shilaowusu Minefield in Ordos and Zhulongwan Minefield [2.06% fund research report] through public bidding, and the winning bid price also reached a new high at that time. The former cost 6.649 billion yuan and the latter 7.8 billion yuan.
Yankuang missed the most precious time of resource expansion from inaction in the early stage to huge investment in the later stage. Shenhua stands at the top of the coal industry and is the biggest beneficiary of coal golden decade. In the early heyday of Yankuang, Shenhua overtook Yankuang internally, and now it has become the benchmark of Yankuang Shenhua, but the gap is getting bigger and bigger. In 20 13, Shenhua's output exceeded 400 million tons, and Yanzhou's output exceeded 76 million tons, of which more than 26 million tons came from Australia.
* * * Dispute
The tragic mistakes in the strategic period made it difficult to conceal the criticism of Yanzhou Mining at that time, even if the discussion was not made public.
Since Yankuang reached its historical peak at the end of last century, it has experienced four top leaders: Zhao Jingcheng, Geng Jiahuai, Wang xin and Zhang Xinwen. Among them, Geng Jiahuai, who was in charge of Yankuang from 2003 to 20 10, was the most controversial.
In April 2003, Geng Jiahuai officially took over as the chairman of Yankuang and began to decide the fate of this star enterprise in the coal industry. Geng Jiahuai came from Zibo Mining Bureau, a resource-exhausted mining area, with an annual output of less than one million tons in the most difficult period.
When I first came to Yankuang, for at least two or three years, Geng often started with "Yankuang" instead of "we". A sensitive person means that he "doesn't regard Yankuang as one of his own."
It is an acknowledged fact that Geng Jiahuai's predecessor was too brilliant. Zhao Jingcheng1991May served as the director of Yanzhou Mining Bureau, and in 2003, he stepped down as the chairman of the board of directors of Yanzhou Mining Group. Both inside and outside Yankuang, Zhao Jingche has the reputation of "foresight and courage". People in the industry mention Zhao, and now they are often impressed by him.
Zhao Jingche completely led the rise of Yankuang and reached its peak. He continued to invest heavily in developing fully mechanized top-coal caving technology to resist risks, which is of great significance to Yankuang. Zhao took the lead in putting equal emphasis on "coal and non-coal" (but this decision is difficult to evaluate now), and earned Lunan Fertilizer Plant with 1999, which started the process of coal chemical industry in Yankuang. Zhao Jingche also saw the problem of exhaustion of resources in this department, and proposed to rebuild "three Yankuangs" outside, and Yankuangs then entered Guizhou, Shanxi and Australia.
After taking charge of Yankuang, Geng Jiahuai also made his own voice, and expressed his thoughts on his predecessor's strategy at an internal meeting, calling Zhao Jingche "bragging". However, according to the insiders of Yankuang, during his tenure, Geng still took the route set by Zhao Jingcheng. For example, the chemical projects such as Cathay Pacific and Guo Hong, which started in succession during his term of office, and the sustainable development of Guizhou can be traced back to his predecessor.
However, in the strategic development period of the coal industry, the implementation of the old strategic policy failed to keep pace with the times, and it is difficult to call it qualified. The internal doubts of Yankuang are concentrated here. In the period of strategic development, Geng Jiahuai did not lead Yankuang to expand rapidly outside the province by means of acquisition and bidding for mining rights, like Shenhua.
Not only that, Yankuang also rejected the great opportunity to send it to your door. During Geng Jiahuai's tenure, Yankuang missed two opportunities around 2004. One is Xinjiang Hami Mining Bureau. Wang Lequan was in charge of Xinjiang at that time. Because he was born in Shandong, Wang Lequan's deep affection for Shandong enterprises is well known. He also hoped that outstanding enterprises from Shandong Province would invest in Xinjiang. He once proposed to transfer Hami Mining Bureau as a whole to Yankuang free of charge, which was politely declined. Since then, Hami Mining Bureau has been merged into Lu 'an Group.
Another person who found Yankuang was the Ordos government. Since central enterprises are subordinate to the central government and their counterparts are the government of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Ordos local government is not taken seriously. Moreover, the profits of central enterprises are handed over to the central government, and the profits and places are limited. Ordos therefore hopes that Yankuang will enter Mongolia to develop coal resources, and puts forward superior conditions to allocate Yankuang's favorite resources free of charge. But in the end it was rejected by Geng Jiahuai.
A former employee of Yankuang Strategic Research Institute told his personal experience. Previously, when Yankuang purchased foreign equipment to build an international coking company, Shougang took the initiative to come to the door and asked for a stake. "The other party is very polite, saying that it admires Yankuang's reputation, but only shares, only enjoys shareholders' rights and interests, and does not interfere in business. Based on his position, this person once wrote a report recommending Yankuang for approval, which was eventually rejected by Geng, on the grounds that the international coking company already had foreign partners, "No need. "Therefore, Yankuang missed an opportunity to establish an alliance with downstream customers to reduce risks. After the coke overcapacity, Yankuang is very helpless for the sales market.
"There are too many missed opportunities." The above employees are saddened. Looking back on the period of Gengjiahuai, he commented on Gengjiahuai, "too much attention was paid to the risks of things."
A conscientious person summed up the successive years of Yankuang and put forward the viewpoint of "Yankuang cycle". Specifically speaking, Yankuang's * * * is a "pioneering" and "defensive" crossover operation. For example, Zhao Jingche belongs to the vanguard type, and Geng Jiahuai belongs to the defensive type. Zhao's predecessor, Liu, also belongs to the business type. "The house built for employees is very small." Peng, Liu's predecessor, is said to be bolder than Zhao. "Although not as bold as Zhao, it is far better than Geng."
Although it is impossible (Zhao Jingche retired due to his age), this person still believes that if Zhao Can is in charge of Yankuang during the strategic expansion period, Geng Jiahuai will pay attention to internal management and assist in cooperation. "Yankuang will never do this."
Shandong yankuang
In September of 20 13, Zhang Xinwen, the new chairman, said at the meeting of leading cadres of Yankuang that Yankuang was "three inferior" to Shenhua (bidding against Shenhua was a complex that Yankuang could not get rid of). "First, the strategy is not as correct and reasonable as Shenhua; Second, political resources are not as good as Shenhua; Third, the execution is not as strong as Shenhua. "
As a management-oriented enterprise in Shandong Province, Yankuang has its own vision and system, so it is inevitable that it is biased to blame all the decision-making mistakes of Yankuang on one manager. The decline and landslide of Yankuang just laid a curse at the peak of management reform at the end of last century.
1998 is a year of great changes in the coal management system. In that year, the Ministry of Coal was abolished, and the key coal enterprises directly under the Ministry of Coal were also decentralized to local governments. Yanzhou Mining was supervised by Shandong during this period, including personnel appointment and dismissal. Since then, decentralized coal enterprises have followed the ideas and policies of local governments and embarked on different paths.
Compared with the resource expansion of the whole industrial chain of Shenhua and China Coal, Shanxi merged and reorganized according to different coal types. 200 1 Xishan Mining Bureau, Fenxi Mining Bureau and Huozhou Mining Bureau merged to form Shanxi Coking Coal, and then continuously acquired local small coal mines. Since then, Shanxi has relied on Datong Coal Mine Group to integrate coal resources and reorganize more than ten coal enterprises. At the same time, Shanxi also established anthracite group.
Shaanxi and Ningxia gathered the strength of the whole province and set up a coal group with the province as the unit, from which Shaanxi coal and Ningmei coal were born. Shaanxi Coal Industry Group was established in February 2004, which merged 65,438+00 units in Shaanxi. At the beginning of its establishment, its raw coal output reached 30 million tons, accounting for 40% of Shaanxi Province.
Shandong chose to develop non-coal industry. Shandong coal resources are generally exhausted, and the possibility of discovering large coalfields is getting smaller and smaller. "Social problems cannot be caused by the exhaustion of coal mines and the unemployment of employees. This is something that the government must consider." An official of Shandong Coal System explained why Shandong chose to develop non-coal industry.
Since 2003, the development of non-coal industry has become a main direction of Shandong coal industry. Every year in 65438+February or the following year in 65438+1October, the Shandong provincial government will hold an annual provincial coal work conference to set the tone for the development of the coal industry throughout the year. In April next year, the Coal Industry Bureau will communicate and coordinate with coal enterprises in detail according to the spirit of the working meeting to ensure that coal enterprises operate in accordance with the instructions of the provincial government.
"The non-coal industry is an important part of the annual coal work conference." According to the above-mentioned official, Shandong is the fastest growing area of non-coal industry in China, and the total economic output of non-coal industry can account for more than 60% of the total economic output of coal industry. He highly praised the execution of Shandong coal enterprises and "always kept pace with the government". However, he also admitted that the economic operation quality of non-coal industry is not high, and the profit of 20 12 years only accounts for 1.28% of the profit of coal industry.
Before 2005, Shandong Province had always opposed the expansion of coal enterprises outside the province. According to informed sources, at that time, there was a popular view at the top of Shandong Province that all localities were attracting investment and coal enterprises were well funded. Why do they invest outside the province and why don't they build in their hometown? "At that time, I didn't expect that this was to seize resources. Whoever has resources will have a future. " The above-mentioned person said.
According to this person, Hami Mining Bureau failed to be included in Yankuang in the end, and Shandong SASAC played a great role. The merger condition proposed by Shandong SASAC is that Hami Mining Bureau needs to divest social functions such as schools, hospitals and public security before Yankuang can take over. This condition angered Wang Lequan, which led to the missed opportunity. "Hami is full of people from the Mining Bureau. Where do you want people to take off their clothes? "
Until 2005, Shandong's resources were increasingly exhausted. The thinking of the province began to change, and instead encouraged coal enterprises to start going out. It was also during this period that Shandong coal enterprises such as Yankuang and Xinwen began to look for resources, and the substantive breakthrough would wait until after 2007, but at this time, the division of coal resources was coming to an end, and the price of resources was pushed to a high point, which was not the same as that in the early years of the century.
"So we should give Lao Geng a fair evaluation. Even if he wants to approve those projects, Shandong SASAC can't pass. " The above coal system official said. In 2003, appointed by the Shandong provincial government, Geng Jiahuai took over as the chairman of Yankuang, and changed the slogan of Yankuang from "domestic first, facing the world" to "based on Jining".
Difficulty in turning around
After the new * * * took office in July, he actively solicited opinions on the next visit, which caused a heated discussion on the internal reform of Yankuang. There is no way to avoid problems that were originally covered up or turned a blind eye. The future of Yankuang is a problem that must be faced. Among them, losses and debts, headquarters resource crisis and rigid system are the biggest challenges of its reform.
A series of inefficient investment projects in the past decade have made the total debt and total assets of Yankuang rise simultaneously. It shows that from 2009 to 20 1 1, the debt ratio of Yankuang has been fluctuating around 70%. In 20 13 years, the debt ratio of Yankuang has been conservatively estimated to have exceeded 70%. At present, the financing repayment pressure of Yankuang Group is huge. A senior executive of Yankuang Group revealed that "if you don't eat or drink, you will spend 80 million yuan every day".
In the first half of 20 13, Yankuang Group suffered losses in four of its five major sectors (coal, coal, Donghua, property and aluminum) and made a small profit in one sector. If the internal related party transactions are excluded, all five sectors will lose money. The debt ratio of some sectors exceeds 100%, and the capital chain is facing a fracture.
This also made Zhang Xinwen set a "written pledge to fulfill a military order" to the provincial party committee before taking office to ensure the continuity of the capital chain. Objectively speaking, the good reputation of Yankuang Group is consistent with the excellent performance of Yanzhou Coal Industry [- 1.6 1% capital research report], and financing of Yankuang is relatively easy. However, no one can say for sure how long the projects that need continuous investment and the reality that only the headquarters of seven bases can make blood.
But this headquarters is also the future of Yankuang. A grim fact is that Yankuang headquarters is facing a coal crisis with increasingly exhausted resources.
At present, the main mines of Yankuang Command come from six pairs of mines in Yanzhou coalfield and two pairs of mines in Jining coalfield. In the 1990s, these mines were still in their youth and entered the new century [1.2 1% capital research report]. Due to the wide application of fully mechanized top coal caving technology, the output is greatly improved and the resource consumption is accelerated. By 2005, the data showed that the recoverable reserves of Yanzhou coalfield were less than 600 million tons. In 2003, when Geng Jiahuai became the new chairman of Yankuang Group, he said that Yankuang's headquarters resources could only be mined for another 20 years.
A Yankuang person provided another message. According to its introduction, the coal market in golden decade is in great demand. It is an open secret that the coal industry exceeds the approved production capacity, and Yankuang is no exception. "Sometimes the production capacity can reach twice the approved production capacity." In his view, considering this factor, the resource consumption of Yankuang headquarters is greater than the surface, and the difficulty of stable production will increase year by year. "You will see it within ten years."
Juye Coalfield, the last integrated coalfield in East China, which was originally regarded as the future headquarters of Yankuang, was "evenly distributed" with the intervention of Shandong. Seven pairs of Yankuang only won the second place on the grounds that "other mining bureaus are also facing resource depletion". In addition, a person familiar with Yankuang said that at that time, the competition was fierce, the provincial government had not yet demarcated resources, and various mining companies had independently developed and seized resources in Juye, resulting in an "established reality."
This dispute pattern has continued to Cao Xian coalfield, the last large coalfield in Shandong. At present, it has received much attention. According to Huang Xinglong, deputy director of the Planning, Survey and Design Center of Shandong Coalfield Geological Planning, Survey and Research Institute, in addition to shandong energy and Yankuang, two major coal state-owned enterprises in Shandong, many coal enterprises affiliated to Shandong cities and counties are also eager for a piece of the action. In addition, foreign capital and some central enterprises are also eyeing this. "There is no doubt that the competition will be fierce."
The key to Yankuang's future lies in a series of projects in the central and western regions and overseas. It carries the resource docking task of Yankuang headquarters and the expectation that coal chemical industry will turn losses into profits. However, the project has been promoted for a long time and needs constant capital injection. Yankuang bears the brunt of the financial pressure.
In addition to losses, liabilities and the coal crisis at headquarters, the biggest resistance to Yankuang's reform should come from internal governance. After ten years of accumulation, Yankuang is no longer the original management model enterprise. According to internal information, in addition to investigating Yankuang's subordinate enterprises, Yankuang's management also visited and studied Shenhua, Shanneng and other enterprises. Therefore, Zhang Xinwen, the new chairman, is very dissatisfied with the present situation of Yankuang.
At an internal meeting, Zhang Xinwen criticized Yankuang for "unclear responsibilities, overstaffed personnel and insufficient endogenous motivation". At present, the post setting level of Yankuang is only seven, and the number of people in Yankuang headquarters is 1200, which is twice that of Shenhua headquarters. However, Shenhua's total economic output is seven times that of Yankuang, and its total employment is three times that of Yankuang.
Some employees of Yankuang complained and reported to their superiors. After half a year, they didn't say yes orno. Yankuang described Yankuang as "big head, soft waist and thin legs."
The new leadership has made up its mind, and the primary reform direction points to "big enterprise disease". However, Yankuang, as a large local state-owned enterprise in Zoucheng, has a complicated relationship with each other and often hurts the bones. Zhang Xinwen has strictly ordered that all coal chemical entities that continue to lose money should turn losses before 20 15, except some enterprises that shut down and turn around. At the same time, it is required to make good use of employees' psychology of being prepared for danger in times of peace, so as to "not throw off the burden, not push employees to the society, not easily reduce wages, and not affect stability".
People who participated in the internal meeting of Yankuang revealed to the reporter of Energy that "things are inextricably linked, but I am very excited". How the new team implements the reform commitment is not only the concern of 200,000 employees of Yankuang, but also the deeply troubled coal industry in China.