The Yellow Sea naval battle is the main decisive battle between the Chinese and Japanese navies, and its scale, intensity and duration are rare in the history of modern naval battles in the world. As far as the military losses of both sides are concerned, China's losses are undoubtedly greater than Japan's. "In September, Ding led Beiyang warships to fight against Japan in Dadonggou, losing four ships: Zhiyuan, Jingyuan, Chaoyong and Yangwei." Only five Japanese ships were damaged and none sank. In contrast, although the Beiyang Navy finally forced the Japanese army to leave the battlefield and shattered its attempt, from the perspective of battlefield losses and actual effects, the Beiyang Navy did fail at the tactical level.
If Beiyang Navy had the courage to fight in this fierce battle from June 65438 to September 0894, then the final demise of Beiyang Navy in February 65438 and February 65438+1July 7, 995 was an elegy. "At 8: 30 a.m. on February 17, the Japanese joint fleet was headed by Matsushima, followed by our ships such as Chiyoda, Li Qiao, Yandao, the First Guerrilla, Yoshino and Qiujinzhou area. The third and fourth guerrillas set sail from Bai Chi Cliff in a single vertical formation, with flags flying high, filing in from the north entrance and slowly entering Ahava Port." "Zhenyuan, Jiyuan, Pingyuan, Guangc, Zhendong, Zhenxi, Zhennan, Zhenbei, Zhong Zhen and Zhenbian all lowered the China flag, but easily used the Japanese flag. The only exception is the Ji Kang ship, whose tail still hangs the yellow dragon flag. Because this is a coffin for Ding. ..... At four o'clock, six coffins were carried, including Ding, Liu, Yang Yonglin, Dai Zongqian, Shen Shouchang and Huang Zulian, as well as sailors and foreigners. Facing the cold rain, they left Ahava Port sadly and headed for Yantai Port. " In this way, the Beiyang Navy was destroyed, and China's naval dream turned into a cloud in the rumble of the Sino-Japanese War. The reason should be said to be the result of a variety of factors, but the gap in strength is an indisputable fact. Li Hongzhang once said: naval battles only rely on ships to run. "A little sense of superiority makes the pros and cons very different." Judging from the comparison between the Beiyang Navy and the Japanese Navy during the Sino-Japanese War, it can be said that it is only slightly inferior, so other factors are not considered. On the one hand, the Beiyang Navy is in a very unfavorable position.
We take the Yellow Sea naval battle as an example to illustrate this strength gap.
Japan's joint fleet has obvious advantages over Beiyang Navy in many aspects. Details are as follows:
1) Number of ships participating in the war: The Japanese army is 1.2 times that of Beiyang Navy.
2) The total number of fire runs: the Japanese army is 1.549 times that of Beiyang Navy.
3) Gross tonnage: The Japanese army is 1.302 times that of Beiyang Navy.
4) Total horsepower and average horsepower: The Japanese army is 1.587 times and 1.322 times that of Beiyang Navy respectively.
5) Average speed: The Japanese team and the First Guerrilla are 1.006 times and 1.252 times that of Beiyang Navy respectively.
6) Total strength: The Japanese army is 1.767 times that of Beiyang Navy.
7) Rapid-fire guns: The Japanese army has 97 guns, while the Beiyang Navy has none.
Of course, Beiyang Navy also has certain advantages in some aspects. For example, in the number of armored ships, Beiyang Navy has an absolute advantage of 4: 0 1, while in heavy artillery with a caliber of more than 30 cm and artillery with a caliber of more than 20 cm, it also has an advantage of 8: 3 and 2: 0/kloc-0, respectively. However, on the whole, Beiyang Navy is at an obvious disadvantage. In this regard, the British Philemon vice admiral once commented: "In order to compare the strength of the two armies, we can draw a correct conclusion by comparing the warships involved in the Yellow Sea campaign. Judging from tonnage, personnel, speed, rapid-fire guns and new ships, the Japanese fleet is better. Except Chicheng, the performance of warships in this country is roughly the same, and the hull size ranges from 2,200 tons to 4,200 tons, all of which are newly completed cutting-edge ships. China, although there are Dingyuan and Zhenyuan second-class warships, each has a tonnage of 7,400 tons; Secondly, Jingyuan and Laiyuan ships each have a tonnage of 2,900 tons, but only in the name of armored cruisers. The remaining ships are either small in tonnage or weak in strength, or asymmetrical in ship type and improperly equipped. "
Although the ships of both sides in the Yellow Sea naval battle did not cover all the ships of the two armies, they basically included the main forces of the Chinese and Japanese navies. Therefore, from the gap between Chinese and Japanese naval strength in the Yellow Sea naval battle, we can basically understand the gap between Chinese and Japanese naval strength around 1894. However, was the Sino-Japanese naval power comparison like this from the beginning?
Second, the arms race.
To understand this, we must trace back to the source and start with the development history of the Chinese and Japanese navies.
China has had a navy since ancient times. After the Tang and Song Dynasties, China's shipbuilding technology has made great progress, and it can be said that it once had the world's leading level. In particular, Zheng He's seven voyages to the Western Ocean during 1405- 1433 were unprecedented feats in the history of world navigation. It can really be described as "showing off foreign troops and showing China's prosperity". However, by the Qing Dynasty, the navigation and shipbuilding technology of western countries had made rapid progress, and the related naval system and strategic thinking were gradually modernized. In one hundred and twenty years, the transformation process from traditional navy to modern navy was completed. At this time, China's navy still followed the inherent system of past dynasties, and there was no breakthrough. The so-called "navy division" is divided into inland rivers and high seas. At the beginning, the naval divisions of coastal provinces were only used to defend Haikou and catch pirates. Although their jurisdiction is in the coastal areas, the official system is the same as that of the mainland. During the Guangxu period, the North-South foreign iron ships were all built, and special officials were also set up to command them. "Visible, until the Guangxu period, China has not yet completed the transformation from the ancient navy to the modern navy.
As for the establishment of China's modern navy, it is recorded in the Charter of the Qing Dynasty: "China did not have a navy at the beginning, and it was only during the Daoguang period that it began to raise funds for coastal defense and began to discuss buying ships from abroad to supplement the water army. In the early years of Tongzhi, Zeng Guozhen and Zuo suggested setting up shipyards and ironworks. Shen Baozhen sailed in the Bohai Sea, and Li Hongzhang practiced Beiyang Navy at Lushun Repair Pier, which was the beginning of a navy. " Visible, the creation of China navy, when in Xian Tong, and really completed, I'm afraid it has been in the early years of Guangxu.
Let's look at Japan again:
"In ancient Japan, there was no navy. In June of the second year of Anzheng, the Dutch began to provide steamboats. General Tokugawa's family decided to send Yasuda Hiroshi, and Tibet's victory over Rintaro was equal to Nagasaki, so they learned steamboat operation from Lan Ren, and then sent Sakamoto Kamajro and Akamatsu Taisaburo to learn naval methods from Guo Lan and buy sightseeing boats in the Netherlands. ..... Keio Ding Mao, Tokugawa returned to politics, with three posts and eight classes, only in the name of army, navy and military affairs, without special officials. ..... In August, the Ministry of War was divided into two divisions, the Army and the Navy, and each division had its own sub-bureau. In February of five years, the Ministry of War was abolished, separated from the army, and a naval province was established. In June of six years, the official system was redefined, which is the current system. "
Based on the history of naval development between China and Japan, we choose 1888 as a reference. It is not difficult to see that the Japanese navy at this time still has great advantages over the Japanese navy. Details are as follows:
1888 Comparison Table of Strength between Beiyang Navy and Japanese Navy
Types of warships in China and Japan
(Beiyang Navy only)
Second class battleship 2 1
Armored ships include four second-class warships and two.
(Including "Oriental Ship" made in France in 1865)
Clipper (cruiser) 7 5
Total number of ships 24 22
(excluding transport ship) (excluding transport ship)
There are more than 4,000 officers and men, nearly 10,000 (according to Huang Zunxian's record of Japan, it seems to be less than this figure)
In this way, by 1887, only one Beiyang navy in China will be enough to compete with the whole Japanese navy. Moreover, it is still ahead of the Japanese navy in major indicators such as secondary warships, armored ships and clippers. If you add the strength of the Nanyang Navy (Fujian Navy was completely annihilated in the Mawei naval battle before), it is naturally far above Japan. There is a good example in this regard. "In the first year of Guangxu (1875), the Manufacturing Bureau built a long-distance ship. The ship management system is successful. Through practicing martial arts, students can travel all over Nanyang and return to Japan. " At that time, "British Lang Weili was in charge of naval training." At this time, China was still able to fight with Japan. The so-called "return to Japan" showed that the Japanese navy was very inadequate at that time. At that time, Lang Weili suggested using this opportunity to annihilate the main force of the Japanese navy in one fell swoop. Although this proposal was later rejected, it can be seen that the fashion gap between Chinese and Japanese naval forces is huge. This incident greatly stimulated the Japanese authorities and accelerated the pace of their military expansion and preparations. But even so, to 1888, from the comparison of the strength of the Chinese and Japanese navies, the advantage is still in China.
However, only six years later, 1894, China Beiyang Navy was defeated by Japanese Navy. From the comparison of Chinese and Japanese naval forces in the Yellow Sea naval battle listed in the first part, we are surprised to find that after just six years, the strength of the Japanese navy has been far higher than that of the Beiyang navy, especially in rapid-fire guns, ship speed and the number of sophisticated ships. Therefore, the fiasco of China navy in the Sino-Japanese War seems inevitable. So what is the reason for this drastic change?
Third, the reasons for the rise and fall of Chinese and Japanese naval forces
To study the internal causes of this drastic change, we must combine various factors to make a comprehensive analysis. To sum up, it is because of the huge differences between China and Japan. It is this difference that led to the ups and downs of Chinese and Japanese naval forces in the second half of the19th century. There are six aspects: system, funds, importance, strategic concept, education system and development environment.
Differences in systems
If we discuss the differences between Chinese and Japanese naval systems, we must first make clear what the Chinese and Japanese naval systems are.
As far as China is concerned, the navy did not have an independent organization at first, but was assisted by the navy. The whole system still follows the military system of the navy and remains unchanged. In the management of the navy, it was first managed by the National Affairs Office of the central government. After the dissolution of Li -A Fleet, it was changed to local governor and minister of Beiyang Trade and Industry, but no specialized agency was ever set up. 1885 (11th year of Guangxu)10/3 In June, the Qing government issued a decision to set up a naval yamen. Yi Xuan, Prince of Alcohol, was appointed as Prime Minister and Minister of the Navy. "All coastal naval divisions should be controlled and dispatched". Qing Prince Yi Kuang and Zhili Governor Li Hongzhang were appointed as conference ministers. Commander-in-Chief of the Han Army is Hongqi Shanqing, and assistant minister of the right Ministry of War Ceng Jize is the deputy. And instructed Li Hongzhang to "specialize in it." The establishment of the naval yamen marked a new stage in the naval construction of the Qing government.
The modernization of the Japanese naval management system was much earlier. "Keio Ding Mao, Tokugawa shogunate returned to politics, set up three positions and eight classes, only in the name of military affairs on land and sea, but there were no special officers. In February of the first year of Meiji, it was changed to the Military Defense Bureau, and in April it was changed to the Military Affairs Officer. In July of the following year, it was changed to the Ministry of War, all of which were transferred by the navy, and there were no officers such as prefect, lieutenant general and major general. In April of four years, major, middle school student, minor assistant, major, middle school student and second lieutenant were restored. In August, the Ministry of War was divided into two divisions, the Army and the Navy, and each division had its own branch office. In February of five years, the Ministry of War was abolished, separated from the army, and a naval province was established. In June of six years, the official system was redefined, which is the current system. "
From this, we can easily see that Lu Haijun was divided into two provinces as early as the fourth year of Meiji (187 1), which was equivalent to a ministerial unit. However, it was not until 1885 that China established the specialized agency of naval yamen, which was 14 years later than Japan. From the level, it is still an institution under the Ministry of War. From this, we can easily see that there are great differences in the management system between the Chinese and Japanese navies. Japan has a special naval province, while China has only one naval yamen, which has almost no real power. In fact, the naval management power is in the hands of Beiyang Minister, Nanyang Minister and local governors, and the power is scattered and chaotic, which is not conducive to centralized management and command, thus affecting the naval combat effectiveness and mutual cooperation. The major defects of this system were not completely exposed at the initial stage of the development of China Navy, but by the end of 19, its disadvantages were completely exposed. However, the superiority of the Japanese naval system gradually came into play in the late19th century, which provided a good platform for the development of the Japanese navy.
Differences in funds
From the investment of Chinese and Japanese naval military spending, we can also see the reasons for the rise and fall of Chinese and Japanese naval forces in the second half of the 19 th century. The following is a comparison of the military expenditure of the Chinese and Japanese navies with only information.
Table 3: Comparison of Military Expenditure between Beiyang Navy and Japanese Navy
Year China (Beiyang Navy) Japanese (converted at the currency exchange rate of 1895).
The situation of1868-1875 (June) is very complicated, so it is impossible to make it clear here. In theory, the Southern Ocean and the Northern Ocean Navy allocate 2 million yuan each year, but in fact it has not reached this amount. According to Ming Jiang's research results, it is considered that from the first year of Guangxu (1875) to the twentieth year of Guangxu (1894), Beiyang received a total of 23 million yuan of silver, including the last eight years (1887- 1894).
1875/6-1876/62.7 million yuan (about 1.7 million yuan)
1876/6-1877/63.54 million yuan (about 2.23 million years)
1877/6-1878/6321.75 million yuan (about 2.03 million yuan)
1878/6-1879/6264.16000 yuan (about 1667000 yuan)
1879/6-1880/62,636,300 yuan (about1662 million yuan)
1880/6- 188 1/6
(1881.6-1882 lack of data) 3.65 million yuan (about 2.302 million).
1883- 1890, with an annual average of 3.3 million yuan (about 2.082 million yuan).
1891-18955855 yuan (excluding the imperial palace funds of the emperor, etc.). ), the average annual 1 17 1 ten thousand yuan (about 7.388 million yuan).
It can be seen that from the beginning of 1875, Japan's investment in the navy surpassed that of Beiyang Navy, and it remained above 2 million liang during the period of 1876- 1890. After 189 1 year, the average annual investment has reached 7.38 million taels of silver, much higher than that of Beiyang in the Qing Dynasty. On the whole, during the period of 1875- 1894, the theoretical input of the Qing government to Beiyang Navy should be 40 million taels (calculated by north-south decomposition, Beiyang Navy can get 2 million taels of silver every year). According to the research results of Ming Jiang, only 23 million taels were actually put in place, while the Japanese side reached 65162,000 taels (6,543,000 taels). From the above analysis, we can easily find that there is a huge gap in investment between China and Japan. Without input, there will be gains. Therefore, it is not difficult to explain why the naval forces of China and Japan changed greatly in the second half of the19th century.
Different levels of attention
There are also great differences in the importance attached by China and Japan to the development of the navy. From Japan's point of view, Japan attaches great importance to the development of navy and coastal defense from the emperor to the people. 1890 (16th year of Guangxu and 23rd year of Meiji), Emperor Mu Ren issued a letter and set aside 300,000 yuan as shipbuilding fee. At the same time, we will collect more than two million yuan from the people to build ships. 1February, 893 (Guangxu 19, Meiji 26), Mu Ren once again ordered to save the palace funds. In the past six years, 300,000 yuan has been allocated for shipbuilding every year. It also ordered all civil and military officials, except in special circumstances, to pay one-tenth of their salary as shipbuilding fees during this period. In order to raise the navy's military expenditure, the Japanese emperor set an example and even ordered to save the palace funds to pay for the navy. His attention is not high. On the other hand, the supreme ruler of China, whether Cixi or Emperor Guangxu, paid little attention to coastal defense. Focus on two points:
One is the dispute between coastal defense and defense from 65438 to the 1970s of 2008. At that time, China was facing a serious border crisis. The Agubo regime once controlled a large area of Xinjiang, and then there was a border crisis in southern China. French invaders have penetrated into northern Vietnam, approaching Guangxi and Yunnan. Some important officials in the Qing court, such as Zuo, advocated defense first, while Li Hongzhang and others still believed that the biggest threat to China came from the sea, especially the Japanese. Li Hongzhang's coastal defense strategy should be said to be far-sighted, but judging from the situation at that time, if the fortress defense was not emphasized, China would be in danger of losing its territory again. However, China people have always attached great importance to the territory, and the so-called "not giving an inch of land" did not fully understand the significance of the boundless maritime boundary and sea power at that time, and thought that it was urgent to stop the defense. Therefore, it is no wonder that the party that insists on fortress defense occupies an advantageous position, which eventually makes the Qing court spend a lot of military money on wars in Xinjiang and other areas to strengthen border defense.
If this debate is still divided, then the misappropriation of the Beiyang Navy's military expenditure is irrefutable evidence that the Qing government did not attach importance to naval construction. In the past, people often thought that these funds were mainly used to build the Summer Palace, but in fact this is not the case. After the General Administration and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development decided to allocate 4 million yuan for coastal defense every year, it became a major source of income for the public. Whenever the Qing government was in financial difficulties, it made a lot of money from it. From the first year of Guangxu to the sixth year of Guangxu alone, there were 203,000 yuan in Yunnan case allowance, 42,000 yuan in Henan loan to buy rice and silver, 202,000 yuan in Shanxi and Henan province relief, 74,000 yuan in capital parity, 42,000 yuan in Hejian and Hui Ling projects. In the 12th year of Guangxu, under the pretext of insufficient funds, the Maritime Department requested that the funds for the North and South Seas and the reimbursement for the three northeastern provinces should be uniformly distributed at 22 ping (that is, Jingping) from the 1st month of the 13th year of Guangxu, and more than 62 ping should be deducted for each ambiguity, so as to offset the food expenses of eight ships such as Dingyuan, which were nominally appropriated by the special fund of the naval yamen. According to the statistics of shipping rates from the 13th year of Dingyuan to the 20th year of Guangxu, in the past eight years, more than 200,000 wages were allocated. Although all the above items are listed in the column of "Incoming" in Beiyang coastal defense reimbursement, after all, they are all deducted from the coastal defense reimbursement, and the total amount exceeds 1.7 million, accounting for more than 7% of the total income of Beiyang coastal defense funds, which cannot be ignored. As for the Western Empress Dowager Cixi's misappropriation of naval funds for the construction of the Summer Palace, the situation is very complicated and there are different opinions, especially the amount of misappropriation ranges from several million to tens of millions. But in any case, the construction of the Summer Palace has had a certain negative impact on naval construction, especially the shortage of funds to a certain extent.
Judging from the above examples, China and Japan attach great importance to the navy. Here's another example: The Japanese government has always regarded the China Navy as an opponent and an imaginary enemy in the activities of building ships and expanding its army. Especially for Dingyuan and Zhenyuan armored ships in beiyang fleet, China, I feel a great threat, and I will get rid of them quickly. So that at that time, not only among Japanese naval soldiers, there was a popular saying that "we must win the battle and set a good distance." Even when children play games in primary schools, they are divided into two groups. One group is assembled into a Chinese fleet, and the other group is dressed as a Japanese fleet to play a battle game to capture Dingyuan and Zhenyuan and decide the outcome. The purpose is to educate children to defeat Dingyuan and Zhenyuan as Japan's strategic goal. The construction of the Japanese navy is well known to women and children and deeply rooted in the hearts of the people. In contrast, China's high-level officials don't know enough about coastal defense and naval construction, not to mention the middle and lower levels.
Differences in strategic concepts
The difference between Chinese and Japanese naval forces also lies in the difference in strategic concepts.
As far as Japan is concerned, its territory is small, its population is dense, its natural resources are scarce, its domestic market is limited, and it is a capitalist country, so there are not enough colonies to provide huge overseas markets. Therefore, if Japan wants to expand its influence and seek development, it must expand its living space under the conditions at that time. East Asia is not America, and there is no virgin land for colonization. If it wants to gain more room for development, it will inevitably harm the interests of other countries. Therefore, Japan's development strategy has been very aggressive and offensive from the beginning. "After completing its own modernization, Japan began to expand to the Asian continent. As long as you look at Japan's militant tradition and the great prestige enjoyed by its army since ancient times, you won't be surprised. Seeking truth from facts, Japan has come to this clear conclusion: every nation must plunder for itself, and the weak and timid get nothing. " It is based on this that Japan's strategy has been offensive and aggressive from the beginning. Japan is an island country, and if it wants to invade other countries, it must cross the vast sea. It is very important to have a strong naval force to protect the Japanese army's maritime traffic lines and its sea control rights in the relevant sea areas. It is precisely because of this that the Japanese government and military have put the construction of a modern navy at such an important strategic height. It can be said that, based on the above reasons, Japan's naval strategy is an offensive strategy, in which action controls the static state and attack replaces defense.
Compared with Japanese, China's naval strategy focuses on "defense". From 1874 (the 13th year of Tongzhi), the Qing government stepped up the pace of preparing for the navy. In the same year, Ding Richang, Governor of Jiangsu Province, put forward six articles of naval charter. It is suggested to purchase and manufacture large warships, build forts in coastal areas, train naval divisions and select elite personnel to serve in the navy. It is also suggested that three naval divisions of Beiyang, Dongyang and Nanyang should be established along the coast. Beiyang Navy is responsible for the coastal defense of Shandong and Zhili, and set Beiyang Navy as the prefect in Tianjin. The Eastern Navy is responsible for the coastal defense of Zhejiang and Jiangsu, and the Eastern Navy is set as the prefect in Wusong. Nanyang Navy is responsible for the coastal defense of Guangdong and Fujian, and has set up Nanyang Navy as the prefect in South Australia. Each naval division has six private boats and ten small boats. "The prefect of Sanyo will whistle once every six months. If there is nothing, he will transport food, and if there is something, he will catch thieves." The three divisions of the Navy (Navy) are divided into Tianjin, Wusong and Nan 'ao, and they implement divisional defense. At the same time, the core idea of this strategy is to take static braking and defense as the attack, so that the influence of this idea did not disappear until the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, nor did Beiyang Navy. As history enters the modern era, the maneuverability and endurance of ships have been greatly improved, and the coastal areas of Wan Li can be said to be hard to prevent. However, the strategic thinking of the Qing court has not changed from the traditional concept of coastal defense in the past, and it has spent a lot of money and energy on coastal artillery construction and coastal defense, thus affecting the development of the ocean navy to a certain extent, which cannot be said to be a big mistake.
Differences in educational systems
There is also a big gap between China and Japan in terms of naval education and training.
First of all, let's look at China: In the second year of Guangxu, Shen Baozhen and Li Hongzhang sent students to universities and manufacturing bureaus in Britain and France for internships. This is the first international student. For six years ... Li Hongzhang founded the Naval Academy in Tianjin. Eleven years, Ceng Guoquan said: "In Fujian, Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces, iron boats, clippers and torpedo boats have been added. Later, warships and ships specialized in ocean cruises and were not allowed to carry brave tugboats. " I will play with Minister Beiyang and send the third batch of international students abroad. In the first 13 year, ... Beijing set up a navy school in Kunming Lake and Guangdong set up a navy school in Huangpu. In August of 16th year, Beiyang set up a navy school in Liu Gongdao, and Nanyang set up a navy school in Nanjing. In nineteen years, the ship administration system of Fu Jeer torpedo was built. The Governor of Guangdong changed the lecture hall of the Navy into the Navy Academy. From this point of view, from 1876 (the second year of Guangxu) when China sent overseas students to European countries for the first time to 1893 (the nineteenth year of Guangxu), the Qing government sent three groups of overseas students successively, and built four naval schools in Kunming Lake, Huangpu, Guangdong, Liu Gongdao and Nanjing (which may be omitted due to lack of information). It should be said that naval education has a certain scale, but
Japan, on the other hand, is a different story: after the "version book was returned" in 1869 (the eighth year of Tongzhi and the second year of Ye Ming), Cheung Chau, Satsuma and Tosa handed over all their armies to the Ye Ming government to supplement the basic troops of the imperial army being formed. In order to develop the naval cause, the Naval School was opened in Tokyo in the same year, and then the Naval University and the Naval Engineering School were established on this basis. In these schools, British officers are hired to teach. And sent many students to practice in Britain and the United States. Since the draft notice was issued, Japan has established 1 naval school and three marine corps to train and supplement naval officers. In order to train naval talents, the Japanese government has set up naval officer schools, naval driving schools, naval shipbuilding industry schools, naval artillery training institutes and naval mine training institutes in Wugang, Hiroshima and Yokosuga. 1887 (13th year of Guangxu and 20th year of Meiji), it was decided to establish a naval university in Tokyo, stipulating that "students who graduated from military schools, mining departments and driving schools can enter the university for two years". In addition, merchant shipping schools have been established in Tokyo, Osaka and Hakodate. 1888 (14th year of Guangxu and 21st year of Meiji) promulgated the official system of the naval academy, in which the first article stipulated that "the naval academy is a place for educating students of naval ordinary schools" with the purpose of training naval officers. 1889 (15th year of Guangxu, 22nd year of Meiji) promulgated the "Regulations of the Navy", and set up navy teams in various garrisons to be responsible for the education and training of naval guards and sailors guarding the military port and the recruitment of new recruits. Regarding the Naval Academy, Huang Zunxian's History of Japan has a detailed description: "The Academy has principals, teachers and teaching assistants. There are three kinds of learning houses, one is childhood, the other is maturity, and the third is specialty. Childhood is1under 9 years old1over 5 years old, and the study period is five years. In the prime of life, students are over 20 and under 25, and they study for three years, regardless of age. The navy enrolls students in April every year, and scholars who are expected to apply for admission are admitted to the school in August every year. At the beginning of admission, there is a method of examination. Whether they are strong or not, whether they can write books ... there are grades, the first is shallow and deep. ..... Schools are divided into official students and illegitimate students, and official students are sworn in as soon as they enter the school. I am willing to engage in the navy for life, and I will not do other business. The expenses will be paid by the government. ..... After their completion, government students will be sent to study in western Thailand, and some non-commissioned officers will be sent to the embassy to study the military systems of other countries, or when they encounter wars, such as the recent war in Aceh, the Netherlands, the war in Pufo, and the war in Russia and Turkey, special officials will be sent to observe. " As can be seen from the above materials, the Japanese naval education system not only rose earlier than China, but also slightly surpassed China in scale and perfection. It is particularly noteworthy that Japan has a relatively complete training system, which can continuously transport talents for the navy, which is also an important factor that can not be ignored in the changes of Sino-Japanese naval forces.
Special development environment
As far as the development environment of the Chinese and Japanese navies is concerned, there is no doubt that Japan also has great advantages. It should be said that in the middle of19th century, Japan and China were jointly threatened by the west. China experienced the Opium War of 1840- 1842, and the Japanese experienced the beating of Perry's fleet of the United States of America of 1853. Both China and Japan were forced to open the door. However, what happened later was quite different.
"For better or worse, Japan, like China before it, was forced to be invaded by the West. However, its response to this invasion is completely different from that of China. " In fact, Japan quickly responded positively. After the Chen Wu War and the return of the big government, Emperor Meiji of Japan began to carry out drastic reforms, which made Japan gradually get rid of the interference of western colonialists in a short time and won its sovereign independence. "After long-term diplomatic efforts, in 1894, they (Japan) persuaded Britain and the United States to end their extraterritorial consular jurisdiction within five years. ..... Since then, there is no reason to regard Japan as an inferior country, and other powers have followed the example of Britain and the United States and soon gave up their privileges. By 1899, Japan has gained legal jurisdiction over all foreigners in its territory. Under this circumstance, it became the first country in Asia to break the western control chain. "
However, the situation in China is just the opposite. Since 1840, the degree of semi-colonization in China has not declined, but has been deepening. After the Opium War, the Second Opium War, the Sino-French War and the border crisis in 1970s and 1980s 19, China suffered huge losses in territory and sovereignty, and also suffered huge war reparations. (The Opium War was 2 1 10,000 yuan, and the Second Opium War 1.67 million yuan-including 8.5 million yuan in Britain and 8.2 million yuan in France) In addition, during the period of 1- 1.864, China also experienced the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Movement and gave it to the society of the Qing Dynasty.
The above analysis mainly focuses on the internal environment. As far as the external environment is concerned, China is in the interest and core area of the Far East and is always surrounded by great powers. It is impossible for a big country to allow China to have a powerful navy for its own interests in China. Japan, on the other hand, is on the edge of the interests of the Far East. Because of many contradictions among the great powers, they all want to use Japan's expansion to limit other forces, so they adopted a conniving attitude towards Japan, which provided a relatively stable international environment for Japan's arms expansion during this period.
Four. conclusion
From the above analysis, it is not difficult to see that the ups and downs of Chinese and Japanese naval forces in the second half of the19th century are not accidental, but have very profound and complicated reasons. Due to the lack of information, this paper can't explore them one by one, just draw a rough outline and sort out a rough idea. In a word, the ups and downs of Chinese and Japanese naval forces in the second half of the19th century are the result of a series of factors, such as system, funds, emphasis, strategic concept, education system, domestic and international environment and so on. We should analyze this problem from a comprehensive and objective perspective. The final failure of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 is very complicated, and it can never be simply attributed to personal factors such as Empress Dowager Cixi, Li Hongzhang and Ding. I believe that the defeat of the Japanese navy in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 was the inevitable result of the differences between China and Japan in the second half of this century, which was beyond the control of one or two people.
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