Special commentator Liu Heping: Actually, we say that diplomacy is a continuation of internal affairs, because many countries often try to boost domestic nationalism and transfer internal contradictions by showing their strength and provoking external disputes when facing problems in internal affairs. In my opinion, the reason why the Kishida government is more radical than the United States in revising its national security strategy lies in its internal affairs. Because in recent years, under the deliberate manipulation of Japanese right-wing forces, the relations with China of recent Japanese governments have deviated from the normal track more and more. However, Kishida himself and his cabinet, which were already in a weak position in factional competition, fell to the bottom because of poor internal governance, and the stability of the regime was in jeopardy. In this case, they can only extend their political life by showing their strength to China and treating China as an "enemy".
Apart from the needs of internal politics, I think the Kishida government did this not because it faced the so-called "military threat" from China, as they said, but because of the needs of Japanese military development, especially the need to strengthen its own military strength. We must know that the Kishida government has decided to raise Japan's defense budget to more than 2% of GDP, and the Japanese Defense Ministry also seeks to increase its military spending by nearly 50% in the next five years, making Japan's military spending jump to the third place in the world. In addition, Japan is considering deploying more than 1 1,000 cruise missiles with a range of 1 1,000 kilometers to enhance its so-called counterattack capability against neighboring countries. To realize these ambitious military expansion plans, we must establish powerful so-called "threats" and "enemies" outside. Moreover, more crucially, the dream of Japanese right-wing politicians to amend Article 9 of the Peace Constitution to make Japan a so-called normalized country has not yet been realized, and to achieve these goals, China should also be regarded as an "imaginary enemy".
Finally, I would like to remind you that you must not think that the kishida fumio administration's position on China is more radical than Biden's, and the United States will stop the reckless behavior of the kishida fumio administration. I think, on the contrary, it is exactly what the United States wants to do to contain the China issue, let Japan take the lead and let China and Japan compete with each other. The United States can use Japan to contain China, and the fisherman will benefit. Therefore, in the relations with China, if Japan lags behind the times and can't keep up with the pace of the United States, the Biden administration will certainly whip it. But if Japan is ahead of the United States, the United States will turn a blind eye and even feel glad.
Direct news: So what measures should China take to deal with Japanese behavior?
Special commentator Liu Heping: I think that if the Kishida government really defines China as a "threat" in the revision of its national security strategy, it will be a major turning point in Japan's security strategy and an important turning point in Sino-Japanese relations, and its impact on Sino-Japanese relations will be immeasurable. Of course, besides paying attention to how the Kishida government defines China in its national security strategy, we should also pay attention to what changes it will make on the issue of Taiwan Province Province, and whether Abe's verbal political declaration that "there is something in Taiwan Province Province, and Japan and the Japan-US alliance will also have something" will be further implemented as a specific policy and security strategy for Japan. Because according to Japanese media reports, the new national security strategy of Kishida government will not only re-emphasize the importance of "peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait", but also may have so-called opposition to "Wu Tong". If this happens, it will be a gross interference in Taiwan Province Province and China's internal affairs.
However, it is worth noting that, in the face of the possible "storm" in the relationship between the Kishida government and China, China did not appear emotional in its response, nor did it blindly intensify the contradictions by being hard. China has not only maintained calm and restraint, but also maintained its strategic strength, and maintained a certain degree of strategy and flexibility in its response. This is mainly manifested in the fact that China not only initiated the * * * meeting between China and Japan during the APEC meeting, but also held the14th round of consultations of the China-Japan high-level consultation mechanism on ocean affairs as planned. In addition, China explicitly opposes the kishida fumio administration's positioning of China as a "threat" rather than a challenge, and Natsuo Yamaguchi, leader of the ruling Komeito Party, is expected to visit China. This means that China is not only making Japan correct its wrong China policy through direct contact with the Kishida government, but also preparing to influence and contain the Liberal Democratic Party from the side through the Komeito Party in the ruling coalition.
In this case, I think it is still possible for China to prevent the Kishida government from positioning China as a "threat" when formulating a new national security strategy. That is to say, when positioning China, the Kishida government may "shrink back" slightly, that is, keep pace with the United States and NATO, and only regard China as a so-called challenge and competitor.
Extended reading:
Sun Xingjie: Japan's security strategy will be greatly adjusted, and the security pattern in East Asia will be affected.
Direct news: The Japanese government plans to revise the national security strategy and other diplomatic security documents at the end of the year, in which the counterattack capability has become the focus of attention. Will Japan take the initiative?
Special commentator Sun Xingjie: Japan's national security strategy is a guiding document for medium and long-term diplomatic security, from which we can see Japan's current and future strategic trends. The Japanese Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito Party, which are in power jointly, have reached a certain consensus on the issue of counterattack capability. This concept may be written into a document and will be the core concept of Japan's future strategy. Although the definition of counterattack capability is not clear, or it has not completely surfaced, I think this concept represents a major adjustment of Japan's strategy.
First of all, what exactly does counterattack capability mean? At present, the information disclosed by the media shows that the counter-attack ability is not a defensive concept, but a preemptive concept, that is, to let the other side give up the deterrent force of armed attack. In other words, Japan wants to form an intention to deter the other side from launching an attack on Japan. Considering that it is the missile age, how to deter possible missile threats? It is not to develop Japan's anti-missile system, but to enhance Japan's missile attack capability. In addition, Japanese officials also admitted that the interception system could not defend national life. Actually, this is common sense. The current interception system cannot intercept 100%. Recently, North Korea launched missiles, especially medium-and long-range missiles flying over Japan, which caused a certain psychological impact on Japan. Polls show that more than 60% of Japanese people support the concept of counterattack capability.
Second, how to form Japan's counterattack capability? One is to increase Japanese military spending and buy medium-range missiles, which may include the Tomahawk cruise missile system of the United States. The Japanese government has proposed to increase the defense expenditure to 2% of GDP, which means that Japan's military expenditure will increase considerably in the future. Second, the security cooperation with the United States will be extended to Japan and the United States, and Japan and the United States will share relevant intelligence information. The core of counterattack capability is to strike the enemy in advance, which has actually crossed the bottom line of Japan's post-war defense. Although the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito Party of Japan emphasize the principle of defending exclusively and prohibiting preemption within the scope of the Constitution and international law, the counterattack capability itself contradicts Japan's existing strategy and peaceful constitution.
Finally, the revision of Japan's diplomatic security strategy also involves how Japan views its own security environment. If the surrounding challenges and competition escalate into threats, it means that Japan's diplomatic security strategy will also be adjusted. By joining the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" and defense cooperation with relevant countries, Japan's security strategy has undergone substantial changes, which also means that the security pattern in East Asia has been greatly impacted with the qualitative change of Japan's security strategy.
Direct news: South Korean presidential officials are cautious about President Yin Xiyue's plan to visit Japan this year. How to treat the prospect of mutual visits between Japan and South Korea?
Special commentator Sun Xingjie: In an interview with Japanese media, South Korean Ambassador to Japan Yin Demin said that considering the drastic changes in the international situation, the possibility of President Yin Xiyue's visit to Japan during the year is not ruled out. For this information, the attitude of the South Korean presidential palace seems to be more cautious. After all, there is only one last month left this year. To arrange a summit visit, both sides need to communicate and coordinate, and time is tight. The information released by Yin Demin was also interpreted as that Japan and South Korea are coordinating the summit visit. In my opinion, the exchange of visits between Japanese and South Korean leaders has been interrupted for ten years, and the exchange of visits between leaders is also regarded as an important symbol of the warming of diplomatic relations. From its point of view, the improvement of Japan-ROK relations has several favorable factors, as well as insurmountable difficulties in the short term.
From the favorable conditions, first of all, North Korea has frequently launched missiles in recent days, especially long-range missiles, which greatly enhanced the necessity and urgency of communication and coordination between Japan and South Korea. For Japan and South Korea, the common threat is an important driving force for closer relations. Second, Yin Xiyue's government has high expectations for improving relations between South Korea and Japan. Since May, South Korea has repeatedly sought to improve relations with Japan, and the two countries have also held many meetings on multilateral occasions, laying a good foundation for the exchange of visits between leaders. The relationship between South Korea and Japan has been in a downturn in recent years, and fell into a trough during Moon Jae in's administration. Judging from the internal logic and surrounding environment of the relationship between the two countries, the relationship between South Korea and Japan has also reached the critical point of bottoming out. The third is that the United States pursues the "Indo-Pacific Strategy". Japan and South Korea are both important support points of the United States. Japan has been an advocate of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" from the beginning, and South Korea is the focus of the United States. Therefore, the United States also has the motivation to promote the recovery of Japan-ROK relations.
As far as disadvantages are concerned, the first problem is forced labor, which seems to be a legal problem. In fact, it is related to the foundation of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea. Japan believes that the issue of compensation has been solved, while South Korea believes that it has not. In addition, the issue of forced labor is linked with historical issues and national sentiment. At present, the support rate of Yin Xiyue and kishida fumio is not high, and dealing with this issue related to national sentiment is also greatly restricted. If there is no basic plan acceptable to both sides on the issue of forced labor, it is difficult for Japan-ROK relations to achieve substantial improvement. The second is the repositioning of Japan-ROK relations. When Japan and South Korea established diplomatic relations, their strength and status were unbalanced, but now South Korea's national status and consciousness have changed greatly. South Korea is also becoming more and more active in Japan-South Korea relations. This process of adjustment and repositioning is also an obstacle facing Japan and South Korea.
On the whole, the process of Japan-ROK relations adjustment has begun, especially in the global and regional situations, which has enabled the two countries to actively or passively improve their relations. Of course, it is difficult to predict the speed and timing of adjustment, which depends on the decision of politicians.