Perhaps many people don't know that by the end of 2002, China Unicom had more than 80 million GSM and CDMA network users, and its domestic mobile market share exceeded 30%, making it the third largest mobile phone user group in the world after China Mobile and Vodafone. Since 2003, in many areas, the number of new users of China Unicom and China Mobile is basically the same, and the share of China Unicom in China mobile market will further increase.
In the whole domestic telecom market, in the first half of 2003, China Unicom began to surpass China Netcom Group, which operates fixed communications, and reached the position of the third largest operator in China, second only to China Mobile and China Telecom. However, the gap between China Unicom and the top two is still obvious: at the end of 2002, the operating income of China Unicom was 56.8 billion, while the income of China Mobile and China Telecom was over 654.38+02 billion, more than twice that of China Unicom.
In many industries, it has been quite successful to achieve the third place in the world and the third place in China, but Unicom's third place is a bit embarrassing. After the re-split of telecom in 2002, both New China Telecom and China Netcom tried to enter the field of mobile communication, but their requirements for obtaining mobile licenses were not approved. Starting from getting out of the predicament of the low-speed development of fixed communication, improving the ARPU value of users and accumulating the experience of operating mobile services, the two companies have made the development of PHS in full swing, while the Ministry of Information Industry has kept the default, just invading the low-end mobile communication field that China Unicom has always adhered to. China Mobile, with its network scale and two absolute advantages of having the most high-end mobile users, has been competing with China Unicom all over the country, taking various contingency measures flexibly and fully defending its position in the high, middle and low end. China Unicom is in a delicate situation, caught in the middle: China Mobile, which ranks first in the world in the high-end market, is squeezed by PHS of China Telecom and China Netcom in the low-end market, and is also faced with the potential threat that operators such as China Telecom and China Netcom want to enter the mobile market, so the market competition is extremely fierce.
Location problem1:the balance between C network and G network
The growth of China Unicom is not easy. From the first day of the establishment of 1994 China Unicom, it was granted the right to operate the basic telecommunications network. From a global perspective, it is not too late for China to decide to introduce a competition mechanism into the basic telecommunications services in the telecommunications market. However, China Unicom has encountered various obstacles in market access and interconnection, and its market share in many telecom fields is still very small: in the history of domestic GSM mobile phone development, China Unicom first started the construction of GSM mobile phone network, followed by Old China Telecom, but it was not until the construction of GSM network of Old China Telecom began to take shape that China Unicom obtained the mobile communication license after China Telecom. 1995, the market share of China Unicom was about 20 %(GSM). By 1998, China Unicom's mobile phone market share had dropped to 9. 1%, 1998 added new mobile phone users 1047, of which only 1047 added new users. 1998 After the spin-off of China Telecom and the reorganization of the State Council, China Unicom achieved explosive growth that had been suppressed for a long time. By the first half of 2000/kloc-0, China Unicom's market share in the field of mobile phones had risen to 26.3%, and the total number of users exceeded 30 million. Up to now, China Unicom has nearly 80 million users, with a market share of 30%.
Due to the interconnection problem, the devil in policy details and the gap in network coverage, China Unicom has fewer high-end users, which shows that the average revenue per user (ARPU) of China Unicom is far lower than that of China Mobile. In 2000, the ARPU of China Unicom was 92.5 yuan, while that of China Mobile was 22 1 yuan. Great Wall Communication was merged into China Unicom in 2000, and the Ministry of Information Industry granted Unicom the only CDMA mobile communication business qualification in China, which laid the foundation for China Unicom to compete for high-end users.
At present, only Telstra and China Unicom are operated by the same operator in the world. Telstra has only built a CDMA network specially built for the Olympic Games, but it is mainly used in surrounding areas, and GSM is mainly used in central cities. The main purpose of China Unicom is obviously not for this. There is no doubt that the focus of Unicom's development is on C network. Unicom tries to realize the coordinated development of the two networks through market segmentation, and repeatedly emphasizes the different positioning of C network and G network: C network focuses on high-end users and gives consideration to the public; G network focuses on the mass market and actively strives for high-end users. But now it seems that this positioning is becoming more and more vague, and how to balance the relationship between the two networks has become a difficult problem for China Unicom.
Positioning problem 2: the balance between mobile services and other services
Most people are talking about Unicom, which is just a mobile service operator. Indeed, the mobile business is the pillar business of China Unicom, and it is also the key to the rapid growth of China Unicom. Mobile service is the fastest growing and most profitable piece of cake in China telecom market, and almost all operators are salivating. But Unicom is actually a real full-service operator, and it is still the only full-service operator. Unicom, which got the fixed-line license very early, was forgotten as a fixed-line operator because of its commitment to mobile services.
China Unicom began to operate fixed-line telephones on 1998, but up to now, its local local telephone network service has only been piloted in three cities, such as Chongqing, Chengdu and Tianjin, and it has not been very successful. Coupled with the "Tailong" incident in April this year, there was a small bubble in the telecommunications industry where China Unicom participated in the fixed-line competition. Unicom's fixed-line business can be said to be basically unknown, and consumers know nothing.
In fact, China Unicom's long-distance network has reached a considerable scale, and the basic network, business network and support network have basically achieved national coverage: the total length of the completed optical fiber transmission network has reached 240,000 kilometers, reaching 28 provinces and cities and 293 cities across the country; Metropolitan transmission and integrated access network for users have been built in more than 0/00 cities in/kloc; The newly-built 193 long-distance telephone network of China Unicom has covered 29 provinces, cities and 300 cities, basically covering economically developed areas, and international long-distance calls have reached 200 countries and regions. IP telephone services have been provided in 306 cities, and broadband data networks including line leasing, FR, ATM, VPN and Internet have covered 220 cities.
As for the wireless paging service, since the former China Telecom's Guo Xin paging was merged into China Unicom, China Unicom has a dominant position in the wireless paging market, with the largest wireless paging network and the largest number of users in the world. With the development of wireless paging industry entering a mature stage, wireless paging business has declined under the strong impact of mobile phone short messages. China Unicom has taken various ways to find a way out for the paging industry: developing two-way paging business; Establish a call center; Cooperation pages with major domestic banks and so on.
Compared with other operators' dream of seeking full-service operation, China Unicom's full-service operation seems to be careless. Up to now, China Unicom's mobile communication revenue accounts for nearly 90% of the total revenue, and the balance between mobile communication and other services has become a difficult problem for China Unicom to further develop.
Survive in the cracks
Unicom's first problem is that it has been unable to surpass China Mobile due to the serious homogenization competition. Unicom, which introduced CDMA network, tried to compete with China Mobile in a differentiated way, seeking opportunities to catch up. Unicom's second problem, if nothing else, is "poverty".
Unicom has never lacked telecommunication policy resources and telecommunication natural resources. From asymmetric regulation, fixed+mobile license, paging industry to the only CDMA business license, China Unicom has repeatedly encountered operational difficulties, but they have all survived. Unicom now is not the Unicom before. It is not satisfied with being the younger brother of China Mobile, China Telecom and China Netcom, but hopes to be an equal operator with them. CDMA is undoubtedly the "sword of the sky" in its hands. Because China Mobile GPRS got in the way on GSM, China Telecom and China Netcom closed their networks, and the market space gradually narrowed. China Unicom hopes that CDMA can avoid the market area of PHS and compete with China Mobile GSM by virtue of its data application advantages. It is precisely because of its growth that asymmetric control preferential policies will not exist for a long time. On the one hand, it is because of the strong demand of other operators. On the other hand, the history of foreign telecom reform shows that when the market competition reaches a certain level, asymmetric regulatory policies will hinder the development of the original leading telecom enterprises, and it is also not conducive to the new operators to continue to develop and enhance their competitiveness in the market competition.
Capital and management have always been the "cover door" of China Unicom. In the early days of the establishment of China Unicom, huge investment was needed for network construction, but China Unicom could not obtain other capital income except a small amount of network access fee, and the domestic telecom industry strictly restricted the entry of foreign capital, which made the development of China Unicom encounter a capital bottleneck. China Unicom was forced to create a "Chinese-foreign" model, but this flexibility was suspended in 1999. In June 2000, China Unicom was listed in new york and Hongkong with a capital of 5.65 billion US dollars. Even so, this fund is only equivalent to China Unicom's fixed assets investment for one year, and China Unicom's cash flow is still quite tight. After the CDMA project was launched, China Unicom had to carry out a subsidy policy called vicious circle because of the unfavorable business development in the initial stage, which raised the business index of that year, but left financial risks in the following years.
My future is not a dream.
In order to change the two positioning problems and the living conditions under the shadow of "Two Strong Companies", China Unicom needs to make more breakthroughs in management and thought than in pure business.
Although it has a CDMA network, China Unicom is still stuck in the past thinking. In addition to the price war, expanding the scale of users is also a price war. In the deep excavation of many businesses, the gap between China Unicom and China Mobile is getting farther and farther. Now Unicom seems to be dragged into the vicious circle of CDMA, and it is difficult to extricate itself. It only cares about constantly developing new users. It seems that CDMA network has been shaped as a replica of its low-end GSM network. From the original mobile GSM VS Unicom's 130 nameless brand, to China Mobile's Shenzhouxing VS Unicom's Ruyitong, "Monternet" VS "CITIC Unicom", Unicom lost almost every step and followed suit. After the completion of CDMA network, which mainly focuses on data services, it lags behind China Mobile in service. China Unicom has been silent except for launching several games based on BREW, and it seems that it does not take data business as the leading brand. It thinks that everything will be fine as long as this service is provided. China Unicom's real market-oriented thinking is still very weak, and there is a big gap between its business management and brand management and China Mobile.
Unicom, the old road of price war, is no longer feasible. The so-called mantis catches cicadas, and the yellowbird is behind. At the critical moment when China Unicom relied on the price war, PHS came to the backyard. In the face of PHS, the price weapon has become its own disadvantage. It seems that Unicom has not fully understood this point. Apart from price war or price war, it is not the best way for the company to develop in the long run, especially when the external environment and market prospects have changed beyond recognition.
Unicom has no other future. First, a breakthrough in business, using CDMA and China Mobile to form differentiated competition. The second is a breakthrough in thinking, and more efforts are made in the depth of users, not just considering the breadth of users; The third is a breakthrough in management, making full use of the advantages of the only full-service operation, not just being a second-rate mobile operator. From these points of view, while competing for new users, it is feasible to gradually transform existing GSM users into CDMA users in a planned way, sell GSM assets, make use of the advantages of various services for packaging and strive for high-value customers.