But I mainly want to object to an attitude: I think this kind of article is purely a joke, "concocted every year to achieve the goal" (@ Langxie Yang Wenli). This article was published in 199 1. At that time, the assessment indicators were far from being so clear now, and the effect of publishing such a small article was very limited. There are some sympathetic understandings: the author is either comfortable powder or prime minister powder, or tired of all kinds of comfortable powder and prime minister powder; After reading the relevant historical materials, she felt that she could provide some new insights. Of course, publication does not mean quality, but only that it conforms to academic norms and raises questions based on existing understanding.

I want to explain the following points: first of all, the ratio of three households to one soldier has its origin, and it is not completely impossible; This is not a very absurd statement. However, almost no regime will really maintain its armed forces in the proportion of three households and one soldier; According to some historical data of Han, Tang and Song Dynasties, I guess there are about ten to twenty households per soldier. In other words, although the economic, social and military systems have undergone tremendous changes, from the Eastern Han Dynasty to the Southern Song Dynasty, this proportion was relatively stable (3). So the real question is:

Since three households and one soldier are feasible in theory, why does it rarely exceed the ratio of ten households and one soldier in actual history?

I think it has something to do with marginal revenue. Simply put, there is a curve between the input of unit troops and the contribution to the growth of total combat effectiveness; At a certain time, the contribution of the new unit force to the total combat effectiveness will be reduced; When it is low enough, it is meaningless to recruit again. This is especially meaningful for understanding the military history of the Middle Ages, which can tell us the economic foundation behind the military "aristocrats" and explain why the armies of Wang Mang, Fu Jian and Yang Di were tactically fragile (4).

Lu Wen's main problem is that she ignores the marginal curve between the number of soldiers and combat effectiveness. The main mistake of her full text lies in the presupposition that strength and combat effectiveness are positively related. The more soldiers, the stronger the overall combat effectiveness. From this, she acquiesced that a regime must expand its army as much as possible in order to survive; And if Zhuge Liang really wants to help the Han Dynasty, he should also invest as many troops as possible. Under such a wrong presupposition, she consulted scattered historical materials and selected materials beneficial to her argument, forming the main pattern above.

After reading Professor Lu's article, I am actually a little scared: historians can still draw some completely wrong conclusions after carefully combing the historical materials-and the reason may be the lack of knowledge of other social sciences. We don't know what kind of knowledge we need, and we don't know that we don't have any common sense ... In other words, when we see other scholars make mistakes, we still have more reverence for history and less ridicule for others.

2

Let's start with the idea of three households and one soldier. Old Tang books, under literate Sect;

Changqing accounted for 3.35 million, and the number of soldiers was about 990,000, that is, one soldier and three households.

This is Wang Yanwei's analysis based on the yuan and the national accounts. What he said is: in fact, only 3.35 million households are registered in tax, so they can be taxed; Theoretically, the state should support 990,000 soldiers. Countdown, three taxpayers raise one soldier. The implication is that the central government has too few accounts and too many soldiers, which is a big problem. On the other hand, in extreme cases, it is not impossible for three households to correspond to one soldier.

We can also look at it from another angle: can the taxes of three families really afford a soldier? The data under the two taxes are more complicated, so we go back to the early Tang Dynasty. Under the tenancy system, each ding has to pay: rent 2 stone, silk 2 Zhang, cotton 3 Liang (omitted). Assuming that there are only two households, under the rent-and-pay system, the state can get from three households every year:

Rent 12 stone, silk 12 sheets and cotton 18.

Mr. Zhang Guogang used the standard of military resources in the book "The Enemy of the Magical Machine is Too White and Silent", in which the per capita annual expenditure is:

Millet 12 stone, silk 48 feet.

In fact, on average, each household always has more than two dices. The shortage of silk is made up by extra millet and cotton. Of course, this is rough, but on the whole, it seems sustainable to raise 1 soldier with the tax of three families-although it may be on the verge of mutiny.

Of course, the actual war needs not only soldiers, but also a lot of investment in food transportation, equipment production and condolences to the casualties. In addition to raising soldiers, the state has many other expenses, such as the daily expenses of the royal family, the salaries of officials, etiquette, diplomacy and so on. At this time, in theory, the government can use the barracks to let the soldiers create some value. But more importantly, the government also has business tax and local contributions. -during the Changqing period, the proportion of three households and one soldier can be maintained. There is also a background: although there are few accounts directly controlled by the central government, based on its authority, there are still a large number of contributions from local secretaries and festivals.

So, will there be a significant difference between the Han Dynasty and the Tang Dynasty? Of course there is a difference. The economy of the Tang Dynasty was much more developed than that of the Han Dynasty. However, while the production level of unit land is improving, the cost of raising soldiers is also increasing. This is because, under normal circumstances, the overall income of soldiers is higher than that of farmers. If this is not the case, or soldiers will flee and become farmers; Or, they will directly plunder farmers by their own force.

Most importantly, it is not an absurd idea that three families serve one soldier, although no regime will really pursue this ratio.

Lu Huayu is an economic historian in Tang Shi. Although she doesn't quote these historical materials of the Tang Dynasty, she is obviously familiar with the discussion behind it. She might think like this: in extreme cases, three families can raise one soldier; At the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty and the Three Kingdoms period, all regimes were struggling for survival, and Shu Han was no exception. So she should be like this in Shuhan. Of course, there is something wrong with this inference, but I think many people who laugh at her know nothing about the economic and historical background behind it.

three

Perhaps some readers vaguely feel that Lu Wen's conclusion goes against common sense, but many people themselves don't know what common sense should be-or, in general, what is the ratio of the number of households to the total number of armed men. Here we will make a scrutiny based on the materials in the latter part (700 to 1200). There is a reason for choosing this time period, so that we can grasp some actual accounts at that time, instead of relying on imaginary numbers concocted in a specific context-so the observation results obtained are more reliable.

We will find that there are great differences in the military system in different periods, such as the hukou held by the government and the social structure. However, under the premise of the general separation of military and civilian, the ratio of registered permanent residence to the number of soldiers is relatively stable, generally fluctuating within the range of 20: 1 to 10: 1.

3. 1 Southern Song Sichuan

First of all, we can find that the territory of Sichuan Fourth Road in the Southern Song Dynasty is basically the same as that of Shu Han-the population of those places where Shu Han flooded is not much:

What was the population of Sichuan No.4 Road in Song Dynasty? Miscellaneous notes of the ruling and opposition parties since the proposal:

60 prefectures in Sichuan, 199 county:

In the second year of Yuanfeng, there were more than 265,438+households.

In the thirty-two years of Shaoxing, there were more than 2.64 million households with 7,565,438+10,000 people. (The average household rate is 30. )

In the second year of Xichun, the number of households exceeded 2.58 million and the population was 7.43 million.