Author: Qin Hui article Source: Network hits: 1647 Update time: 2006- 10- 17.

-several problems in the comparison of the history of Chinese and western public welfare undertakings

The writer is a professor of history in Tsinghua University.

First, the historical model of the development of western public welfare undertakings

Two viewpoints of "the third sector"

If the concept of "the third sector" is defined by its founder t. Levitt and others (Levitt, 1973), that is, it is neither fair nor private, nor the third organization of state institutions or private enterprises, then it should be an ancient phenomenon. Because no matter China or the "West" or any civilized area, the organizational forms of people except the state (government) and enterprises are varied from ancient times to the present. Strictly speaking, "nation state" is regarded as a modern phenomenon in the west. In China, the "state" is precocious, forming a rare bureaucratic system in the pre-modern world, but its organizational development cannot be compared with that of the modern state. The strict definition of "private enterprise" is almost only applicable to the capitalist era. Although its broad sense can be seen in ancient and modern times, it also flourished in modern times. Therefore, logically speaking, the "third sector" defined above should be the older the era, the more "traditional" the society, the more prosperous it will be. Our ancestors (also ancestors of westerners) were more active in various organizations-clans, tribes, country clubs, churches, gangs, guilds and so on. There are more people outside the government and companies than there are today. Even after adding additional conditions (such as organizations that must provide "public goods", etc. ): After all, if there were "public goods" in those days, I'm afraid I couldn't expect yamen and companies to provide them.

However, people usually describe the "third sector" as a modern phenomenon, or even a "postmodern" phenomenon. Some of them mainly associate the growth of the "third sector" with state intervention, the withdrawal of state control and the expansion of civil autonomy and social autonomy, so they attach great importance to its "modernity" meaning or "civil society" meaning-these two words are generally associated with the existing western society called capitalism under this background. This view often directly points out the relationship between the development of the "third sector" and the privatization process and the demise of the welfare state, and regards it as "official substitution", "unplanned (voluntary) cooperation", "institutionalized privatization" and so on. (Kramer [et al], 1993) On the contrary, some people mainly emphasize that the growth of the "third sector" is a denial of the classic principles of "civil society" such as individualism, free competition and private enterprise, and the rise of the "third sector" is related to communitarianism, cooperation, "new socialism", "criticism of modernity" or "postmodernism". This view often regards the non-private (of course not government-run) economy as the main component of the "third sector", from the "workers' autonomy" enterprises in the former Yugoslavia, the Republican movement and Fabian society economy in Spain and Britain, to the Kibbutz commune in Israel, all of which are regarded as examples of the "third sector". Some people have also summed up three types of "the third sector": "cooperative economy", "cooperative elements in mixed economy" and "cooperative interests combined with profit distribution in participatory system". (Clay, 1980)

Obviously, these two "views on the third sector" are quite different, and even antagonistic to some extent. It not only leads to the difference of value judgment, but also leads to the difference of fact judgment, including the judgment of "what is the third sector". Although the "autonomous enterprises" in the former Yugoslavia, mondragon in Spain and Kibbutz in Israel are not privately owned, they are still "enterprises", and the "departments" that do not necessarily pursue profit maximization but absolutely have the purpose of legal person's economic interests are typical third departments in Clare's eyes, but in Kramer's view, they may not belong to the category of the third department at all. We can call it the third sector view of the new left and the new right respectively, or the third sector view of "non-individualism" and "non-nationalism". Marilyn Taylor believes that these are two completely different ways to provide public goods: as far as the main providers of public welfare are concerned, the new left (called "welfare pluralism" in the book) expects the "voluntary sector", while the new right expects the "profit sector that establishes a social security network for the voluntary sector". As far as the source of funds is concerned, the former expects the government, while the latter expects private sources. In terms of rules, the former advocates that the government and the voluntary sector are the rules of "intermediary structure", while the latter advocates that individuals conduct transactions according to market rules. Of course, what is different from the two is the traditional welfare state model, which only expects the government in three aspects. (Gidron [et al], 1992: 150)

It can be seen that the "third sector" that people are talking about today has the roots of the times (modern or "post-modern") and the roots of the structure (between the government and enterprises, or more essentially, between the state and individuals). It is the result of the dual structure of China family and civil society (that is, individualism or individual-oriented society) in the process of modernization. It is as an intermediary organization in this dual structure and trying to treat the symptoms of dual tension in modern society that the third sector will have two directions: non-nationalism and non-individualism, modernity and post-modernism.

From "* * * the same body" public welfare to "country+market" public welfare

In the traditional west before modern times, this dual model did not exist. F Toennies, one of the founders of modern German sociology, once pointed out that "* * * identity" and "society" are two combined types of human group life. There is no "society" in pre-modern traditional civilization, only "isomorphism". * * Isomorphism is a collective bond of blood, geography or religion formed naturally based on habitual coercion. It is not the sum of the individual will of its members, but an organic whole, which is a kind of "unity of the people's will". Only in the process of modernization, on the one hand, the development of communication has broken through the narrow boundaries of the same subject and developed a wide range of public life (regional or national), on the other hand, people's personality and individual rights have been developed, thus forming a "society." Tonnis believes that * * * is the product of natural customs, and society is a "purposeful union" formed by rational people on the basis of agreement. * * * Homotopy is the overall standard, and society is the individual standard. "Society is based on individuals and their thoughts and will". Homomorphism is a relatively narrow group, and the society is as big as a nation-state, thus forming a dual structure of "society" and "country". Homomorphism is ancient, but society is new. (Tonnis, 1999)

Tonnis's analysis, I think, is generally in line with the reality of western social history. In this process, since the dual structure of state and society (individual-oriented civil society) is the product of modernization, the "third" department outside (or between) the dual structure can only be the product of modernization. In the traditional era of "* * *", since there is no "two" yuan of nation-state and civil society, there will certainly be no "third" department. Therefore, although there are organizations other than the government and companies in the western traditional era (that is, "the same body") and "public goods" provided by them, that is, traditional public welfare and charity, the modern third sector is not its successor. The researchers of "the history of the third sector" seldom discuss its "historical roots" when discussing the era and social roots of the development of the contemporary third sector.

Contemporary historiography has accumulated rich research results on the history of pre-modern public welfare, charity or "social work" in the West (even Japan, India and other countries). For example, J.B. Schniewind's Study on the Evolutionary History of Western Philanthropy and Relief Consciousness (Schneewind, 1996), and A. E.C McCants's 17- 18 th Century Discussion on Citizen Charity Organizations and Orphan Relief in Amsterdam, the Netherlands (McCants, 1997), M. Dauton et al. (Dauton, 1996), w. k. ior from these studies, we can see that in the traditional era before modern western times, charitable undertakings were not only backward in technology (the scope of activities was narrow, mainly limited to rescuing orphans, delivering medicines, etc.). ), but also has obvious characteristics in ideology and social organization: conceptually, charity relies too much on religious consciousness and is regarded as one-way "giving", so the concept of "public goods" cannot be formed. (Schneewind, 1996) Activities are confined to small groups, and are often brought into the traditional bondage-protection relationship of the same body, forming a personal attachment bond between the giver and the receiver. For example, in Turin in the16th century, there is a clear connection between charity and power, and the purpose of donors to establish free hospitals is often to use them as a bridge to the status of rulers. Innocenti, the most famous charity in Florence during the Renaissance, was directly sheltered by the Pope. Although it was also supported by church donations, the pledge at that time was an obligation to the church, not "voluntary".

The traditional public welfare activities of many other nationalities outside Western Europe also have obvious "* * * identity" nature, and the bond of bondage-protection rather than voluntary cooperation becomes the basis of these activities. For example, the traditional Russian Mill Commune not only has economic functions such as public land, periodic redistribution, labor combination and environmental protection, but also has developed community public welfare functions. The mill has specially reserved "* * * cultivated land", and its harvest is used as public welfare fund (that is, the labor of each family on * * * cultivated land is equivalent to public welfare donation), such as subsidies for the elderly, the sick and the disabled, the employment of doctors at public expense, craftsmen and herders, and the expenses of holiday celebration equipment. , can bear (figure, 1986). Villages and towns in traditional Japan and villages and communities in India have similar public welfare functions. (Yoshida 91,1994; Wadia, 1968).

However, after entering the modernization process, the traditional identity tends to disintegrate, and people lose their traditional protection while getting rid of the traditional shackles, including a considerable number of "public goods" originally provided by the traditional identity. Therefore, people in many countries "enjoy" two kinds of freedom when they become free citizens from "appendages of the same body": freedom from bondage and freedom from protection. Part of the traditional public welfare functions are undertaken by emerging state machines, and part of them become market transactions, which are provided by profit-making departments instead. As for the problem of "hitchhiking" in the supply and demand of public goods, it will not attract much attention during this period. The reason is very simple: in the transition from the traditional identity-based era to the individual-based civil society, due to the existence of old barriers such as identity, rank, privilege and identity, the fields of "market failure" abound, and the "failure" caused by "hitchhiking" can easily be covered up. Only when the fetters of the old times no longer exist, the freedom of trading is fully developed, and the social and economic mechanism is as close to the "complete market" as possible, those "failures" that are not caused by the interference of non-market forces, but by the inherent defects of market logic itself will be highlighted. Similarly, when the function of "nation-state" has taken shape and the power of government intervention has not been fully exerted, it is difficult to highlight the problem of "government failure". Until the second world war, this was indeed the case. At that time, "nationalism" and marketism were on the rise. From19th century, disraeli, England and Bismarck, Germany respectively established the embryonic form of welfare state (namely "emperor-king national socialism", "conservative welfare state" and "paternalistic Tory socialism"), the New Deal of the United States in the 20th century, the welfare system of the Nordic Socialist Party, the Labour Party socialism of Lloyd George and MacDonald, and the corporate body of Germany and Italy fascism. Until Stalin's socialism, the left (socialist party), right (conservative party), extreme left (* * * production party) and extreme right (fascism) in Europe and America all introduced the system design of providing "public goods" by the state. On the other hand, the traditional public welfare is declining. For example, the traditional community donation fund and church charity fund in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, were still in the "golden age" in the17th century. However, due to the rise of capitalism in the18th century, "fiscal conservatism and cultural generosity" appeared in civil society, and the relationship between "friend politics and money" became increasingly obvious. Traditional charitable fund system, (McCants, 1997) In Britain, Tzu Chi clinics and pharmacies originally run by churches were mostly secularized in the18th century and supported by secular governments and enterprises. At that time, this kind of medical public welfare in York, Leeds, Hull, Sheffield and other places was still guild-like, and in the19th century, this guild-like nature tended to disappear. For example, in the textile Tzu Chi clinic in hadfield, 57% of the patients in 184 1 were textile employees, but by 187 1, the proportion dropped to 22%; However, while the clinic transcends the guild and opens to the society, charity is gradually replaced by commerce. (Barry and Jones,1991:149-169)19th century, French traditional community mutual aid associations developed rapidly after getting rid of the colors of country clubs, guilds and churches, with the number ranging from1. But at the same time, its charity color has also greatly declined. By 19 10, the total income of such associations reached 62.98 million francs, but only11890,000 francs, that is, 18.8% came from donations, bequests and voluntary contributions from members; In addition,11720,000 (18. 6%) from government grants, 39.36 million (62.5%) from self-benefiting membership fees or membership fees-and this part of the members, using members' funds as membership conditions, is actually a transaction. (ibid., 172- 186).

In short, under the background of social modernization in Europe and America, the homogeneous foundation of public welfare undertakings is gradually replaced by the foundation of state+market (or government+"society" and state+individual). As the researchers pointed out, the characteristics of non-profit organizations in this period are that "non-institutional free donations have little effect, and most organizations are under the supervision of the government". During the period of 1882- 1902, the number of "approved" non-profit organizations in France increased by 1 10,000, while the number of "free" non-profit organizations only increased by 1 10,000. The reason is simple: state funds can only be used under the control of the government. Without state support, few organizations can make ends meet. Therefore, it is not "abnormal" to get income from the state and private (market). The "mutual aid" public welfare practice in this period is actually a prelude to the post-war welfare state system, which "makes people involuntarily choose a path between liberalism and nationalism". (ditto: 184- 185)

Scholars in the past have expressed many views on the evolution of traditional public welfare to modern public welfare in western history, such as "the transition from church charity to secular control" (Weaver, 1967: 14) and "the transition from paternalistic welfare form to professional management and insurance-financing system" (Barry and Jones,196544). 190), from "charity helps individuals" to "charity as social responsibility", "charity as moral responsibility", and finally to "charity in welfare countries" (Alvy, 1995), from "approximation principle" to "rational evangelism" (ibid.; 26) and so on. But fundamentally speaking, the author believes that the essence of this change lies in the dual worship of the country and the market caused by the "same body failure". Western modern public welfare is formed on this basis.

From "State+Market" Public Welfare to the Third Sector: Negation of Negation?

The formation of modern public welfare mode has brought about a series of changes:

The first is the change of traditional charity concept. The word "harity" in Spanish is now interpreted as "benevolence", "love for Christ" and "love for all living beings and love for God", with a strong religious (Christian) color. But in fact, it was popular before the era of classical civilization in BC. In early Latin (caritas) and Greek (charis), it first means a precious feeling and noble behavior, which is associated with kindness and gratitude. However, whether in ancient Greece or Rome, this word has never been used to express the good relationship within a family (family), but only to express a person's kindness to people outside his family (family). It can be seen that charity at this time, although including the recipient's dependence on the giver, also embodies an intention to break through the limitations of interpersonal relationships naturally formed by the same body. (Weaver: 6) At this time, the famous "Cy-Presism" appeared in the history of western public welfare: this principle holds that when the direct aid goal of the donor cannot be achieved, the powerful organizer can take what he has done for himself and use it for "other purposes similar to the original intention of the donor". (Alvy; 8) This opens the way for the development of charitable trust funds. However, in the19th century, the charity concept associated with gratitude was increasingly rejected by two aspects: for the weak, their "democratic expectation of benefit" made "charity" like "insult to the poor" (Barry and Jones,1991:/kloc-0. For the strong, "rational evangelism" has also caused a "Victorian aversion" to the so-called disappointing people; And tend to be "more selective and friendly to the beneficiaries", as the British scholar Andre Reid said, "It does not intend to help the prodigal son, the prodigal son or the pure poor who are not worthy of help. The land law gave them enough. It only intends to help those who are willing to help themselves: like others, they have no providence to block their way with irresistible sudden disasters. " The new brotherhood should help people: "They can't beg, because they are used to working, they refuse poverty, because they pursue independence for a better life". (Alvy, 1995:26)

Because this "evangelism" refused to help the so-called "self-poor" rather than the truly "self-poor" unfortunate people (such as the disabled and orphans), and believed that this should be the responsibility of the countries with increasingly developed functions at that time, the private donation trust fund (charity fund) that rose in the19th century gradually withdrew from the traditional charity field, that is, charity for the special unfortunate people and turned to the public.

The characteristics of modern public welfare are particularly obvious in the relationship with religion. As mentioned earlier, the biggest donor of western philanthropy in the Middle Ages was the church, and it was a tradition at that time that "the church funded social undertakings". However, in the UK16th century, in the Netherlands18th century, and in other western European countries during this period, religious charitable funds showed a decreasing trend. Secular funds established by a large number of private heritages (the product of capitalist accumulation) have replaced it as the pillar of relief cause. (Alvey: 1995: 12, 19) However, with the rise of "rationalist evangelicals", such undertakings as giving medicine to the poor, supporting the elderly and raising orphans are gradually transferred to the state, and folk secular funds pay more attention to the spiritual needs of the public. At the same time, the trend of separation of church and state required by modernization also makes it inconvenient for the state to support the church, and folk secular funds have become a special religion. Christian fraternity, salvation and altruism are still one of the spiritual motivations of western donation, but the church itself has changed from a giver to a major receiver. "Church subsidizes social undertakings" has been replaced by "social undertakings subsidizes churches", which has become a major feature of modern public welfare. This is particularly evident in the United States. In the early 1960s, 80% of public welfare in the United States came from individual donations, and religion accounted for nearly half (49%) of public welfare expenditure, which was the largest end, followed by education (17%), welfare (14%) and medical care (12%). (Weaver, 1967:62-65)

In the important field of traditional charity-medical treatment, the "paternalism" of drug dispensing has gradually become the "rationalism evangelicalism" of medical research funds. It appeared in the Pasteur Institute in France from 65438 to 0888, and was regarded as "a model of medical charity inheritance in the 20th century". In addition to a series of scientific research achievements, this non-profit organization with private investment and voluntary donation is world-famous. Public welfare activities such as diphtheria prevention (65438-0894) were also carried out to provide free medical care for rabies patients. However, its organizers always believe that science is the hope of "eliminating the root causes of poverty and disease" and charity is secondary. It has created a large number of similar institutions, such as the Rockefeller Institute of Medicine in Frankfurt and the Paul Eric Institute. Similarly, the traditional charity poverty alleviation has also developed into efforts to expand employment opportunities with non-governmental public welfare organizations, and the development of the Republican movement is a typical example. (Barry and Jones,1991:195-196)

Another important activity field of modern public welfare is education. With the formation of the dual structure of civil society and nation-state, the "education industry" operated by market rules and the "education undertaking" sponsored by the state go hand in hand, crowding out the * * * education characterized by churches and village communities in the traditional era. However, there is still a big gap between the "education industry" and the government-run "education cause", which needs the third force to fill. This is the result that education has become one of the most important public goods in the industrialized era, so it is in this field that new forms of non-profit organizations appeared earlier. /kloc-At the beginning of the 9th century, the Royal Charity Commission and Broham Commission with thousands of donors appeared in Britain, engaged in educational assistance to schools and students. At that time, a survey showed that more than 465,438+000 schools in Britain were funded, and these schools had 65,438+065,000 students. In other 14300 non-aided schools, there are 3 10000 tuition-paying students and 68000 charity-funded students. The total number of aided students in aided schools and non-aided schools is 334,000, which has exceeded the number of paying students. In addition, there are many subsidized primary schools among non-Anglicans outside the mainstream education system, which were established by war fighters, Jews and Huguenots (Alvy, 1995:28-3 1).

These situations in the fields of education, religion and scientific research show that even in the period of "modernization" when "state+market" is given the highest expectation, there are also non-governmental public welfare forces outside the state and market in the West. It is undoubtedly the pioneer of the contemporary third sector. Undoubtedly, as far as the inheritance of western culture is concerned, it has something to do with pre-modern traditional culture. As Paul Weiderling said, the large-scale participation of Christian humanitarian heritage and commercialism in the early industrial age was "not so much rejected as transformed under the guidance of more modern times". (Barry and Jones, 199 1: 190) However, if we look at the guiding ideology, organizational resources, mobilization methods and behavior rules of spiritual practice, the differences between paternalism and rational evangelism, the same charity organization and public welfare organization, and "church subsidizing society" and "society subsidizing church" are still very obvious. Because of this, from the end of 19 to the beginning of the 20th century, the so-called "end of charity" and "charity failure theory" appeared in the west. As the Nathan Committee, which discussed public welfare in Britain, mentioned in the early 1950s, "One of the most tragic failures in our history is the efforts made by these philanthropists. Especially in the late18th century and19th century, private efforts were made to provide universal services for schools, hospitals, pharmacies, workhouses and orphanages, distribute pensions and help the "poor" in other fields. History has proved that these efforts of the people have come to an end. " Today, the state's statutory services-new or old-now provide personal benefits from cradle to grave ... The basic question that puzzles the Committee is: What else can charities do? "

However, Dana, the chairman of the Committee, a famous British lawyer and parliamentary jurist, believes that the end of the old charity means the rise of new voluntary action. Interestingly, he did not emphasize "market failure" and "state failure" when demonstrating this point, but only discussed the combination of voluntary action and the two. He believes that the view that voluntary service and state service are mutually exclusive is outdated, and there is no obvious boundary between them: "Historically, (democratic) state behavior is the crystallization and popularization of voluntary behavior", "As we all know, it is difficult for democratic countries to operate effectively without the cooperation of voluntary service channels". The welfare state system should be supplemented by voluntary efforts, not only because voluntary organizations as non-governmental forces can act as pressure groups to "stimulate, restrain and criticize" the state, but more importantly, they can help the state: "Unlike government agencies, the voluntary sector has the freedom to conduct experiments and become pioneers, and if such pioneers are proved to be beneficial, the state can continue to do so." In contrast, although the profit-making sector also has "freedom to experiment", the purpose of its experiment is to produce private goods, so even if the experiment is successful, the country cannot "continue to do it". On the other hand, because the voluntary sector is not mandatory, if its experiment fails, it will not cause serious consequences, while if the country engages in "experiments" at will, it will lead to disaster.

In other words, the voluntary sector will become a "beneficial and harmless utopia" at best, and it will be terrible if the country engages in utopia-China people who have experienced this kind of experience should know better than Canadians-which is to affirm the voluntary sector from the perspective of "negative freedom". Voluntary action from the perspective of "positive freedom" is certainly more worthy of recognition. Because this concept of freedom not only talks about "what you have the right to do" but also "what you should do", it is obviously "what you should do" for volunteers to be altruistic and serve the public.

It can be seen that the voluntary sector in the eyes of Dana Committee is based on liberalism (which can also be said to be social democracy in the sense of "positive freedom"), and it is based on the premise that (democratic) countries are effective and markets are effective, that is, (democratic) nationalism and individualism are first, and then its non-nationalism and non-individualism are reflected at a higher level, and it is fully utilized to make up for "national failure". Only on this basis can society "find a way to make the good intentions of the past serve the new needs that have changed now more freely". (Alf, 1995:38)

Therefore, the voluntary sector or the third sector in the modern west is developed within the civil society. Whether its innovative experiment successfully opened the door to "postmodernism" or turned it into a "beneficial and harmless utopia", it was completely different from the traditional charity of the former civil society. Only under the logic of "negation of negation", some characteristics of traditional charity sometimes "revert", such as "approximation principle" has now become the general rule of voluntary donation trust funds. Relying on this principle, the individual wishes of scattered donors can be respected, and these donations can be integrated into a unified funding intention to serve the greater social goals. This principle, which appeared in ancient Rome, was strictly restricted in the era of "rational preaching", because in that era, freedom of will and respect for the specific choices of donors were emphasized. However, after the war, the development of the third sector and public welfare undertakings increasingly requires breaking through the limitations of the scattered will of donors, and the applicability of the "approximation principle" is expanding. For example, Benjamin Franklin, the most important public welfare donor and great politician in the early days of the United States, established one of the earliest public welfare organizations in North America (officially named American Charity Association) on 1743, with the legacy donated by Franklin as the principal, and Fourier's initial funding targets were "married young inventors with good reputation" in Boston and Philadelphia. However, in 1962, the Franklin Foundation finally obtained legal permission. Under the principle of cy pres, the money originally designed for young inventors was used to support medical students and hospital staff. Prior to this, part of the fund has been used to support the establishment of Franklin College. (Weaver, 1967:2 1-22)

The "principle of approximation" gives non-governmental organizations the right to effectively mobilize voluntary donation resources for various public welfare goals that were not envisaged in advance under changing social conditions, which obviously expands the energy of the voluntary sector. It can be said that without this principle, there would be no development of the third sector today. It is in this sense that the Tan Dan Committee once argued that if voluntary public welfare should be encouraged, charitable trust funds must be given "their ancient privileges" (see cy pres et al. (Alvy, 1995:38) But this "ancient privilege" is the result of the second innovation under the conditions of civil society, that is, "negation of negation", which is no longer a simple continuation of "tradition".

Second, the historical model of the development of public welfare undertakings in China

* * * homomorphism, society and big * * * homomorphism.

As mentioned above, the vertical dichotomy of * * * isomorphism-(individual-oriented) society and the horizontal dichotomy of nation-state-civil society are effective models to explain the changes of western society. Therefore, the transformation from traditional public welfare to modern public welfare of state+society (individuals, markets, etc.) has become the main line of the development of western public welfare undertakings. ), and then develop the third sector from outside the country and market. However, the situation in China is completely different. As the author once demonstrated (Qin Hui, 1998-9), the traditional China society since Qin and Han Dynasties is not a "society" based on individuals as Tonnis said, but a small * * * isomorphism of geography, blood relationship and so on, which is not as developed as the Western Middle Ages. In the ancient autocratic centralized state of China, the individual families of countless small farmers were directly subordinate to the imperial power and its subordinate power organization (official power) as "compiling households and merging people". In this structure, a small body can't reach the standard position, but this doesn't mean the growth of citizens' personal freedom and rights. On the contrary, it is a precocious centralized country that is under the strong control of the big body, which makes the growth of the small body rights impossible, let alone the growth of individual rights. Therefore, at the micro level, due to the lack of strong small isomorphic ties, traditional China presents a state of "pseudo-individualism", which is similar to the situation after the traditional isomorphic body was dissolved by the individual-based western modernization process, and there can be no extensive horizontal dependence between "compiling households" and "combining people" (such as the dependence seen in villages, manors, parishes, guilds and clans in the Middle Ages in the West). But this fragmented "freedom" is based on some macro-level "universal slavery". (Du, 1990)

In other words, the traditional China society (this "society" is in a broad sense, which is different from Tonnis's "society" based on individuals)? /ca & gt；