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What version of game theory does Peking University use?
Game theory course

Yue Chang monarch trial, edited by Shen Qi.

Game theory course

Wang Zeke and Li Jie, Renmin University of China Press.

Chapter 1 What is Game Theory?

Section 1 Basic Concepts of Game Theory

Section 2 Typical Models of Game Theory

Section 3 Classification and Elements of Games

The fourth quarter the emergence and development of game theory

Section 5 Game Theory and Economy

Chapter II Static Game with Complete Information

Section 1 Static Game and Dominant Strategy Equilibrium

Nash equilibrium in the second quarter

Section 3 Application of Nash Equilibrium

The fourth quarter mixed strategy Nash equilibrium

Section 5 Existence of Nash Equilibrium

Section 6 Multiple Nash Equilibrium and Its Choice

The third chapter is the perfect information dynamic game.

Part I: Extended representation of dynamic games.

The second quarter backward induction

In the third quarter, sub-game and sub-game refine Nash equilibrium

The fourth quarter dynamic game model

Section 5 simultaneous selection behavior in dynamic game

Limitation of backward induction and balance of handshake

Chapter IV Repeated Game

The first section is the basic theory of repeated games

In the second quarter, finite repeated games

Section 3 Infinitely Repeated Game

Chapter V Static Game with Incomplete Information

The first section Bayesian Nash equilibrium

Section 2 Bayesian Game and Mixed Strategy Equilibrium

Section III Auction Theory

Section IV Mechanism Design Theory and Presentation Principles

Chapter VI Dynamic Game with Incomplete Information

Section 1 Representation of Dynamic Game with Incomplete Information

Refined Bayesian Equilibrium in the Second Section

The third quarter lemon game mode

Section 4 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

Chapter VII Dynamic Game with Incomplete Information

Section 1 Hasani Transformation of Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information

The game of empty promises in the second quarter

The third quarter signal game

The fourth quarter negotiation game under incomplete information

Section V Reputation Model in Prisoner's Dilemma with Limited Repetition

Section VI Comparative Analysis of Four Concepts of Equilibrium

Chapter VIII Static Cooperative Game

Section 1 Basic concepts of cooperative game

Section 2 Core and Stable Sets

Section 3 shapley value and its application

Section 4 Negotiation Set, Kernel and Nucleus

Chapter 9 Dynamic Cooperative Game

The first section differential cooperative game between two people

Multi-player dynamic cooperative game in the second quarter

Chapter 10 Evolutionary Game Theory

Section 1 bounded rationality and evolutionary game theory

Two examples of evolutionary game in the second quarter

In the third quarter, evolutionary stability strategy

The fourth quarter imitator dynamic model

Section 5 Personal learning mechanism