The main content of Professor Moran's report is to trace the development history of the concept of empathy, especially the discussion of it by classical phenomenologists. In the lecture, Professor Moran introduced to Lips, Husserl, Scheler and Stein in phenomenological philosophy the relevant thoughts of philosophers who first discussed empathy from Hume and Adam Smith.
Professor Moran first introduced the theme from several different levels of consciousness mentioned in the previous lecture. He pointed out that time consciousness is the lowest level of experience flow, and all levels, including self, are built on this basis; The apperception mentioned in the second lecture is the possibility of connecting different senses such as vision and touch, which constitutes the synthesis of multimodal perception, thus opening up the experience of objects and space. If the structure of the object is re-recognized through repeated recognition, then the next step involves how we can enter the world of sharing experience, that is, the world with other subjects. The theme of Professor Moran's lecture is the movement from one's own experience to the experience of others, that is, Einfühlung's "empathy"-a special concept from German psychology.
Empathy is very important to human life. It can help us understand the feelings and emotions of other subjects, and it is the basis of our concern for others. For example, doctors must empathize with patients. Professor Moran distinguishes two different concepts in English: empathy means that I don't have to feel the same way as others, while sympathy means that I feel the same way as others. Judging from the Greek etymology of these two words, the former emphasizes "feeling and … shoulder to shoulder", while the latter emphasizes that feeling is integrated with each other.
Professor Moran pointed out that the research theme of empathy has been restored today, but in the past many years, empathy has been ignored by the scientific community, especially behavioral psychology. They advocate studying external reactions and ignoring people's internal activities. However, since the 1960s, due to the development of cognitive science, the research and discussion on empathy have been resumed. Professor Moran mentioned a British psychologist named Simon Barron-Cohen, who did a lot of research related to the threshold of autism. The typical symptom of this kind of people is that they can't understand the feelings of others or understand the social situation well. Even at the scene of the death of their loved ones, they can't feel the sadness of the people around them. Research on people with autism shows the complexity of empathy. As Melo-Ponty pointed out, the best way to do phenomenology is to look at what people who are sick or have impaired normal function lack in their lives. The study of autism threshold is also based on the same idea.
In the field of phenomenology, Lips, Husserl, Scheler and Stein all contributed to the study of empathy. Husserl and other phenomenologists emphasize that empathy should not be understood as some kind of inference or reasoning process, in which we directly capture the feelings of others; Secondly, phenomenology emphasizes that empathy is not an imitation, not a reflection of others' feelings, and imitation is just a specific way of understanding. Therefore, phenomenologists will think that empathy is a direct and immediate perception of the feelings of others. As Melo-Ponty pointed out in the book Symbol, the consciousness at the moment when I shake hands with others, just as I feel my own body, involves a kind of intersubjectivity, and this consciousness between bodies constitutes the basis of empathy.
Professor Moran went on to talk about the origin of the word "empathy". In fact, empathy, the German word Einfühlung, was a new word invented by Theodore Lipps at the end of 19. Although there are obvious differences between empathy and sympathy in meaning, the description related to empathy initially appeared in the form of "sympathy". For example, in Hume's view, sympathy is interpreted as an impression/idea, and Hume emphasizes that the investigation of this phenomenon "must be traced back to its first principle", which is essentially consistent with Husserl's method. Adam Smith, another Scottish philosopher in Hume's time, tried to build a sense of morality on the basis of sympathy. According to Adam Smith, our sympathy for other people's experiences is based on our ability to recognize other people's emotions. Professor Moran believes that even the worst hooligans or criminals have this ability to sympathize with others. Professor Moran pointed out that Adam Smith agrees with Scheler on this point. Both of them believe that sympathy or empathy is not only a basic ability unique to a moral person, so Scheler opposes empathy as the basis of morality. Adam Smith's explanation of sympathy belongs to the category of "imitation" mentioned above. He took the performance of the audience when watching the tightrope performance as an example: the phenomenon that the audience will subconsciously sway with the tightrope walker shows that we are imitating the behavior or emotions of others, and this imitation may be because we imagine the possible emotions of others, and this imagination can only be realized from our own feelings. Professor Moran pointed out that this is a very common explanation of empathy or sympathy, that is, we think that we are feeling or thinking from the perspective of others through imitation, and then grasp the feelings of others. However, phenomenologists will think that although this imitation may constitute a specific way to perceive others, it does not mean true empathy, nor can it explain the possibility of empathy. Adam Smith's imagination theory will also be criticized by phenomenologists, because this imagination does not mean that I understand the feelings of others, and what I experience in this imagination is still only my own feelings.
Professor Moran then introduced Lips' explanation of empathy. In Lips era, psychology and phenomenology were unified, so Lips was both a philosopher and a psychologist. Lips' explanation is similar to Adam Smith's point of view to some extent. Lips also believes that imitation is the basis of empathy. He thinks empathy is a kind of higher-order perception, which he calls apperception. When we see the "expression" of other people's bodies, this apperception enables us to see other people's emotions at the same time. However, Husserl, Scheler, Stein and others criticized Lips' point of view, pointing out that this perception of others based on imitation does not constitute real empathy, but only triggers the reaction, which Scheler called "emotional contagion".
Professor Moran then introduced Husserl's explanation of empathy. Husserl's exposition of empathy can be traced back to the lectures around 1905, but we didn't see the written content until Descartes' Meditation. Husserl has not only read Lips' related treatises, but also been exposed to Dilthey's treatises on empathy. Dilthey believes that empathy is a part of the methodology of "Verstehen". However, compared with Einfühlung, Dilthey uses the word mitgeüHL more, which means "empathy" and emphasizes thinking from the perspective of others.
Then Professor Moran introduced Scheler's theory of empathy. Scheler believes that sympathy is a direct grasp of the feelings of others, not based on imagination or imitation. Scheler distinguishes between "infection" and synaesthesia, and denies that the essence of synaesthesia is a kind of identity; He believes that for children, it may be an emotion of self-identity, while for adults, it is a kind of empathy in a strict sense. Scheler, like Adam Smith, refuted the view that morality is the basis of empathy, and pointed out that even a villain like a criminal might have such a good sense of loyalty. Scheler also pointed out that empathy will not make my feelings conquer or overwhelm others' feelings, nor will I project my feelings on others. Wittgenstein once expressed similar views with Scheler. He also believes that our perception of other people's minds is not an inference, but a direct grasp of the present.
Professor Moran then introduced the difference between Husserl's phenomenological tradition and others' experience. Husserl compared my earlier self-experience with others' experience: when I recall my childhood, I was actually engaged in an activity similar to empathy, because I was not the original person, so I had to grasp my feelings at that time through memories. But Husserl distinguishes this kind of similar empathy memory from real empathy, and emphasizes that I must have direct contact with others face to face, and I must experience this other person as another self or a person like me. Husserl emphasized that I don't construct my affairs and my world first, and then grasp another self through empathy. I have a common relationship with others, so the perception of others is an important step in building the external world. Husserl pointed out that empathy created the first real transcendence: when I hold others as the first person subject different from me, I have the first real experience of others. Although many people criticize Husserl for always starting from a Cartesian "self-thinking" or self-experience, we can see that Husserl actually holds a very complicated understanding of his relationship. My grasp of others is not entirely based on my own experience, but on others, so we can say that the concept of "self" does not originate from me, but from others. Husserl, like Scheler and others, thinks that empathy is not based on an inference. He emphasized that my understanding of others is not based on an assumption like my own memory, so empathy is a kind of "non-primitive" experience (nicht origin? R) experience. In addition, Husserl also emphasized that empathy is based on the living body: I realized that there is a parallel structure between me and other people's bodies, and the two bodies work in harmony as two systems. The concept of "Paron" mentioned by Husserl in Descartes' Meditation emphasizes the one-to-one connection between me and other people's bodies. This also involves his "passing" (? Bertragung) concept, for example, I feel the same object with others. Although I can imagine that we feel similar touch, I can't feel the original feeling of others on this object, so Husserl described this feeling of "transmission" as empty.
On this basis, Professor Moran turned to the explanation of Stein's empathy. Edith Stein, as one of Husserl's students, was an outstanding German female philosopher in the early 20th century. Her research made empathy a traditional topic closely related to phenomenological groups. Stein emphasized that empathy is a unique direct perception. In empathy, I perceive that others are real, that is, "here and now". Another important point of Stan's view is that she emphasizes that empathy not only means understanding other people's experiences, but also means holding others as subjects: I perceive someone's anger, but I will not stay in the perception of this anger, I will directly feel the impact of anger on this person, so the focus of empathy is not the emotions of others, but the subject itself. According to Lips, Stein also noticed the relationship between empathy and memory and expectation. She pointed out that when I experience empathy for someone, the experience of empathy is in others rather than me, so it is different from our own experience of expectation, and empathy involves two different subjects. Professor Moran gave an example to illustrate Stein's thought: the mother of a pair of twins died, and both children expressed their grief over the death of their mother, but when they observed each other, they would find that their grief was different from each other. Therefore, even if the object of emotion-the same mother of twins-is the same, the subject holding emotion is also two different subjects. Stan describes this difference as the difference between "primitive" and "non-primitive" experiences, and she thinks that empathy experience is the non-primitive experience of another person's original experience.
Finally, Professor Moran mentioned the discovery of mirror neurons in neuroscience. The researchers connected electrodes to the brains of macaques to test the stimuli they received. They found that when one macaque observed the movements of another macaque, the same part of its brain as that of a moving macaque was activated. Some scientific research like this has revived the following series of questions: What happens to our brains when we engage in empathy activities? Do two different brains perform similar activities in parallel? Therefore, the problem returns to the discussion of sympathy in phenomenology. We can easily find that relying solely on the discovery of brain science is not an effective way to solve the problem of empathy, and we must clearly describe the phenomenon of empathy itself. If there is really a transcendental condition that makes empathy possible, then this condition will help to clarify our scientific findings.
July, 2065438 1 day, Sun Yat-sen University, lecture on the core concepts of phenomenology in Hetian philosophy series. Professor Mott Moran's topic is "Empathy and Understanding of Others".
Question and answer session
Q: Hello, Professor Moran. Thank you very much for your wonderful speech. My question is about Husserl's statement that there is a stone in an environment without human beings or creatures, and a possible observer can observe it. This observer is also someone else, but there is no empathy in this case. My question is: What role does empathy play in the field of subjective problems?
Moran: First of all, this question involves my next class, because the next topic is intersubjectivity and the transition from empathy to intersubjectivity. It should be pointed out that for Husserl, empathy is a direct perception of the experience of others present at the moment, which is neither memory nor imagination. At the same time, Husserl pointed out in the fifth meditation of Descartes that it involves an ideological process from grasping others as a self, to perceiving that this is a self different from mine, and then rising to a universal self. Once we understand the universal meaning of self, we will realize all the possibilities related to self, including the possibility of a neutral observer, such as some observations in scientific research. When we observe an antique, even if we know that its history can be traced back to thousands of years or thousands of years ago, we can only start from now, because it presents me with the present side, so we can't ignore the basis of this intersubjectivity, even if it doesn't constitute all intersubjectivity.
Q: Hello, Professor. What I want to ask is: Is there any crucial difference between human empathy and animal empathy? Because sometimes we feel the same way and even sympathize with animals, but many times we misunderstand the real situation of animals. But the same mistake rarely happens in empathy between people, so how should we distinguish the two?
Moran: My answer to the first question just now has something to do with this question, because Husserl really believes that empathy is not only related to human beings, but also to our relationship with animals and even inanimate objects, such as symbols. When we see a gesture indicating a certain direction, we will understand its meaning, and this process is realized through empathy. Similarly, when it comes to animals, such as behavioral psychology, we don't want to talk about empathy to avoid anthropomorphic descriptions. For example, people are used to thinking that wagging a dog's tail reflects the dog's happiness, but in fact, wagging a dog's tail is pure excitement, even when it is ready to bite. But this kind of mistake rarely happens when people understand people, because people have a common horizon, so it is necessary to include the life world when we interpret the direct grasp of an object. We need less knowledge of the life world when facing people, but we must have more knowledge when interpreting animal behavior. After all, animals also have some deceptive behaviors, which involve a higher level of initiative. So empathy is not a simple perception, but involves many complicated situations. I can't impose my knowledge on the object, but I must understand the complex context related to the object's behavior.
Q: Hello, Professor Moran. Thank you very much for your wonderful speech. I have a question for you, that is, Husserl's related thoughts seem to involve such a cycle: on the one hand, Husserl emphasizes that we can't say that there are others, and then form empathy on this basis; On the other hand, he pointed out that empathy is the result of my co-construction with others, so this "commonality" presupposes me and others, so Husserl sometimes relies on the concept of empathy in phenomenological thinking of intersubjectivity, and sometimes it seems to be abandoned. Heidegger made it clear on one issue: Empathy must be based on "being in the world" and must be analyzed by existentialism. This is my problem.
Moran: Thank you for asking this difficult question. It points to the core of Husserl's confusion, which is also related to Husserl's transcendental self-concept. As early as Husserl's explanation in the Fifth Meditation, Levinas made the same criticism on Husserl, that is, if I can only understand others as another me and replace others with myself, we will face the real danger of losing the other, which is the basis of Levinas' criticism on Husserl's Totality and Infinity and his early works. Husserl himself is not satisfied with his explanation in Descartes' Meditation, which is why he didn't publish the original German, but only asked Levinas to translate it into French. There is indeed a cycle involved here, that is, my understanding of others only begins with myself. A feasible solution to this problem is to point out that I and others are participants of transcendental self at the same time, which leads to a question: Is transcendental self just a preexisting structure that makes subjectivity possible? Or a concrete thing, that is, everyone has a detached self? Husserl does give people the impression of saying this and that on this issue, which also involves Heidegger's criticism of Husserl Heidegger believes that empathy is an overly subjective expression, and a true expression of shared coexistence can only be based on our transcendental existence. In fact, both Heidegger and Husserl have a point. Husserl's expositions in Descartes' Meditation and Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity are indeed different, but not unrelated. In the former, Husserl's exposition highlights a Descartes style, that is, stripping off all things that are not me. Husserl called this world with only me "my own field", but even in this current consciousness of my own experience, Husserl thought that I had experienced others. When we go to the essence of self, we will see that there are many forms of self, and then realize that these forms are plural representations of transcendental self. In other texts, such as The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl discussed it along another line of thought. He pointed out that there is an interactive subject world, such as language, where people communicate with each other. Language is a system constructed by interactive subjects, which everyone can enter but is not exclusive. This argument is very similar to Heidegger's intersubjectivity, that is, it involves a shared space while maintaining the individual self. So I think there is no final answer to your good question, and you can find corresponding words in both senses. This is a question involving where to start.
Q: Hello, Professor, I have a question here: There was an experiment in psychology. A child lived in the jungle for ten years, and he completely lost the ability to learn human language. So I want to ask whether the formation of empathy in phenomenology must depend on society. Or can you rely entirely on personal experience?
Moran: OK, thank you for your question. I mentioned in my speech just now that even Scheler thinks that what is recognized by children may be the same for adults, so there is a difference between children and adults. This also involves why we don't want children to see some violent scenes on TV, video games and other media, because we are worried that children may not be able to distinguish between reality and fiction. Empathy also has different stages, and we will become more subtle in consciousness and will not be overwhelmed by emotions at once. Therefore, we set up a warning in society, that is, emotional retreat and good at distinguishing, which is a sign of maturity. Many mental patients' changes in childhood will make them lose the ability to perceive other people's emotions, so education and empathy are closely linked. In the field of psychology, such a question is controversial-the more people feel the same way, the better? I think if it is the perfect form of empathy, then the answer to this question will be yes, but excessive empathy may also lead to an extreme passion. This also involves another question, that is, how much sympathy we should allow to enter some public areas. For example, we often subjectively think that some criminals are innocent. Therefore, this is a controversial issue worthy of discussion.
Q: Hello, Professor Moran. Thank you very much for your wonderful speech. My question is: is there a principle of empathy that can help us distinguish whether someone really feels this way or just pretends to? For example, someone is actually very sad, but his happy appearance makes me feel that he is very happy. At this time, how can you judge whether you are wrong in empathy? Because we know that people from different groups and cultural backgrounds are prone to make mistakes when directly perceiving others' feelings, how can their empathy provide citations for their intersubjectivity?
Q: Hello, Professor, the transcendental field you mentioned just now when talking about empathy reminds me of Kierkegaard's thought. He distinguished two different kinds of love, one is the love of preference, that is, the love between me and another self, such as the feelings between me and a friend; The other is Christian love, which involves my relationship with you. When you mention the transcendence of empathy, it involves the transcendence of self, so I wonder if this Christian love provides some foundation for the transcendence of empathy.
Moran: I will answer these two questions together because they are related. I'm glad you mentioned love in the last question, which also involves the standardization of empathy. Many of Scheler's works deal with the nature of love. For him, love is an advanced form of empathy, which is very different from empathy. Scheler believes that all emotions are related to value, and Husserl also thinks so. For example, loyalty means that I cherish the friendship between me and my friends, which is also an exclusive emotion, because people may use it in a negative sense. Scheler believes that love is the highest level of value judgment, because in love we not only understand the feelings of others but also share the value with them, which includes respecting others as independent individuals. Therefore, Scheler pointed out that this is not only a kind of "integration" with others, but also a respect for their differences. This is why we often hope that the other person loves me for who I am, not the person he/she wants me to be. It should be pointed out that Scheler and Husserl have only uncovered a surface, and people have great disputes about related issues, such as whether they can accept unilateral love ... In contemporary philosophy, people have returned to the discussion of value and emotion, for example, Nasbaum distinguished the different nature of anger. It can be seen that it is necessary to judge the empathy relationship between people on the value level, which also involves the question of Christian love just mentioned, that is, whether your love for others is mediated by a sacred love, so that a third party appears in the love relationship, and some such questions are really complicated. Husserl himself did not give many explanations on the issue of love. Even Stein only made relevant comments in her later works, and she had already converted to Christianity, so she deviated from the field of phenomenology and began to study mysticism. If we want to study cross-cultural philosophy in a real sense, we must understand whether there are differences between people such as Buddhist sympathy, Christian love and Marx's camaraderie. What is the difference? These different forms of relationships are interrelated in nature. I don't think we can find a detailed answer to this question in the classic phenomenological works we just mentioned, but what we can provide is a useful methodology.
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Finally, the host Professor Zhu Gang summarized the contents of this lecture. He thanked Professor Moran for his wonderful speech and said that today's speech was very rich and clear. Professor Moran, from Hume, Adam Smith to almost all the major phenomenologists today, has introduced the discussion and thoughts on empathy one by one, which also shows that empathy is an important issue not only for philosophers, but also for each of us, because people are fundamentally a co-existing existence. Today's lecture mainly discusses phenomenological understanding of empathy. Of course, not only from the perspective of phenomenology, but also from other perspectives such as cross-culture, cognitive science and analytical philosophy. Therefore, today's discussion is only the beginning of empathy research. I hope that students who are interested in it can continue to study this issue in depth.