1, the topic is novel. At present, most of the research is about the relationship between equity incentives and corporate performance of all listed companies, and there are few studies on state-owned listed companies alone. However, with the promulgation of the "Two Measures" one after another, equity incentive has entered the field of vision of state-controlled listed companies, and the particularity of state-owned enterprises will determine the particularity of their research. Therefore, this paper will study the effectiveness of equity incentive in the specific micro-background of state-controlled listed companies. To enrich the research in related fields.

2. The novelty of indicators to measure the effectiveness of equity incentives. In the past, almost all researches chose the company performance as the measure of the effectiveness of equity incentive, but the object of equity incentive is the company management, and the performance of management should be measured when evaluating the effectiveness of incentive. At present, most domestic studies do not distinguish between corporate performance and management performance. Considering the particularity of state-owned enterprises, this paper selects management performance as the measure of the effectiveness of equity incentive, and observes the real effect of equity incentive in state-owned enterprises after excluding the influence of market environment, market structure and enterprise resources on enterprise economic performance. It provides an empirical basis for the establishment of long-term and effective incentive system for state-owned enterprises in China.

3. Introduce the theory of relative performance evaluation. This paper systematically expounds the theory of relative performance evaluation, and based on the theory of relative performance evaluation and the characteristics of state-owned enterprises in China, determines the relative performance of state-owned listed companies from three different angles: accounting income, company development and stock income.

4. Use the new model. In the empirical analysis of the effectiveness of equity incentive in China's state-owned listed companies, this paper does not directly use the previous models, but makes a regression comparison of various models to explore the best model, so that the regression results can reflect the relationship between equity incentive ratio and operating performance more truly and accurately, which has direct reference significance for China's state-owned listed companies.

In the research on equity incentive of state-owned listed companies, the author deeply felt the infinite seconds of this research topic. Although the author has done a lot of research and efforts, but because the personal understanding of equity incentives is not deep enough, coupled with personal energy and ability is limited, this paper still has the following shortcomings:

1, limitations of the research object. In this paper, the management equity incentive is only aimed at state-owned listed companies, but the management incentive problem exists not only in state-owned listed companies, but also in a large number of state-owned unlisted companies. Because it is difficult to collect and sort out the relevant data of state-owned unlisted companies, the conclusion of this paper may only be applicable to state-owned listed companies, and its applicability to state-owned unlisted companies needs to be studied, which leads to the lack of application basis for the promotion of research results.

2. Limitations of data selection. Because this paper selects the data after the share-trading reform as the research sample, the time of the share-trading reform in China is very short, and the relevant laws and regulations are not perfect, so there are not many state-owned listed companies that implement equity incentives, resulting in a relatively small sample size.

3. Limitations of index selection. This paper chooses relative performance as the explanatory variable. Due to the difficulty in quantifying non-financial indicators and the particularity of performance evaluation of state-owned enterprises in China, this paper only chooses a single financial indicator when measuring relative performance, and does not build a comprehensive relative performance evaluation system. Secondly, there are many factors that affect the effectiveness of equity incentives. Due to the limitation of the author's knowledge reserve, only some control variables are selected in this study, which may not be considered in detail, which will affect the accuracy of the research results.

4. Limitations of research methods. In this paper, relative performance is chosen as a substitute variable of limited equity incentive, but the development time of relative performance evaluation theory is still short. There are many researches on the theory of relative performance evaluation abroad, but the research in China is still in its infancy. And most of them are used to study the salary of management, and almost no equity incentive is touched. Then the applicability of relative performance evaluation theory to equity incentive needs further testing.

5. Lack of verification. Due to the limitation of data collection and time, whether the performance of state-owned listed companies has changed before and after equity incentive has not been verified in descriptive analysis, which is another deficiency of this paper.