(A) pension insurance liquidity difficulties.
At present, the policy orientation of China's old-age insurance system reform is to gradually transition from pay-as-you-go system to partial accumulation system. However, there is a huge fund gap between the raising and expenditure of old-age insurance funds, which seriously restricts the process of old-age insurance system reform. At present, the gap of provincial endowment insurance accounts for about 2.5%-3% of all provincial fiscal revenue. Old-age insurance is facing serious liquidity difficulties, and local finance has to make up for the current funding gap of old-age insurance with personal account funds (individual contributions plus 7% enterprise contributions) and tax revenue, which leads to the general empty accounts of personal accounts under the reform mode of "integration of unified accounts and accounts". Even so, the endowment insurance fund is still insufficient, and the central government has to allocate funds to solve it in order to maintain local financial and social stability. It can be said that the difficulty of endowment insurance liquidity is the most urgent problem facing the reform of endowment insurance system at present.
(2) The endowment insurance is stable and the labor market is divided.
The difficulty in the mobility of endowment insurance, the widespread false accounts and empty accounts in personal accounts, and the narrow coverage of endowment insurance have caused the solid endowment insurance. Before the reform and opening up, China implemented the all-inclusive pension insurance system for state-owned enterprises. When an employee's job changes, his old-age insurance will be borne by the new enterprise, and the individual employee will not suffer losses due to the job change. Endowment insurance does not constitute an obstacle to labor mobility. With the deepening of reform and opening up, the ownership system is gradually diversified, which requires the marketization of labor force and the rational allocation of factors. However, the old-age insurance system for employees in non-state-owned economy, private enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises has not yet been established, and the old-age insurance for employees in state-owned enterprises cannot flow with the security subject. The old-age insurance has the characteristics of solid state, which makes laid-off employees in state-owned enterprises and institutions reluctant to work in non-state-owned economic sectors. At the same time, because the pension insurance for employees in state-owned enterprises and institutions has not accumulated personal accounts, and the government has not made arrangements for this part of the funds, the labor cost of laid-off workers in state-owned enterprises and institutions is obviously higher than that of migrant workers, and non-state-owned economic sectors prefer to hire migrant workers rather than laid-off workers in state-owned enterprises and institutions. Faced with the increasing contradiction between laid-off workers from state-owned enterprises and institutions and a large number of migrant workers entering cities, the government has to intervene in the labor market. For example, the Beijing municipal government stipulates that the total number of migrant workers in 200 1 should not exceed 950 thousand, with some conditions and cumbersome procedures attached; Guangdong province has also introduced similar measures. Government intervention further distorts the labor market and intensifies market segmentation, which is not conducive to the healthy development of the labor market.
Second, a preliminary analysis of the causes of the problem
(A) the solvency of pension insurance is insufficient.
In the past, China's employee pension insurance was contracted by enterprises, and there was no pension accumulation in employees' personal accounts. However, the goal of the reform of the old-age insurance system determined by the the State Council document is to establish a partially accumulated old-age insurance system that combines unified accounts and make the labor market truly mobile. In the past, the debts owed by state-owned enterprises to employees' pension insurance caused hidden direct liabilities on the government balance sheet, which constituted a huge transformation cost for the government. At present, there is no unified caliber and standard for the statistics of this cost, and the results of various calculations are quite different. However, through various calculations, we can draw a clear conclusion that the transformation cost of China's endowment insurance is very high. For example, according to the estimation of World Bank 1997, the conversion cost of China's endowment insurance is as high as 46% of GDP. However, there is no corresponding assets to balance the government debt of such a scale, which makes the conversion cost of pension insurance reform unresolved, leading to a serious shortage of solvency of government pension insurance debt, which has become a major hidden danger of pension insurance and state-owned enterprise reform.
(2) The proportion of enterprise overall planning and social overall planning in endowment insurance is low, and the financial burden is heavy.
At present, the main ways of raising endowment insurance funds in China are financial raising, enterprise raising and social raising, each accounting for 1/3, and the insufficient part of enterprise raising and social raising is supplemented by finance. However, at present, due to the low compliance rate of enterprise pension insurance (about 90%), the pension raised by enterprises only accounts for 20%-25% of all pensions, and the pension insurance is seriously in arrears. As of June 2000, there were 16 provinces with arrears exceeding 10 billion yuan, and 6 enterprises with arrears exceeding 10 billion yuan. At the same time, the pension insurance money raised by the society only accounts for 15%-20% of the total pension insurance money raised, which leads to the situation that the pension insurance fund relies heavily on financial funds, with the proportion as high as 55%-60%, which seriously aggravates the current local financial difficulties and is an important factor in the formation of local financial risks.
(3) The aging of population and the improvement of dependency ratio.
At present and for a long time to come, China will face the double contradiction of further increase of labor supply and retirement population. With the further deepening of socialist market economy reform and the increase of rural surplus labor supply, the employment problem will prevent the government from adopting the policy of raising retirement age to reduce the scale of pension insurance payment. With the aggravation of population aging, it is estimated that the proportion of the elderly over 60 in China will rise from 9% in 1990 to 22% in 2030. With the increase of (World Bank, 1997) and dependency ratio (retired employees/on-the-job employees), the liquidity difficulties of pension funds faced by China will be more severe.
(D) There are loopholes in the old-age insurance system.
This means that the non-state-owned economy has not yet established employee pension insurance, and the government's policy of expanding the coverage of pension insurance has little effect. For state-owned enterprises, employee pension insurance is jointly established by the government, enterprises and individuals, but for non-state-owned economies, the government has not assumed the responsibility, enterprises have borne all the costs of establishing employee pension insurance, and pension insurance can only be accumulated by enterprises and employees. Under this condition, the cost of establishing endowment insurance for employees in non-state-owned economy is much higher than that of compensating employees through bonuses or bonuses, the motivation of establishing endowment insurance system is seriously weakened, and the problem of narrow coverage of endowment insurance has not been effectively improved.
The management of endowment insurance fund is chaotic and lacks effective legal protection.
At present, the reform of China's old-age insurance system lacks effective legal protection, the collection, distribution and management of old-age insurance funds are chaotic, and the ability of maintaining and increasing the value of old-age insurance funds is very low. The reform of China's old-age insurance system is based on the principle of territoriality, that is, the main body of responsibility for old-age insurance is the local government, which leads to decentralized and inefficient management of old-age insurance funds, low or even negative income of old-age insurance funds, and widespread misappropriation of old-age insurance funds. For example, the yield of pension funds in a province is still lower than the one-year bank deposit rate, and nearly 30% of pension funds are misappropriated. The confusion and inefficiency of fund management have seriously aggravated the liquidity difficulties in the process of pension insurance reform.
Third, improve China's pension insurance system policy recommendations
(1) Raising the cost of pension insurance reform and transformation through multiple channels.
As a government liability, the huge transformation cost brought by the reform of endowment insurance must be balanced with the corresponding government assets or capital gains in the government balance sheet. The state should make a medium-and long-term financial plan, and gradually absorb the transformation cost of the old-age insurance reform within a few years, otherwise, with the aging of the population and the improvement of the dependency ratio, the hidden financial liabilities will increase sharply, threatening the future financial stability and sustainability. According to the successful experience of international pension insurance reform, there are three main financing channels to pay the transformation cost of pension insurance: the transfer of state-owned assets, the collection of new taxes and the issuance of special government bonds.
1. Transfer of state-owned assets. The amount of funds obtained from the transfer of state-owned assets is a function of the scale and quality of state-owned assets, the developed degree of capital market and the absorptive capacity of capital market. For our country, it is not an appropriate policy choice to completely rely on the transfer of state-owned assets to meet the transformation cost of pension insurance reform. (1) The income from the transfer of state-owned assets is limited by the scale and quality of state-owned assets. By the end of 1999, although the total scale of state-owned assets in China reached 4.6 trillion yuan, after deducting the liabilities of state-owned enterprises, the net assets of state-owned enterprises were only1150 billion yuan, and the quality of state-owned assets was low. (2) Limited by the absorptive capacity of the capital market. Although the current savings deposits of residents in China exceed 6 trillion yuan, if there is a large-scale transfer of funds, some small and medium-sized banks and even the four major state-owned banks will have a liquidity crisis and even a solvency crisis, and the policy orientation and intensity of reform will be greatly limited. (3) More importantly, it is limited by the developed degree of the capital market. In order to realize that the state-owned assets will not shrink in the process of transfer and will not cause stock market shocks, a developed and perfect capital market is needed. For our country, it is unrealistic to improve the capital market in a short time.
Even so, the transfer of state-owned assets is still an important financing channel for the transformation cost of China's pension insurance reform. Under the current conditions, in order to achieve this policy goal, we must change the current policy focus, change the current situation of using the capital market as a tool for the country to solve the government's financial difficulties, and do not want the capital market to become a tool to save enterprises, a major means to support enterprise transformation, or a tool for enterprises to carry out permanent financing. The capital market must raise rather than lower the market access standard, establish an effective exit mechanism, change the current situation of low quality of listed companies, appropriately slow down the listing speed of enterprises, and take increasing the reduction of state-owned shares as the policy focus.
The problems and policy suggestions in the reform of the old-age insurance system come from: free paper network in www.paper800.com.
2. While continuing to implement the policy of transferring the increase of 3% of fiscal revenue to the endowment insurance fund, we will levy new taxes or raise the tax rate of some taxes. The government can use the government's coercive power to increase new taxes to balance the transformation cost of the old-age insurance reform, but these taxes should not be the future commitment of the government to the employee's old-age insurance, nor should they be linked to the future interests of taxpayers, but only used to digest and absorb the transformation cost of the old-age insurance, otherwise the hidden direct liabilities of the government will increase sharply and the necessary sources of funds will be lacking. In the choice of taxes, we should adhere to the principle of tax neutrality and mainly choose taxes with progressive characteristics. (1) Levy social security tax. It is an internationally accepted method to levy social security tax to pay endowment insurance, so that all wage earners and employers can become taxpayers of social security tax to maintain the liquidity of endowment insurance. (2) capital gains tax. The perfection and development of the capital market lies in formulating perfect policies and regulations, enhancing the transparency of the market, reducing the speculative tendency of the market and enhancing the investment function of the capital market. Capital gains tax is a good tax that reflects the advantages of progressive tax system in the current situation that personal income in China is difficult to count, and should be included in the balance of the cost of pension insurance reform and transformation. Perfecting the capital market should not be at the expense of exempting capital gains tax. At the same time, the cost of capital gains tax is low, which can be realized through the way of withholding and remitting by the stock exchange, which has realistic economic rationality. (3) levying inheritance tax. Inheritance tax is also a tax that reflects the characteristics of personal income progressive tax system and social equity, and is also an appropriate tax to balance the cost of pension insurance reform and transformation. With the increase of per capita income and the intensification of income distribution centralization, inheritance tax will become an important balanced tax to balance pension insurance liabilities. The important problem now is how to reduce the tax cost by reasonably determining the collection scheme, so that the collection of inheritance tax has reasonable economic rationality. (4) The bank deposit interest tax rate is changed to progressive tax rate. The implementation of bank deposit real-name registration system and the networking between banks have created conditions for the interest income tax to change from a fixed tax rate to a progressive tax rate. It is necessary to choose a suitable time to levy progressive interest income tax on bank deposit interest.
3. Issue special government bonds. Issuing long-term special government bonds is another feasible financing channel for the government to pay the transformation cost of endowment insurance. Chile's experience shows that by formulating appropriate policies, a considerable part (40%) of the special national debt is held by the endowment insurance fund, which can not only make the endowment insurance system transition smoothly, reduce the impact and minimize the transition cost, but also change the inefficiency of government management of the endowment insurance fund and the misappropriation of the endowment insurance fund from the system.
(2) Effectively restrain the expenditure scale of endowment insurance fund, and make the level of endowment insurance adapt to the level of economic development.
The demand for endowment insurance is infinite, but the level of financing is limited, which is a function of economic development level, per capita income level, employment rate and support rate in a certain period. The level of old-age insurance should be kept within a reasonable range: the minimum should be higher than the needs of employees for survival after retirement, and the maximum should be lower than the marginal income of labor. The level of endowment insurance is higher than the marginal income of labor force, which will inhibit labor efficiency. At present, the index that can best reflect the marginal income of labor force is the per capita income level, not the wage level, so endowment insurance should be linked to the per capita income and determine a reasonable replacement rate, not the current policy linked to wages. At the same time, the principle of differential treatment should be implemented. With the reform and opening up and the development of market economy, there are great differences in the level of economic development and per capita income in different regions, and the level of endowment insurance in different regions should be consistent with the per capita income level in this region. For example, in 2000, Shanghai's per capita national income exceeded US$ 4,000, and its per capita income exceeded RMB 65,438+0,000, so its pension insurance level should be consistent with and higher than other regions.
(3) Marketization and standardization of pension fund management.
China's old-age insurance system reform is facing liquidity difficulties and insufficient solvency, on the one hand, insufficient fund raising, on the other hand, management problems. At present, the policy orientation of pension insurance reform is to gradually transition to the partial accumulation system of "unified account combination", and the marketization of fund management is the inherent requirement of pension insurance reform. Otherwise, it will be difficult to achieve the goal of increasing the rate of return of pension funds, maintaining and increasing the value and realizing the accumulation of funds, personal accounts will remain empty and fictitious, and the reform goal of "combining unified accounts" will also fail. Long-term practice shows that fund management is a market-oriented project with very high requirements. The government does not have the ability to directly manage the fund, and the government's management of the endowment insurance fund causes waste and inefficiency of the fund. Fund management should be based on departmental interests and personal interests, and should not be directly managed by government departments. In the process of fund management, departments with vested interests will be formed, thus forming resistance to reform. At present, the marketization cost of fund management is the lowest and the timing of reform is the best. We should seize the opportunity and actively promote the marketization of fund management.
1. Establish a central-level endowment insurance fund and a local-level endowment insurance fund respectively. The reform of the old-age insurance system inevitably involves the transfer of interests between local governments. In order to reflect the interests of local governments, central and local pension funds should be established at the same time, and the proceeds from the transfer of state-owned shares of central enterprises and the central tax revenue should be included in the national pension fund. Most (for example, 90%) of the transfer payment income from all local enterprises and local taxes should be transferred to local pension funds, and a small part should be transferred to national pension funds to enhance the scale and capacity of central transfer payment. Central-level insurance funds are managed by the National Pension Fund Management Committee, while local-level funds are managed by unified local pension fund management committees and operated by professional fund companies. Members of local fund management committees are represented by local governments, and the committees exercise the functions of the board of directors in fund management. The voting rights of directors are determined according to the fund shares they represent, so as to fully reflect local interests. The Management Committee appoints professional fund companies to manage the fund, and establishes a board of supervisors composed of relevant experts to supervise the legality and compliance of the fund operation. This can not only reflect the local interests in fund management, but also overcome the inefficiency of decentralized fund management, make the fund operation truly market-oriented, and realize the preservation, appreciation and accumulation of funds.
2. The choice of professional companies should give national treatment to foreign companies or mutual funds. Foreign * * * funds or insurance companies have rich professional experience and strong financial strength, which is conducive to the standardized operation and risk dispersion of endowment insurance funds and to reducing the scale of financial contingent liabilities brought about by financial guarantee for the minimum rate of return of funds. At the same time, with China's entry into WTO, the opening process of financial services will be accelerated. Under this condition, instead of passively waiting for foreign companies to enter, it is better to actively formulate policies to let them enter the domestic market and reduce the impact on the domestic financial market.
3. Fund segmentation. The huge scale of the endowment insurance fund has had a serious impact on the capital market. The endowment insurance fund can be divided into several small-scale funds according to the principle of fund division, and each professional company or mutual fund is only allowed to operate one of them. The decentralized mechanism of operation can reduce the speculative pressure in the market and effectively reduce the risks borne by the financial sector.
4. Gradually realize the standardization of the central government's transfer payment for local endowment insurance. Because the current endowment insurance adopts the principle of territoriality, the transfer payment from the central government to the local government involves the transfer of interests between local governments. The central government should clearly formulate the standards and procedures for the transfer payment of old-age insurance, ensure the openness, justice and fairness of the transfer payment, and ensure the efficiency of the transfer payment. At the same time, it can effectively restrain the moral hazard of local governments when raising endowment insurance funds.
The reform of endowment insurance involves the interests of the central government, local governments, enterprises and every employee, the success or failure of labor market reform, the success or failure of state-owned enterprises reform, and the stability and sustainability of finance. We must take measures to reform and improve the old-age insurance system in China as soon as possible, which is the essential requirement for establishing a socialist market economic system. On the one hand, it is necessary to raise funds through multiple channels, reduce the level of endowment insurance expenditure, and change the problems of insufficient liquidity and solvency in the current reform of endowment insurance funds, among which increasing fund-raising efforts is the focus of current work. On the other hand, it can be said that it is more important to realize the marketization of pension fund operation. Only in this way can the reform of the old-age insurance system succeed.