The 200 1 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to three American economists, george akerlof, Michael spence and joseph stiglitz, in recognition of their important contributions in the field of "analyzing markets full of asymmetric information" in the 1970s. They have widely applied the theory of information asymmetry in various fields, which has been verified by practice and made a fundamental contribution to modern information economics.
1 the basic content of information asymmetry theory
The so-called information asymmetry means that the knowledge or probability distribution of some events is not symmetrical among the corresponding economic people. Information asymmetry theory is a core content of micro-information economics research, which is used to explain the influence of asymmetric distribution of relevant information on market trading behavior and the resulting market operation efficiency in an incomplete information market. In the research of asymmetric information game, the party with information advantage in the game is usually called the agent, while the party with information disadvantage is called the principal. All models of information asymmetry can be carried out under the framework of principal-agent. A basic assumption of traditional economics is that "economic man" has complete information. In fact, people have long known that in real life, market players can't have complete market information. Under the condition of information asymmetry, agents may choose behaviors that are not conducive to the principal for their own interests by virtue of their own information advantages, which leads to two core problems in the theory of information asymmetry-adverse selection and moral hazard.
Adverse selection is a game model to study information asymmetry in advance, which means that the party with more information uses the other party's ignorance of information to hide relevant information, gain additional benefits, and objectively lead to unreasonable market distribution behavior.
Moral hazard is a game model to study information asymmetry afterwards, which refers to the behavior that one party with information advantage deliberately conceals relevant information for its own benefit and causes damage to the other party. The existence of moral hazard increases the risk and cost of transaction.
The asymmetric distribution of information is suitable for any market subject, and it is precisely because of the asymmetric distribution of information that people engage in the collection, service, production and consumption of all kinds of information. The purpose of all information activities is to reduce information asymmetry and make all parties have as much information as possible. Information asymmetry will inevitably lead to information owners harming their own interests for their own greater interests. In order to reduce or avoid this behavior or reduce the cost of information search and improve the efficiency of social resource allocation, economists have put forward many theories and models.
2 Summary of information asymmetry theory
Traditional economic theory usually assumes that both parties to a market transaction have complete information. However, in real economic activities, economic actors not only do not have complete information in most cases, but also have limited ability to discover information, which makes their decision-making behavior face many uncertainties, which directly conflicts with the assumption of complete information in traditional economic theory. On the basis of making up the loopholes of traditional economic theory, information asymmetry theory has promoted the new development of modern economic theory.
2. 1 Information asymmetry theory is a major breakthrough in traditional economics.
Because of the existence of information asymmetry, the party with information advantage will often make "immoral behavior", and the party with information disadvantage will face "adverse selection" in the transaction. The direct consequence of these two kinds of problems is to distort the function of market mechanism, mislead market information and cause market failure. Therefore, it is necessary to design the optimal market system scheme to prevent the "market failure" caused by information asymmetry. This theory not only broadens the theoretical perspective of understanding the operation of market economy, but also provides enlightening ideas for developing countries in transition economies to design systems and choose policies.
2.2 The information asymmetry theory promoted the birth of behavioral economics.
Because people's economic behavior is largely a reflection of people's psychological activities, the information asymmetry between the two sides of the transaction is caused by the "shielding" of people's psychological activities. Therefore, when studying information asymmetry, it is necessary to study the psychological and behavioral motives that cause this information asymmetry and the economic benefits it brings. In other words, economics must begin to turn to the combination of economics, behavioral science and psychological science. Therefore, it can be said that the emergence of information asymmetry theory actually marks that economics has changed from a set of theoretical models divorced from reality based on many strict assumptions to a theoretical explanation based on real economic life, so it has revolutionary significance and promoted the birth of behavioral economics in a certain sense.
2.3 Information asymmetry theory promotes the development of game theory.
The problem of information asymmetry between the two sides is caused by the "shielding" of people's psychological activities. Therefore, the two sides of the transaction are actually playing a psychological game for their own economic interests, and this contest itself is based on information asymmetry. Therefore, the research on information asymmetry plays an important role in promoting the development of game theory to a certain extent.
2.4 Information asymmetry theory urges people to re-understand information.
Traditional economic theory thinks that income is the result of labor or output, but people seldom think that the reduction of information asymmetry to a certain extent means a kind of income. Because of the existence of information asymmetry, people are faced with many uncertainties in decision-making, and reducing this uncertainty will inevitably pay economic costs. Therefore, this reduction in economic costs means an increase in income, which is another powerful evidence that information is wealth. In addition, the existence of information asymmetry shows the importance of information transmission, because there is incomplete information and information asymmetry in the transaction, so people need to communicate and talk, and transmit information to each other, so that both sides can achieve the success of the transaction, so that the free market mechanism can effectively play its role and prevent market failure.
3. Engineering project management based on information asymmetry theory
Information plays an increasingly important role in the economy. The asymmetric distribution of information exists for any market subject, and it is precisely because of the asymmetric distribution of information that human beings will engage in various information collection, exchange activities, information services, information production and consumption. The purpose of all information activities is to reduce information asymmetry and make all parties have as much information as possible.
Asymmetric information distribution and asymmetric information theory are profoundly affecting all aspects of market economy and changing many important market concepts. The theory of information asymmetry also has great influence on project management.
3. 1 Information model in project management
In project management, there is still the problem of information asymmetry. As far as a project is concerned, from the beginning of project planning to the completion of the project, the main actors of the project, that is, the project organization, involve owners, contractors, supervision units, intermediary consulting agencies and government administrative departments. The owner, also known as the construction unit, developer or Party A, is the buyer of the project products; The contractor, including survey and design units and construction units, also known as Party B, is the seller of the project products; Supervision units and intermediary consulting institutions are entrusted by owners or other economic persons to supervise and manage the whole process of the project or provide consulting services; The administrative department of the government manages and supervises the project according to laws and regulations, including not only the competent department of construction, but also the relevant departments of environmental protection, municipal administration, fire protection, health and planning.
According to the relationship between modern project management theory and the actors involved in the project, we can build a project management information model as shown in figure 1.
Figure 1 Project Management Information Model
3.2 Analysis of Information Asymmetry in Project Management
Information asymmetry in project management information may exist between two actors or between multiple actors at the same time.
This paper mainly studies the information asymmetry between the owner and the contractor. 3.2. 1 The information asymmetry bidding stage is a process of mutual confrontation and two-way selection between the owner and the contractor. On the one hand, the owner should comprehensively consider the qualifications, performance, quotation and other factors of bidders to select contractors; On the other hand, contractors also have the problem of choosing owners, hoping to choose owners with high reputation, strong financial strength and complete procedures. In this process of mutual selection, the information owned by both parties is asymmetric, which is mainly manifested in the following aspects: the owner knows more about his own construction needs, but less about the information of the bidder, such as the contractor's ability, quality, technology, equipment, management, service, etc., so that the owner belongs to the information disadvantage party and the contractor is the information advantage party; However, the contractor knows more about his own ability and less about the owner's detailed construction intention, financial payment ability, engineering procedures and other information. In turn, the contractor becomes the inferior party of information, and the owner becomes the superior party of information. In this field of information asymmetry, in order to master each other's information, both sides will pay the price to search and analyze information, bargain and take countermeasures, so as to reach a balance and reach an agreement in constant countermeasures. On the one hand, in order to let the owner know his technology, quality ability and reputation, the contractor needs to convey his ability and reputation to the owner through advertising and quality certification. On the other hand, in order to select the contractor, the owner also needs to investigate, understand and evaluate the contractor.
3.2.2 Information asymmetry in the performance stage When the owner chooses the contractor and signs the contract, there is also information asymmetry in the performance of the contract. The contractor knows his own construction behavior better than the owner, such as the quality of users, the quality of materials, construction methods and technologies. It is impossible for the owner to fully grasp whether the contractor has carried out the construction in strict accordance with the contract, and whether there are Jerry-building and "lazy" behaviors. In this way, the owner is the information inferior party and the contractor becomes the information superior party. At the same time, the contractor didn't understand the owner's reputation and economic ability, and deliberately defaulted on the project payment because of the owner's moral hazard. At this time, the contractor's unfavorable choice to the owner will bring losses to himself. Therefore, in this antagonistic transaction process, due to the asymmetry of information, both parties are uncertain and cannot completely control the final result of the choice behavior, and there are risks that may be caused by unfavorable choices. The fundamental reason is business reputation, that is, there is moral hazard.
3.3 Solutions to information asymmetry in project management
The negative influence of adverse selection and moral hazard caused by information asymmetry on market behavior and the resulting market inefficiency exist objectively, and certain measures must be taken to control them to ensure the effective operation of the market.
3.3. 1 Strengthening the acquisition of information by information network construction can reduce the uncertainty of the market and is an important means to overcome the incompleteness and asymmetry of information. In order to reduce the negative impact of adverse selection and moral hazard on the market, we can balance the information asymmetry between the two parties by obtaining a large number of market signals. In order to obtain high-quality information, we should also strengthen the information infrastructure and establish a comprehensive data environment for data sharing. In the process of project management, data standards are adopted to establish an integrated data environment to avoid the formation of "information islands" and realize the digitalization, automation, networking and integration of project management information. Through the construction of information means, the information asymmetry in the process of project management will be reduced to a minimum, thus ensuring the correct decision-making of all actors.
3.3.2 A reasonably designed contract According to the principal-agent theory, the relationship between the owner and the contractor is essentially a contractual relationship, and the transaction behavior of both parties is essentially an act of concluding a contract. In order to ensure the balance of interests between the two parties before and after the transaction, designing a reasonable contract is an important means to avoid adverse selection and moral hazard caused by information asymmetry. Its core is to establish an information mechanism to encourage consistency, so that the goals of the principal and the agent are the same. In order to prevent the contractor from harming his own interests because of the information asymmetry in his unobservable behavior, the owner needs to design a contract that can achieve the owner's purpose and the contractor is willing to accept it. Design an incentive contract that satisfies the following two constraints. The first constraint is personal rationality constraint, also called participation constraint, which means that the contractor should actively participate. The second constraint is the incentive agreement constraint, which means that the contractor should be encouraged to work hard for his own interests according to the owner's wishes.
3.3.3 Strengthening government policy guidance With the improvement of the modern market, the macro-control role of the government is increasingly strengthened. From the perspective of information analysis, the government, as an entity, is brought into the construction market, which reflects the role of the government in regulating the trading behavior of owners and contractors through relevant information. The government's macro-control of the construction market is an effective way to guide the normal development of project management and solve adverse selection and immoral behavior, especially in the process of developing market economy and establishing an orderly market competition mechanism in China. To this end, we must implement the relevant policies of the state and establish and improve various laws, regulations and systems for the management of the construction market. Complete categories, support each other, and avoid overlapping, omission and conflict. At the same time, government departments should also give full play to and use the means of laws and regulations to cultivate and develop China's construction market system and ensure that all activities of construction projects from preliminary planning, survey and design, project contracting, construction to completion are brought into the legal track.
3.3.4 Strengthening Integrity Construction Integrity refers to the reliability, social responsibility and trustworthiness of a person and a unit. In the market economy environment of commodity economy society, the commercial credit status of enterprises and individuals, as well as the trust and recognition of the whole social and economic credit relationship, are important indicators to measure the economic environment and operation of a country, region or economic organization, as well as the degree of social civilization. Therefore, we must standardize and rectify the order of the construction market and gradually form a good fashion of honesty in the construction market. Both the owner and the contractor should establish a sense of honesty, standardize their own behaviors, strengthen mutual communication, and strive to solve the phenomenon of information asymmetry. Only by strengthening the construction of good faith can we establish a mutual trust and mutual recognition economic relationship between owners and contractors, and reduce the probability of adverse selection and moral hazard.
3.3.5 Cultivation of fair and standardized intermediaries In order to reduce information asymmetry, the third party, namely the supervisor, can supervise and manage the construction project. Supervisors have professional advantages. They take their own reputation as the guarantee and information service as the main activity content, which is an important factor to establish and improve the industry self-discipline mechanism. Therefore, it is necessary to cultivate a fair and standardized intermediary industry and establish a mechanism that can make information symmetrical. Trade associations should establish "rules of the game", make a series of clear and operable agreements on information disclosure, increase information transparency, and make the intermediary industry become the center of information flow and the platform of "justice, fairness and integrity".
3.3.6 Establishing a project risk early warning mechanism An important point in controlling project risk is to establish a project risk early warning mechanism and strengthen the risk early warning of "information asymmetry". Project risk early warning is mainly to analyze and predict the possibility of various risk factors affecting the project during the project operation; The project risk early warning mechanism is to design the corresponding index system and empirical target parameters according to the project risk factors, and determine the pre-control of the project risk degree by comparing the target value with the observed value. The establishment of project risk early warning mechanism is conducive to quickly finding key risk factors, and taking these key factors as risk early warning points of risk management system to make early warning in time, so as to achieve the purpose of control and management in advance.
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