With the continuous expansion of the autonomy of state-owned enterprises, the income distribution system of managers has also changed accordingly. However, it still does not effectively solve the asymmetry problem of enterprise managers' contribution and income, responsibility and income, risk and income. The outstanding performance is that three gaps are too big: first, the gap between the income and responsibility of state-owned enterprise managers is too big; Second, the gap between the income of state-owned enterprise managers and the salary and price of corresponding personnel in the market is too large; Third, the wage gap between managers of state-owned enterprises and similar personnel of joint ventures, private enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises is too large.

The problem of income distribution of state-owned enterprises has long plagued us. For many years, we have always emphasized the incentive mechanism based on political responsibility and spiritual encouragement, and there is not much difference between enterprise managers and employees in terms of salary. From a historical point of view, we can't deny the positive role played by spiritual incentives in the development process, but with the development of market economy, we feel more and more that it is not enough to rely solely on such incentives. In the early 1980s, Comrade Deng Xiaoping clearly pointed out the essence of this problem. He said: "if you don't work hard, you get more, that is, you don't pay attention to material interests. For a few advanced elements, but not for the masses. You can do it for a while, but not for long. The revolutionary spirit is precious. Without it, there would be no revolutionary action. However, the revolution is based on material interests. If you only talk about sacrifice and don't talk about material interests, it is idealism. " (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume II, page 146, People's Publishing House, 1985).

Compared with the income level, the economic responsibility, social responsibility, political responsibility and contribution of managers in important state-owned enterprises are obviously low, which does not reflect the complexity, heaviness and creativity of managers' human resources and the special role and position of managers in the production and operation of enterprises. Their wages are roughly three times the average wages of employees in this enterprise, and the excessive labor paid by managers has not been recognized. Moreover, the income of managers has little correlation with the performance of enterprises, and is "asymmetric" with the contribution of enterprises to the country. They can't compete with companies in developed regions (besides a considerable annual salary, there are also high bonuses drawn according to the profits created). For example, Shenzhen Development Company stipulates that if the profit is above 100000, individual special prize will be given according to 10% of the profit. It can't be compared with foreign companies (the annual salary of operators in large American companies is generally dozens or even hundreds of times that of ordinary employees). China faw group corporation has paid more than 20 billion yuan in national profits and taxes for decades, which is more than 30 times of the 600 million yuan invested by the state at the beginning of its establishment. Only 1999 realized profits and taxes of 3.3 billion yuan, but the total annual income of its nine business leaders was only 320,000 yuan, less than one tenth of the annual profits and taxes realized by the enterprise. The general manager of China No.1 and No.2 Heavy Machinery Group Corporation 1999 earns less than 20,000 yuan.

As the operators and managers of state assets, the managers of key state-owned enterprises shoulder very important responsibilities, not only to bear the economic responsibility of enterprises to obtain huge profits, but also to bear the social responsibility and political responsibility of re-employment of laid-off workers, ensuring their lives and maintaining social stability. The operators of joint ventures and private enterprises, because they have no "chores" such as social burdens, have flexible internal mechanisms and simple production, operation and management, but their income is often 5- 10 times or even more than that of state-owned enterprises. Relevant data show that 1999, the annual wage income of business operators is below 20,000 yuan, and state-owned enterprises account for 62.2%. Because the central enterprises have no right to determine the salary and income level of the leaders at the same level of the group, in order to arouse the enthusiasm of the managers of subordinate enterprises and intensify the reform of internal distribution of the group, the income level of some managers of secondary companies or joint-stock enterprises listed from the head office has been much higher than that of the group leaders, and there has been a phenomenon that the income of the leaders of the group companies and the managers of the directly affiliated enterprises is "upside down". For example, the annual income of leaders of Wuhan Iron and Steel (Group) Company and Dongfeng Motor Company is 30,000 yuan, while the annual income of general managers of their secondary companies is as high as 654.38+10,000 yuan. This phenomenon has become more common in central enterprises.

From the perspective of risks and pressures, most managers of central enterprises bear the heavy responsibility of overload and rack their brains to ensure the completion of various economic indicators and social responsibilities. For example, in recent years, the ups and downs of world crude oil prices have made Sinopec undergo a severe test in reducing costs and increasing efficiency, turning losses into difficulties; As a national pillar industry and key enterprise group, the company also plays an important role in stabilizing the domestic market of refined oil and chemical products. Facing the grim situation, arduous tasks and heavy pressure, the leading group of the group company works with a high sense of responsibility and mission, overloaded and high intensity. At the same time, the personal income level of the leading group is relatively low. The existence of these contradictions not only limits the intensity of salary incentives for managers at all levels within the group company, but also affects the process of reform of the internal distribution system of the group company to a certain extent. In the long run, it is not conducive to the enthusiasm of managers of state-owned enterprises, nor to the formation of talent market for managers of state-owned enterprises, resulting in a large loss of senior managers of state-owned enterprises, and even the loss of their ability to participate in market competition.

(D) The main obstacles to the reform of the distribution system for managers of key state-owned enterprises

The reform of the distribution system of state-owned enterprise managers cannot be carried out unilaterally without the existing operating environment of state-owned enterprises. At present, there are many factors restricting the reform of the operator distribution system, but the most fundamental obstacle is that state-owned enterprises have not yet established a truly modern enterprise system and corporate governance structure. The essence of salary system reform is the reform of personnel system. To establish an incentive mechanism in line with the market economic system, the value of managers must gradually adapt to the requirements of market economic laws. Specifically, the main obstacles restricting the reform of the distribution system of state-owned enterprise operators are as follows.

1. From the perspective of enterprise system

At present, there is a so-called "the most expensive enterprise system and the cheapest entrepreneur" in China. First, most state-owned enterprises have not really established corporate governance structure and modern enterprise system. Second, the investment subject of state-owned enterprises is not clear enough to meet the requirement of "clear property rights" Third, the reform of personnel system in state-owned enterprises is still not in place, and a complete market talent selection mechanism has not been formed. Fourthly, the income distribution mechanism of state-owned enterprise managers lacks clear, quantitative and market-oriented institutional guarantee, and a universal and scientific performance evaluation system for enterprise managers has not been formed.

2. From the ideological point of view

Traditional ideas hinder the formation of incentive and restraint mechanism for managers of state-owned enterprises. First, at present, employees' market concept is relatively backward, they have insufficient understanding of the importance of management factors, and they have the psychology of keeping up with the income of business operators. The egalitarianism and the thought of "big pot" under the planned economy system limited the reform of the salary system of enterprise managers to some extent. Second, employees' psychological endurance is weak, and they think that the success and development of enterprises are really closely related to managers. It is natural for managers to earn more, but it is unbearable because there are still a large number of difficult enterprises and laid-off workers. Third, some managers are afraid of difficulties and dare not take more. Worried that getting more salary will lead to unnecessary contradictions with employees and other managers, which will affect the work.

3. Analysis from the current situation of enterprises

Most state-owned enterprises have heavy historical and social burdens. At present, although the two major goals of reforming state-owned enterprises and extricating them from difficulties in three years have been basically achieved, the foundation is still not solid. In particular, military enterprises and old state-owned key enterprises generally have poor operating conditions, serious losses, and low income levels of cadres and workers, resulting in weak ability of workers to withstand reform. Workers hope that enterprise managers can share joys and sorrows. If this point is not fully considered in the reform of the management personnel distribution system, it will be unfair and it will be difficult to really mobilize the enthusiasm of the broad masses of workers.

4. From the social environment analysis

The reform of the relevant distribution system has not yet been put in place, and the good social environment has not yet been completed. First, the treatment level of high-quality national civil servants deviates from the market price. The salary of national civil servants has been at a low level for a long time. If we simply carry out the reform of enterprise managers' salary system, the salary level of enterprise managers and national civil servants will be seriously unbalanced, and the reform of enterprise managers' salary system will not be truly implemented. Second, the progress of central and local distribution policy reform is inconsistent. At present, many provinces (cities) have issued some guiding opinions on the reform of distribution system, and the steps are relatively large. For example, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Wuhan and other provinces and cities have not only issued guiding opinions on the reform of the annual salary system for managers, but also made a preliminary exploration on the issue of executive stock options. Comparatively speaking, the relevant departments of the central government are relatively backward in the reform of the distribution system. If the state, as the owner of assets, does not issue a clear policy, it will be difficult to promote the reform of the distribution system of managers in central enterprises, which will easily have a negative impact. If the central government fails to issue corresponding comprehensive, forward-looking and guiding opinions in advance or at the same time, it will not only lead to unfounded local documents and unbalanced regions, but also hinder the reform of enterprise managers' salary system due to fait accompli and other reasons. Third, as a product of market economy and an effective means of adjustment, the market economy conditions required by the implementation of incentive mechanisms such as annual salary system, stock right and stock option are not yet fully mature, and the corresponding reforms are not perfect. If the annual salary system of enterprise managers is implemented, it is necessary to solve the problem of real linkage between income distribution and performance, and how to separate the interests of operators and employees. Because the assessment mechanism of state-owned enterprise managers is not perfect, it is not clear which department will assess the completion of maintaining and increasing the value of state-owned assets and other economic benefits indicators, which affects the implementation of the annual salary system for managers.

(5) The current wage system is not compatible with the reform of the distribution system for managers of state-owned enterprises.

In recent years, the State Council and the Ministry of Labor have carried out some reforms and experiments on the current wage system, introduced many measures to improve and perfect the income distribution of the operators of enterprises owned by the whole people, and tried to pay the remuneration of the operators of state-owned enterprises by various methods of wages and incentives. For example, the Interim Measures for the Management of Wage Funds issued by the State Council on September 24th 1985, the Interim Measures for the Management of Labor Wages of Joint-stock Pilot Enterprises issued by the Ministry of Labor and the State Commission for Economic Restructuring on June 30th 1992, and the Wages of Enterprises Owned by the Whole People issued by the Ministry of Labor, the State Economic and Trade Commission and the State Commission for Economic Restructuring on June 22nd 1993. For example, the original file salary promotion management measures, enterprise managers' starting salary management measures, exchange leading cadres' salary management measures, and difficult enterprise managers' income distribution management measures. Generally speaking, the current wage management system of state-owned enterprises in China has affected the optimal allocation of human resources and the effective incentive of enterprise operators to a certain extent, and has also caused certain obstacles to the reform of incentive and restraint mechanism of enterprises, which can no longer meet the needs of the development of socialist market economy. Specifically, it is mainly manifested in:

1. The management method of total wages is out of date.

At present, state-owned enterprises still follow the management mode of total wages under the planned economy system, and the annual total wages plan of each enterprise is examined and approved by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and the settlement is linked with work efficiency. This wage system management mode is still administrative and non-market. Although the form of "linking work efficiency" is adopted, there are some disadvantages, such as wage leakage, stopping profit without loss, coexistence of linked and non-linked distribution modes, and great friction. Moreover, due to the unreasonable and serious lag in the formulation of salary scheme, the determination of the approved base of economic indicators and performance appraisal, the particularity of management labor cannot be fully reflected, resulting in the low income level of managers in state-owned enterprises, failing to highlight the position and role of managers in the company's operation and failing to reflect their special contributions and market value.

In addition, the current practice of determining the income level of managers according to the income level of employees in state-owned enterprises in China cannot build a diversified income structure of managers and form a distribution mode different from that of ordinary employees, which is not conducive to the cultivation and development of managers. The annual income level of enterprise managers is generally controlled at 1-3 times of the average annual income of employees, and the maximum income should not exceed 5 times, which is obviously outdated. This regulation not only makes the income of enterprise managers fail to fully reflect the particularity, complexity, creativity and diversity of their labor, but also keeps the income of enterprise managers at a very low level and fails to achieve the due incentive effect.

2. There is a lack of close relationship between the operating results of enterprises and personal work performance.

The operation of an enterprise depends to a great extent on the comprehensive quality and ability of managers. Therefore, the income of enterprise managers should be determined on the basis of correctly evaluating the annual operating results and personal work performance of enterprises in combination with the operating conditions of enterprises. In order to change the situation that the income of managers in the past is not linked to the business indicators of enterprises, the income of managers in enterprises should be linked to the scale of enterprises, the difficulty of operation and the economic indicators achieved. The state should establish a performance evaluation system for key state-owned enterprises, and relevant departments should regularly evaluate the completion of enterprise assets preservation and appreciation and economic benefits (profits, taxes, etc.). ) and link it with the salary of business leaders.

3. Income management measures lack restraint mechanism.

Due to the imperfection of management, the salary management of managers in important state-owned enterprises has neither standard nor competent examination and approval department, and it is entirely decided by the enterprise leaders themselves, resulting in various forms of income among enterprise managers and a great gap. Some state-owned enterprises have poor operating performance and a lot of losses, but the income of managers has not been affected. On the contrary, some people even give themselves a raise. What is more noteworthy is that the job consumption of many important managers of state-owned enterprises is very arbitrary, with no standards at all, and it is not open, especially the amount of public expenditure (subsidies) such as car use, housing and going abroad is very large. We must adhere to the post salary system, annual salary system and asset management responsibility system. , so as to ensure that managers' income is fair, just and open, and establish necessary restraint mechanisms as soon as possible, such as appointing financial directors, sending supervisors, and strengthening the supervision and restraint mechanisms of owners and shareholders.

Second, the practice of the reform of the distribution system of state-owned enterprise managers.

(a) the initial establishment of enterprise managers asset management responsibility system.

According to China's current system, the state implements a system of unified ownership by the state, hierarchical supervision by the government and independent operation by enterprises. This management system essentially recognizes that governments at all levels have quasi-ownership of state-owned assets under their supervision. The advantage of this management system is that the central government has greater power over state-owned assets and reduces the workload of defining property rights. However, in practice, there are some problems in this management system, such as unclear property right relationship, unknown investor, absent owner and unclear asset management responsibility. In order to solve these problems from the system, some central enterprises continue to explore and establish and improve the asset management responsibility system of enterprise operators in the practice of reform. For example, in April 2000, China Aviation Industry Corporation I revised and issued the Notice on Printing and Distributing the Interim Measures for the Responsibility Assessment of Enterprise Managers of China Aviation Industry Corporation I (Hangfa [2000] No.20). Subsequently, the general manager of the group company and the legal representatives of 25 directly affiliated enterprises signed the 2000 enterprise management responsibility letter, which clearly defined the responsibilities and rights of enterprise managers. For another example, Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation implements the asset management risk responsibility system for the main managers and other team members of its wholly-owned and holding subsidiaries. Managers of wholly-owned and holding subsidiaries pay a certain amount of annual asset management risk premium every year. The annual asset management risk premium of the manager and party secretary is 5,000 yuan/person, and other team members are 3,000 yuan/person. When the profit plan, capital preservation rate and net assets rate are completed or exceeded, the risk funds of key management personnel and other team members will be returned, and the party secretary and manager will be rewarded with 5,000 yuan each, and other team members will be rewarded with 3,000 yuan each; If it is not completed in the whole year, the risk fund will not be returned, and it will be handled according to the company's cadre assessment regulations. In this way, it is not only conducive to strengthening the business risk awareness and responsibility awareness of enterprise managers, but also conducive to the smooth realization of enterprise business objectives.

(2) A relatively complete performance evaluation system has been initially formed.

As mentioned above, the performance evaluation system is an important foundation and reliable guarantee for establishing the incentive and restraint mechanism for managers of state-owned enterprises. For example, China Mobile Communications Group Company has formulated the Measures for Evaluating the Operating Performance of Mobile Communications Companies in Provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities), and established an evaluation system including a series of evaluation indicators such as mobile communications business income, return on net assets, EBITDA (EBITDA= operating income-operating expenses+depreciation+other business profits+provision for asset impairment), major network obstacles, communication cases, fire accidents, safety production and so on.

Take China Oil and Gas Co., Ltd. as an example. It is the holding company of China Oil and Gas Group Corporation. Since the reorganization and listing in April 2000, a new salary system based on performance appraisal has been established for enterprise managers according to the requirements of modern enterprise system. It mainly includes: (1) The salary structure adopts the internationally accepted three-unit model of fixed salary, performance bonus and stock option. Combine short-term incentives with long-term incentives, and combine the interests of managers and shareholders. (2) In terms of salary standard, the original practice of determining salary according to "grade" for managers of state-owned enterprises was abolished, and the salary standard was determined according to the responsibilities and risks of the units to which the managers belong, as well as the management scope and unit benefits, and the regional companies were classified, which widened the gap. In the proportion of each compensation unit, the proportion of floating part increases with the increase of position and responsibility, which enhances the risk awareness of managers. (3) In salary distribution, adhere to the principle of linking with performance appraisal. The operator's variable salary is linked to the performance index and distributed according to the assessment results, so that the operator's income fluctuates with the completion of the performance index to ensure the realization of the strategic objectives of the joint-stock company. As a supporting measure of the reform, the joint-stock company signed a performance contract with senior managers, formulated the "Performance Appraisal Measures for Senior Managers", actively promoted the competitive employment system for management positions, and unified the incentive mechanism and restraint mechanism; Draw up the salary system for people below the middle level, introduce the guiding opinions for performance appraisal of managers below the middle level and the performance appraisal methods for operation service personnel, link the salary distribution of other employees with managers, and mobilize the enthusiasm of all employees. China Petroleum and Natural Gas Co., Ltd. has adopted the internationally accepted operator compensation system model, which has widened the income distribution gap, highlighted the performance appraisal, and paid attention to the relationship between managers' interests, company value and shareholders' interests, which has become an important "selling point" of the company's listing, which is also one of the key factors for the success of PetroChina's stock issuance.

For another example, in 2000, China Chemical Import and Export Corporation reformed the company's traditional salary system and implemented an annual salary system for all employees. On the basis of adhering to the principle of "two below" stipulated by the state, according to the law of value and the basic principle of equivalent exchange, the salary of employees is strictly linked with their labor skills, job responsibilities, work performance and market value, so as to realize the unity of responsibilities and rights, completely abandon the content of equal distribution of administrative levels, length of service and seniority, and include academic qualifications and professional titles in wages. Under the planned economy system, wages are determined entirely by posts, responsibilities and achievements. After the introduction of the reform of the salary system, In principle, 70% of the annual salary is paid monthly as a fixed salary, and the remaining 30% is paid at the end of the year according to the annual performance, and the original subsidies and welfare expenses are cancelled. The company president's income is only the annual salary, and there is no share income and other income. The income of the company's president is 3.75 times of the average income of the company's employees, maintaining a low level. It is worth noting that the new performance system established by the company classifies the existing business entities of the company according to the contribution, and evaluates them mainly from four aspects: current profit and scale, business growth, asset security and other management levels, so as to guide operators at all levels to continuously improve their quality, strive for real business performance, actively pursue the growth of enterprises, cultivate innovative ability and potential profitability, and continuously enhance enterprise value in the process of implementing corporate strategy. The performance appraisal index of the company's president is specially formulated, and the appraisal result is directly linked to the approval of the president's annual benefit salary, which is clearly stipulated in the company's salary system. The focus of performance evaluation includes current profitability, future growth and asset security, and mainly evaluates the company's current pre-tax profit, net profit growth rate, turnover growth rate, market profit growth rate, new overdue accounts receivable control rate, new non-performing inventory control rate and target non-performing asset recovery rate, which solves the problems of unclear objectives and uncertain standards. It can be seen that this new performance evaluation system attaches great importance to the concept of value management, not only to the financial results of strategic development, but also to the management process of continuous innovation. Compared with the previous financial evaluation based on the completion of budget targets, it has an essential change, which has important reference significance for the establishment of the performance evaluation system for state-owned enterprise managers.

(C) Diversified practice of enterprise managers' incentive methods

At present, the annual salary system is widely used in the reform of the distribution system for managers of state-owned enterprises. Annual salary system is a distribution method that pays operators' income annually according to enterprise scale and operating performance. It is a mode of modern enterprise system distribution and the embodiment of managers' value. The implementation of annual salary system can fully mobilize the enthusiasm and creativity of enterprise managers, further improve their management level, promote the growth of economic benefits of enterprises, and realize the preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets. Take China Ocean Shipping (Group) Corporation as an example. The group company implements a structural salary system with post salary as the main body, which consists of post salary, annual performance salary and performance salary. In addition to salary income, the leaders of COSCO Group do not enjoy any other salary income such as share income and housing subsidies. 1999, the annual salary income of president and party secretary of cosco group was156,000 yuan and154,000 yuan respectively. Since 1999, the group has tried out the annual salary system for the managers of secondary enterprises, made it clear that the income of enterprise managers consists of basic salary, risk income and reward income, adhered to the economic benefit as the center, strengthened the assessment mechanism, established an assessment index system combining the management objective responsibility book with the operator's management evaluation, and comprehensively assessed the enterprise managers from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives, involving production, operation, finance, management and other aspects.

We believe that for the implementation of incentive compensation system for managers of state-owned enterprises, the distribution method is not single, but should be classified and designed according to the situation of enterprises, adopt various distribution forms, and establish an effective incentive and restraint mechanism for managers' compensation.

Three, key state-owned enterprise managers compensation system reform suggestions

(A) combined with the establishment of a modern enterprise personnel system, accelerate the improvement of the marketization level of the salary system of important state-owned enterprises, and rapidly enhance the competitiveness of human resources of state-owned enterprises. At present, state-owned enterprises are facing enormous competitive pressure of human resources. Especially among outstanding senior managers and professional technicians, the pressure from foreign-funded enterprises and private enterprises is even greater. Because foreign capital and private enterprises employ people by market mechanism, their employment and salary system is rooted in the market from the beginning and changes flexibly with the changes of the market, so they show great advantages in the competition. This advantage is most directly reflected in the salary. Since the reform and opening up, the rigid wage system of the original planned economy of state-owned enterprises has been broken through by the market economy, and the general trend of state-owned enterprises' salary is to move closer to the market (international counterparts), but overall, the current marketization level is very low, and the salary system suitable for the market economy system is far from being established. In the aspect of human resource allocation, it is far from the report of the 15th National Congress that "under the national macro-control, the market plays a fundamental role in resource allocation". Salary involves the vital interests of every employee in the enterprise. Without a good salary system, it is hard to say that a modern enterprise system has been established. If state-owned enterprises want to be competitive in the market economy, they must establish a reasonable salary system according to market rules. The basic rule of the market is equivalent exchange, which is specific to the allocation of human resources: I will give you how much money you are worth. Due to the limitation of conditions, the salary system of state-owned enterprises cannot reach this level at once, but it must eventually reach a competitive level in the market. At present, the urgent task is to raise the income of senior managers and professional technicians in low-paid state-owned key enterprises to an appropriate level as soon as possible. At the same time, it is necessary to establish a system of selecting, appointing and managing managers that is compatible with the modern enterprise system as soon as possible, and combine the principle of the party managing cadres with the right of the board of directors to select managers and use managers according to law. For companies limited by shares and limited liability companies, the state no longer directly appoints or hires managers, but appoints them by other means or agrees with investors, and the board of directors decides the appointment of enterprise managers. In dealing with the relationship between the old and new "three meetings", the method of "two-way entry and cross-employment" is implemented. The main body of enterprise employment has changed from the state to the market. The state no longer allocates personnel to enterprises, and enterprises choose the talents they need for the market. It is necessary to strengthen education and training through various forms, comprehensively improve the quality of enterprise managers, and vigorously cultivate and create entrepreneurial markets.

(2) It is necessary to change the situation that managers of state-owned enterprises decide their own salaries and establish a system in which investors decide managers' salaries. At present, a common and obvious phenomenon in the salary situation of state-owned enterprises is that managers decide their own salaries and take as much as they want (although the labor department has stipulated "total control", it can't actually control it). It is the basic rule of market economy that investors decide managers' salary. The emergence of state-owned enterprises is rooted in the "absence of investors" in corporate governance structure. To change this situation, we can consider the following schemes: first, referring to the practice of American companies, we will send "independent external directors" to the board of directors representing the interests of the state (investors) (they do not hold management positions in the company, but only receive a small amount of conference subsidies, similar to the external directors representing the interests of shareholders in the United States), and they will form a compensation Committee to determine the salary of managers. Second, the state authorized the establishment of a "representative office of state-owned assets investors", one of which was to examine and determine the remuneration of managers of key state-owned enterprises. The third is to authorize the state-owned backbone enterprises with modern enterprise system, large scale and standardized management, and create a new management model of enterprise leadership with property rights as the link and unified management of people and property. Managers working in wholly state-owned group companies and state-owned holding enterprises or subsidiaries should be treated differently by classification and formulate different salary systems. The salary of managers hired from the manager's market as managers of listed companies should correspond to the market price of managers. The chairman and manager of a superior company cannot concurrently serve as the chairman or manager of a listed company. Directors of higher-level companies can serve in lower-level listed companies and receive corresponding remuneration according to their duties.