Accounting information and corporate governance: [Abstract] Financial accounting provides direct and indirect financial information for corporate control mechanism, reflecting the result of the game between stakeholders, while corporate governance structure provides environmental protection for true and reliable financial accounting information. There is a two-way interaction between financial accounting information and corporate governance structure. [Keywords:] Financial accounting information The interactive relationship of corporate governance Financial accounting provides direct and indirect financial information for the corporate control mechanism, which reflects the result of the game among stakeholders, while corporate governance structure provides environmental protection for true and reliable financial accounting information. There is a two-way interaction between financial accounting information and corporate governance structure. I. Financial accounting information and corporate governance structure Accounting information provides information about the company's operating conditions to the majority of stakeholders according to accounting standards and accounting systems, and is one of the important basis for stakeholders to make decisions. The authenticity of accounting information is directly related to the decisions and results of stakeholders. The distortion of accounting information refers to the phenomenon that accounting information fails to truly reflect objective economic activities and adversely affects investors' relevant decisions. The distortion of accounting information may cause some stakeholders' mistakes in decision-making and the ineffective allocation of some social and economic resources, thus causing the turmoil in the capital markets such as securities, which is one of the factors affecting the normal economic order. Corporate governance structure is a series of laws, cultures, habits and systems used to coordinate the interests and behaviors of different stakeholders in a company under the modern company system. Corporate governance structure is to standardize and coordinate the rights, responsibilities and interests of investors, management, employees and creditors under the principal-agent relationship of company property. The effective operation of this institutional arrangement must rely on corporate financing. The full competition of the external mechanism of corporate governance can produce information that restricts managers' behavior, so it can solve the supervision problem caused by the separation of ownership and control. In a country or market, the external governance mechanism of companies is basically the same, so the difference of companies lies in the internal governance mechanism. Second, the interactive relationship between financial accounting information and corporate governance 1. The role of financial accounting information in corporate governance mechanism Whether the company's financial structure is reasonable directly affects and restricts the efficiency of corporate governance structure. Under a certain corporate governance structure, the game results of corporate stakeholders are directly reflected in the company's accounting information. Adequate and perfect accounting information system plays an important role in reducing information asymmetry, controlling adverse selection and limiting moral hazard. On the one hand, with the help of effective external information disclosure and auditing system, accounting information supports the orderly operation of the external competitive market system and ensures that external governance mechanisms such as takeover pose a credible threat to managers' deviation from shareholders' interests; On the other hand, in the internal governance structure, accounting information directly plays the governance value of supervision, evaluation and contract communication. Financial accounting system is the logical starting point for adjusting the property rights of important information systems to clarify moral hazard issues, which helps the board of directors to distinguish controllable events from uncontrollable events. Managers often submit budgets to the board of directors and explain periodic reports that deviate from the budget, which may help the board to distinguish controllable events from uncontrollable events. Without the support of reliable and relevant accounting information, any decision made by the internal supervision mechanism such as the board of directors and the board of supervisors may be blind and invalid. Financial incentive mechanism, especially stock option, is an important part of modern corporate governance. By letting executives share the residual income, they can be encouraged to create excellent performance. Highly comprehensive accounting information has become the basis for the design and implementation of incentive contracts. The internal manager talent market evaluates the manager's performance according to the reflected financial accounting information, and promotes the marketization and legalization of the manager's appointment and dismissal mechanism, which is the source problem to solve the company manager management. In short, we can define the role of accounting information in corporate governance as: in the relevant control mechanism centered on alleviating the agency problem of "shareholders-managers", the financial accounting data reported to the outside world are used to improve governance efficiency, thus improving the economic performance of enterprises. 2. Internal and external governance mechanisms affect financial accounting information. To fully understand the role of financial accounting information in the allocation of economic resources, we must study corporate governance. In order to achieve ideal results in corporate governance research, the key lies in the mastery of information by both parties. Whether financial accounting information objectively and fairly reflects the internal and external governance mechanism in corporate governance and the balance of property rights game among stakeholders. Under the separation of the two rights, the information asymmetry between the "present" managers and the "absent" property rights subjects exists objectively, and it has two levels. The first level is the state information about the business environment and future prospects of the enterprise; The second level is about the efforts of managers. Managers have the first level of superior information, which is a favorable condition for their competence in decision-making and management. Because of the different interests of the owners of enterprise property rights, it is necessary for stakeholders who are far away from the enterprise to analyze and verify the information provided by managers in order to prevent adverse selection in advance and immoral behavior afterwards caused by information asymmetry. In order to improve efficiency, shareholders and other external property owners can institutionalize this analysis and verification procedure through negotiations with human capital owners. For example, within the corporate governance structure, an audit committee can be set up in the board of directors or independent directors with professional quality can be introduced; Outside the corporate governance structure, we can rely on intermediaries to ensure the reliability and relevance of accounting information provided by managers. It can be seen that financial accounting information and corporate internal and external governance are two-way influences. Third, the role and countermeasures of China's financial accounting information governance In China, the main body of supervision of accounting personnel is the government and other external supervision institutions; The instigators are mainly shareholders and management; The beneficiaries of accounting information distortion of listed companies in China are mainly insiders such as major shareholders and company management. We can find the problems existing in China's listed companies: (1) the company's control right is incomplete, the state-owned major shareholders are absent, and the minority shareholders can't control it, which leads to insider control of China's listed companies. As state-owned shareholders gain external control, listed companies lose the constraint on insider control. (2) The control right and the risk taker are misplaced. In China's listed companies, the control right is mainly in the hands of major shareholders and insiders, but the risks are mainly borne by small and medium shareholders, creditors and company employees, and the risks are not proportional to the benefits. The problems existing in the governance structure are the reasons for the distortion of accounting information of listed companies in China. To reduce the distortion of accounting information, we can only start with perfecting and perfecting the governance structure of listed companies in China: (1) Determine the goal of the governance structure of listed companies in China and maximize the interests of enterprises. (2) Improve the ownership structure of listed companies in China and cultivate complete shareholders. (3) Improve and perfect the control rights of listed companies in China and establish complete control rights. (4) Improve and perfect the supervision mechanism of listed companies in China. With the advancement of China's shareholding system reform, state-owned shares will no longer circulate, and the phenomenon of "one share dominates" will be improved to some extent. By introducing institutional investors and social capital, we will gradually improve the independent director system, improve the management salary contract, cultivate the internal manager market, and gradually improve the corporate governance theory in China, thus improving the quality of financial accounting information in China. The improvement of the quality of financial accounting information will in turn improve the efficiency of corporate governance, and then promote the perfection and development of China's modern enterprise system. On the basis of the study of internal governance mechanism, we should attach importance to the environmental function of external governance mechanism and cultivate the institutional factors of external governance in China. Only in this way can corporate governance in China be improved, and relevant and reliable financial and accounting information can be provided to investors to protect their interests. 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