In fact, during the whole process of sickle harvest (Army A rushed to the sea with seven armored divisions and three motorized divisions as the vanguard troops, cutting off the Anglo-French allied forces that went deep into Belgium), the German high command-including but not limited to Chrysler armored cluster commander, Commander-in-Chief of Army A Lundstedt and his chief of staff, Solden Dawn, and of course Hitler-repeatedly tried to stop the fanatical armored officers. Only the Showa officers under his command (crossed out), such as 19 Panzer Corps Commander guderian and 7 Panzer Division Commander Rommel, made some moves and went it alone boldly, thus achieving this miraculous battle.
Why is this happening?
The genius of manstein Plan, or Sickle Plan, shocked not only French officers, but also senior German officers. In fact, only guderian, Rommel and Hald, the post-war chief of staff, can really understand the essence of this plan-"speed is defense", except Manstein.
In the eyes of many other senior officers, such as Rangstedt, the French army fought for four years in World War I, but failed to defeat its opponents. 19 14 The scene where the miracle of the Marne River made the Germans fall short is still vivid. So don't worry about the well-organized and powerful counterattack of the French army without considering the bold March of the flank? The armored forces separated from the infantry. If the "French General Reserve" attacks and cuts off the rear road of armored forces, wouldn't it be a turtle in a jar?
Look back at Dunkirk. First of all, we need to find out how the orders are given.
In fact, many scholars have already clarified the process of issuing orders.
At 0:30 a.m. on May 24th, 165438+ Hitler and Jodl, director of the operational bureau of the High Command, arrived at the headquarters of the A Army Group in charleville and held a meeting with Lundstedt, commander of the A Army Group. Lundstedt reminded Hitler that the possibility of allied forces taking concerted action to attack the Germans could not be ignored, and emphasized that the Kleist cluster had lost 50% of its tanks (permanent loss+war injury) because of this action. So, 12:4 1, Hitler officially issued the famous "stop moving" order, and defined the offensive stop line.
This order was naturally opposed by armored commander and chief of staff Hald. After consulting with brauchitsch, Hald ordered attack force to advance to Dunkirk on the evening of 24th. However, after Army A received the order at 0: 45 on 25th, Lundstedt, Chief of General Staff Solden Dawn and Minister of Operations Blumentrit strongly rejected General Lu's order on the grounds that "the Fuehrer has handed over the disposal right to Army A".
Finally, it was not until May 26th that Hitler ordered the resumption of the assault, but by this time the British army had shrunk to a narrow area near Dunkirk, and it was very difficult to panic in.
It can be said that on the issue of "stop", rundstedt's responsibility is not greater than Hitler's, or at least equal to Hitler's-so why did the famous old marshal, who was the army chief of staff during World War I, do this?
On May 20th, the 19 motorized army arrived in Abbeville, completing the encirclement of the allied forces in Flanders. On may 2 1 day, Flanders' allies broke through from the northern line to the south, and launched the largest counterattack of the allies in the whole French campaign-alastair counterattack.
Of course, it was a "large-scale" counterattack, but due to the pitiful coordination and organization level of the Coalition forces and the pressure of the East Wing B Army Group. Only the 15 1 brigade of the 50th British division and the 1 armored brigade of the British army (with 87 tanks available) actually led the attack, and the disabled 3rd Light Mechanization Division of the French army and the 13 tank battalion (with 60 tanks available) provided assistance.