This paper mainly studies the systemic banking crisis from the perspective of sociology. The banking crisis stems from the construction of banks, and its function of transforming savings into investment determines the fragility of banks. With the development of the banking industry, its position in the social economy is gradually improved, and the impact and influence of the banking crisis on politics, economy and society are also increasing. As a transitional country, China's entire financial system began with the reform of the unified banking system. So far, banks still occupy the dominant position in the financial industry. The four wholly state-owned commercial banks play an important role in China's economic and social development, maintaining the lifeline of the national economy and economic security. In the process of China's transition, the four major banks transferred their ever-increasing savings to state-owned enterprises, and a large number of non-performing assets were formed and appeared when the losses of state-owned enterprises expanded and increased. After the Southeast Asian crisis, due to many similarities between China's economy and finance and countries in crisis, some internationally renowned institutions and scholars predicted that a serious financial crisis would soon occur in China, mainly based on the fact that the non-performing loan ratio of the four major banks exceeded 20% and the capital adequacy ratio was less than 8%. Some scholars even designed the crisis process, just waiting for China's actual verification. However, the fact is far from the forecast. Not only did the four banks not fail because of the bank run, but their deposits and loans still maintained a relatively high growth rate. The Southeast Asian storm did not land in neighboring China, but blew to Russia and Brazil. Why can China resist this crisis? Why didn't there be a typical banking crisis-a run on deposits or even a queue of deposits? This shows that while institutions and scholars who care about China see similar situations in China and Southeast Asian countries, or crisis countries in history, China still has many factors different from crisis countries. What are these different factors? The full text launches analysis and research around this. This paper holds that banks, as the intermediary between savings and investment, have actually formed a bank-centered trust chain. This trust chain consists of two parts, one is depositors and banks, and the other is banks and borrowers. Banks collect the trust gained from depositors and transfer it to borrowers. Short-term deposit and long-term loan and creditor's rights constraint are the characteristics of this trust chain. The rupture of any trust chain may make the whole trust chain unsustainable. In this way, it can be clear why the banking crisis may be caused by two reasons: depositors' centralized run and lenders' default. The trust chain of the four behavior centers is broken in a considerable proportion, but the crisis has not happened. From the comparison of the number of trust chains, it is because the growth of deposits is greater than that of loans, which can hold some broken trust chains. The fundamental reason lies in the social system that determines these changes. The full text consists of introduction and seven chapters. The introduction mainly explains why this research is needed; This paper summarizes the existing research and introduces the research content of this paper. Studying the banking crisis from the perspective of sociology, this paper has a certain frontier from the perspective of discipline. Chapter 1 mainly reviews the banking crises in different countries in the world since the 20th century, including two crises in the United States, two crises in Argentina, crises in Russia, crises in Southeast Asian countries and the closure of Hainan Development Bank by China in 1998. These historical facts are the main materials for empirical analysis in this paper. The second chapter studies the bank-centered trust relationship, and constructs a bank-centered trust chain with reference to Coleman's research on trust. There are many reasons for the banking crisis, but the final result can only be that banks can't maintain the operation of the trust chain. After gathering on the trust chain, we can find that the existence and maintenance of the trust chain can not only judge whether the crisis occurs by picking up a few indicators from the trust chain, but also some factors that are difficult to quantify in politics, economy and society. Explaining the banking crisis with the help of AG model will effectively overcome the defects of the original banking financial crisis theory in explaining the crisis, which is very convincing. The third chapter analyzes the special trust structure of the four major banks, which is the difference between China and crisis countries. The high rate of non-performing assets and low capital adequacy ratio are indeed serious problems, but the state-owned nature makes the public believe that state credit supports state-owned banks, thus making the stability and expansion of the trust chain between depositors and banks hold the trust chain between banks and borrowers, which has caused losses because of distorting the relationship between banks and enterprises. The first chapter mainly studies the currency stability, which is actually the first firewall for China to prevent the crisis in Southeast Asia. The institutional choice of RMB exchange rate interaction has successfully maintained the internal and external stability of RMB. The fifth chapter analyzes the reasons for the increase of residents' savings after the East Asian crisis, because the existence of trust does not mean the increase of trust. The centralized introduction of education, housing and social security systems after the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and the establishment of the new government have changed residents' psychological expectations and led to an increase in savings due to the enhancement of preventive motives. The growth of savings and the expansion of the deposit gap ensure that the four major banks will not return to the crisis caused by insufficient liquidity. The sixth chapter analyzes the measures and effects of the government's rescue after the Southeast Asian crisis, as well as the strong control of the China government. This is the first time to learn from the Southeast Asian crisis and make it public at the end of the crisis, which shows that the political system is successful in grasping the opportunity and using the means in integrating the social system including the banking system. The seventh chapter studies the preventive measures of future banking crisis. Joining the WTO will lead to profound changes in China's banking and other social systems. The original favorable factors may be lost, and the unfavorable factors will gradually increase. Drawing lessons from the successful experience of Roosevelt's New Deal and South Korea, China can completely turn ex post facto behavior into ex post facto prevention, thus reducing the possible huge cost of the crisis. Bank safety net and social security safety net are the two most important systems to reduce or control the crisis cost.