Abstract: There are many reasons for the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises in China, among which the unreasonable capital structure is an important factor. On the basis of expounding the present situation and causes of capital structure of state-owned unlisted enterprises in China, this paper puts forward corresponding optimization strategies.
I. Introduction
There are two types of state-owned enterprises in China: listed and unlisted. State-owned listed companies have a reasonable property right structure after equity reorganization. However, there are still many problems in unlisted companies, such as high asset-liability ratio, single equity, unclear property rights relationship between the state and enterprises, which seriously affects the normal operation of enterprises. Seriously hindered the development of unlisted state-owned enterprises. Therefore, it is necessary to separate the ownership of state-owned assets from the ownership of enterprise property and realize the diversification of property rights of state-owned enterprises. According to the benefit principle of modern enterprise system, clarify the property right relationship of enterprises. Establish a system of responsibilities and rights that is compatible with the property rights relationship, so that all parties can perform their duties and benefit from each other, and ensure that the state-owned property is responsible for the whole process from input to output. Avoid the loss and waste of state-owned assets, so as to improve the operational efficiency of state-owned assets.
Second, China's non-listed state-owned enterprises capital structure of the status quo and causes analysis
(A) high asset-liability ratio
Property right ratio and asset-liability ratio are two main indicators to measure the degree of debt, and property right ratio is the basic indicator to reflect the stability of enterprise structure. The asset-liability ratio of state-owned enterprises in China from 2000 to 2005 was 60.99%, 59. 19%, 59.30%, 59.24%, 56.24% and 56.66% respectively. The proportion of property rights has remained at around 1.5. From the figures of asset-liability ratio in these years, it can be seen that most of the sources of funds of state-owned enterprises in China are obtained by liabilities, and the equity capital is seriously insufficient. The capital structure of state-owned enterprises is a high-risk financial structure, but the unlisted state-owned enterprises are more serious, with an average asset-liability ratio of 60% ~ 70%. The main reasons are as follows: First, the traditional state-owned property right system is unreasonable. Under the traditional state-owned property right system, the state is the sole owner of state-owned enterprises, and all the assets of enterprises are owned by the state. As a result, "big pot rice" has been implemented worldwide. The state centralizes government savings, and then distributes the savings funds to all needed areas. All the income of the enterprise is centralized by the state finance office, and even the depreciation fund is paid in full. Under this system, a financial-led approach has been formed. Enterprise financing channel is single, negative profit and loss, and production and operation funds depend on it. Enterprises have no motivation and constraints to minimize and maximize profits. Only talk about output value, not benefit, only talk about speed, scale, not efficiency, regardless of solvency and financial risks, enterprises simply do not have the concept of "capital structure", which makes the debts of state-owned enterprises increase continuously and the capital structure forms a deformed state. Second, the state, as an investor, has insufficient capital investment, which leads to excessive debts of state-owned enterprises. The state is the owner of state-owned enterprises, exercises the ownership of all or most of the assets of state-owned enterprises, and is the complete or main investor of enterprises. However, a considerable number of state-owned enterprises in China have not injected or injected enough capital as the largest investor in the process of scale expansion or even establishment. For a long time, most state-owned enterprises in China have been regarded as state-owned enterprises within the budget, and the finance of state-owned enterprises has been included in the fiscal budget, and the funds needed for enterprise production and operation have basically been allocated by the financial department free of charge. The enterprise's own capital and borrowed capital are not clearly defined, and banks as creditors of enterprises are allowed to fill the investment gap with loans instead of investors. Transferring the rights and interests that should have been invested by the state to the bank reduces the self-owned capital that the investor should have invested, and increases the borrowed capital of the enterprise out of thin air. And the bigger the enterprise, the more debt it has.
(B) poor solvency
Poor management and low economic benefits of state-owned enterprises are the main reasons for their poor solvency. For a long time, the management mechanism of state-owned enterprises is not perfect and the management level is low. After the economic system changed from planned economy to economy, it could not adapt to the fierce competition of other ownership enterprises, resulting in poor efficiency in the use of production funds and a shortage of funds for enterprises. Only by increasing debts can we maintain production and operation. However, due to poor management, the return on investment can't keep up with the cost of capital, which leads to poor solvency. On the other hand, there is a phenomenon that state-owned enterprises undertake too many business activities, and the commercialization of employees in state-owned enterprises also leads to unreasonable asset structure of state-owned enterprises. The proportion of non-operating assets is large, which greatly reduces the solvency of state-owned enterprises.
(C) single financing channels, general preference
The main reasons for China's state-owned enterprises' excessive preference for bank loan financing are as follows: First, due to the change of distribution policy, the capital injected by the state into enterprises has decreased and the profits and taxes paid by enterprises have increased. With little retention and insufficient development funds, I had to turn to the bank for help. Second, the development is relatively late, and few enterprises can directly raise funds through the securities market, especially non-listed state-owned enterprises, which are not qualified to go public through securities financing and can only rely on banks. Third, it is caused by the softening of bank budget constraints. Budget constraint means that the expenditure of an enterprise must not exceed the sum of its money stock and enterprise income, that is, it must make up its own expenditure with its own income. If an enterprise's expenditure is strictly controlled within its income, beyond which it will go bankrupt, then its budget constraint is hard: if it is possible for an enterprise to make its expenditure exceed its income in some way without worrying about bankruptcy, then its budget constraint is soft. At present, the budget constraints of state-owned enterprises in China are soft. Because state-owned enterprises bear various social responsibilities, they can bear profits but not losses. Even if the enterprise cannot repay the principal and interest to the bank due to losses, the bank may not be able to forcibly recover the assets of the enterprise through auction.
(4) The subject of rights and interests is single and the state-owned equity is high.
The incomplete restructuring of state-owned enterprises has led to a high proportion of state-owned shares and a single investor in state-owned enterprises. The arrangement of enterprise equity structure has an important influence on corporate governance structure and operation mechanism, which is not only reflected in the concentration or dispersion of enterprise equity, but also reflected in the characteristics of shareholders. At present, China's state-owned enterprises mainly include state shares, legal person shares, individual shares and foreign-funded shares. Although state-owned enterprises have become limited liability companies and joint-stock companies through restructuring, the proportion of state-owned shares is still very large. Moreover, it is difficult to form an effective corporate governance structure because of the lack of restraint and supervision mechanism for state-owned property rights. The most basic feature of the ownership structure of state-owned enterprises in China is state-owned shares. One share is dominant. "
As we all know, the equity of American companies is highly dispersed. Although the shares of Japanese enterprises are concentrated, they are mainly controlled by legal persons such as banks and enterprises, and all the shares of enterprises in developed capital markets can be listed and circulated, which is essentially different from the ownership structure of state-owned enterprises in China. State-owned shares account for more than half of the shares of state-owned enterprises in China, and the excessive concentration of shares encourages the speculation of major shareholders. Moreover, there are too many levels of principal-agent relationship of state-owned shares. The investment subject is not clear, and the constraints on state-owned enterprises are softened. There has been a phenomenon of "fuzzy governance" in which everyone can manage and no one can manage. The loss of state-owned assets is serious, and the agency of enterprises is on the rise.
Third, the optimization of the capital structure of unlisted state-owned enterprises.
(1) Deepen the system reform and solve the unreasonable capital structure from the system.
Reforming the system means establishing a system that adapts to the market, establishing a new investment and financing system and a modern enterprise system, and realizing that the market plays a fundamental role in resource allocation. To this end. The specific reform measures are as follows:
First, establish the main body of national investment, deepen the reform of government investment and financing system, completely separate government from enterprises, and fundamentally solve the problems of inefficient investment and rigid management; ● Economic benefits to prevent the loss of state-owned assets. Waste is serious.
The second is to standardize and gradually narrow the scope and areas of government investment. At present, the construction projects in China are divided into three categories. That is to say, competitive investment projects, basic investment projects and public welfare investment are the mainstay, while unlisted state-owned enterprises are mainly state-owned small and medium-sized enterprises. The business mainly focuses on competitive investment projects, and these enterprises should gradually push to the market in an all-round way, focusing on enterprise investment and financing, and appropriately guiding foreign investment. At the same time, gradually guide and encourage the public, enterprises and foreign investors to actively participate in social welfare projects and basic projects. The third is to establish a perfect enterprise bankruptcy system. Because the state-owned enterprises have no mechanism of survival of the fittest, the bankruptcy law of enterprises is not perfect enough, and bankruptcy is difficult to achieve, resulting in a large number of insolvent enterprises and shell enterprises. In order to survive, these enterprises have to borrow money to live. The heavier, the heavier. Moreover, some state-owned enterprises default on their debts, making it difficult to optimize their capital structure and solve excessive debts. Therefore, to optimize the capital structure of enterprises, it is necessary to establish a bankruptcy mechanism and enhance the sense of crisis and mission of state-owned enterprises.
Fourth, speed up the system construction, establish and improve the old-age insurance system, unemployment insurance system, medical insurance system and maternity insurance system. , thus stripping the social functions of enterprises, solving the social problems of enterprises and reducing the social burden of enterprises.
(B) The development of capital has created diversified financing opportunities and conditions for enterprises.
The problem faced by state-owned enterprises is that the formal capital structure is unreasonable. In essence, it is an unreasonable problem of system and even enterprise property right structure and internal governance structure. The irrationality mentioned here mainly refers to two aspects: first, in addition to indirect financing and direct government capital injection. Direct financing through the capital market has not been fully opened. Second, even if this channel is opened, if its function is limited to "circling money" and there is no corresponding change in the property right structure and internal governance structure of enterprises, then the old disadvantages such as low asset utilization efficiency and serious bad debts will still exist. The significance of developing capital market is that it may play a positive role in solving the above two problems. The problem of capital market is largely raised from the perspective of financing. For enterprises with high debts and in urgent need of funds, it is certainly a good thing to open up new sources of funds through the capital market, but for state-owned enterprises in transition, the more important significance of developing capital market is to promote the reform of financing system, create diversified financing opportunities and conditions for enterprises, promote the reform of enterprise property rights structure and internal governance structure, and then promote the optimization of capital structure of state-owned enterprises.
(3) discovering and cultivating new subjects. So as to expand investment in state-owned enterprises.
On the basis of clear property rights, try to diversify the investment subjects of state-owned enterprises. For state-owned enterprises that do not need state-owned capital, other corporate funds, personal funds and foreign capital can be appropriately absorbed, and the state can only hold shares; For state-owned enterprises that should be operated by the state alone, they should also be funded by two or more state-owned asset management institutions as far as possible. Diversification of investors, on the one hand, can broaden the sources of funds, enhance the strength of funds, and help form a reasonable capital structure; On the other hand, it can disperse risks and optimize the internal governance structure of enterprises.
(D) the establishment of a modern enterprise system, hardening the budget constraints.
State-owned enterprises should establish a modern enterprise system in accordance with the principles of "clear property rights, clear responsibilities, separation of government and enterprise, and scientific and reasonable", cut off dependence on the government and harden budget constraints. Make it compete fairly with other types of enterprises in the market. At the same time, it is necessary to clarify the relationship between the state as the owner and the operator, strengthen the supervision and assessment of the owner to the operator, continuously improve the internal governance structure of the enterprise, strengthen internal management and improve efficiency; Establish strict responsibility system and investment management responsibility system. In violation of the decision-making procedures blindly on the project, the decision-maker should bear the decision-making responsibility; If losses are caused by mistakes in decision-making, the responsible person shall be investigated for corresponding, economic and even responsibility; For operators, a mechanism should be established to link their performance with their future and interests. The improvement of enterprise's economic benefits and the establishment and improvement of risk restraint mechanism will help enterprises maintain a reasonable capital structure. Only in this way can state-owned enterprises develop healthily for a long time. ; Graduation thesis collection: graduated from paper network.