Introduction to fink-. Fink started his research from Husserl and Heidegger. He replaced Langeleb as Husserl's assistant with an award-winning paper "Imagination and Image", which was written for the competition in the university. Fink's topic was probably put forward by Husserl, who discussed it according to Husserl's phenomenological spirit (though not entirely according to his style). Obviously, after he succeeded Ranglebe as Husserl's assistant, his task as Husserl's assistant was obviously different from his own research, and he was more independent. Because Husserl needs a sensitive person after retirement, in order to understand the reaction of the outside world to his views. Fink once said that Husserl asked him to behave like a person who deliberately opposed him when discussing his new ideas. Husserl soon gave him the task of modifying and expanding the German version of Descartes meditation. Obviously, this task was not completed to Husserl's satisfaction, because nothing was published at that time. However, Husserl was particularly satisfied with some explanatory and defensive papers by Fink, especially the one published in Kant's Studies by 1933. He added a special preface to the paper, which was very consistent with Fink's language. Fink also suggested Husserl's transcendental phenomenology plan in 193 1, and worked out a two-volume plan of Time and Time with Husserl. Finally, Husserl even seems to think that Fink is the only one who can finish his unfinished business. Nevertheless, especially because of Fink's later criticism of Husserl, the nature of Fink's cooperation needs to be carefully studied. At that time, to what extent, I just tried to strengthen Husserl's position on phenomenological reduction, egoism and idealism, so as to test and popularize Husserl's views (but Fink himself did not have these views)? Obviously, many of Fink's expositions go far beyond what Husserl has found in his own articles so far. Fink stood by Husserl faithfully in the last few years when Husserl was under the shadow of Nazi threat, and kept Husserl Leuven's manuscript with Langelebe. After the war, he was appointed as a professor of philosophy and psychology at the University of Freiburg, and he worked in a new direction, which was in sharp contrast with Langueb. He even talked about the "prejudice" of phenomenology. At the first international symposium on phenomenology held in Brussels (195 1), he criticized phenomenology as abandoning metaphysics. He pointed out that Husserl's view contains some speculative elements that are not recognized by people, especially in the following aspects, such as interpreting Chen Sa as a phenomenon, asserting that the conceptual world is in a secondary position, failing to provide a clear meaning about the concept, and the phenomenological concept of life is vague. At the symposium in Krefeld (1956), especially in Loyolmont (1957), he repeated and expanded these criticisms. Fink's new philosophy is closer to Heidegger's research than Husserl's in general concept. Fink's ambition is to expand the scope of the title of Being and Time by supplementing the dimension of space and movement with Heidegger's emphasis on time, and in this way, even if "Being and the World" instead of "Being and Time" becomes the inherent scope of ontology. But Fink's "existence" is not Heidegger's "Sein", but the "Seiendes" in Hegel's philosophy, so existence is actually consistent with the world. Perhaps the most striking feature of Fink's philosophical research is that he described the basic philosophical experience as "surprise to the world facts", which is a puzzling spectacle. Fink thinks it has a function, which is to turn ordinary trivial things into something worth exploring. In the first volume of Phenomenology Series, Fink continued this new ideological line, and its leading purpose is said to be "to make the horizon of problem cosmology conflict with the phenomenological theme of Husserl and Heidegger's philosophy". The concept of phenomenon itself, like a special concept of motion, can only be discussed in connection with the presentation of existence. However, even non-Fink's phenomenology of "phenomenon" can be influenced by the development of some enlightening distinctions of Fink. His major works include Selected Works of Phenomenological Studies, The Essence of Enthusiasm, Reflections on the Early Ontological History of Space, Time and Movement, Being, Truth and the World: Prerequisites for Phenomenological Concepts, Being or Not: The Road to Philosophy, Language as a World Symbol, Metaphysics and Death, and Proximity and Interval. (Input Yu Xin, proofread Zhang Renzhi)