Zhang Xueliang said in an interview with Japanese state-run television on 1990 that he believed that "war is not in the interest of the Japanese government, and the Japanese government should restrain the Kwantung Army". Therefore, many people commented that Zhang Xueliang's non-resistance behavior was mainly due to the consistent implementation of the national government's non-resistance policy, which made him misjudge the purpose of the Japanese army. He thought that if he had known that the Japanese army was not "looking for trouble" but was annexing the Northeast, he would not have given the Northeast to Japan as a marshal. However, if we analyze it, we will know that this statement is not completely correct. If it is wrongly judged that Zhang Xueliang did not resist at the beginning of the September 18th Incident, it still makes sense. However, when the Japanese army began to advance to western Liaoning and attack Jinzhou in February 193 1, Japan's intention to annex the northeast was already obvious. Chiang Kai-shek, Sun Ke and Gu Weijun also ordered or persuaded Zhang Xueliang to resist in Jinzhou, but Zhang Xueliang still did not resist. Can this be explained by "misjudgment"?
In fact, Zhang adopted a policy of non-resistance on 9 18, mainly for the following reasons:
1, think that the national strength of China and Japan is very different, and China has no fighting capacity against Japan. 1928 10, Zhang Xueliang told the students of Northeastern University that he had visited Japan and saw the huge scene of groups of planes flying wildly and many ships jumping into the water. He believes that all Japanese armaments are superior to ours, and requires students to work hard and strive for strength. Deep down, Zhang Xueliang always thought that China had no strength on the issue of Japan. 193 1 On July 6, 2000, Zhang's telegram to the Northeast Administrative Committee fully reflected his thought: "At this time, if you go to war with Japan, you will lose. If it loses, the Japanese side will demand compensation from me, and the Northeast will be beyond redemption, and it is urgent to avoid conflicts. Justice and rotation. " It can be seen that Zhang Xueliang had a serious fear of Japan at that time.
2, misjudgment of the situation, including misjudgment of the domestic situation in Japan and dependence on the League of Nations. Due to frequent contacts with Japan, Zhang Xueliang knew that the Japanese domestic military had differences with the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on China, and the Japanese government and diplomats opposed the military's blind use of force. Moreover, at the beginning of the incident, on September 193 1, 19, the Japanese cabinet determined the policy of "no expansion"; 193 1 On September 24th, the Japanese government issued a statement accusing China of the wicker lake incident, but it also said that the Japanese army would "generally withdraw and gather in the railway subsidiary". However, Zhang Xueliang did not realize that the Japanese military, the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were only different in means, and they were consistent in safeguarding and expanding their interests in Manchuria. Unexpectedly, the Japanese government and the provincial capital of foreign affairs gradually merged with the military. Zhang Xueliang also placed too high hopes on the League of Nations. It stands to reason that Zhang Xueliang misjudged the reasons for not resisting at the beginning of the incident. (However, as the Japanese army further attacked Hei Province and Jinzhou, the League of Nations weakened obviously. It is unreasonable to say that Zhang continued to resist because of his misjudgment. )
3. Preserve the strength of the Northeast Army and rely on the central thinking. After all, Zhang Xueliang is a local strength faction born out of the old warlords. Although he does have a patriotic side, the interests of individuals and small groups also hold considerable weight in his heart. 193 1, 10 On February 29th, Zhang Xueliang told Wang Huayi that the Northeast Army could not break tiles. If it is broken into jade, it is ok, but it is not necessary. Jade crushing refers to the national war of resistance, and tile crushing refers to the independent northeast war of resistance. Zhang Xueliang's meaning is clear. To resist Japan, the whole country will resist Japan, and the whole army will fight and sacrifice together. It is impossible for the Northeast Army to sacrifice him. What's more, even if the three northeastern provinces fall, Zhang Xueliang still owns several provinces such as Jehol and Hebei.
4, covet comfort, depression, low ability. In his later years, Zhang Xueliang told people frankly that when he was young, he came to everything and liked women and gambling best. After living in Ping Jin, I covet comfort and pursue an absurd life intoxicated by money. Moreover, as commander-in-chief, Zhang Xueliang has a hobby of taking drugs and is deeply addicted to them. After the fall of the Jehol, Hu Shi once criticized: "Zhang Xueliang's physical strength and spirit, knowledge and training can't withstand such a major and critical situation." This kind of comment is also quite appropriate for the previous September 18th incident.
It can be seen that the key figure in September 18th was Zhang Xueliang, not Chiang Kai-shek. If it was a loyal opposition at that time, it was most likely to form a deadlock. The Japanese occupied parts of northeast China.
Japan's China strategy is a nibbling strategy.
At that time, Japan implemented the Outline of National Defense Policy formulated by Shintaro Ishihara, chief of staff of the General Staff. The order of imaginary enemies put forward is America and Sue. First of all, the Soviet Union gave up its offensive strategy and replaced it with "after completing the armament enrichment and preparing for a protracted war, it first began to work actively to force the Soviet Union to give up its attempt to attack the Far East as soon as possible", that is, to negotiate with the Soviet Union with force as the backing and not to be an enemy.
For the United States, it is "trying to maintain friendly relations with the United States" because Ishihara knows that Japan and Manchuria are rich in coal and iron resources, but they lack the most important strategic resources: oil and rubber. That thing is all in the hands of Americans and British people. Don't turn against Americans. As long as it doesn't turn against Britain and the United States, Ishihara thinks that Britain and the United States will acquiesce in the existence of "Manchukuo", because Manchuria, controlled by the Japanese, just eliminates the worries of capitalism going south for Britain and the United States.
The strategy for China is to "do a good job in stabilizing Japanese Manchuria and the northern branch (North China) and complete the basic work of preparing for a protracted war" and oppose the expansion of the war. That is to say: provoke the civil war in the northwest, establish Manchukuo at the same time, consolidate North China, stop the Russians from going south, then infiltrate into Southeast Asia, get Malaya rubber and Brunei oil, and at the same time crowd out the British, strive to reach out to "East India" (Dutch colony east indies, now Indonesia) to ensure oil supply, and then "decisive battle" with the United States. In the early 1930s, Japan also planned to jointly capture Wuhan by the navy and the army. However, in Ishihara's plan, in view of the strengthening of the China government, Japan gave up the plan to capture Wuhan once it went to war, because that was not allowed by Japan's national strength. In fact, at that time, Japanese decision-making bodies wavered on whether to fully invade China after the Lugouqiao Incident on July 7, and the "non-expansionists" represented by Shimonoseki, the second chief of staff, temporarily gained the upper hand. Ishihara was a very powerful figure at that time, because the chief of staff, Prince Zairen, was nominally a royal family, and the real power of the military department was in the hands of the second chief of staff, Ishihara. Ishihara even advocated: "We can withdraw all our troops stationed in North China to the border of Shanhaiguan Manchukuo in one fell swoop, and then the Prime Minister's Guards will personally fly to Nanjing to have a heart-to-heart talk with Chiang Kai-shek to solve the fundamental problems between Japan and China." (Base Camp Operations Department, volume 1, Chaoyun News Agency, 1974, p. 452). Itaro Ishikawa, director of the East Asia Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also planned the Adjustment and Armistice Plan of Japan-China Diplomatic Relations and the Work of Ships and Tianjin. 1at the end of July and the beginning of August, 937, ishihara greeted the Japanese leader Lu Haijun with a smile and insisted on "cleaning up the mess by diplomatic means". Therefore, Itaro made a "comprehensive diplomatic adjustment plan" and "armistice conditions" with the army and provincial authorities. The plan was unanimously agreed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Army Province and the Navy Province, and Premier Fumimaro Konoe immediately expressed his support. Itaro Shi She entrusted the plan to Tatsuichiro Funasu, chairman of the Japanese Textile Association in China, who asked the latter to confide the plan to Gao Zongwu, director of the Asian Department of the Nanjing Foreign Ministry, in order to test China's attitude. On August 9th, Chuanjin and Gao Zongwu held talks in Shanghai. On the same day, Japanese Ambassador to China Chuan Yue also held talks with Gao Zongwu. Japan's plan is to return to the state before the Lugouqiao Incident in exchange for the official recognition of Manchukuo in Northeast China by the National Government. The "August 13th Incident" just broke out. After China's army attacked the Japanese army in Shanghai, Ishihara was forced to resign, and the commander-in-chief of the Japanese army decided to invade China in an all-round way.
All-round War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression broke out