About the author Neville Maxwell (UK)

Translator Zheng Jingyan

According to the editor, Neville Maxwell is a famous British scholar. After 1959, he served as a reporter for The Times in South Asia for a long time and witnessed the whole process of India's war against China. 1967 After returning to China, he entered the School of Asian and African Studies of University of London to study the history of the Sino-Indian border and the Sino-Indian border conflict. 1970 published the book India's War against China, which had great international influence. Since then, Maxwell has continued to pay attention to and study the development of Sino-Indian relations, and has written a series of related papers and articles. Reflection on Sino-Indian Border Disputes is his latest work, which was published in the first issue of Indian Economic and Political Weekly (Volume 34,No. 15) on April/6, 199910. Based on years of observation and increasing new historical data, the author confirms that India created the 1962 border dispute. It refused to negotiate on this issue and then tried to realize its demands by force. China's military counterattack is justified both strategically and politically, and the Indian policy really leaves Beijing with no other realistic choice. India's unprovoked invasion is a self-comforting myth, and the unresolved border issue between China and India is the result of Nehru's policy.

Through reflection on the border dispute between China and India, the author draws the following conclusions: 1. The border war between China and India can be completely avoided; 2. India is responsible for the failure to solve the border issue for decades before and after the border war; Third, it was India's policy that pushed the diplomatic deadlock to the battlefield. If the Indian government continues this policy, it may lead to a recurrence of the war.

The abstract of this paper was published in Resources in June 1999, June 12 and June 13.

Upper guide bearing

The Nehru government tried to decide the location of the Sino-Indian border by itself, and then imposed its chosen border on Beijing, refusing to negotiate on it. This means that unless Beijing gives in to India's territorial claims to the area north of the Aksai Chin and McMahon lines, conflicts are inevitable. China's military action in 1962 was to strike back and pre-empt, comforting itself that it was a myth that India was "invaded for no reason". The fact that the Sino-Indian border has not been resolved is the result of Nehru's policies, which have been strictly followed by all previous governments except the government of Narasingha Rao.

First, "China 1962 invasion": the big Indian lie.

Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee talked about China's "armed aggression against India in 1962" and the unresolved border dispute between China and India (note: A.B. Vajpayee's letter to President Clinton, new york Times, 1998 5). )。 From Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian political class insisted from the beginning that border disputes and border wars were the result of China's expansion, and finally its sudden "large-scale aggression" against India led to the disintegration of its army. On the contrary, China accused India of being stubborn and expanding its territory, and described India's military actions as counterattack and pre-emptive. Based on the observation accumulated in the past 40 years and new materials, it is time to reflect on the reasons for the unresolved policies of the two governments leading to wars and border disputes.

When India and People's Republic of China (PRC) began to exist in the middle of this century, they faced the same task: to transform their borders into borders. In fact, this is a basic formal expression of their new identity as a modern country, because they began to imitate and catch up with those European countries that advocated the implementation of new political mechanisms because of the emergence of nationalism and the rise of nation-states in the first three centuries; This new political mechanism is the border: a line (demarcation) agreed through diplomatic negotiations, jointly marked on the ground (demarcation), accurately printed on the map, and described in the treaty between two neighboring sovereign countries, so they recognize their own territory and the territory of their neighbors. (Note: The definitions and arguments here come from ansley T. Emberley's enlightening paper "Borders: Evolution of Modern Countries". See Imagining India: Essays on Indian History (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 6544). Pre-modern countries can exist within national boundaries, which are not lines, but transitional zones and regions between countries: modern countries need national boundaries.

As far as China is concerned, when People's Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, the Sino-Indian border issue was considered to be an important issue, but it was a minor factor in the huge task of reaching an agreement on tens of thousands of miles that are usually inaccessible and accurately delineating the sovereignty border in the negotiation or repeated negotiations between about a dozen countries adjacent to China. Many surrounding areas reflect the culmination of the foreign powers' aggression against the Chinese Empire, and the ousted Kuomintang authorities left a promise to recover these "lost lands" for the sake of national reunification. Newcomers in Beijing realize that accepting this legacy will inevitably lead to intractable quarrels with many neighboring countries, especially the most dangerous quarrel with the Soviet Union, which is the successor of the vast territory of the Far East of the Chinese Empire annexed by Russia according to the imposed Aihui Treaty (1858) and the Beijing Treaty (1860). Therefore, they decided that the new China would solve the border issue according to the route left to them by history. Zhou Enlai used the opportunity of the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung in 1955 to show its government's attitude:

..... some borders with some countries have not been demarcated. We are prepared to define these borders with our neighbours. Until then, we agree to maintain the status quo and acknowledge that the undetermined border has not yet been determined. We prevent our government and people from crossing the border. If such a thing happens, we are willing to point out our mistakes and return to China immediately. As for how to determine the border with neighboring countries, we can only use peaceful methods, and there is no other way. Under no circumstances will we change this practice. (Note: International Affairs Document 1955 (OUP, London, 1958), p. 423. (Translator's Note: The quotation here is slightly different from the text on page 10 of Selected Works of Zhou Enlai Diplomacy).

The development since then shows the extreme importance of this policy statement, so it is worth analyzing. The first step for Zhou Enlai to solve the border issue is to announce that some paragraphs have not been demarcated and need to be determined. Then there is the agreement to maintain the status quo. The two sides strictly maintain the status quo, and if there is anything beyond the border, they should immediately admit and correct it. Thirdly, he looked forward to future negotiations and promised that China would only use peaceful methods to resolve territorial disputes. Finally, he warned that China would not allow any other way, which meant that if neighboring countries used force, they would respond with force. (Note: If we read Zhou Enlai's statement about what happened on the Sino-Indian border five years ago, it seems logical that he had a good understanding of his attitude towards India at that time, because the previous military redeployment, public statement and cartographic requirements have clearly indicated the pattern of opposition between India and China. )

For most of the next half century, China consistently and strictly implemented the policies formulated by Zhou Enlai, and achieved obvious and now almost complete success. Negotiations were held with Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Mongolia, North Korea and Laos, and border treaties were signed. Now, the negotiations are proceeding in an orderly manner: with Vietnam, and within the scope permitted by New Delhi, with Bhutan; As for Russia and the Central Asian countries of the former Soviet Union, the negotiations have been completed and an agreed border has been reached, except that the disputes in several specific places have not been resolved and need to be resolved at an undetermined date in the future to prevent misunderstanding. In three cases, the "peaceful way" was replaced by armed forces: with India, the Soviet Union and Vietnam.

On the Sino-Soviet border, Moscow initially refused to renegotiate the19th century treaties, according to which the Tsar annexed a large part of the territory of the Qing Empire which later became Siberia and coastal provinces, suspecting that Beijing's insistence on negotiations contained the intention of recovering the territory. Conflicting interpretations of various treaties regarding amur river/Heilongjiang and Ussuri/Ussuri rivers as boundary rivers led to the Soviet Union's use of force to defend its exclusive rights to the whole river and all the islands in it, while China's resistance led to armed conflict between the two neighboring countries in 1969, which led to the brink of nuclear war. (Note: See the papers published by the author in the following journals: China Quarterly (1 973 1 0-12), Pacific Ocean (1,1) and Modern China (65438). 1,/autumn of kloc-0/958), international affairs (vol. 47, 1, 1,1). )

It was not until 1987, under the leadership of Gorbachev, that the Soviet Union agreed to renegotiate the Sino-Soviet border, and accepted the relevant principles of international law, that is, in the absence of any contrary treaty, the navigability of the border river meant that the separation of the two sovereignty was not on the banks of the China, which Moscow once advocated, but on the waterway boundary line (along an imaginary line in the deepest part of the main river). As a result, two neighboring coastal countries shared the right to use the river equally. Beijing immediately responded to Gorbachev's position of overthrowing his predecessor, and the negotiations started soon, and a treaty was signed at an appropriate time, drawing the exact boundary needed for the Sino-Soviet border between the rivers in the east of China and the western border. The heads of state of China and Russia met in Beijing, and announced that it is a "model for solving problems left over from history" to solve the border issue between the two countries through negotiations on the basis of equality, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. (Note: For the original text, see World Affairs (New Delhi), Vol.2, 1, 1998,1-March, p.39.. Central Asian countries of the former Soviet Union have also solved the border problem with Beijing.

As for Vietnam, China, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, launched an attack aimed at "teaching a lesson" under the pretext of a border dispute of only a few hundred meters-it must be admitted that the lesson is China's hegemony. This interruption is the only harmful exception to China's principled and pragmatic position on solving the border issue in other aspects.

Compared with the importance of China's border issue, India faced fewer tasks when it gained independence from British rule in 1947. The vast area of India's border has long been transformed into the border of the departing empire. In the partition of Pakistan, the international boundaries were determined by the Radcliffe Committee according to the administrative divisions that have always been domestic; After many wars and annoying negotiations, the British have agreed to Indonesia's border and demarcated it, that is, erected boundary markers on the ground, and cooperated with two other Himalayan countries, Sikkim and Bhutan (Note: J. R.V Prescott: Drawing a map of the Asian continent through treaties (Melbourne University Press, 1975). ) also basically completed the same work. However, the British governments in London and India failed to reach an agreement with China to demarcate the Sino-Indian border. (Note: For a brief description of these attempts, please refer to the author's Indian War against China (Jonathan Cape Company, London, 1970). For a comprehensive discussion, please refer to alastair Lamb's historical research series, especially the two-volume McMahon Line (Ruterle Hezhi Jigan Bauer Company, London, 1996) and Tibet, China and India1914-/kloc. ) in the east, and later became the northeast border special zone adjacent to Tibet after independence. In the west, Ladakh is located in the Indian-controlled state of Jammu and Kashmir, bordering Xinjiang and Tibet. There is only the boundary, that is, the area where the sovereignty line was originally separated but not yet determined. When the administrative management of two new countries extends to the border areas and conflicts inevitably occur, there is a potential conflict and negotiations are needed.

When the executive authorities contacted, the attitude of absolute conflict between Beijing and New Delhi immediately became obvious.

In a word, Zhou Enlai's attitude towards China expounded in Bandung and practiced in the future looks forward to the following steps: (1) Identify and announce those areas that need to be demarcated with neighboring governments; (2) Agree with neighboring countries to maintain the status quo, so as to avoid the danger of conflicts and casualties when patrol personnel contact in advance; (3) Considering existing treaties, current positions, traditional activities and customs, etc. Negotiate a border agreement that is satisfactory to both parties; (4) Establish a joint border committee to mark the agreed border on the ground; (5) Sign a new comprehensive border treaty.

Before briefly describing the elements of Jawaharlal Nehru's position for India in the early years after India's independence, it is necessary to consider the nature and historical background of Indian nationalism, which has had a far-reaching impact on the Nehru government's attitude towards solving the Sino-Indian border issue. (Note: Steven A. Hoffman was the first scholar who realized how important Indian nationalism was in the policy evolution and implementation of New Delhi when studying the Sino-Indian dispute. See his Indian and China Crisis (University of California Press, 1990), which can be seen everywhere. )

In 1950s and 1960s, there were obvious differences between the following two different trends of Indian nationalism: on the one hand, secularism, on the other hand, religion, specifically Hinduism; But for the two of them, the principle they defined for imaginary India was the territorial principle, which established a connection between two apparently opposing ideological systems in the concept of "sacred geography". The bloody division of 1947 may be regarded as shaking or even destroying the absolute concept that India's territorial boundaries are determined by history, but for secular Indian nationalists who believe in Hinduism, the effect is just the opposite; Any internal or external territorial challenge is regarded as an attempt to desecrate this sacred geography. (Note: Ashutosh Varshney, Controversial Significance: Indian National Identity, Hindu Nationalism and Anxiety Politics), Daedalus122,3. )

The hotbed of two varieties of Indian nationalism lies in the elite who hate Britain and are cultivated by British rulers according to their own image. This class has gone through different stages of development-from the gentry class, through the challenger movement to inheriting power. The great debate of that era was about the historical identity of India before the establishment of British rule. The mainstream British view expressed by John Strachey in India (published in 1888) is that "even according to the European point of view, India, as a country, has never had any tangible, political, social or religious unity". When trying to define India's borders, the British don't think they are marking an existing country, but on the contrary-creating and expanding a political entity by defining its borders. This entity is not a nation-state, but just "an empire like other empires, a collection of different territories and people gathered by British military strength, diplomatic skills and fraudulent means for many years, and then maintained its existence by forcibly pushing the British to control non-British people." (Note: alastair Lamb: Incomplete Division: 1947- 1948 Origin of Kashmir Dispute (Origin of Kashmir Dispute1947-1948) (Roxford Buchs Company, Hertingford). )

However, when this new multilingual elite grew into its challenger stage, they discovered the main feature of their national identity, a language (although it is a foreign language, that is, English), and they began to identify themselves as members and representatives of the "Indian people", whose existence was denied by Strachey and his contemporaries. A few years later, the argument evolved by Indian nationalists to support their demands for political power has become a firm belief that there has been a country clearly defined by culture, common experience, customs and geographical location since ancient times. (Note: Hoffman, op. cit. , page 25. This concept has become a prism related to personal feelings and attitudes for Nehru government to examine and solve the Sino-Indian border issue. If India "has existed since ancient times", what followed in the minds of the first leaders after India's independence was that its "traditional and customary boundaries have long existed and naturally evolved, because they are based on demographic and cultural activities and geographical features such as ridges and watersheds". (Note: Hoffman, op. cit. , page 25. In fact, "the northern border has been in its present position for about three thousand years". (Note: Indian government's explanation on the historical background of Indian Himalayan border, white paper (Volume II), p. 125. As a result of inference, India's "historical boundary" must be composed of lines ",that is, it is exact. (Note: Hoffman, op. cit. , page 25. )

The outline of this theory can be traced back to the diplomatic dispute between India and Beijing on the border issue. But its most detailed exposition appeared in a book written by an Indian official named T.S. Murty, pretending to be an academic work and advocating Indian views. The Indian official has been closely involved in his government's handling of border disputes. (Note: Frontier: A Changing Concept (Palit, New Delhi, 1978). Murti is an official of the Indian border department. It was after the field investigation in the late 1950s that he proposed that the eastern boundary should be located in Tagra Ridge, rather than a few miles to the south as McMahon said. He later became a member of a group of Indian officials who drafted a report on the historical evolution of the border after the failure of the Nehru Zhou Enlai meeting. Murti believes that the exact dividing line between boundary and boundary exists through human natural interaction, which is a "historical consolidation process" or "crystallization"; Only one of the two countries concerned needs effective recognition. This kind of "historical demarcation" eliminates the necessity of "formalization" through the diplomatic process, and dilutes it into a kind of "decoration" in the process of forming the real border bred by history. In his view, it is enough for the legitimate government to "publicly announce" a line to finally determine the boundary, and "formalization" is unnecessary.

From this ideological point of view adopted by the Indian government, the inevitable result is that, unlike other countries, India has a fixed border with China, so negotiations become redundant, instead of thinking that it is necessary to negotiate with neighboring countries to reach an agreement on the direction of its border. For the Indian government, the only thing to do is to "discover" the exact direction of the border between the country and China by studying its own archives, referring to history and myths, and considering security interests. Once the appropriate direction is determined, it can be published and drawn on the map. Just as Jawaharlal Nehru had to give instructions to his government, India should set up outposts "along the whole border, especially those places that may be controversial"; The resulting guard boundary will be "not allowed to discuss with anyone." (Note: Excerpted from Nehru's Circular on the Northern Border distributed to relevant ministries and commissions in July 1954. It was originally a secret, but it was not officially published, but it was read by Indian writer D.R. Mankekar and quoted in his book 1962 The Guilty Man (Mumbai Dulcea Company, 1968), p. 1968. Mankekar asked the author to share the original manuscript, which was first published in the Indian War against China. )

In this way, (1) India insists that the border with China has been completely demarcated; (2) Push the state power to the territory it advocates as soon as possible; (3) refusing to reach any agreement on maintaining the status quo before India controls all the territories it claims to own; (4) At all stages, they refused to negotiate the border trend they advocated. The above points are absolutely contradictory to China's attitude. In short, they are tantamount to insisting that, in Indian view, demarcation and consolidation of the border with China is a unilateral process.

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