This is the same view of strategists at home and abroad, from clausewitz (1780- 183 1) to B.H. Liddehart (1895- 1970).
As b·h· liddell hart said: "History is the experience of the world, which is longer, wider and more complicated than any individual's experience." Therefore, he used a question as the title of one of his books: (Why not learn from history? Why don't we learn from history? )。
For 45 years, I have been engaged in strategic research. In this process, I often feel that there is a subtle relationship between strategic research and historical research. Although historians are not necessarily strategists, strategists seem to be amateur historians. If I classify my personal writing and translation, I can find that there are far more discussions about the history of war than the strategic theory. In fact, clausewitz and B.H. liddell Hart are the same, so it can be said that this is a normal phenomenon.
Over the years, I have written and translated many works on the history of war, besides monographs, there are many short articles, most of which are published in journals, and even I can't count the number. Over time, some of these papers may have lost their original value, but some articles are still available for reference today.
Unfortunately, however, many of these articles are hard to find, and even those who want to read and quote them will find it inconvenient to publish them in different journals, which leads me to choose some old works to compile prose collections.
This collection is entirely about the analysis and review of the history of war. The number of papers collected is 16, which is divided into two parts. The former is about the history of China, and the latter is about the history of the West, with eight articles each. The latter deals with the First World War, while the Second World War, due to its proximity and many problems, has been compiled into another anthology, namely the published Review and Reflection on the Second World War.
My research on the history of war stems from the study of strategy, and the scope of his writing naturally focuses on the west and modern times. Therefore, for China and the ancient part, the efforts invested in the past are relatively limited. In recent years, due to the age, I have seen more than I have learned, so it is necessary to trace back to ancient history, especially our ancient history.
I can make small achievements in the field of strategy and war history, thanks to the enlightenment and guidance of the late old superior General Xiao Yisu. Xiao Gong has a lot of research on the ancient history of our country, especially his incisive views on "the time of Qin and Chu" and "Han Xin used troops", which is admirable. The two papers I wrote were generally based on their past comments. Xiao Gong died many years ago, and every time I read it, I still miss him infinitely.
In his later years, B.h· liddell hart pointed out that history was his most interested academic field, and I seem to feel the same way today. The lessons of history are so profound, but what mankind has learned from them is so shallow. Isn't this a question worth pondering?
-Clock written in 1997.
Excerpts from books
For those who study war, the history of China is an undeveloped treasure house. There are too many materials worth studying, but not many people are engaged in this kind of research, and some results are limited. It is difficult to write a complete history of China War.
However, if we can extract some fragments from the history and analyze them carefully, it will still be a fundamental work, especially to arouse the interest of the younger generation in the study of China's war history.
The choice of historical materials should have two criteria:
(1) enough records can be found in the historical records for accurate analysis. This is very important, because the records of war in China's history books are often too simple. Therefore, although many facts are well known, they cannot be carefully analyzed. Historical research is a science, and it is absolutely not allowed to speculate out of thin air.
(2) The war itself is of sufficient importance, that is to say, this battle is a key to the historical evolution, which is the so-called "decisive battle". What needs to be added is that ancient wars are generally short-lived, and often only one battle is the core. Therefore, war and campaign are inseparable in meaning, and there is even no need to distinguish them.
The concept of "critical analysis" originated from CadVOIlClausewitz. He said that accurate analysis is a bridge between theory and practice, and its purpose is to help overcome the gap between them.
Its contents include three points: (1) the discovery and explanation of suspicious facts; (2) Tracing the reasons from the results; (3) Draw lessons from history, including praise and criticism.
The theme chosen in this paper is the Battle of Chengpu in Chu Jin during the Spring and Autumn Period. Why did you make such a choice? The reason is that it meets the above criteria:
(1) (Zuo Zhuan) and (Mandarin) have quite good records of the autumn war. In particular, from the perspective of war research, the value of Zuo Zhuan far exceeds that of other historical books in later generations.
(2) In the eyes of fire war historians, this meeting should be regarded as a veritable decisive battle, which can be used as an example and provide some meaningful lessons in the strategic field, so it is worthy of in-depth analysis.
In western history, it can really be said that it is a great star, but it is Alexander the Great who has the highest generation, the most admired by future generations and the enduring reputation. Hannibal lecter, Julius Caesar, Napoleon and so on. They are all respected as famous names by later generations, but if compared with Alexander, they will inevitably fall behind.
There are at least two things that other famous players can't compare with him:
(1) Other famous players will always have a record of failure in their lives, but Alexander was almost invincible in his short life.
(2) Later military scientists or historians will criticize other famous soldiers and give them different praises, but for Alexander, there is almost no other discussion except praise.
Is Alexander really that great? Is it because time is too long, the history of faith is difficult to verify, so it is natural to send him to the realm of myth? This is a very interesting and meaningful question, which deserves further discussion.
Here we must first explain why we should learn from this great commander-in-chief and his generals. B.H. liddell Hart once pointed out that soldiers and others; Unlike other majors, he can't often engage in this major. War seems to be accidental, and many generals have never even fought in their lives.
However, Bismarck once reminded us: "A fool says he learns from experience, but I prefer to use other people's experience." Bismarck's words make us realize that there are two different forms of experience, one is direct experience and the other is indirect experience. The latter is broader and more valuable. Even if a soldier's life is rich and colorful, his direct war experience may still be very limited, and the scope of application of this limited direct experience is bound to be quite narrow. On the contrary, the value of indirect experience lies in its complexity and broad scope.
Therefore, B.H. liddell Hart believes that "history is the experience of the universe", which is not only the experience of another person, but also the experience of many others under various conditions.
Therefore, it is completely reasonable to take the history of war as the basis of military education. However, for the study of Jiang Dao, it seems that it is not enough to study history only, because the advantage of history is objective and concise, and the disadvantage is that it is completely impersonal. Therefore, the people we see in history seem to have seen them on X-rays, only the bones are not flesh and blood. If a soldier wants to learn how to be a general, he must imitate the famous soldiers in history as real people, and even put himself in the position of the ancients to consider the problems at that time.
Therefore, learning to master Tao is much more difficult than studying the history of war, because the latter is only a scientific effort, while the former must enter the realm of three techniques.
As Napoleon said, "Take the offensive like Alexander and Hannibal ...: Read and review their records of 83 battles and take them as examples." This is the only way to become famous and learn the secrets of art. "
In short, if you want to learn the essence of generals, you must study the biographies of famous generals, preferably his own memoirs, but unfortunately, only modern famous generals will leave such records. Nevertheless, after digging and sorting out by some sages, we have accumulated a lot of information about the words and deeds of western generals for future generations to learn from. At least for a beginner, you may think there is too much material.
People who study the history of war often like the new and hate the old, and are unwilling to make an in-depth analysis of ancient records, because they are not only far away from the present, but also incomplete in the history of war, and the background of the times is different, which may have less enlightenment to the present and the future.
Therefore, clausewitz once advocated extracting historical examples from modern military history, because from there, we can get a more appropriate understanding and evaluation of present and future wars.
More than 80 years have passed since the First World War (1914-1918). According to the standards set by historians, it is still in the modern scope, but it is really far away now, especially because of the progress of science and technology, the form of war has changed a lot. Can the experience of more than 80 years ago still provide the current war research?
As far as tactics and technology are concerned, the enlightenment that World War I can provide may be really limited, but from the perspective of strategy and strategy, there are still many places worthy of in-depth study in the history of World War I. First of all, it should be pointed out that the ontology of war is people, not things. Although weapons and technology can change a lot, the basic principles of war (especially operational command) usually change little. In World War I, there were many famous soldiers and many important battles, and these records are still quite complete today. If we can analyze them accurately, it will be not only beneficial, but also interesting.
Unfortunately, there are not many people who study the history of western wars, and the research objects are mostly limited to the world of the Second Han Dynasty. World War I seems to have been forgotten.
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, it reminds everyone of the history of World War I, on the other hand, it puts forward a case from this era as a reference for studying strategy and tactics. This case includes a famous soldier and a decisive battle, namely the battles of Hindenburg and Tannengburg.
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Book excerpts 2
Battle of Gaixia
The dispute between Chu and Han began in August of the first year of Chu and Han (206 BC). Since then, for three consecutive years, Han has always been at a disadvantage. Liu bang faced the danger of collapse several times in Xingyang and Gaoping's defense front, and even Liu bang himself only narrowly escaped the difficulties.
However, in October of the fourth year of Chu and Han Dynasties (203 BC), the whole situation began to take a new turn. First of all, Liu Bang took advantage of Xiang Yu's eastward expedition to Wei Zhiji and launched a counterattack in Henan to challenge the occupied Chu army. As a result, the Chu army was defeated, and its leaders Cao Blame and Sima Xin both drowned themselves. So Liu Bang recovered the elevation, defended Guangwu and restored his original position.
Then, in November, there was the great victory of Weishui in Han Xin. This war not only wiped out the elite of the Chu army, but also completed the conquest of Qi. So Han Xin began to plan to go straight to Cheng Peng to fully realize his grand strategic vision. The Chu army suffered two defeats in a row in two months, and the total loss of troops may be between 200,000 and 300,000, which is even more incalculable for morale.
To make matters worse, Xiang Yu broke his old habit again. He refused to fight Peng Yue, who was about to be destroyed, but turned to attack Liu Bang. So he wasted his time and energy, not only got nothing, but also made the situation worse than in the past. Only in this way can Liu Canbang support Xingyang, Gaoping and Guangwu Triangle 1 1 month.
In August of the following year (the first 202 years, according to the calendar at that time, or the fourth year of Chu and Han dynasties), the two sides finally reached an agreement to share the world equally according to the gap. So the two sides made a temporary truce. In September, Liu Bang accepted Sean's and Chen Ping's advice, and broke the contract to pursue the Chu army that had already returned to the East, which led to the last scene of the Chu-Han War-the Battle of Gaixia.
In the winter of the fifth year of Chu and Han Dynasties (202 years ago), Liu Bang led an army of more than 65,438+10,000 people to the south (now Taikang County) and stopped, in order to wait for the arrival of troops from Han Xin and Peng Yue. Xiang Yu heard that Liu Bang had broken his word and led an army of about 65,438+10,000 people to stop in this area. When Liu Bang arrived in Guling (now northwest of Huaiyang County), Xin Yue Army had not yet arrived. Xiang Yu pursued the victory and defeated the pursuers, forcing Liu Bang to build fortifications on the spot and stick to aiding Vietnam. It was not until Xin and the Vietnamese soldiers arrived that the Battle of Gaixia began.
Han Xin let stay in Qi, led his generals Kong and He, and led tens of thousands of troops south. Take the cavalry in its infancy as the vanguard, first break Cheng Peng, and then go straight from northern Jiangsu to eastern Henan, and go straight behind Xiang Yu. Subsequently, Liu Bang and Han Xin attacked, and Xiang Yu's army suffered about 10,000 casualties and retreated to Gaixia, so the Qi and Han armies joined forces in Akun (south of Luyi County).
It was November, and Peng Yue, Lu Bu and other soldiers had arrived. Under the command of Liu Bang and the unified command of Han Xin, the China vassal army of about 300,000 people continued to pursue Xiang Yu. After Xiang Yu chased Gaixia (south bank of Suishui, 200 kilometers away from Guling), he retreated and assembled 90,000 people to prepare for the final battle.
So Han Xin also immediately began to expand its power. General Kong lives on the left, General Fei lives on the right, and the letter pretends to be in the middle. After Liu Bang left, He Chai was appointed as Liu Bang's rear guard. (The above is completely based on historical books, and the strength is not recorded. As for how to match the soldiers of the princes, it is also impossible to verify. But according to this record, there is no doubt that Han Xin is responsible for the planning and execution of the campaign. )
Han Xin first led the army to attack, and Xiang Yu rose up and resisted. XinJun should not retreat, xiang yu 56-point thrashing. So Kong and Fei immediately attacked the two armies, and Han Xin returned to the army to take it. The Chu army was defeated on three sides. Xiang Yu built a barrier defense, and Han Xin immediately mobilized 300,000 soldiers to surround the Chu army, ready to annihilate it all.
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