In modern western philosophy, many philosophers insist on the correspondence theory of truth or the objectivity of truth, among which Talsky and Popper are the most famous. However, philosophical schools and philosophers who oppose correspondence theory or replace correspondence theory with some form of continuity theory are overwhelmingly dominant. The first wave of attacks on conformity theory was initiated by pragmatists and New hegelianism. New hegelianism generally adopts the typical breakthrough theory, which interprets truth as the consistency between judgments or appearances. Pragmatists put forward a new form of breakthrough theory. For example, Peirce defines truth as something that is proved under ideal research conditions or accepted at the end of the research. This so-called new form is called "confirmation theory".
At the beginning of the 20th century, many empiricists, including members of the Vienna School and thorough empiricists, rejected the whole concept of "truth" as "metaphysical". For example, Dewey replaced the concept of truth with "rational certainty". Later, more empiricists agreed with Peirce's point of view, that is, whether the theory is true or not was replaced by whether the theory is the best. They think that asking and answering "Is the best scientific theory true?" Meaningless.
The representative of a new generation of pragmatism not only opposes transcendental philosophy's argument that conceptual forms must conform to intuitive content, but also opposes scientific realists' efforts to find a special relationship between language and the world. They emphasize that theory and the world we know are the same thing, and think that the whole process of modern epistemology defending empirical science is futile. In this way, pragmatism eventually evolved into historical relativism.
Kuhn and others also interpret truth as consensus, also known as "consensus theory". This is the latest form of breakthrough theory. The second wave of attacks on correspondence theory comes from existentialism, phenomenology and philosophical hermeneutics. It is characterized by replacing objective truth with explanation, opposing correspondence theory with relativism, and finally fundamentally canceling the concept of truth. Among these critics, Heidegger is the most famous representative. His criticism of "western metaphysics" since Plato, an ancient Greek philosopher, is actually a correspondence theory that criticizes truth. He is very dissatisfied with Husserl's acceptance of correspondence theory and his attempt to turn hermeneutics into existential hermeneutics.
Melo-Ponty also opposed the theory of conformity, trying to restore the truth of various experiences, such as aesthetics, dreams, myths, perceptions, etc., in order to juxtapose with scientific experience and diversify the truth. The most serious challenge to correspondence theory comes from the whole hermeneutic trend of thought. Hermeneutics itself is a fundamental criticism of objectivism metaphysics, natural science thinking mode and the concept of truth. On the question of truth, it and the later structuralism both fell into extreme relativism.
For example, Foucault refused to admit the facts that positivists talked about, thinking that "facts" were just a disguise of the original explanation. The explanation of facts is the explanation of the original explanation, and the explanation will never end. He thinks that there is nothing absolutely primitive to explain, because fundamentally everything has been explained, and each mark is also the explanation of other marks. Derrida also replaced the discovery of truth with the interpretation of symbols or texts. He thinks it is impossible to distinguish between markers and references. Because every symbol is a presenter and its reference is another presenter, but it is by no means a concrete "thing itself" presented by Husserl.
The third attack on correspondence theory comes from within analytical philosophy, especially from the scientific realist H Putnam. Scientific realism claims that there is a special relationship between language and the world, which can explain why consensus is also in line with realism.
Silas thinks this relationship is imitation or description. Putnam regarded scientific theory as a "map of the world", but later he called the point of reference outside the theory or description system "metaphysical realism" to distinguish it from the "internal realism" that advocated reference inside the theory or description system.
Putnam no longer believes in the "coincidence" relationship between decision-making reference and truth. He attacked the coincidence theory according to the Schollen theorem of mathematical logic. Putnam thinks that this must be applied to any object domain, and that only in a belief system, that is, in a classification naming system, can this or that object be referred to, while between different belief systems, the same word and sentence can refer to different objects, and there is no "coincidence" relationship. But what Putnam proved is that a true proposition (see first-order theory and its meta-logic) that cannot be expressed by primary logic successfully points to the object. He didn't prove that people can't achieve independence in any other way. In his view, "truth" is an idealized or reasonable acceptability, not a "real situation" that conforms to the heart or language.
Putnam claimed that he had ended his life of conformity which lasted for more than 2000 years. In essence, he just replaced the coincidence theory with another form of breakthrough theory. Other forms of transfixion theorists have declared the death of coincidence theory more than once, but their successors are still attacking coincidence theory, which shows the tenacious vitality of coincidence theory from the opposite side. Authenticity is a long-term goal pursued by western philosophers. Aristotle believes that scientific knowledge is a proven truth. Rationalists and empiricists seek certainty from rational intuition or sensory experience through different channels. Kant tries to find the foundation of knowledge certainty in the subject structure, while modern empiricists try to find the foundation of knowledge certainty in the language system.
Among the main schools of modern western philosophy, there is no doubt that they inherit the tradition since Aristotle and insist on scientific knowledge, including Husserl's phenomenological school, neo-Kantism, logical atomism and most logical positivists; They oppose the tradition of classical philosophy and think that it is futile to seek certainty and scientific knowledge may be wrong. There are French positivism represented by Comte, British philosophy of science represented by W. Sewell (1795 ~1866), pragmatism, existentialism, hermeneutics and so on, including Nietzsche and Bergson. On the other hand, Popper wavered between these two tendencies. He not only admitted the truth correspondence theory and the objectivity of knowledge, but also insisted that scientific knowledge was wrong and unprovable. In modern western philosophy, the position of insisting on certainty is constantly challenged and faced with insurmountable difficulties. It is generally believed that Aristotle's view of scientific knowledge is out of date.
The problem of certainty includes two aspects, namely, the certainty of theory and the certainty of reasoning premise:
(1) On the theory of certainty.
/kloc-in the 0/7th century, F. Bacon, I. Newton and others were convinced that the research methods used in science could get the true theory absolutely and reliably. However, these so-called absolutely reliable scientific methods, whether it is the "acquired proof" of R Descartes and others or the elimination induction of the so-called "invention machine" of Bacon and others, were generally doubted and regarded as uncertain forms of reasoning. Therefore, modern western philosophers generally no longer defend science with the certainty or truth of scientific conclusions, but with science constantly moving towards truth.
Herschel, Comte and sewell are all very concerned about the progress of science and its process of approaching the truth gradually. An important feature of early positivism is to understand the investigation of science as the investigation of the history of science and deny the existence of complete science. In its view, scientific truth is no longer eternal, or even effective at all times; Scientific knowledge is not absolutely correct, but it also contains errors. However, it believes that the scientific method has the nature of self-correction in essence, and science progresses in self-correction. This progress is not the increase and accumulation of proven truths, but the replacement of some truths by others.
Popper believes that even if a scientific theory is in fact true, people can't be sure that it is true. He pointed out that if one false theory draws more true inferences (true contents) than another false theory, the resulting false inferences (false contents) are much less than one false theory. Then these two pseudo-theories are comparable, and one of them is more realistic than the other. In his view, the progress of science lies in the growth of theoretical fidelity, and scientific theory will get closer and closer to the truth only by continuous progress. Although Popper denied the truth of the theory, he admitted its possible truth. Like Peirce, lakatos and Laudan replaced truth with scientific progress. However, historical relativists, like Nietzsche, not only deny truth and certainty, but even deny scientific progress.
(2) The certainty of reasoning premise.
Because inductive reasoning can't really prove scientific theory, most modern western philosophers deny the certainty of scientific theory. Other philosophers who maintain the tradition, although they also believe that seeking certainty cannot resort to reasoning, think that there are some certain things in people's beliefs or knowledge, and the science building is not built on the beach after all. They are convinced of the existence of basic propositions, and believe that these propositions can provide defense for other propositions, but they do not depend on any other propositions, and their nature is quite similar to Aristotle's direct and obvious basic truth.
Russell, Moore, Carnap, Louis, El, R.M. Chisholm and others who tried to seek the certainty of reasoning premises all thought these propositions were true. But they argue endlessly about which propositions are basic or what are.
The traditional view is based on the proposition of sensory impression or sensory data. Later, some people claimed that the proposition of the subject's own psychological state was basic, while more scientific philosophers thought that various observation propositions were basic. Their similarity is that they all try to reduce all scientific propositions to basic propositions, so that scientific knowledge can be confirmed. However, not only Russell's and Carnap's early reductionism programs ended in failure, but Al and Carnap's efforts to reduce theoretical propositions to observation propositions in order to solve the meaningful problems of theoretical propositions were also futile.
Since the late 1950s, N.R. Hansen clearly put forward the view that observation nouns are full of theories for the first time, which made the observation proposition lose its certainty as a basic proposition. This view quickly replaced the orthodox view of logical positivism on the strict difference between two languages, and observation evidence is no longer the main basis for theoretical comparison and evaluation, because observation is always "polluted by theory" and there is no neutral observation. In this way, it is not observation that determines theory, but theory that determines observation. However, as Kuhn and Feijier Abend argued, there is no * * * with the same language, so it is incommensurable or incomparable. Observation reports and scientific theories, and even observation itself, have neither certainty nor authenticity. In this way, the basic principles of the classical philosophical tradition have been completely abandoned. However, these relativistic views are not generally accepted. Scientific realists, while completely abandoning theories and observing the authenticity of evidence, strive to maintain the objectivity of truth and compare, evaluate and choose theories in various ways (including inductive logic or normative methodology). Scientific realism holds that the object, state and process described by the correct theory are real, and many unobservable things in the micro-world are as real as those in the daily life environment. It also believes that even if the scientific theory is incorrect, people often have a view that is close to correct. Among modern western philosophers, the famous representatives who hold the view of scientific ontology are: Russell and Carnap, Popper, Quinn, Silas, Smart, Kripke, Chomsky, Xia Pier and so on.
Contrary to scientific realism, anti-realism holds that electrons, photons, genetic codes and so on do not exist. It points out that there are indeed electrical phenomena and genetic phenomena in nature, but the reason why we construct theories about microscopic states, processes and objects is only to predict and produce what we are interested in. Therefore, both electronic and genetic codes are fictitious, and the theory about them is only a calculation tool. It holds that no matter how much people admire the victory of natural science in speculation and engineering technology, even the most effective scientific theory should not be considered true, and the theory is only appropriate, useful or just and applicable.
Positivists, pragmatists, members of the Vienna School, historical relativists, Nietzsche, Bergson, Wittgenstein and others are all representatives of anti-realism. Pragmatists see no need to argue with common sense. If people no longer doubt the value of electronic products in the future, they will be as real as chairs. Positivists and logical pragmatists say that we can't trust electrons because they can never be seen.
There is not much difference between scientific realists and anti-realists about the authenticity of observable objects in daily life and scientific research. The focus of their argument is mainly the unobservable "rational objects", including the existence of particles, fields, processes, structures and states. The authenticity of atoms and molecules was once the center of scientific philosophy debate, in which various positions of scientific realism were formed.
Due to the continuous progress of science and technology, the anti-realism view about an object often has to give way to realism in the end. On the question of the authenticity of atoms and molecules, anti-realism has to give way to realism. The territory of scientific realism is getting bigger and bigger, while the position of anti-realism is shrinking accordingly. This trend caused by the development of natural science also indicates the direction of modern western philosophy.
On the authenticity of theoretical objects, the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism involves not only the existence of theoretical objects in physics and biology, but also the authenticity of theoretical objects in psychology and social sciences. The latter problem presents various complicated situations of modern western philosophy. Some scientific realists only see the authenticity of the theoretical objects of physics, ignore or even deny the real existence of the theoretical objects of psychology and social science, or think that it is meaningless to talk about the authenticity of such objects.
These realists often call themselves physicalists, and the most famous figure is Quinn. Quinn and others only admit abstract objects such as physical objects (objects) and mathematical sets, and deny that mind is another object, thinking that psychological predicates are only directly applicable to people as objects. Physicists generally believe that according to the atomic theory, any physical difference is the difference in the number, arrangement or orbit of atoms as part of an object. Because, without such physiological differences, there would be no factual differences, especially psychological differences. In the physicalist's view, if a person is in the same physical state twice, then his thoughts and all unrealized thoughts and behaviors will be exactly the same.
With the development of modern physics, physicalism presents a new trend. The basic theory they used to observe the world changed from atomism to field theory, which directly attributed the different States of things to different time and space regions to varying degrees, and finally abandoned the object itself. This so-called new ontology is essentially an abstract ontology of pure set theory and pure mathematics. It is not only extremely abstract, but also completely ignores the importance of people, social history and culture and "objective spirit", which is in sharp contrast with the philosophy of continental Europe. Contemporary philosophers in Britain and America have inherited the tradition of western classical philosophy and are mainly concerned with the question of "what exists". Phenomenological and existential philosophers in continental Europe pay attention to human beings, trying to overcome the division and opposition between object and subject, nature and human beings, and find a comprehensive and unified way in human existence and history.
Sartre called his system "phenomenological ontology". He divided existence into two parts: free existence (nature) and self-created existence (history). The former means keeping one's identity, and its change is periodic; The latter is defined by negativity, and this existence lies in the will to ask for differences instead of keeping the same. However, due to Sartre's dual position, he failed to solve the problem of "how to stand out from freedom". His main philosophical work Being and Nothingness is almost entirely about self-reliance, and rarely talks about freedom. So he actually transformed ontology into historical philosophy.
Sartre and his companions advocate humanitarianism and believe that the existence of the world lies in the appearance of people. Its humanitarian feature is that it advocates making people divine, creative and the power to make the world exist. 1947, Heidegger accused Sartre of humanitarianism as the most typical metaphysics, not the phenomenological ontology he claimed. Because in Heidegger's view, the ontology of phenomenology should be an ontology based only on the faithful description of phenomena.
Merleau-Ponty abandoned Sartre's view of freedom and self-opposition, and became the pioneer of French "existential phenomenology". His phenomenological program is precisely to describe the things between self and freedom, consciousness and things, freedom and nature. He ruled out the traditional philosophy's either-or view on this issue, thinking that the living are neither pure comfort nor pure self-motivation. In his view, the solution to this opposition is not to reconcile or integrate two opposing views, but to reject the hypothesis that leads to this opposition. Merleau-Ponty believes that the solution is found in the "between the two" or "limited" synthesis, that is, an unfinished and unstable synthesis. He pointed out that historical facts have proved that this kind of synthesis appears every day, and people are neither pure things nor pure consciousness. It is both a product and a producer; Both active and passive; It is both a subject and an object.
In modern western philosophy, Heidegger first turned phenomenology to ontology, but Heidegger introduced the concept of "existence" to explore the so-called human existence, which has nothing to do with the traditional ontology of "what exists". Heidegger believes that the problem of existence is only raised because of human existence. He rejected the "objective thinking" caused by traditional metaphysics, pointing out that long before the proposition about man appeared, man belonged to existence (the world) in a more primitive way.
In his view, thinking is not a "subject" or an "object" opposed to reality, and it is totally devoted to existence. He pointed out that language is not about the subjective representation of objects, but existence replaces human self-expression. It is not people who speak, but existence. Heidegger clearly pointed out in his later works that what poets and thinkers said was more primitive than the objective narrative of science. This made him more and more involved in mysticism. Language analysis in analytical philosophy mainly refers to logical analysis of scientific language or semantic analysis of everyday language. In the first 30 years of the 20th century, many analytical philosophers focused on the study of grammar or syntax, that is, the formal relationship between deixis was studied purely from the logical aspect, without involving the content of language. At the same time, the meaning analysis of sentences and the question of whether sentences have meaning standards have also been deeply studied by them.
Since 1930s, Talsky and other Polish logicians strongly advocated semantic methods. By the mid-1930s, especially after the early 1940s, because Talsky published two papers on the concept of truth, analytical philosophers became interested in semantic method and regarded it as a recognized tool for studying scientific language.
In semantics, Frege's viewpoint has been deeply influenced 100 years. Frege thinks that semantic relations are non-negotiable, because we can never talk about them outside this relationship. They are presupposed for all our conversations. Because of this, he didn't express his semantic theory clearly. Wittgenstein and Quinn have similar views that language is the universal medium of all dialogues. Therefore, they either doubt the possibility of semantics; Still don't state your own semantic theory.
The first step away from Frege's tradition is to change the view that language is a universal medium into the view that language is calculus. On the basis of this transformation, logical semantics (see model theory) has developed slowly. Another step away from Frege's model is done by possible world semantics. In the semantics of possible worlds, individuals not only appear in the real world, but also in many different possible worlds, so individuals are very similar to functions, and it can be inferred that everything in them is functions.
In possible world semantics, Frege's sub-proposition does not exist, and there is no so-called primitive individual semantics. Game semantics inspired by Wittgenstein's "language game" theory is the biggest departure from Frege's system. It puts forward the concept of semantic relativity, which is incompatible with any practice that takes initial logic as the only standard symbol, and even makes the concept of logical form suspect.
Since the 1960s, pragmatics has also made great progress. It focuses on the study of speech acts and the context in which they are completed, especially speech acts, indirect speech acts and deixis that strengthen semantics. Speech act theory originated from Wittgenstein's thoughts in his later years and is an important part of daily language philosophy. French semiotics advocates that human language is similar to communication or communication system. Among them, symbolic structuralism regards language phenomena as communication phenomena, and the rules of natural language as codes used by people to transmit information; Structural anthropology further compares the whole social life to the process of exchanging signals. Lacan put forward that "the unconscious is structured like language" and expressed the basic principles of symbolic structuralism on language issues. Structural anthropology hopes to find a universal code that can express the special structural attributes of all aspects of social life, and thinks that with this universal code, we can find all structural invariants and explain the diversity of culture, language and customs.
According to the understanding of semiotics, meaning comes from symbols or from the initial opposition between "yes" and "no", "being" and "nothing"; The meaning of communication is not the meaning of experience, but the acceptable meaning of experience in a conversation that expresses experience according to a code, that is, a system that expresses opposites; There is no predetermined harmony between language and experience, and it is the code, not the person who sends the code, that determines whether the expression is appropriate. People are bound by code, and it is structure, not people, that determines everything. Hermeneutics tries to transcend the whole "metaphysical" tradition in language and meaning. From Hegel and Nietzsche to Heidegger, Gadamer and Derrida, there is almost a view that meaning comes from the dialectical relationship between the interpreter and the text. Every encounter between them is an explanation at a certain time and place, and the interpreter must explain the meaning of the text from his own vision and language ability.
Different from semiotics, hermeneutics emphasizes the importance of historical traditions and the role of interpreters. Derrida believes that interpretation is an activity process in which the interpreter produces meaning. Interpretation is not so much passive acceptance as active interpretation under the guidance of interest, which makes up for the defects in the text. In his view, explanation is not a mysterious dialogue with a theme, but an explanation of the theme presented in the tag, that is, the meaning.
On the issue of meaning, semiotics and hermeneutics sometimes regard texts as meaningful units, while semantics of analytical philosophy regards sentences and words in natural or artificial languages as meaningful units. From the perspective of analytical philosophy, semiotics and hermeneutics are not semantics, but closer to pragmatics and grammar.