First, the development of war theory under high-tech conditions has obvious transcendence.
There is no doubt that technology determines tactics, and the progress and development of technology will inevitably promote and promote the reform of war theory. However, under different historical times and technical levels, technology has different characteristics in promoting the development of war theory. Different from the past, high technology has promoted the development of modern war theory, and its important feature is its obvious transcendence, which is mainly manifested in the following aspects:
1, high technology can transcend the actual existence of weapons and equipment reform and directly promote the development of war theory.
The application of technology in military process generally goes through three stages: scientific existence, production existence and equipment existence. An advanced technology is invented and has the function or nature of application in the military field, which is its scientific existence; After the invention is put into production, it is transformed into technical finished products (weapons and equipment) needed by the army and exists for its production; When a large number of products are equipped with troops, new combat power is formed and equipment exists for them.
In the past historical era, the application of advanced technology in the military field, and ultimately promote the reform of war theory, usually have to go through the above three stages in turn, and actually form combat effectiveness before it can be realized. This is because in the historical era of relatively low productivity, it takes a long time for science and technology to be transformed into products, and it takes a long time for troops to be equipped with weapons and products to form new combat capabilities, so that people need to go through a long process to understand the great role of new technologies and construct new war theories. Therefore, it is natural that new operational theoretical principles in the past can only be produced after new weapons and equipment exist, but not before them. The influence of modern high technology on the development of war theory is different from the past history. When it is in the stage of scientific existence or production existence, it can go beyond the stage of equipment existence, promote the reform of war theory and change its nature and content. For example, when the United States put forward the theory of "air-ground integrated warfare" in 1982, new tanks, stealth aircraft and precision guidance were not equipped with a large number of troops, and many of them were not even put into production. The "Star Wars" theory put forward by the American government is not the result of interstellar weapons production and military equipment, but is designed and planned according to the scientific existence that high-tech groups may apply in the military field.
This transcendence phenomenon is determined by the internal relationship between the development of modern high-tech monarchies, the production of weapons and equipment and the research activities of military theories. First, various fields within the high-tech group are interrelated and promote each other, presenting the possibilities and trends affecting military activities to people as a whole, so that people can grasp the prospect of future wars very approximately, and then improve or update the war theory; Second; The speed at which science and technology are transformed into real productive forces is amazing. As long as science and technology can provide design, production can realize its existence, and as long as the army needs it, products can quickly meet its requirements, changing the traditional thinking of "attacking whatever weapons are available" and realizing the theoretical conception of "attacking whatever weapons are made". In this case, it is no longer necessary to wait for a large number of new weapons and equipment troops before conceiving the war theory, but we can boldly go beyond design and creation; Thirdly, the research of modern military theory itself regards the influence of technology on war as an important topic, and comprehensively, systematically and scientifically analyzes the influence of high technology on war with the help of advanced scientific research means represented by computers provided by high technology, so that the research of war theory can go beyond the stage of equipment development and design future wars.
2. High technology can directly promote the development of war theory beyond war practice.
Under the previous military technical conditions, whether it is from cold weapon operations to firearms operations, or from firearms operations to general weapons operations, it follows such a trajectory: after the fundamental changes in the form of war practice, people began to gradually rise from some empirical understanding to systematic war theory. In the high-tech era, war theory can go beyond war practice and develop and innovate. The development of high technology not only provides the possibility of "what to fight and what weapons to build", but also provides advanced forecasting means for military theoretical research. In the past, people's predictions of future wars, whether quantitative or qualitative, were analyzed, judged and reasoned by decision makers and their assistants relying on human brains and artificial means, so the conclusions drawn were often more or less arbitrary. Modern high technology is a technology group with microelectronics as the core, among which modern "soft" technologies such as information theory, system theory and cybernetics based on electronic computers provide simulation means for military prediction. In his book System Engineering, Qian Xuesen said that the combat simulation method "essentially provides a' combat laboratory' where strategies and plans can be tested, their defects can be tested, their effects can be predicted, the effectiveness of weapon systems can be evaluated, and new combat ideas can be stimulated." Therefore, when a new war form is still brewing and a specific war has not yet occurred, people can "design" a new war practice form according to the possible level of high technology, relying on the team of scientific research experts and using advanced scientific research means and methods represented by computer simulation. During the Cold War between East and West, this kind of "design" itself was a competition of war creativity. You design a way of fighting, and I will design another way of fighting against you. From "hard-shell frontier defense" to campaign mobile cluster, from "deep attack" to "air-ground integrated operation", from nuclear deterrence to "strategic defense initiative", etc., all these are vivid situations created by war theory before war practice. Although this kind of "design" can not be separated from practice in the end, its advance is no longer a simple summary of past war experience and analysis of actual war situation, nor is it a countermeasure for a specific war, but a comprehensive pre-arrangement and planning for future wars in combination with scientists, professionals and decision makers to ensure the victory of the war. Of course, this kind of war theory, which transcends the development of war practice under high-tech conditions, is ultimately inseparable from practice. It should be applied to war practice, tested, revised and perfected in practice, so as to meet the needs of actual combat more and more.
3. High technology can transcend different levels of war theory and promote the development of strategy, campaign and tactics theory.
Before the appearance of nuclear weapons, the change of war theory caused by advanced technology has a certain law of gradual and continuous change, that is, advanced technology first leads to the change of tactical theory and gradually reaches the theory of campaign and strategy. The appearance of nuclear weapons makes the development and change of war theory present the reverse process to the above process. Because it first appeared in BLACKPINK as a weapon of mass destruction, it first caused changes in the strategic level, produced the strategic theory of nuclear war, and then derived the campaign and tactics theory under nuclear conditions. Nowadays, high technology has broken these two modes of the development of war theory at a higher level and in a wider scope, namely; It is not developed according to the procedure from tactics to campaign strategy, nor is it simply developed according to the procedure from strategic reversal to campaign tactics, but it can transcend different theoretical levels or fields and have a profound impact on war theory in all directions, which can almost simultaneously trigger comprehensive and profound changes in tactics, campaigns and strategic theories.
Modern high technology is not one or two isolated inventions, but an interrelated technical group, which can meet the overall needs of different levels and aspects of war theory. Under high-tech conditions, weapons and equipment exist in the form of systems, and generally have technical performance and operational functions that can be used in various fields such as strategy, campaign and tactics. For example, the information provided by satellite communication system can be used for strategy, campaign and tactics; C3I command and control system can constitute a command and feedback system from the highest command to the smallest tactical unit, and so on. Although the design and manufacture of high-tech weapons and equipment are divided into tactics, campaigns and strategic weapons in technical performance, they can be flexibly mastered in practical application due to the conversion of module design and system control. This makes the original strategy, campaign and tactical actions of the war itself cross the border or penetrate each other. It's hard to say whether invasion of grenada's attack on Libya is a combat action, a campaign action or a strategic action. In the Gulf War, the command organization of the multinational force can directly command each aircraft, and even directly specify the dispatch time of each aircraft and the detailed coordinates of the attack target. This shows that the high-tech command and control system has greatly improved the ability to concentrate on the overall situation of the war. In many cases, strategic goals can no longer be achieved through several campaigns and battles. Strategic action, campaign action and combat action are only the activities of different levels of combat organizations, but these different levels of combat actions may be implemented and completed at the same time. This makes the war theory break the strict distinction between sequential development procedures and levels, and develop.
The transcendence of the development of war theory under high-tech conditions makes all countries in the world pay more attention to the advanced research in war theory research. The historical time view of the past war theory research is being replaced by the future time view, and the research method of historical extrapolation is being replaced by the research method of prediction simulation. The development of modern war theory presents a development mode of gradual advancement and gradual improvement with the approach of the future and reality. Fully understanding and grasping this trend of the development of war theory is of great significance to the development of our army's war theory.
Second, the theory of war under high-tech conditions has dual functions of deterrence and actual combat.
Sun Tzu, an ancient military strategist in China, put forward the famous theory of "conquering the enemy without fighting" as early as 2,500 years ago, but the modern deterrence theory as a system came into being in the era of nuclear weapons. In the past, the theory of war was basically a theory to guide the preparation and implementation of war in order to win a real war. After the appearance of nuclear weapons, the theory of nuclear deterrence came into being because of its great destructive power. For example, comprehensive nuclear deterrence theory and limited nuclear deterrence theory. Its basic idea is to shock the enemy with nuclear superiority and make him yield to his will. The emergence of nuclear deterrence theory makes modern war theory show the development trend of paying equal attention to actual combat and deterrence. With the development of high technology and its wide application in the military, this trend is more obvious and prominent, and presents new characteristics:
First of all, the development of high technology has greatly expanded the function of military deterrence, making deterrence theory occupy a very prominent position in modern war theory. We know that modern warfare is not just a military confrontation, but a contest of comprehensive national strength, especially high technology. The development of high technology can not only promote economic development and improve the basic conditions for supporting war, but also directly develop military forces. At the same time, in the high-tech field, the boundary between civilian technology and military technology is getting smaller and smaller, and it is more and more convenient to transfer military to civilian and civilian to military. Therefore, the development of modern high technology will inevitably greatly expand the function of military deterrence. Because of this, at present, many developed countries in the world have introduced the all-round competition strategy with high technology as the core into the war theory, and regard developing and maintaining a strong comprehensive deterrent force as an important goal of national development. The "strategic defense plan" promoted by the American government and the "Eureka plan" in western Europe are the products of this thought and policy. As German Chancellor Kohl said, "The US strategic defense plan 10% is a question of war theory, and 90% is a question of cutting-edge technology". This situation shows that in the era of relative peace, improving the country's deterrent ability is not only an important content of the national development strategy, but also an important topic of war theory.
Secondly, the development of high-tech weapons and equipment has greatly improved the performance of weapons and equipment, and further integrated deterrence theory and real distance theory. The reasons are as follows: First, high-tech weapons are different from nuclear weapons and have dual functions of deterrence and actual combat. We know that high-tech weapons and equipment are not only comparable to nuclear weapons in terms of long-range strike and damage effect, but also have incomparable accuracy and controllability. Therefore, high-tech weapons can be used as an important force of deterrence and also in actual combat, thus overcoming the shortage that nuclear weapons can only be used for deterrence and are generally difficult to be used in actual combat. In this way, deterrence theory and real distance theory based on high-tech weapons and equipment are two means to achieve a certain political goal, which are easier to convert and use alternately. Second, the development of high-tech weapons and equipment has made modern local wars an important deterrent force. Deterrence depends not only on certain strength, but also on certain military actions to achieve its goal. Because high-tech weapons have accurate and huge destructive power and long-range strike power, generally speaking, certain strategic goals can be achieved by using a small amount of troops and weapons through air or long-range strike; At the same time, because the party with high-tech advantages generally holds the initiative, it can effectively control the scale and process of the war. Therefore, in order to achieve a certain political goal, some countries not only threaten their possible opponents with military strength, but sometimes take limited military actions to oppress them to yield to their own will. This kind of military action is actually a deterrent. For example, Israel attacked Iraq's nuclear reactor, the United States attacked Libya, and the United States, Britain and France established a "no-fly zone" in Iraq, all of which fell into this category. To sum up, we can see that under the high-tech conditions, deterrence and real distance theory are gradually merging into one. They are interdependent and complementary, thus forming a complete modern war theory system.
Third, the campaign theory under high-tech conditions has undergone profound changes.
Modern high technology has brought unprecedented changes to modern warfare. Wu has the characteristics of large three-dimensional, full depth and high strength. Combat operations will be carried out day and night in the fields of ground, sea, air, outer space and electromagnetic spectrum. The fighting forces of the opposing sides will carry out non-rear operations and nonlinear operations throughout the depth of the battlefield. In a short time, fighting will consume a lot of combat materials, causing great harm and destruction to both sides. This has caused profound changes in all aspects of campaign theory.
1, the change of offensive combat theory. The traditional offensive theory emphasizes that the army should start from marching, prepare for fire, start from tactical breakthrough, conduct straight-line operations, gradually turn into campaign breakthrough and strategic breakthrough, gradually annihilate enemy defense groups and seize important targets or regions. Under the condition of high technology, the remarkable change of this theory is that the offensive action is mainly from ground assault to air assault; The continuous attack from the front to the depth has turned into a full-face and full-depth simultaneous attack. In the Gulf War, the U.S. military demanded that the air offensive war must first destroy 50% of the combat effectiveness of the Iraqi army. After the ground attack began, the air raid continued. The fixed-wing aircraft of helicopter gunships is the protagonist of annihilating Iraqi armored targets and destroying solid fortifications. Infantry's actions are almost close to eliminating the remnants of the enemy from the movement, and they rarely break through and attack the strategic, campaign and tactical goals of the Iraqi army from the beginning of the attack. There are also many people in the former Soviet army who believe that "the victory or defeat of high-tech wars in the future does not depend on the large-scale use of ground troops, but is closely related to surprise attacks and air superiority."
2. Changes in the theory of defensive operations. Because high-tech weapons improve the mobile combat capability and firepower of the army, expand the combat radius, and because offensive weapons can destroy almost any fortifications, the factors of position support become less important, and the flexible attack of the defensive side on the enemy in a certain area becomes the main means to stop the enemy's attack. This has caused three major changes in the theory of defensive operations. The first is to emphasize mobile defense. Because mobile defense can comprehensively use offensive, defensive and delayed operations, it is a defensive operation based on offensive actions. The second is to put more emphasis on flexible organization. The us military stipulates that whether it is mobile defense or regional defense, it can choose to defend in a fairly advanced place and strike when the enemy approaches; You can choose to fight the enemy in major areas; It can lure the enemy deep, and then attack the enemy's flank and rear; Even the enemy can launch a devastating attack first. The third is to emphasize the deep attack on the attacking enemy and the fighting in the deep area behind. The us military believes that deep combat, close combat and rear combat are unified in defense. "Fighting in depth will disrupt the enemy's deep movement of troops, destroy high-value targets that are vital to the attacker, and disrupt the enemy's command and control at critical moments." Fighting in the rear, that is, fighting in one's own depth, "the main function is to ensure the freedom of action of commanders without being disturbed by the enemy's command and control, fire support, logistics support and reserve team movement."
3. The change of command theory. The fundamental change of high-tech command activities is from commanding manpower-intensive troops to commanding technology-intensive troops; From human command theory to command theory of automatic command system. Its performance is: in intelligence work, from human reconnaissance to technical reconnaissance, high-tech reconnaissance equipment is widely used to obtain information. During the Gulf War, the belligerent forces were able to obtain information accurately, comprehensively and timely, mainly relying on superior technical equipment with full-time and all-round reconnaissance and automatic information transmission capabilities. Its early warning aircraft takes off 24 hours, the intelligence reconnaissance system can transmit multi-spectral images of the battlefield in time, and the global positioning system and position calibration reporting system can navigate and indicate targets for aircraft and ground forces at any time; The information, communication and command system from the ground to outer space manages more than 34,000 frequencies every day, and can maintain 700,000 calls and 654.38+052,000 messages every day.
In the operation organization, it has changed from unified and step-by-step planning to unified and systematic planning. The operational plan of the supreme command organization often goes deep into troops and units. For example, the US military stipulates that a master plan, an emergency plan in a war (also known as a "branch plan") and a follow-up action plan must be made. Among them, the latter two schemes are multi-schemes, which foresee various situations that may occur in the battle and possible disposal methods, so as to be meticulous and thorough. During the Gulf War, the U.S. military mobilized a large number of planners, used computers to simulate various situations in the combat process, and made and constantly revised plans according to the simulation results and the experimental results of combat learning. In combat, the air force also made an attack plan two days in advance, which was transformed into an "air mission instruction" one day in advance to control each aircraft.
In terms of operational deployment, the concept of "more is better" has changed to the concept of "reasonable and sufficient" efficiency. The composition of technical arms has been greatly increased in the battle formation. Through full operational analysis, the proportion of various arms and arms has been reasonably determined according to different tasks. Emphasize the mobility of the army's field deployment, try to change the method of static deployment in the past, and try to reduce the time spent in an area, so as to hide the operational attempt and achieve the suddenness of the operation.
In terms of operational support, first, it has changed from a simple support operation to a more combative combat operation. Traditional support operations are increasingly incorporated into the mobile system. Reconnaissance and communication support have been listed as command elements. In addition to road support, other engineering support is borne by the combat troops themselves. Air defense support has been completely regarded as combat operations, and "three defenses" support has also become an indispensable part of combat operations. Second, due to the frequent maneuvers of the army and the unprecedented increase in supplies, transportation support has become the key to logistics support. Third, attach importance to the role of technical support. In order to ensure the normal operation and intact rate of tanks, aircraft, artillery, radar and automatic command system, it is necessary to reserve, test, inspect, repair and supplement technology, and technical support activities are infiltrating into operational support and all links.