Article 1
On the Utility of Accounting Information
Abstract: With the development of corporate governance theory, the topic of investor protection is becoming more and more intense. Accounting information has been improved in form and quality, which provides investors with useful information for decision-making, and then better meets the information needs of investors. Based on the content and meaning of accounting information utility, this paper analyzes how investors use accounting information for themselves, lists the influencing factors of accounting information utility, and analyzes the protection of this utility to investors from the perspective of accounting information utility.
Keywords: accounting information; Information needs; Accounting information utility
I. Research background
At present, China's capital market is in constant progress and development, and some listed companies have formed a strict information disclosure system, which has a certain positive impact on truly reflecting the company's operating conditions, stabilizing the stock market order and protecting the interests of many investors. In recent years, many enterprises in China, especially listed companies, have gradually taken the step of integrating with the global economy. At present, the increasingly complex economic environment and fierce market competition mean that enterprises have to constantly face various risks, so it is particularly important to provide investors with high-quality and efficient accounting information. We must analyze and improve the effectiveness of accounting information from the perspective of investors.
Second, the basic theory of accounting information utility
First, the concept of accounting information
Accounting information refers to the information that accounting units explain the financial status and operating results of enterprises to stakeholders through financial statements, financial reports or notes.
Second, the connotation of accounting information utility
The utility of accounting information refers to the value of accounting information obtained by accounting information users and the measurement of information demand satisfaction, which depends to a great extent on the subjective psychology of information users, that is, investors.
Thirdly, the classification of accounting information utility.
For investors, the utility of accounting information can be divided into target utility and process utility.
The target utility of accounting information can be divided into accounting information service utility and accounting information creation and consumption utility.
The utility of accounting information process refers to the utility given in the process of information transmission and reception, with the basic premise of benefiting investors.
Fourth, why should we pay attention to the effectiveness of accounting information?
Accounting information reflects the operating results, financial information and risks of an enterprise as a whole. Most of the information that investors make investment decisions comes from the accounting information provided by enterprises.
Creditors, shareholders and potential investors are all users of accounting information. The final accounting information appears in the form of financial statements and notes. Through financial statements, users of accounting information can obtain information about the profitability, operating ability, solvency and future development ability of a company or enterprise.
First, by analyzing the balance sheet, we can understand the company's financial situation and judge whether the company's solvency, capital structure are reasonable and liquidity is sufficient.
The second is to understand and analyze the company's profitability, profitability and operating efficiency by analyzing the income statement, and judge the company's competitive position and sustainable development ability in the industry.
Thirdly, by analyzing the cash flow statement, we can understand and evaluate the company's ability to obtain cash and cash equivalents, and predict the company's future cash flow accordingly.
Third, the significance of accounting information utility disclosure
Based on potential investors
First of all, we should know what users of accounting information need. Especially for investors, the following four kinds of information are generally needed: including enterprise background information, enterprise financial information and non-financial information, enterprise managers and shareholders information, and forward-looking information. Some people think that investors are most concerned about the information related to the net cash flow and profits that enterprises can create in the future, while some scholars think that investors are most concerned about the risks and benefits of investment and their evaluation. They can conduct securities risk assessment through financial statements.
For potential investors, effective accounting information can make them fully understand and know the operating results and financial status of the enterprise, thus guiding and helping potential investors to effectively judge the strength of the enterprise. Thereby determining the flow of funds. This will help to promote the rational distribution of limited social resources and improve the capital market.
Based on creditors
As a creditor of an enterprise, it is often concerned about whether the income of the enterprise is stable and safe. Pay attention to the profitability and solvency of enterprises. These can be analyzed through the effective use of accounting information, so as to use the effectiveness of accounting information to help creditors decide whether to borrow or not.
Based on shareholders
With the development of economy, ownership and management rights are separated. Shareholders, as investors in enterprises, have the right to know their investment income and risks. High-quality accounting information can help shareholders understand the operating conditions and investment recovery of enterprises, so as to make decisions to further enhance the profitability of enterprises. There are often conflicts of interest and information asymmetry between operators and investors, which may be more prominent than non-listed companies. Due to the limitation of skills, experience and resources, investors often can't get enough information to make decisions, and the effectiveness of accounting information is low. It may lead operators to take risks against investors' wishes, thus harming investors' interests, so it is of special significance to study the effectiveness of accounting information.
Accounting information can provide investors with profitability information, solvency information, business ability information and development ability information. Through the analysis of accounting information, investors can judge the profitability, development ability, debt repayment ability and management ability of enterprises, so as to ensure that they can get more profits. Such as: normative information distortion, low accounting quality, poor correlation, incomplete information, etc. No matter what causes the poor effectiveness of accounting information, it will eventually affect investors' decision-making. Therefore, we should strengthen the governance of accounting information utility. - ! & gt
Fourth, the effectiveness of governance accounting.
Due to various reasons, the effectiveness of accounting information may be low. Therefore, in order to give full play to the role of accounting effectiveness, we should take various countermeasures, including internal governance and external governance.
1, strengthen internal control
The perfection of internal control can ensure the authenticity and reliability of accounting information, improve the quality and efficiency of work, and thus restrict the economic activities from progressing on the right track. To improve the binding mechanism and corporate governance structure of the company's articles of association, the board of supervisors should be responsible for supervising the company's business activities and financial revenues and expenditures and binding the manager's work. The independence of the board of supervisors should also be guaranteed.
Using management participation system to effectively supervise the work of managers.
2, improve the professional quality and professional ethics of accounting personnel. Only by clarifying the scope and subject of accounting responsibility and strengthening the examination and training of accounting personnel's technical qualifications can we ensure the quality characteristics of accounting information.
3. Create a perfect external environment and strengthen the construction of laws and regulations. It is necessary to improve the social supervision system and ensure the normal implementation of the accounting system. With the change of market operation, the applicable accounting standards are constantly revised. So that the fraud of accounting information can not be concealed. Keep up with the trend of enterprise reform and speed up the establishment of modern enterprise system.
In a word, the governance of accounting information utility starts from three aspects: internal control system, accountants' own quality and external environmental constraints. Investors are the owners of funds, and sports funds can create value. Only by using the utility of accounting information and making correct decisions can we maximize the value of funds. So that enterprises with good efficiency and reasonable structure can develop better, while those enterprises with weak external reality are gradually eliminated because of the broken capital chain.
Discussion on countermeasures of verb (abbreviation of verb)
1. Establish and improve the internal control system to prevent, find and correct accounting errors.
2. Formulate and improve relevant accounting standards and accounting systems to prevent enterprises from whitewashing financial statements through related party transactions or inflated income or expenditure.
3. Strengthen external inspection, supervision and punishment, and severely punish accounting fraud such as disclosure of false accounting information.
References:
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the second
On Accounting Information Supervision
At present, the research on accounting information supervision mainly focuses on the game between the supervisor and the accounting subject. Through the game, several key factors are obtained, and then the supervision methods are put forward. However, these factors are contradictory. With the continuous development of economy, the implementation of these regulatory measures will become more and more difficult. It is necessary to improve the supporting disciplinary measures in the legal system, strengthen the supervision of * * * and highlight the core position of the financial department in the supervision system, strengthen the supervision of internal control of enterprises and strengthen the supervision of private audits.
Keywords: accounting information; Supervision; Ideal method
The distortion of accounting information seriously affects the order of market economy, which is not conducive to the state's supervision, management and guidance of economic activities, nor can it make the rational and effective allocation of social resources. The distortion of accounting information not only harms the interests of the state and the public, but also harms the interests of enterprises. Under the current accounting production mode, the supervision of accounting information market is mainly regulated and restricted by laws, regulations, standards and systems formulated by state institutions and * * * departments, and implemented by the supervisors of accounting information market, including * * * departments, auditing departments and intermediary institutions. Proper supervision of the production and disclosure of accounting information by relevant departments will reduce the frequency of accounting entities making false accounting information to a certain extent and ensure the interests of relevant parties.
Many scholars have conducted in-depth research on accounting information supervision from the perspective of game theory. Du Xingqiang made an analysis from the perspective of property rights in 20001,2002 and 2003, pointing out that the rights of different stakeholders in accounting information are determined by the stable triangular structure composed of "enterprise ownership sharing, accounting information control and moral factors of stakeholders", which affirmed the role of accounting information supervision departments; In 2002, Peng Jiasheng made a boundary analysis of the effectiveness of accounting supervision, and thought that not only the huge illegal cost made it invalid when the investigation rate was low, but also the high investigation rate was invalid when the illegal cost was too low, so * * * must "do both" to make accounting supervision effective; In 2003, Wu Liansheng divided accounting information distortion into regular distortion, illegal distortion and behavioral distortion, and analyzed the different causes of these three kinds of accounting information distortion from the perspectives of accounting field order, information asymmetry and human bounded rationality, which proved the necessity of accounting information supervision from one side. In 2003, Wang Xiongyuan and Yan Yan believed that the rationality of * * * intervention varied from case to case. Excessive intervention not only gives enterprises the power and legitimacy to hide accounting information, but also the power to distort accounting information intentionally because of the inconsistency of various institutional rules. Therefore, intervening or forcing information disclosure may worsen the situation of accounting information distortion. Wang Yurong, Lu Fangyuan, Jiang Dan and so on. In 2004 and 2006, Li Zhiqiang analyzed the game between regulators and counterfeiters from different angles, and thought that effective supervision must have low supervision cost, high detection rate and fine amount. Wang et al. combined with the game analysis between enterprises in 2004, pointed out that the distortion of accounting information depends not only on the degree of punitive failure, but also on the degree of accounting information management preference, mandatory influence and punitive influence of * *.
Based on the current research, it is not difficult to see that the effective supervision of accounting information is mainly based on reducing the cost of supervision and improving the probability of investigation. However, at present, these three aspects are contradictory. Increasing the probability of investigation will definitely increase the cost of supervision. If the probability of investigation fails, it is useless to punish again. At the same time, too much intervention is not conducive to the development of enterprises. Furthermore, from the results of these scholars' game equations, it is not difficult to see that no matter how balanced the three are, the motivation and tendency of accounting subjects to create false accounting information can not be completely eliminated. Moreover, with the intensification of market competition and the increasing complexity and diversification of economic business, the degree of distortion of enterprise accounting information balance will also increase, coupled with the selectivity of accounting policies, so to some extent, the supervision of accounting information is facing difficulties.
First, the reasons why accounting information supervision is facing difficulties
Driven by interests, the imperfection of accounting supervision system, the lack of professional ethics and low professional quality of relevant personnel, the unreasonable management system of accounting personnel and the imperfection of relevant laws and regulations have caused various difficulties in accounting information supervision. Some of these factors can be solved by deepening the reform of property rights system, strengthening the legal system construction and the professional ethics education of accounting practitioners, but they cannot solve the sharp contradiction between the sociality of the source and use of accounting information and the individuality of accounting information production. From the perspective of information economics, it is impossible to fundamentally solve the distortion of accounting information caused by information asymmetry. This is the fundamental reason why accounting information supervision is very difficult.
Accounting information goes through two steps: one is the enterprise itself; The second is the external supervision department of the enterprise. As an independent economic man, an enterprise pursues the maximization of its own interests, so there is no moral constraint on whether to make false accounts. The key is whether making false accounts or real accounts is beneficial to enterprises. Accounting information supervision departments and investors are both pursuers of maximizing interests. Because of information asymmetry, accounting subjects have information advantages, so moral hazard and adverse selection may occur again. Many scholars only seek solutions on this premise, without considering whether there is a problem with this premise and whether it needs to be changed. In fact, the fundamental reason of information asymmetry is the individual production of accounting information.
Economic business is not only the behavior of individual operators, but also exists in economic agreements generated by transactions between related operators. These economic agreements constitute a trading link, which connects the trading links of countless commercial organizations and forms a chain and network of economic activities for social and economic activities. However, traditional accounting limits the reflection of social and economic activities to individual "accounting subjects" and cannot provide comprehensive information reflecting economic activities. It is generally believed in the accounting field that "accounting of enterprises can only reflect accounting economic activities from the perspective of enterprises themselves". This kind of accounting information is obviously individual. The individuality of accounting information is also reflected in its content. Due to the individual needs of operators, accounting activities based on the assumption of "accounting subject" record and reflect the internal information of "accounting subject", which artificially cuts off the links between economic subjects, so it is difficult to reflect the overall situation of social and economic activities. At the same time, the traditional accounting based on "accounting subjects" can not subjectively and theoretically put forward the requirements to reflect the relationship between various "accounting subjects". Although providing accounting information is the responsibility and obligation of "accounting subject" for users of accounting information, in most cases, the provision of accounting information and financial reports provided to the outside world are only the result of "compulsory" rights or laws, not voluntary. Driven by interests, the accounting information it provides may inevitably be modified and distorted. In order to meet the requirements of users of accounting information, traditional accounting has established a series of socially recognized accounting standards to restrain accounting behavior. Facts have proved that adverse selection and moral hazard caused by information asymmetry are inevitable. The mutual preconditions and conditions of economic activities are the conditions for comparing and verifying the authenticity of information and the only conditions for ensuring the authenticity and reliability of accounting information. Relying on the self-supervision of "accounting subject" to achieve the purpose of social supervision is not only difficult to achieve, but also unscientific and logically contradictory. Through the above analysis, it is not difficult for us to draw a conclusion that the contradiction between individual production of accounting information and social demand is the root cause of the asymmetry of accounting information and the dilemma of accounting information supervision. Two, China's current accounting information supervision mode problems
The form of accountability is single and there is no punishment.
At present, although China's accounting laws and regulations system has become a system, there are still defects. First of all, all kinds of laws and regulations, including the accounting law, take administrative responsibility for the investigation of accounting violations. Only serious cases can be investigated for criminal responsibility, and there are even fewer provisions involving civil liability. Relying too much on administrative accountability and ignoring the use of legal means has affected the majesty of accounting laws and regulations and the effect of their implementation and enforcement. Sometimes accounting irregularities cannot be punished according to law, which makes accounting laws and regulations seriously out of touch with actual work. Secondly, China's accounting laws and regulations on administrative responsibility are too principled and abstract, lacking pertinence and concreteness, and many punishments are flexible at the same time, which not only makes the standards difficult to control, but also affects the majesty and justice of laws and regulations.
2. There are too many regulatory departments, and there is no resultant force.
At present, China adopts the way of separate supervision of accounting information. Although the supervision function of accounting information is mainly concentrated in the financial department, auditing, taxation, people's bank, securities supervision, insurance supervision and other departments supervise accounting information within their respective management scope. It stands to reason that the regulatory authorities perform their respective duties and the supervision is targeted, which should be conducive to the realization of the effectiveness of supervision. However, the opposite is true. Due to the lack of unified supervision regulations and communication and coordination between departments, the supervision standards of various industries and units are different, and the supervision functions overlap and overlap. Because of the unclear division of supervision, it is easy to have repeated supervision and absent supervision of the same information, and the supervision problems will inevitably be accompanied by unclear responsibilities and mutual shirking, which will reduce the efficiency and image of supervision. At the same time, due to multiple regulatory policies, regulatory costs will inevitably increase, resulting in unnecessary consumption and waste of manpower and material resources by regulatory departments and supervised departments.
Third, the internal accounting information supervision is inefficient.
The essence of internal accounting information supervision is internal control. Establishing and perfecting the internal accounting supervision system of the unit is clearly stipulated in the Accounting Law. Good internal accounting information supervision is conducive to the improvement of accounting information quality. At present, China's internal accounting information supervision is ineffective and inefficient. The main reason for this phenomenon is that many units do not attach importance to internal accounting information supervision, and even think that internal accounting information supervision is for others and should not be their own job. This work is only to cope with the inspection of relevant departments. Based on this idea, many units do not attach importance to internal accounting information supervision, and even the staffing and funding are not guaranteed, making the board of supervisors, internal audit departments and other institutions exist in name only. In addition, another main reason for the inefficiency of internal accounting information supervision is the poor independence of internal accounting supervision. Some units attribute the internal accounting supervision department and the accounting department to the same organization or the same leader, and even attribute the internal accounting supervision institution to the leader of the financial department.
Fourth, indirect supervision is weak.
Since its establishment, accounting firms have made great contributions to the supervision of accounting information quality, but at present, false information of listed companies still occurs from time to time, which affects the stable implementation of social and economic order. From a series of accounting fraud incidents in recent years, it can be seen that the supervision effect of accounting firms and certified public accountants in China is not high. The main reason for this situation is that the accounting firm itself is a self-financing business entity, and there is a comparison of costs and benefits. In the face of fierce competition in the market environment, in order to win business, it is bound to make a fuss about the price. If the accepted business price is low, it will inevitably reduce the necessary audit procedures, narrow the scope of audit, and fail to obtain sufficient audit evidence, which will lead to improper audit opinions and audit failure. At present, China's accounting firms are developing rapidly, so that * * * and its associations can only rely on rotating spot checks to check the quality of their audit services. Poor business supervision, coupled with the current disciplinary measures are not matched, so that accounting firms and certified public accountants reduce their risk awareness, and even practice illegally, failing to play their due social supervision role and responsibility.
The weakening of direct supervision of verbs (abbreviation of verb)
The direct supervision departments in China involve finance, auditing, securities supervision, taxation and so on. In recent years, the increasing number of enterprises, institutions, accounting firms and certified public accountants makes the audit resources of these departments tense, which leads to the direct audit can only take the form of spot checks, which virtually reduces the probability of fraud being investigated. In addition, the current penalties for violations are limited, which weakens the role of direct accounting supervision.
Third, the countermeasures of accounting information supervision
The first is to improve the supporting disciplinary measures in the legal system.
The majesty of law is reflected in the form and intensity of supporting disciplinary measures in the legal system. At present, we should actively promote the revision of the Accounting Law and the Certified Public Accountant Law. Refine the supporting disciplinary measures in these regulations and reduce their flexibility. We should change the practice of focusing only on administrative punishment in the past, strengthen the identification of criminal responsibility and civil responsibility, and attach importance to establishing and improving the investigation mechanism of civil compensation responsibility. Intensify the crackdown on illegal activities of false accounting information, emphasize the responsibility identification of managers, accountants, accounting firms and their signed certified public accountants of the units involved, increase the cost and risk of violations of units and individuals, and make laws and regulations more targeted and deterrent.
Second, strengthen the supervision of * * *
In order to improve the efficiency of supervision, the situation of multi-head supervision should be eliminated as soon as possible. At present, the most important task is to strengthen the supervision of * *, focusing on major issues and hot issues in national economic life. At the same time, it highlights the core position of the financial department in the supervision system, and calls for the establishment of a unified supervision system platform as soon as possible, with the financial department as the representative, to do a good job of information communication between * * * and various supervision departments, and at the same time strengthen its communication and cooperation with auditing, taxation, securities supervision, private auditing and other departments in this way, and gradually form a good situation of individual responsibility, clear hierarchy and comprehensive management.
Third, strengthen the supervision of internal control of enterprises.
Good internal control can improve the reliability of enterprise accounting information and is conducive to the implementation of accounting information supervision. In view of the current weak internal control of enterprises in China, it is suggested that relevant departments should strengthen the guidance and supervision of internal control of enterprises. At present, the focus of supervision is to strengthen the inspection of internal control implementation mechanism, and at the same time give full play to the power of private audit, and with the joint efforts of both parties, promote the improvement and implementation of enterprise internal control system.
Fourth, strengthen the supervision of private auditing.
Enterprise accounting information needs to be audited by certified public accountants before it is released. As an independent third party, the audit results of certified public accountants often mean objectivity and fairness, but this is not always the case. Therefore, strengthening the supervision of the audit of certified public accountants is conducive to the re-supervision of the accounting information quality of the audited units. To strengthen the supervision of non-governmental audit, the first prerequisite is to advocate the diversification of organizational forms of accounting firms, encourage the development of partnership firms under the current situation of more limited liability firms, straighten out the industry structure and meet different non-governmental audit needs. To strengthen the supervision of non-governmental audit, it is necessary to increase the legal awareness and responsibility awareness of accounting firms and certified public accountants, and clearly divide their respective audit responsibilities and legal responsibilities; At the same time, we should do a good job in the follow-up education of certified public accountants and constantly improve their comprehensive quality. * * departments should also strengthen guidance, strive to improve the practice environment of certified public accountants, and comprehensively improve the supervision efficiency of private audits on accounting information.
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Wu Liansheng. Accounting information distortion triangle: theoretical framework and demonstration [J]. Accounting Research, 2003 1.
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