"... resolutely fulfill the sacred duty of defending national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security ..."-Hu Jintao concluded that China's military theorists have formulated a reform framework driven by implementation theory to build an army that can win "local wars under the conditions of informationization". This concept emphasizes the role of modern information technology as a force multiplier. Therefore, the PLA can carry out precision strike military operations at a longer distance beyond the border of China. By drawing lessons from foreign wars, especially American-led campaigns, including Operation Enduring Freedom, Soviet and Russian military theories, and the limited historical experience of the People's Liberation Army itself, China's military planners are seeking to transform the entire China army.
The speed and scale of these reforms are impressive. However, the PLA has not passed the test of modern warfare. This lack of operational experience complicates the evaluation of the PLA's progress in realizing its military theoretical ambitions. The same is true of the internal assessment and decision-making of senior civilian leaders in China. They basically lack direct military experience, so they are more likely to make wrong estimates when a crisis occurs. This misjudgment will also bring disaster, whether it is based on the advice of commanders with no combat experience or not.
Military strategic pointer
China does not publish documents equivalent to the national military strategy of the United States. Therefore, external observers lack direct insight into the leadership's thinking about the use of force or emergencies that affect the structure and theory of the PLA. The analysis of authoritative speeches and documents shows that China relies on a series of general principles and guidance called "military strategic policy" to plan and manage the development and use of the army.
The PLA did not provide these "guidelines" for external study. Academic research shows that the current "guide" can probably be traced back to 1993. The Code reflects the influence of 199 1 the Persian Gulf War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union on China's military strategic thinking, which laid a large part of the foundation for the transformation of the PLA in the past 10. Authoritative comments and new military training guidance methods show that some contents of 1993 "guide" may have been revised recently. These revisions seem to reflect China's views on its security environment and the nature of modern wars (that is, "local wars under information conditions"), the progress of China's military modernization and the lessons learned from it, from "building" the army for modern wars in the information age to "winning" such wars.
The operational or "active defense" elements of the "pointer" seem to remain unchanged. According to the defensive military strategy advocated by "active defense", China does not wage war or aggressive war, but only fights to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
However, Beijing's definition of attacking its sovereignty or territory is vague. In the history of modern war in China, China's leaders all claimed that military pre-emptive action was a strategic defensive action. For example, China called its intervention in the Korean War (1950- 1953) "the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea". Similarly, the authoritative statement is also called "War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea". Border conflicts with the Soviet Union (1969) and Vietnam (1979) are called "self-defense counterattack". This logic shows that if the use of force can safeguard or advance its core interests, including its territorial claims (such as solving the Taiwan Province issue and unresolved border or maritime territorial claims). ), China may launch a military pre-emptive strike, perhaps far from its border.
Is China formulating a preemptive strategy?
In the past 10 years, with the PLA's transformation from an infantry-dominated army with limited power projection capability to a relatively modern army with long-range precision strike resources, China has acquired a weapon system and adopted the operational concept that enables it to launch pre-emptive military attacks (including surprise attacks) in the surrounding areas.
As of June 5438+00, 2006, there were about 900 short-range ballistic missiles in the arsenal of the Second Artillery Corps of PLA. With the acquisition of Su -30 attack aircraft and F- 10 fighter aircraft equipped with various precision-guided weapons, China's offensive air power has been improved. The PLA is also strengthening its capabilities in information warfare, computer network warfare and electronic warfare.
The author of the People's Liberation Army said that it is necessary and logical to strike first when encountering a more powerful enemy. China's military theory data emphasizes that static defense is not enough to defend territory on the basis of the high speed and destructive power of modern troops. Therefore, the PLA's operational philosophy is to prevent the enemy from gathering and taking advantage of the attack to seize the initiative, thus making the enemy at a loss. Theorists of the People's Liberation Army believe that effective defense includes destroying the enemy's strength in the enemy's territory before it can be used.
China has acquired power projection resources, including long-range military communication systems, aircraft for air command, control and communication, durable submarines, unmanned combat aircraft (UCAVs) and new precision guided air-to-surface missiles. All these show that the PLA is forming a stronger force to take preemptive military action. The PLA's training focuses on "unexpected" long-range strike training or coordinated air/sea strikes against enemy naval vessels.
According to the "Military Science" document of the People's Liberation Army (2000), once hostilities begin, the essence of "active defense" is to actively annihilate the enemy ..... Although strategically speaking, active defense should be the guiding principle, the focus of "military campaign" should be to grasp the initiative and take the initiative to attack. Only in this way can the strategic goal of active defense be achieved. "
In addition to developing the power to annihilate the enemy, the PLA is also exploring the option of using limited force. China's campaign theory defines this option as "non-war" use of force-an extension of political coercion, rather than an all-out war act. 1995 and 1996 amphibious exercises and missile launches in the Taiwan Province Strait are examples of "non-war" use of force. However, this concept also includes air and missile attacks, assassination and destruction. Such articles emphasize the possibility of misjudgment by China, because the target of any such action will be regarded as an act of war, even if it is not the wider international community.
A Comprehensive View of War For 20 years, China's civilian and military experts have been arguing about the nature of modern war. These arguments use the internal sources of China's strategic tradition and historical experience to provide their views on "military revolution", "asymmetric war" and "information war". This debate highlights China's interest in non-kinetic means of war and economy, finance and information. The role of legal and psychological tools in China's war plan has been strengthened. Military Strategic Science (2000), a document of Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, emphasizes China's comprehensive and multifaceted views on war. The document said: "War is not only a military struggle, but also an all-round competition on the political, economic, diplomatic and legal fronts."
Recently, China's military strategists have become more and more interested in international law, and regard it as a tool to deter opponents before the war. In the context of the Taiwan Province Strait, China may use information warfare to describe the intervention of the third party as a violation of international law. China also tried to influence international public opinion to promote the misinterpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It abandoned the long-recognized freedom of navigation criterion in academic opinions and national views, and accepted the concept of 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone.
Asymmetric war
Understanding and utilizing asymmetry is a basic aspect of China's strategic and military thought, especially as a stronger means to defeat a weaker army. Ever since the Persian Gulf War and the "Joint Action" of 199 1, China's military strategists have been paying attention to taking asymmetric countermeasures to take advantage of the weaknesses of their technically superior opponents. 1999 An editorial in the People's Liberation Army Daily clearly pointed out this point: "Of course, a powerful enemy with absolute superiority does not have weaknesses that can be exploited by the weaker side ... The direct purpose of our military preparation must be to find a strategy to exploit the weaknesses of the powerful enemy." China's exploration of asymmetric war options can be invested heavily in ballistics and ballistics. Cruise missile system. These systems include advanced anti-ship cruise missiles, underwater combat systems (including submarines and advanced mines), space countermeasures systems, computer network operations and special operations forces.
The Role of Secrets and Conspiracy in China's Military Strategy
In China's military strategy, the emphasis on winning the initiative and confusing the enemy in the conflict has led to the emphasis on using tricks at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. China's military theory data defines strategic tactics as "luring the other side to form an illusion" ... and making all kinds of illusions in an organized and planned way at the minimum cost of manpower and material resources in order to gain strategic advantages. "
In addition to information warfare and conventional cover-up, concealment and conspiracy, the PLA has also absorbed China's historical experience and wisdom from the consistent role of strategy and conspiracy in China's way of governing the country. In recent decades, the research on China's classic military figures and their works, such as Sun Tzu, Sun Bin, Wuqi and Shang Yang, has resurfaced. These works all contain the precepts of using intrigue.
China's * * * production party's heavy reliance on secrecy and military tactics work together to limit the transparency of national security decision-making, military strength and strategic intentions. However, overconfidence may be due to the unpredictable benefits of military leaders' infatuation with strategies and tricks. In addition, the skills that commanders use to deal with opponents can also be used to cover up the spread of bad news within the PLA system, which is a long-standing problem in China. Therefore, secrecy and deception.